The death of six British servicemen, pushing British deaths in Afghanistan over 400, is a sober reminder that the Helmand campaign is still far from over. Leaders, both military and civilian, still have to overcome serious challenges if there is to be a peaceful transition in 2014.
By Grant Turnbull, RUSI.org
British forces have reached another sombre milestone in the ongoing operations in Afghanistan. The total number of men and women lost in the decade-long conflict now stands at over 400. The 6 March attack is shocking, six killed (five from 3rd Battalion Yorkshire Regiment and one from 1st Battalion the Duke of Lancaster Regiment) in just one bomb blast. If it is a Taliban improvised explosive device (IED), it will be the biggest loss of life due to enemy action since the war began. There will be inevitable scrutiny and attention surrounding the milestone, especially in terms of Britain's ongoing commitment, its tactical approaches and its willingness - both military and political - to stay the course.
The end of Britain's current troop rotation in Helmand Province is slowly approaching, although the soldiers who died had only been in Afghanistan a few weeks. Operation Herrick 15, the British Army's operational designation for Afghanistan, has seen a concerted effort to build the capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and ready them for transition. But as the attack that killed six soldiers has demonstrated, significant challenges exist that could make this transition both difficult and bloody both for Afghans and the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF).
Despite the significant loss of life in Tuesday's attack, the overall number of British casualties has steadily declined over the last year. The total number of British personnel killed during Operation Herrick 15 (October 2011 to present) now stands at twenty-two; over the course of last year, there were a total of forty-six recorded fatalities; a near 50 per cent reduction from the 2010 and 2009 highs of 103 and 108, respectively.
A new British Army brigade will be taking over Helmand in April; it will face ever increasing danger in Helmand Province as time runs up to transition. Commanders will now be trying to consolidate the gains made in 2010 and 2011 with the extra resources provided by, or made possible through additional US troop strength. These gains will have to be considered alongside a realistic assessment of just how secure Helmand province really is and how dangerous the Taliban will be in the run up to transition. Ultimately, success will be determined by the proficiency and ability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in taking over security by 2014.
Three areas of tactical concern
The reduction of ISAF fatalities across the board is in part due to NATO's 'tactical realignment and rebalancing' in Helmand that took place with US Marines in 2010, the so-called 'surge'.[1] British forces concentrated their efforts in central Helmand and around the provincial capital Lashkar Gah, while withdrawing from the key northern areas of Sangin and Musa Qala. Command of these areas was transferred to US Marines, who by this point numbered approximately 20,000 personnel (the UK contingent in Helmand numbered less than half this figure).
This operational structure has remained relatively unchanged since 2010 and should have, in theory, provided the optimum conditions for ISAF to build lasting security in the province, ready for transition to Afghan forces in 2014. But despite their concentration of force around key Helmand areas, British soldiers and their US Marine counterparts still face a deadly threat from the Taliban and arguably long-term security is still proving hard to develop. Although rare, attacks like the one that killed six British soldiers is a stark reminder of this. There are three main issues that should concern British military commanders and politicians, especially if a transition date is brought forward as has been suggested over recent months.
Firstly, the amount of soldiers and civilians that are being killed or injured in IED blasts remains high and for civilians it is increasing. Secondly, in terms of taking casualties, areas of central Helmand are still dangerous for ISAF and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to operate in. Thirdly, a hastened transition process could expose UK forces to unnecessary risk as they attempt to follow, and possible fill, the US' strategic role. All three issues could affect the stability of central Helmand in the next two years and impact on ANSF capabilities and its effectiveness to fight a counter-insurgency campaign when ISAF have gone.
IEDs remain a significant threat
It is still unclear what caused the blast that killed six soldiers on 6 March, although there is growing evidence that it was a massive Taliban bomb.[2] What will unsettle commanders is the rate at which improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are continuing to kill and injure soldiers and civilians. Out of the forty-six UK soldiers who lost their lives in 2011, twenty-eight were as a result of injuries sustained in an IED blast. Despite the considerable drop in casualty rates, in proportional terms IEDs accounted for 61 per cent of all deaths in 2011, which is an increase from 53 per cent in 2010.[3]This shows that the IED remains a formidable weapon in the Taliban inventory and one that still proves to be successful in its application.
