Starmer’s New National Security Adviser: A Consequential Choice

The announcement on 8 November that Jonathan Powell had been appointed as the new National Security Adviser (NSA) to the UK prime minister resolved a question that had been left hanging ever since it emerged that the Starmer government had decided not to implement the decision made under Rishi Sunak to appoint General Gwyn Jenkins (then the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff) to the role. But in making what looks like a political appointment, the government is inviting interesting new questions around both its security policy and how the NSA functions.

Implications for Security and Foreign Policy

In terms of the individual, Powell is hugely experienced, both in foreign policy and in the business of government, having started his career at the Foreign Office and later spent a decade working as the Chief of Staff to Tony Blair. Having played a major role in the Northern Ireland peace process, after he left the Blair government he was appointed as an envoy on Libya, and he has since established a charity that specialises in conflict mediation and negotiation. More recently, he led the talks on the future of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT).

Writing in 2023 about the challenges facing a potential Labour government, Powell set out an expansive, multilateral outlook that echoed many of the themes of the New Labour era (including Tony Blair’s famous 1999 Chicago speech). It also presaged some of the current Labour government’s rhetoric on ‘progressive realism’, and was consistent with its criticism of UK foreign policy after Brexit as being too ‘inward’. It stands to reason that his appointment comes because he combines personal experience and heft with a similar mindset to that of Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Foreign Secretary David Lammy, and therefore we might infer this confirms the government’s emphasis on ‘rebuilding’ international relations, especially with Europe (manifest in the new agreement with Germany). The more optimistic and interventionist might suggest this means more money for the Ministry of Defence (MoD) – mentioned in Powell’s article – and a muscular approach to international affairs. But the recent budget gave no commitments to underpin any such approach: aid funding was cut and shows no sign of returning to 0.7% of GDP, while the increase for the MoD was only for next year and barely keeps pace with GDP growth, and there is still no sign of a plan to reach 2.5% of GDP (delayed until a ‘future fiscal event’). The first conclusion to be drawn is that the government retains an ambitious set of goals on national security, foreign policy and defence, but implementation will need to be matched by resources if this is not to be a case of the UK once again talking a good game on ‘global responsibilities’, but being unable to back it up.

Powell’s role in the BIOT dispute is something of a footnote to this deduction, but could ring alarm bells for some. He appeared dismissive of concerns around the deal, including about Chinese influence, and was hardly reassuring in answering questions around protecting the broader strategic utility of the base there. His expertise in difficult negotiations is a positive, but will be put to the test if Russia attempts to exploit the election of President Donald Trump to cut a favourable deal on the future of Ukraine.

To the small but avid band of Whitehall-watchers, it might be of interest that this marks the appointment of yet another former diplomat as the NSA. The post has only existed since 2010, but in that time four of its occupants have been out-and-out diplomats, with only Mark Sedwill (who worked at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office [FCDO] but also had much broader experience) and Stephen Lovegrove (who came from the MoD, but whose tenure as NSA was truncated) bucking the trend. This isn’t necessarily a drawback, but it does bring certain biases and habits into play, for example in attitudes towards the MoD (often opaque to the FCDO and pretty much everyone else!) or intelligence (where diplomats have good access to individual reports but less interest in assessments, and frequently poor infrastructure and processes for handling sensitive information. When Sedwill was NSA, he was enthusiastic about using the full range of government capabilities to deal with security issues under his ‘Fusion Doctrine’, attempting to bring more innovative thinking into solving problems. This will be of particular importance with war raging in Europe, an apparent rise in sabotage and assassination plots by hostile states, and coercive behaviour being used by countries like China in lieu of overt military attacks. The NSA will also need to keep a close eye on the Strategic Defence Review; it may be defence-only, and under the auspices of an external team, but the NSA needs to be alert to the impact of any defence decisions on other security capabilities and security policy. Given Powell was substituted in for the appointment of Jenkins (who combined a defence background with time in the centre of government as one of the Deputy NSAs), he will need to demonstrate that he too can bring a broader perspective to the role.

Self-inflicted Complications

Powell’s appointment is being reported as a special adviser (spad) rather than a civil servant position. This complicates his ability to do the role, because of the constraints on his activity, what responsibilities he can have, and the oversight he can exercise. The rules on special advisers prevent them from being responsible for budgets, or from managing civil servants. The centralisation of some responsibilities under the NSA meant that when the role was created, it acted as the Accounting Officer for the Single Intelligence Account (SIA – the budget for the intelligence agencies) and the line manager for the heads of the Agencies (although they still report annually to the prime minister). Neither is possible if the NSA is a spad, nor is management of the Deputy NSAs, or budget control of the National Security Secretariat (NSS – the part of the Cabinet Office responsible for the coordination of security policy across government). Indeed, while Powell should still be able to attend the National Security Council (NSC), assuming he receives or has clearance (unlike ministers, spads need to be formally approved for Developed Vetting), he can no longer be the secretary of the NSC. He can probably still run the NSC (Officials) meeting – the supporting group of senior officials who prepare papers for the NSC – as he can convey ministerial views and instructions, but his ability to present NSC (Officials) outcomes under his authority is more constrained.

