Overcoming the Challenges of Building a Future Force for Ukraine
Ending the war and establishing lasting peace in Ukraine is impossible without implementing practical measures to deter potential future waves of Russian aggression. Crafting an effective deterrence strategy, however, presents its own unique challenges.
The recent US elections have created a new political reality that will impact global stability in the coming years, including the Russian war in Ukraine. While Donald Trump’s stated goal of ending the war quickly resonates with Ukrainians, achieving a lasting peace requires selecting the right strategies and resources to ensure sustainable results. Apart from dealing with immediate challenges on the battlefield, given Vladimir Putin’s obsession with Ukraine, any solution that lacks this lasting impact risks disastrous consequences, as Russia could recover, rearm, and reignite the conflict.
Defining long-term security arrangements for Ukraine requires a comprehensive set of military and strategic measures for maintaining stability and defending Ukraine’s territory, society, economy and rule of law against future foreign aggression. Such measures are widely seen as critical to Ukraine’s post-war recovery and to preventing future escalations.
This topic is especially challenging to address while Ukraine’s immediate security remains under severe threat. After enduring nearly three years of active war, Ukraine still needs ongoing support for operations, including additional weapons, funding and domestic mobilisation. Meanwhile, the support from international partners shows signs of wavering, and in the US, assistance to Ukraine has become a point of contentious political debate. With uncertainties around how and when Ukraine will emerge from this war, within what borders and in what economic state, it is understandably difficult to plan for its long-term security.
However, long-term strategising remains essential, as lacking a clear security vision creates a void that complicates any future planning. Without this long-term perspective, doubts may arise about Ukraine’s prospects, potentially impacting international support even if its territory is liberated. So long as Russia remains under Putin’s regime, the existential threat to Ukraine will persist, driven by Putin’s personal fixation on the country which may push him beyond rational limits. While some observers suggest that Ukraine should pursue territorial concessions as a path to compromise, this approach misunderstands the existential nature of the conflict. For Putin, territory is not the ultimate goal – ending Ukraine's sovereignty and independence is. Concessions would not end hostilities but instead encourage further aggression, as they would fail to address the core motives driving Putin's actions.
NATO membership offers a natural path forward. Once active hostilities conclude, Ukraine’s admission to NATO will be crucial to stabilising the region. Ukraine must, however, be treated not merely as a security liability but as an asset. Structuring and strengthening Ukraine’s defences will make this discussion more feasible, as a robust new NATO member will strengthen the alliance.
Under current conditions, with limitations on weapon types and their use, Ukraine is fighting a war that NATO would never choose to fight
One crucial assumption is that Putin will refrain from attacking Ukraine if Russia lacks either the resources or the likelihood of success. Although the first condition may be difficult to ensure indefinitely, the second can be achieved. Should Ukraine possess or have access to sufficient defensive capabilities to thwart any future invasion, this would significantly reduce the likelihood of renewed aggression. This approach, often called ‘deterrence by denial’, would serve as an effective defence.
Other forms of deterrence may be less optimal. For instance, ‘deterrence by punishment’ appears limited in impact. Russia is already incurring staggering losses in the current conflict, allocating over 40% of its state budget to the war and losing close to 700,000 troops as casualties, thousands of weapon systems, and most of its Black Sea fleet. For most regimes, such losses would be unsustainable, but for Putin, they do not appear to have impacted his commitment to the war. To force a resolution, the Kremlin would need to lose strategically – not merely in manpower or equipment, but through a fundamental military failure.
Recognising the importance of deterrence, the Ukrainian government has incorporated this strategy into its national military framework, known as the ‘Victory Plan’. While largely classified, key elements were outlined by President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Verkhovna Rada on 16 October 2024, with ‘Deterrence’ as a central theme addressing long-term security. Zelensky proposed a ‘strategic non-nuclear deterrence package’ within Ukraine, aimed at providing a robust defence against potential Russian aggression. According to Zelensky, ‘the deterrence package ensures that Russia faces a choice: engage in diplomacy or see its war machine dismantled. Peace through strength’.
The focus should be on building a force capable of repelling future aggression and ensuring that, if Russia attacks, it will face defeat on the battlefield. Such a capability must not only be developed but also maintained at a high state of readiness. It should be evident to Russia that any attack would lead to decisive failure, thereby preventing it from trying.
The effectiveness of such deterrence must also be evident to the people of Ukraine, allied governments, and the international business community. Confidence in Ukraine’s military potential should be strong enough to assure investors that they can safely conduct business in the country. The only way to sustain such a force in the long term is to match it with a strong economy. In this respect, the example of South Korea is particularly relevant. Despite the absence of a peace agreement with the North, the deterrent capability of military power has provided the security necessary for sustained social and economic growth.