A report published on 7 February by the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has also shown the deadly effect of IEDs on the civilian population. The report's data shows that IEDs 'were the single largest killer of Afghan children, women and men in 2011'.[4] The majority of devices that kill and maim civilians are 'victim-operated IEDs' (VOIEDs) or 'pressure-plate IEDs' (PPIEDs). These are low technology weapons which are often packed with up to 100kg of explosives, decimating anything that detonates it. In 2011, an average of twenty-three IEDs were found or detonated every day, double that of 2010.[5]
For most of the Afghanistan campaign British soldiers have used jamming devices - both vehicle and man portable - in an attempt to counter the threat from IEDs. As an added counter-measure soldiers on foot patrols also began using 'Vallon' metal detectors in an attempt to find and neutralise PPIEDs before they could be detonated. These measures have undoubtedly saved many soldiers' lives through early warning and identification of life-threatening devices. However, the Taliban have demonstrated adaptability, often with simple tactics, to neutralise the various counter-measures that have been employed by British forces. One method has been to use materials less likely to be detected by a metal detector. Last year, a coroner found that Andrew Griffiths, a young infantry captain, had died in Nahr-e Saraj in 2010 as a result of an IED that would likely have been missed by any detector.[6] The IED that killed him had a 'low metal content' and had been placed 'a considerable time before' in an area strewn with metal objects.
The high volume of IED strikes and ISAF's apparent inability to counter their proliferation has implications for maintaining security for transition and building on existing security achievements. As the ANSF gradually take over security from ISAF forces, whether that be in 2013 or 2014, they will be faced with the same threat but will possess lesser capabilities to counter it - especially in jamming equipment, detectors and armoured vehicles. If the Taliban can lay an IED with the destructive power to destroy a small tank and kill six British soldiers, how will the ANSF fare in their Toyota pickups?
Actual Progress in Central Helmand?
At the height of Britain's involvement in Helmand in 2010, the three districts of Nad-e Ali, Nahr-e Saraj and Sangin accounted for around 75 per cent of all British casualties.[7] In Sangin alone thirty-three soldiers were killed. In September of that year, as part of the US surge, US Marines officially took over Sangin district from UK forces - along with Kajaki and Musa Qaleh - a factor which has played an important part, among others, in helping Britain reduce its casualty rate and preventing it rising further. Sangin district had been one of the most violent and dangerous areas in the whole of Afghanistan, by 2010 it had claimed over a hundred UK lives.[8] The US Marines who took over Sangin lost twenty-six soldiers in the first four months there, around a quarter of UK losses in four years.
British troops remain in both Nad-e Ali and Nahr-e Saraj. They are facing a relentless enemy who is still tactically able to hinder ISAF operations and freedom of movement. Last year saw approximately twenty-six soldiers lose their lives in the district of Nahr-e Saraj through hostile action (almost equal to the twenty-eight that died in 2010). We are but three months into 2012 and the district has already claimed another two lives through hostile action.
One of the reasons behind Britain's lower casualty rates in 2011 could simply be because the British are no longer responsible for the more dangerous areas of Helmand province. Many would speculate that casualties could have remained high if Britain was still in control of problem areas like Musa Qala, Sangin and Kajaki. And despite the concentration of effort that characterised the last two years, Taliban activity and their operational effectiveness is still high in districts around central Helmand. According to NATO statistics, attacks also appear to be on the rise in other provinces, especially those in the East[9]. This is likely to add to an overall impression of insecurity across the country.
The talk of early transitions by world leaders in January and February this year raises serious questions regarding the readiness of the ANSF to take over security. The US Marines, who have led the counter-insurgency in Helmand and contributed most of the power, will begin a significant drawdown this year. How exactly British forces will fit into this drawdown is still unclear. They may be called upon to fill a potential security vacuum created by the US withdrawing, although this has been ruled out by the Defence Secretary, Philip Hammond[10].
