Does Brazil Spend Too Much on Military Personnel?

When discussing Brazil’s military expenditure, it has become commonplace to claim that the share allocated to personnel is too large. In fact, if we examine Congress’s Defence Sector report for the 2025 budgetary law (approved on 11 December 2024), we find that personnel expenditure accounts for 74% of the 2025 budget proposal for the armed forces. Further adjustments to the law by the congressman responsible for the report increased that percentage to nearly 76%, similar to the 2023 and 2024 proposals. (There were no increases in personnel expenditure, but investment was slightly reduced, which marginally altered the percentage.)

Furthermore, on the same day, another congressman presented a proposal to reduce pension benefits for the military, arguing that Brazil spends too much on personnel. According to him, 78% of the defence budget goes on payment and pensions. The author of the proposal contrasts this figure with NATO military personnel expenditure, where it never exceeds 60%. The details of the proposal are not particularly relevant, because the Brazilian Constitution explicitly states that any law concerning military salaries, pensions or related matters can only be presented by the president. Unless he has really poor advisors, the congressman must be aware that his proposal will be rejected on constitutional grounds. Thus, he’s not genuinely attempting to enact change, but is instead making a political statement.

The proposal is not the first to compare Brazil’s military personnel expenditure with that of NATO. A news report published in June 2024 went even further – alarmingly so – claiming that Brazil spends three times more on military personnel than the US.

To be clear, I am not suggesting that defence spending in Brazil is not heavily skewed towards personnel payment and benefits. On the contrary, I’ve heard that, if over three-quarters of Brazil’s defence budget is spent on personnel, the primary role of the country’s armed forces is not defence but nation-building – providing jobs to people. As hard as it is to swallow that pill, it’s even harder to deny it. Warfare is a complicated business, one that requires a particularly expensive set of tools. If all we have are people on the ground, there’s no way we’ll ever be ready to fight. In this regard, I wholeheartedly agree that the share of the defence budget allocated to personnel is too large.

But I think Brazilian society is looking at the problem through the wrong lenses. And, perhaps, there are other militaries around the world that could also benefit from adopting a different perspective.

Thinking It Through

When someone claims that Brazil spends too much on personnel, two questions come to mind.

The first is: does Brazil have too many military personnel? According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Brazil has 366,500 active military personnel, ranking 14th globally.

But raw numbers can be misleading. Let’s consider ratios by comparing the top 20 countries (according to the number of military personnel) with their respective populations (2024 estimates, according to the World Bank). In this case, Brazil drops to 17th place, with 1.68 active military personnel per 1,000 people. 

Table 1: Top 20 countries – military personnel per 1,000 people

However, the list includes countries like Ukraine, which is engaged in a Clausewitzian total war against Russia. This may not be the most relevant comparison for Brazil. Let’s narrow the focus to South America instead (excluding the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and French Guiana).

In its region, Brazil (366,500) leads the active military list by a wide margin. 

Table 2: South America – military personnel 

However, the ratio of active military personnel to citizens tells a different story. When we factor in population size, Brazil (1.68) falls almost to the bottom of the list. The only South American country with fewer active military personnel per 1,000 people than Brazil is Argentina (1.54).

Table 3: South America – military personnel per 1,000 people

We could expand the analysis by looking at the ratio of military personnel per land area or the length of each country’s border, but I think the point is clear. Even though Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world, with 8,500 km2 of land area and roughly 17,000 km of borders with nine different countries (plus French Guiana), it ranks 14th globally when it comes to military personnel. Brazil leads South America in active military personnel, but it lags behind every country on the continent (except Argentina) when we consider population size.

According to these ratios, it seems that the answer to the first question is no – Brazil does not appear to have an excessive number of military personnel. 

The second question to consider is whether military salaries in Brazil are too high. To obtain a comprehensive answer, we would need to list every job in Brazil’s public sector (including the military) and examine the earnings of entry-level professionals, the average salary and the end-of-career salary, along with any benefits that may apply. Clearly, this is unfeasible, so let’s settle for a comparison with a news article that lists the highest-paying jobs in the Executive branch at the federal level (originally in BRL, converted to USD at a 6.00 exchange rate). Each entry represents a category that includes various job types, but I’ve included examples for each one. 