Building such a force will be a significant challenge. First, it must deter a Russian force that, despite multiple failures in Ukraine, remains large in numbers. Second, any ceasefire would give Russia the opportunity to rebuild its military capabilities, potentially enhancing its strike power. Russia, after all, spares no resources in producing weapons, with at least 40% of its state budget currently allocated to the military.
The costs of building a credible deterrent force are easy to underestimate. Simply sending older Western equipment to Ukraine will not achieve the necessary deterrent effect. Only competitive capabilities will suffice. For example, the current provision of older F-16s to Ukraine is inadequate to deny Russian air superiority over the frontlines due to outdated radars and missiles. As a result, Russia continues to dominate the airspace in close proximity to the battlefield.
The value of tactical air superiority cannot be overstated. Today, Ukraine faces significant challenges in dealing with Russia’s gliding bombs, missiles, and long-range drones. A competitive air force is as essential for Ukraine as it is for any NATO country preparing for war. With NATO membership, these costs could be shared – especially for high-cost capabilities like aviation. Without it membership, Ukraine will have to build and sustain them on its own.
Planning for a future force cannot be based on today’s operational environment. Under current conditions, with limitations on weapon types and their use, Ukraine is fighting a war that NATO would never choose to fight. NATO’s strategy would rely on overwhelming airpower and deep strikes to weaken enemy forces before they reached the frontline. Instead, Ukraine is meeting Russian forces at their strongest, at the front. Lacking adequate air and long-range firepower, Ukraine is compelled to compensate with the lives of its people – at least until a more effective operational model is established. Addressing the shortcomings of the current model is crucial not only for immediate success but also for ensuring future security. Delaying this effort results in the tragic loss of lives on a daily basis, underscoring the urgent need for decisive action. This painful reality demands immediate attention and cannot be overlooked.
The costs of building this force could be significantly reduced by leveraging Ukraine’s industrial capabilities, implementing leasing arrangements, and creating international funds with contributions from multiple donors for specific programmes. Ukraine has the potential to close a massive capability gap if its industrial base is engaged in full. Unlike Western defence industries, Ukraine’s industry is operating on a war footing, with many factories running 24/7 and bureaucratic red tape kept to a minimum.
Strategically planning Ukraine's future military force, anticipating evolving trends, and conducting rapid assessments is not just essential for Ukraine's survival; it is critical for the security of Western allies as well
However, cost is not the only challenge. In accepting that deterrent capabilities must be competitive, the ongoing need for adaptation and innovation becomes crucial. The speed of technological advancement today is unprecedented. Innovation teams on all sides of the war are working tirelessly, introducing new measures and countermeasures. Technologies such as computer vision, electronic warfare, and long-range communications are poised to profoundly influence future military concepts and capabilities, and we have yet to see how these will ultimately shape weapon systems. The successful implementation of these technologies on the battlefield could render many older weapons and doctrines obsolete, a trend already visible in the current war. Ukraine’s future force must remain competitive in this rapidly evolving operational environment, which makes long-term predictions difficult.
For example, small and medium-sized unmanned platforms are challenging the concept of air superiority, operating beyond the reach of traditional aviation and air defence. At the same time, electronic warfare has significantly impacted the effectiveness of these platforms. Current developments in computer vision aim to make these systems immune to electronic warfare, while counter-air drones are being designed to present a new challenge to drone warfare itself. All of these systems are part of an evolving operational landscape, competing for battlefield dominance.Â
Keeping up the pace of adaptation and technological development is now a critical requirement to remain relevant. Unfortunately, many Western developers and governments have not yet achieved the necessary speed. For example, procurement and export control systems, designed for peacetime conditions, are ill-suited to the fast-paced demands of modern warfare. These bureaucratic hurdles prevent too many innovative platforms from being deployed effectively in the field. Western militaries and governments should not view this as a minor delay in aiding Ukraine. Rather, lengthy supply chains and slow adaptation cycles risk rendering critical platforms obsolete before they can be competitive.
After assessing the ongoing war, former US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mark Milley, co-authored an article warning that the US military is not keeping pace with the fast-changing nature of modern warfare, and this issue is likely even more pronounced in European militaries. Now is the time for faster research and development, more rapid prototyping, and quicker delivery to the battlefield. The multiyear cycles traditionally required for new weapons must be viewed as an unaffordable luxury of the past.
Strategically planning Ukraine's future military force, anticipating evolving trends, and conducting rapid assessments is not just essential for Ukraine's survival; it is critical for the security of Western allies as well. The urgent need to innovate and collaborate in defence capabilities cannot be overstated. Only by embracing change and acting decisively can the West ensure that this conflict does not become a harbinger of greater crises in the future.
© Andriy Zagorodnyuk, 2024, published by RUSI with permission of the author
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WRITTEN BY
Andriy Zagorodnyuk
- Jack BellMedia Relations Manager+44 (0)7917 373 069JackB@rusi.org