France's Political Uncertainties

Emmanuel Macron is a risk taker. In his spectacular political career, rising from economic adviser to President Hollande in 2012 to a two-term president, those risks have paid off. So far.

When Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (RN) emerged as the largest French party from the European Parliament (EP) election on 9 June, Macron behaved true to form by immediately dissolving the National Assembly and calling legislative elections. He justified this by saying that a clarification was necessary, in terms of the governance of France. He probably wanted to use the shock of the RN victory in the EP elections to confront French voters with the underlying question: do you really want the RN, with its populist–nationalist programme, to govern France?

If so, he got partial clarity after a breathless three-week election campaign and two rounds of voting. French electors made it clear that, for now at least, they were not ready to put the RN in government. They relegated the RN and its allies to a surprising third place with 143 seats, behind two other blocs: the ramshackle coalition of hard-left, communist, social democrat and green parties known as the Nouveau Front Populaire (NFP), with 192 seats, and Macron’s centrist Ensemble group, which exceeded forecasts with 168 seats. The centre-right Les Républicains (LR) trailed far behind, with 60. The outcome is a National Assembly more divided than any since the start of the Fifth Republic in 1958.

Under the French constitution, the president has the prerogative to name a prime minister and invite them to form a government. But at the moment, Macron is in no hurry. He is likely to keep the current government in a caretaker role, with limited powers, until the Olympics and Paralympics are over in early September.

At that point, if the president followed precedent, he would give the leader of the largest party in the Assembly the chance to form a government. But the NFP are almost 100 seats short of an overall majority, with little prospect of attracting wider support. They are struggling to agree on who to propose as prime minister, reflecting deep divisions on policies and priorities. Macron will exploit this with the aim of keeping the most hard-left faction, led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon, out of government.

Other permutations might have more chance of lasting at least until further elections can take place in a year’s time. One would be a so-called ‘rainbow coalition’ excluding the Mélenchon faction, but involving the other parties on the left and the centrists, with a centre-left or green prime minister. A second would be a grouping of the centrists and LR, with an LR prime minister. If both of those fail, the only other alternative would be a technocratic ‘national unity’ government, but that would send a signal – including to the markets – that the French system was in deep crisis.

For the moment, the initiative lies with the party leaders. That in itself reflects a subtle shift in the political landscape. The National Assembly now has a legitimacy of its own, since it was elected quite separately from the presidential election process. Macron will have to come to terms with the reality that, for the remaining three years of his mandate, he will be in a period of cohabitation, probably more conflictual than that of 1997–2002 between the Gaullist President Jacques Chirac and the Socialist Lionel Jospin as prime minister. One consequence is that he will not have the same dominant role on the domestic policy agenda.

Implications

What are the implications of this unstable French political scene for foreign and defence policy? The constitution sets out a separation of roles between the president, who is commander in chief of the armed forces and ‘guarantor of national independence’, and the government, which ‘determines and conducts the policy of the nation’. But there is plenty of room for friction. For example, the prime minister is also ‘responsible for national defence’. In practice, Macron is likely to retain the initiative in dealing with international crises, setting foreign policy and representing France at international meetings. Provided that the Mélenchonist faction can be excluded, none of the feasible options for a cohabitation government would contest current French defence policy or press for a different approach on Ukraine, China or the Middle East.

European policy could be more problematic. The Commission has already launched an ‘excessive debt procedure’ against France and five other EU members, requiring them to agree with Brussels a plan to bring their fiscal deficit back to the target of 3% of GDP. But the new French government, whatever its precise composition, will want to spend more in some areas, in response to the very evident dissatisfaction of voters with the status quo. And there will certainly be no appetite for Brussels-mandated austerity measures. If the French lock horns with the Commission on fiscal policy, it will also add to the existing tensions between Paris and Berlin.

As France enters the unfamiliar and possibly protracted business of coalition-forming, the most important impact on France’s allies is likely to be a weakening of Macron’s authority. The whole point of de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic constitution was to create a strong president and escape a long period of parliamentary instability. This has given French presidents a speed and agility in decision-making which most other European leaders lack. Macron has exploited this to the full to position himself as the leading European statesman. One recent example was his sudden announcement of a willingness to consider sending French troops to Ukraine (later qualified as meaning trainers, not combat forces).

The balance of power has now shifted in Paris. Macron will have to negotiate with his government any proposal which requires resources or legislation. This will inevitably sap his capacity to give a strong and confident lead at a time when there are fundamental European security issues to be addressed and both President Biden and Chancellor Scholz are also facing grave electoral problems. Nonetheless, the French constitution gives him enough scope to remain an influential figure. His experience will be complementary to Prime Minister Keir Starmer, with his strong position at home and five-year perspective, but who is still a newcomer to national security affairs. The bilateral meeting which Starmer and Macron are due to hold in the margins of the European Political Community meeting at Blenheim Palace on 18 July will be an important opportunity to build a partnership between them.

The final verdict on Macron’s gamble on calling early legislative elections will only be delivered in the 2027 presidential contest. After the RN’s strong showing in the first round of the National Assembly elections, Le Pen was quick to proclaim that the second round result was a victory postponed. The RN will spend the next three years polishing their narrative that the people’s will was frustrated by an elite conspiracy. France’s allies will be watching anxiously to see whether Macron can work effectively enough with his cohabitation partners to avoid his gamble leading to him handing Le Pen the keys to the Elysée.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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