Narendra Modi as Prime Minister: Engagement, Continuity and Reform

This Friday, the results of the Indian election will be announced with Narendra Modi tipped to be the next Indian Prime Minister. If he wins, the leader of the Bharata Janata Party will succeed Manmohan Singh who is largely seen as spearheading a failing administration with a fraying economy and no strategic clarity.

For wider appeal, Modi has downplayed his supposed Hindu grievances (a staple of the BJP and the related Hindutva movement), offering instead effective governance and in a mantra akin to James Carville’s ‘the economy, stupid’, the key electioneering plank has been to highlight his stewardship of an economically robust Gujarat as a harbinger for future national prosperity.

Prospects for US-India Relations

There is a ‘what’s past is prologue’ Shakespearean view of Modi and it would be easy to form a jejune opinion in light of his controversial handling of the 2002 Gujarat riots, in which over 1,000 people died, most of them Muslims. Whilst cleared of any wrongdoing by a Supreme Court investigation (‘a clean chit’), a lack of contrition has further tainted perceptions. Modi is a decisive, yet divisive figure seemingly tearing at the fabric of India’s secular ideals. 

A 2005 ban has prevented Modi from obtaining a visa to the US on the grounds that he is responsible for severe violations of religious freedom. However, it recently ended a boycott when Modi met the then US Ambassador to India, Nancy Powell in February (the UK preceded this in 2012).

This signals an attitudinal shift in the West borne out of political necessity, especially as Modi utilises trade as a key foreign policy driver. It also marks the emergence of groups including the United States India Political Action Committee (USINPAC), indicative of an affluent and politically engaged diaspora whose lobbying impact upon US-India relations will be interesting to gauge if momentum is required to engineer a Modi visit to the US.

Revoking the visa ban would be politically useful and pragmatic in reenergising US-India relations, following the expulsion from the US of Indian diplomat Devyani Khobragade. A diplomatic storm would have to be weathered, as a Modi visit to the US (and UK) would arouse controversy and distract from substantial bilateral progress. Perceptions  matter and a more repentant and conciliatory approach would serve him better on the world stage rather than playing up to his critics’ claims of being a belligerent figure. 

Continuity in Foreign and Defence Policy?

Despite proffering to ‘fundamentally reboot and reorient the foreign policy goals, content and process’ in the BJP manifesto, Modi would be reliant on the continuity undertaken by previous governments on some core issues whilst also finding ample opportunity for fresh thinking on others, including nuclear weapons.

Aside from media conjecture over the supposed ditching of the ‘No First Use’ policy, the declaration to ‘study, revise and update’ India’s independent strategic nuclear doctrine requires clarity. The rationale for a posture review and a more flexible doctrine lie in how the local neighbourhood has changed since a BJP-led government first conducted nuclear tests in 1998 and as India moves towards deploying a nuclear triad. It would be a bold, signature policy change; with Pakistan and China also looking to increase their nuclear arsenals to complement a range of delivery systems. Such a rethink will however contribute to hindering disarmament efforts and upset the regional nuclear applecart.

Pakistan

Indo-Pak relations, always an area of concern, would see further wariness emanating from Islamabad in dealing with an Indian leader with an anti-Muslim reputation and trailing Hindutva ideological baggage in his wake. A straight talking Modi, drawing finesse from former BJP Prime Minister Vajpayee’s foreign policy playbook and developing a personal chemistry with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif may be conducive to fostering economic cooperation.

Such a rose-tinted view would be blurred by volatile issues in the bilateral in-tray, including Kashmir, cross-border terrorism, Afghanistan and nuclear confidence-building measures. Whilst the manifesto calls for a sharpening of the national security and intelligence gathering apparatus, Modi’s response (politically and militarily) to another Mumbai-style terrorist attack would also be a test of his character and leadership acumen.

China and Looking East

Modi has been politically savvy with his rhetoric on China and what he has called its ‘expansionist mindset’ when speaking in sensitive border states such as Arunachal Pradesh. Projecting a hard man image is intended to bring reassurance to a country still scarred by defeat in the 1962 border war with China.

As such, it is anticipated that pragmatism and the expanding Gujarat—China commercial relationship that Modi has cultivated (having visited China four times) would be undertaken nationally. This would complement the work of previous administrations regarding managing border disputes whilst continuing to bridge the military gap between both countries.

A continuation of the ‘Look East’ doctrine and deepening partnerships with Japan, South Korea and ASEAN members Singapore and Vietnam would be beneficial to the long term quandary that is the Sino-Indian relationship. Such a mutually beneficial synergy of alliances will be best placed to strategically counter Chinese aspirations in the region.

A Sound Defence Industrial Policy

Enacting defence acquisition reform to aid military modernisation is also on the agenda. Whilst India’s military spending is substantially behind that of China, the recently drawn out medium multi-role combat aircraft competition (MMRCA) is indicative of India’s status with European and US companies.  Dependent on political will, huge efforts to clean up defence procurement will need to be expended, with both acquisition and foreign investment in joint ventures entangled in red tape and bureaucratese.
 

 Whilst there is a desire to exploit a diversified Western market and not be beholden to one particular country, India will not deviate from an entrenched defence relationship with Russia (‘Hindi-Russi Bhai Bhai’). Most recently, President Putin was appreciative of “India’s reserve and objectivity” over the Crimean situation. There is also a need to articulate a more nuanced foreign policy, with the BJP keen to unlock India’s ‘soft power potential’ and to use ‘proactive diplomacy’ as indicated in their manifesto. On paper it is an honourable exercise.

In reality a surge in illiberal tendencies alongside enduring social justice issues continue to mar India’s international reputation and it is questionable whether a BJP-led government, juggling a coalition alongside a vociferous Hindu nationalist grassroots movement could assuage such concerns and push forward an enlightened agenda.