As an added complication, the announcement states that the role will be ‘based’ in No.10. The current NSA is based in the main Cabinet Office building at 70 Whitehall. This is connected to No.10, but with a security barrier between the two (the ‘link door’) and unescorted access denied to most Cabinet Office staff (for understandable reasons). It remains to be seen exactly what this means, but on the face of it, the NSA will now be physically separated much of the time from the Deputy NSAs and the NSS staff. 

Some solutions to these problems have already been considered and possibly implemented, because the issue arose when Lord Frost was nominated as the NSA to replace Sedwill in 2020. Sedwill had already taken the accounting officer role with him to the Cabinet Secretary’s office when he combined that with being the NSA after being asked by Theresa May to step in for the unwell Jeremy Heywood. It has since bounced between Simon Case, as Sedwill’s Cabinet Secretary successor, and Stephen Lovegrove as another NSA, and is now delegated from the Cabinet Secretary to one of the Deputy NSAs. Meanwhile, physical dislocation of the NSA was also managed Sedwill combined roles, although the Cabinet Secretary’s office is still at least within 70 Whitehall. 

Towards a More Political NSA?

Having an NSA who is politically close to the prime minister and of a similar mindset can strengthen the influence the role wields: not only is it still relatively new, but as with many other parts of the Cabinet Office the majority of its power comes from the extent to which it is seen to be reflecting the views or direction of No.10. In placing a significant individual in the role, Starmer is signalling that it matters to him. It bears reminding that the controversy around the previous attempt to put in a political appointee was as much about Frost’s lack of relevant experience as it was the political nature of the appointment. Physically moving the role into No.10 reinforces the centrality of the NSA and the proximity to the prime minister (and maybe also reflects some of the criticism over the performance of the Cabinet Office in recent years).

Nonetheless, in both changing the way the role is filled and creating systemic complications, this might be the most significant change the NSA function has experienced in its short lifetime. First, the difficulty in fulfilling some of the previous intelligence responsibilities along with the physical move away from the NSS and Deputy NSAs might result in it becoming a more substantive foreign policy role, at the risk of disconnecting it from some of the national security machinery. Indeed, this looks like a missed opportunity to realign intelligence oversight back with the policy team already in the NSS; having a Deputy NSA as ‘temporary acting’ accounting officer looks as messy as it sounds, and no explanation has been given as to why Tim Barrow didn’t take back the responsibility once he replaced Lovegrove. The NSA begins to look more like the old Foreign Policy Adviser role filled by the likes of David Manning for Tony Blair (when there was a separate Intelligence and Security Coordinator). Another model, as others have highlighted, is something akin to the spad role John Bew was performing over the last few years. This poses the question of why the prime minister didn’t simply appoint Powell to do something similar, while reaffirming the previous concept of the NSA. Additionally, No.10 already has both foreign and domestic affairs policy teams, and a private secretary for foreign affairs, so how the NSS will interact with them and the rest of No.10 – where their head now also sits – will require some thought.

Second, the political nature of the appointment might change the way the NSA’s advice is seen, and how the role operates in the future. The NSA was fundamentally an apolitical Civil Service position (insofar as any Permanent Secretary-level position can be in government), and so provided continuity between governments and prime ministers. But the controversy over the (non)appointment of Jenkins might have been an early indication that this is now changing. Indeed, perhaps the signs should have been spotted earlier, when Stephen Lovegrove was unceremoniously moved on 24 hours after Liz Truss became prime minister in favour of Tim Barrow, with whom Truss had worked at the FCDO. This happened alongside the short-lived change of the NSC to the ‘Foreign Policy and Security Council’. Of course, prime ministers need officials they can trust and with whom they can implement their policy agendas. But if the NSA becomes an explicitly political role, it will be much more likely to change as political fortunes change, and so work will have to be done to ensure that continuity and experience are provided by other officials (for example, the Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee). Once more, other parts of the system will have to bear an increased load to compensate.

These arguments do not mean this choice is an intrinsically ‘bad’ one, but it has consequences for important (if not headline-grabbing) concepts such as accountability, oversight and effectiveness in national security at a time of particular complexity, in both the real world and within Whitehall. None are trivial, and all will benefit from scrutiny if the ‘secret state’ is to help the government keep the UK secure.

© RUSI, 2024

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