Pandemic Preparedness in UK National Security Documents: Paper vs Reality

The recent publication of the UK Covid-19 Inquiry’s Module 1 report, ‘The resilience and preparedness of the United Kingdom’, has cast a spotlight on the country’s pandemic readiness. Released in July 2024 under the leadership of The Rt Hon the Baroness Hallett DBE, this comprehensive report examines the UK’s preparedness for a significant health emergency.

Our Edinburgh National Security Documents Dataset1  allows us to compare the national security aspect of the UK’s approach to pandemic threats with that of other countries. The dataset offers a unique opportunity to see how the UK framed pandemics in national security terms before the COVID-19 outbreak, and to compare this with approaches taken by other countries.

The UK was one of the first countries to explicitly mention pandemics as a national security concern in its official strategy documents. The UK’s first National Security Strategy in 2008 acknowledged the high probability of a pandemic occurring. Only the US, Czechia and France mentioned pandemics in their documents earlier or also in 2008.

Before Covid-19 appeared, 11 countries had recognised the threat of pandemics in their national security documents, but the UK stood out for having the most extensive and consistent discussion of pandemic risks. It addressed pandemics in four separate documents, more than any other country in our dataset. This repeated emphasis suggests that, at least on paper, UK governments had recognised the potential threat of pandemics and had integrated this concern into their national security planning more dependably than their international peers.

Notably, the 2008 document stated: ‘On pandemics, the World Health Organization (WHO) has recognised the United Kingdom as being in the vanguard of preparedness’. This recognition from the WHO underscores that, at least on paper, the UK was considered well-prepared for pandemic threats many years before the Covid-19 outbreak.

Subsequently, the 2010 National Security Strategy identified pandemics as one of the highest-priority risks (Tier One) facing the UK:

‘The risk of human pandemic disease remains one of the highest we face... There is a high probability of another influenza pandemic occurring and, based on a range of data, possible impacts could be severe in terms of the number of people affected.’

One of the Inquiry’s criticisms of the UK’s pandemic preparedness is that, despite the UK’s consistent mention of pandemic threats, the focus was predominantly on influenza rather than other types of viruses. This narrow focus may have limited the UK’s ability to respond effectively to the Covid-19 outbreak.

However, our research uncovers an intriguing exception to this pattern. The UK stands out as the only country in our global corpus to explicitly mention SARS in its national security documents before the Covid-19 pandemic. Of the 11 countries that mentioned pandemics before 2020, most are notably vague in their terminology. Seven countries, including France, Lithuania and Albania, use non-specific terms like ‘pandemic diseases’ or simply ‘pandemics,’ without mentioning particular pathogens. South Africa mentions HIV/AIDS, while the Central African Republic cites Ebola. Three countries – the US, Finland and Ireland – specifically mention influenza pandemics. While the UK does focus primarily on influenza, it is the only country to explicitly reference SARS. This suggests a broader awareness of different pandemic threats, even if this awareness did not translate into comprehensive preparedness for all types of pandemic diseases.

As the Covid-19 Inquiry report reveals, there was a significant gap between this perceived preparedness and actual response capabilities when faced with a real-world pandemic. The report notes a lack of whole-of-government strategic planning and coordination capability. The National Security Council, established by David Cameron in 2010 in tandem with the 2010 National Security Strategy, was meant to enable the UK government to take a more strategic view of national security risks. While it focused primarily on malicious threats, a sub-committee was created to address emergency planning and non-malicious hazards. This sub-committee provided oversight of pandemic preparedness. However, it last met in February 2017 and was abolished in July 2019, leaving no cross-government ministerial oversight of these matters immediately before the Covid-19 pandemic.

While strategic documents are important for outlining the framework of a country’s preparedness, their effectiveness is fundamentally dependent on the existence of robust strategic planning and implementation institutions, such as the now defunct National Security Council. These institutions must be equipped with the authority and resources necessary to ensure that plans are translated into concrete actions. Consistent attention at the senior cabinet level, and ideally at the prime ministerial level, is crucial for maintaining momentum and accountability. Without this high-level oversight and commitment, even the most meticulously crafted strategies can falter in execution. The UK’s experience, as highlighted by the Covid-19 Inquiry, underscores the importance of sustained engagement from the top echelons of government to ensure that preparedness plans are not only well-conceived but also diligently implemented and adapted to emerging threats. As the UK reflects on these pre-pandemic preparations in light of recent experiences, it becomes clear that future resilience will depend not just on robust paperwork, but on the ability to rapidly and effectively implement plans when faced with a real crisis.

The pandemic approach in the UK’s national security documents, while impressive on paper and when compared to peers, highlights the complex challenge of translating written strategies into effective real-world preparedness and response capabilities. The Covid-19 Inquiry’s findings serve as a stark reminder that even the most thorough planning documents cannot guarantee practical readiness.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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