British commanders have already ruled out any return to Sangin - the graveyard of many British servicemen - and it is unlikely they will be positive about any move that could expose British troops as happened in 2006. The ghosts of Helmand and the misguided overstretch of troops when they first deployed into southern Afghanistan still hang over the heads of senior officers and politicians.[11]Instead, they will be hoping that as British and US troops begin their drawdown, units of the Afghan National Army will be able to fill the vacuums that would otherwise be left.
If ISAF forces are reduced too early, before the ANSF have fully developed in terms of capabilities and numbers, then it is likely that the transition will be far more difficult than originally envisaged by ISAF commanders and the politicians who determined the deadline. ANSF casualties are likely to be high because of the effectiveness of the Taliban in targeting those allied to the Kabul government, whether they are security forces or public officials. A misjudged drawdown could leave an immature and ill-disciplined Afghan force in place that lacks the sufficient training, skills and equipment to fight an effective counter-insurgency.
A Bloody Transition Ahead
This analysis has highlighted just a few of examples of where immense security challenges remain for transition in Helmand province. The continuing threat from IEDs, districts and provinces that lack effective security, the US drawdown and calls for early withdrawal, represent some of the biggest military challenges facing ISAF and ANSF forces. As the recent deaths of British soldiers have demonstrated, those currently deployed on Operation HERRICK 15 are still risking their lives for a stable Afghanistan.
Those deploying on Operation Herrick 16 in April 2012 will have huge pressure to deliver on security goals. As the Taliban continue to operate and carry out 'spectaculars', the sense of unease about transition amongst the Afghan population will grow. If Western forces - and specifically the British in central Helmand - cannot bring stability to the province and neutralise the effectiveness of Taliban attacks in time for the beginning of significant handovers of districts and provinces, then it is questionable whether the ANSF will ever be able to take on this responsibility and finish the job.
There is not much time left. In order to mitigate the risks - there is no real chance of eliminating them - that have been identified above, commanders on the ground must consolidate their gains made through the US surge. Civilian governments should also resist the temptation for early withdrawals just to satiate public appetite. Instead the focus should remain on training and equipping a competent Afghan force that can transition fairly painlessly from ISAF forces. If not, then the chances of a violent and bloody transition become almost inevitable. With little over two years to go until a planned handover it is clear that the bloody battle for Helmand and Afghanistan is still far from over.
The views represented here are the author's own and do not neccessarily reflect those of RUSI.
NOTES
[1] Rebalancing of Forces in Helmand, ISAF Press Release, 19 September 2010 available at http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/SEPTEMBER%202010/2010-09-CA-214-Rebalancing%20of%20forces%20in%20Helmand.pdf
[2] 'Afghanistan: "Very large" Taliban bomb killed soldiers', BBC News Online, 7 March 2012
[3] In 2010 fifty-five soldiers died in IED attacks from 103 casualties. In 2011 twenty-eight soldiers died in IED attacks out of forty-six killed. Data available at www.icasualties.org
[4] UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 'Annual Report 2011, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict', February 2012, p.3 http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/UNAMA%20POC%202011%20Report_Final_Feb%202012.pdf>
[5] Ibid p.16
[6] 'Bombs hidden in compound killed captain', Yorkshire Post, 4 November 2011
[7] Sixteen soldiers died in Nad-e Ali (15%), twenty-nine died in Nahr-e Saraj (28%) and thirty-three died in Sangin. Data available at www.icasualties.org
[8] Ben Farmer, British troops hand over Sangin in Afghanistan to US forces, Telegraph, 20 September 2010
[9] Julian Borger, 'Nato plans push in eastern Afghanistan to quell Pakistan-based insurgents', the Guardian, 2 December 2011
[10] Nick Hopkins, 'British troops could leave Afghanistan early', The Guardian, 8 December 2011
[11] See 'The Afghan Papers: Committing Britain to War in Helmand, 2005-06', RUSI Whitehall Paper, January 2012