Is the UK–South Korea Strategic Partnership Living Up to its Promise?

Last year, the UK and South Korea marked a significant milestone in their bilateral relations, upgrading them to a ‘Global Strategic Partnership’. In an increasingly volatile world, the term ‘strategic’ clearly carries certain weight. With the first anniversary of this milestone approaching, is the relationship living up to its new label?

Answering this question requires an assessment of what ‘strategic’ means. The Downing Street Accord, a comprehensive document encapsulating the elevated relationship, provides the answer. It means that the UK and South Korea ‘share similar strategic assessments about the challenges [they] face’ and that the two countries will ‘work to strengthen an open and resilient international order’. It is also notable that the Accord highlights security and defence cooperation as the first pillar of bilateral relations.

Year One of the Global Strategic Partnership: Progress and Milestones

From a strategic perspective, UK–South Korea relations are certainly on the right track. Although the new Labour government has been emphasising the need to bolster the UK's relations with Europe, this does not come at the cost of the UK's relations with Indo-Pacific partners such as South Korea. The strategic assessments remain fundamentally the same.

The joint leaders’ statement marking the third anniversary of AUKUS in September clearly reaffirmed the UK’s unwavering commitment to the Indo-Pacific region. Even before that, exchanges between the UK and South Korea at the highest level were actively pursued. The leaders and foreign ministers of the two countries have already met on several occasions, reaffirming their commitment to UK–South Korea bilateral relations.

Furthermore, the two countries continue to share the core values upon which this new relationship was built. Indeed, this aspect may even have been strengthened. What Foreign Secretary David Lammy suggested in his Foreign Affairs article, where he argued that the UK should focus on 'championing multilateral causes, building institutions, defending democracy, and standing up for the rule of law,' resonates well with the Yoon Suk-yeol administration’s value-based foreign policy vision of the ‘Global Pivotal State’.

The Accord’s security and defence cooperation components, which represent the core of the ‘strategic’ partnership, have been making steady progress too. In April 2024, the South Korean military revealed that the two countries had agreed to conduct regular joint military exercises and for the British Army to be invited every year to the Korea Combat Training Center (KCTC), a Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System-based training field that can accommodate two brigades simultaneously. The British Army first visited the KCTC in 2022 and 2023 for the exercise Imjin Warrior 23. Also noteworthy is the UK’s participation for two consecutive years in the Ssangyong exercise, a division-scale biennial amphibious drill by the combined forces of the US and South Korea, where UK commandos operated as part of a combined surveillance mission.

Furthermore, In May 2024, the UK Ministry of Defence revealed that HMS Spey and a South Korean Navy ship, along with a maritime patrol aircraft, had completed joint patrols around the Korean Peninsula to enforce UN Security Council Resolutions against North Korea. The UK has also been participating in the US-led maritime security initiative, the Pacific Security Maritime Exchange, which has been serving as an information-sharing network to implement UN sanctions on North Korea since 2018 by identifying smuggling ships and illicit maritime activities.

The cyber component has also made meaningful progress. In February 2024, a joint team from South Korea and the UK won the Defence Cyber Marvel hosted by the Army Cyber Association, showcasing strong cyber operational capability and the growing partnership between the two countries. In July, the UK and South Korea, along with the US, released a Cybersecurity Advisory highlighting North Korea’s cyber espionage activities, which are one of the major financial sources for the North’s illicit nuclear and WMD programmes. In September, the UK and South Korea launched a new economic and cybersecurity dialogue between their national security secretariats to discuss countering disinformation and building more resilient supply chains.

There have been positive developments in the private sector as well. Hyundai Heavy Industries and Babcock agreed to cooperate on the development of submarines for overseas export in February 2024. In July 2024, Hanwha Aerospace participated in the Farnborough Airshow, presenting a prototype of South Korea’s own jet engine concept which is intended to replace General Electric’s F414 engine used for indigenous jet fighters such as the KF-21. The evolving needs of the two countries will continue to foster more cooperation in the defence industry.

Enhancing Visibility and Charting the Way Forward

Despite these achievements, challenges remain, particularly in enhancing the visibility of cooperation. One reason for this is that the UK and South Korea have yet to develop a signature defence and security project. Initiatives like AUKUS with Australia and the Global Combat Air Programme with Japan provide strong visibility of the UK's defence ties with those countries. While such a project with South Korea will take time to establish, efforts to increase visibility deserve more attention, as public awareness and support generate important momentum for security and defence cooperation, thus encouraging higher levels of commitment.

In this regard, the new Foreign and Defence Ministerial 2+2 Meeting (FDMM), as agreed in the Accord, will provide an excellent platform for exploring areas for broader and more sophisticated cooperation, as well as identifying potential opportunities for developing a signature project. The inaugural FDMM will also serve as a great opportunity to discuss how to position UK–South Korea security cooperation within a broader strategic framework or 'lattice-like' alliance structure, linking it with multiple minilateral security architectures involving like-minded partners. It is welcome news that during the Foreign Ministerial Strategic Dialogue in October, the two ministers agreed to hold the inaugural FDMM in the first half of 2025.

Linking UK–South Korea defence and security cooperation with the NATO platform could be a valuable option to consider. It would further substantiate South Korea’s relations with NATO if the UK, as a key member of NATO, could guide South Korea in liaising with other NATO members. For instance, connecting South Korea with Centres of Excellence (COE) of which the UK is a member, such as the COE for energy security and the COE for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence, is a possibility worth exploring.

Another front where the two countries can continue building cooperation is countering North Korean financial crime and cyber security threats. The Labour government set out a new ambition to make the UK a leader on the anti-corruption agenda, with a promise to host an international summit on the topic. A special session on the illicit finance of countries such as North Korea could be a relevant topic that expands the scope of this summit. According to the UN Panel of Experts’ last report in March 2024, North Korea continues to engage in illicit financial operations and cyber attacks, which may have generated as much as $3 billion between 2017 and 2023 – 15 times the total cost of the 71 missiles North Korea launched in 2022. Cooperation to enhance cyber security will play a critical role in cutting the financial lifeline for the regime’s illegal weapons programme.

UK–South Korea bilateral relations are making steady progress towards the full realisation of a strategic partnership. The meaningful achievements in areas such as joint military exercises, sanctions enforcement, and cybersecurity cooperation are encouraging, but both countries must persist in their efforts. By actively seeking new opportunities for collaboration and addressing remaining challenges, they can solidify their alliance and contribute significantly to regional and global security.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

Have an idea for a Commentary you’d like to write for us? Send a short pitch to commentaries@rusi.org and we’ll get back to you if it fits into our research interests. Full guidelines for contributors can be found here.