Table 4: Best-paying jobs in Brazilian government

Next, let’s include data from the military. Again, a fully comprehensive approach would account for all possible benefits, but this would be nearly impossible. Instead, I’ve used open-source documents from the Brazilian Navy, Army and Air Force. Payment data was taken from the Army document (accurate as of April 2023), and I’ve assumed this applies equally across all three branches.

Table 5: Best-paying jobs in Brazilian government and the military

As the table shows, a 4-star General is a well-paying position. However, such a high rank would be best compared to a Minister, whose salary is even higher at $6,941.82 (the highest anyone could earn in public office in 2023). Aside from that, Generals and Flag Officers (OF-7, OF-8, and OF-9) make up just 0.11% of the armed forces, so their pay has little impact on overall personnel expenditure.

A Colonel (OF-5) ranks fifth on the list, but the entry-level salary (OF-1) is the lowest of all 10 careers listed. The average pay for an Officer (OF-1 to 5) is $3,197.17, and officers comprise 14.16% of military personnel across all branches.

The bulk of the military consists of non-commissioned officers (NCOs – 41.80%). When comparing their salaries, the military ranks near the bottom of the list. The disparity in entry-level salaries is so large that they should not even be included in the same table: an OR-4 earns less than a third of the lowest entry-level salary listed. 

This comparison is, of course, clumsy at best. However, the goal here is not to present a scientific analysis, but rather to form a general picture. From what we’ve seen, it seems that abnormally high salaries are not the reason why Brazil allocates 76% of its defence budget to personnel.

What is Really Happening?

After addressing excess personnel and overly high compensation, we can begin to confront the real issue at hand. And the truth is as simple as it is difficult to change.

Brazil spends too little on defence. Not only that, but each year, the amount decreases slightly. Let’s examine defence expenditure over time as a share of GDP (from 2000 to 2023, based on data from SIPRI).

Figure 1: Brazilian defence expenditure as a share of GDP (%)

The graph shows that the last year Brazil came close to meeting NATO’s 2% guideline was in 2001. The years 2022 and 2023 were particularly challenging, with defence spending at just 1.07% and 1.08% of GDP, respectively.

If we were to compare Brazil’s military personnel expenditure with NATO standards and increase defence spending in Brazil to 2% of GDP, the share allocated to personnel would drop significantly – falling to 40.99% in 2023.

The problem, then, is not that Brazil spends too much on personnel – it’s that it spends too little on defence.

Impossible Possibilities 

The solution seems obvious: Brazil should increase its defence expenditure. In fact, there is a proposal in Congress to amend the Constitution to reserve 2% of GDP for defence. However, that proposal has gone nowhere – it hasn’t even been rejected. It simply sits there, waiting for someone to bother writing a report and bringing it to a vote. Even the defence minister himself, during a Q&A session at the Superior School of Defence in Brasília in early 2024, stated that 2% is ‘too much’ and that Brazil doesn’t need such a significant allocation for defence.

In this regard, South America does seem to be a relatively peaceful anomaly, with few interstate wars. Even Nicolás Maduro’s 2023 bravado toward Guyana didn’t really change this scenario. However, a closer look at the security landscape reveals a paradox: South America may, simultaneously, be the most secure and the most dangerous region in the world. This is due to the extreme levels of violence linked to organised crime, which frequently draw the region’s armed forces into internal security operations.

Despite these considerations, without the support of the defence minister himself, it’s hard to see how the armed forces could ever win the perennial guns-versus-butter debate.

If increasing defence spending is not an option, the only alternative is to reduce the size of the military. Interestingly, in Brazil, doing so does not guarantee a larger budget for investment or operations due to the country’s budgetary framework.

Let’s assume, for a moment, that it would be possible to lay off 50% of Brazil’s military workforce. (It isn’t – Brazilian law, especially regarding public service, strongly favours workers’ rights.) Such a drastic reduction would, of course, immediately cut personnel expenses.

However, in Brazil, salaries and pensions are classified as ‘obligatory expenditures,’ which receive priority treatment when the annual budget law is drafted. After all obligatory expenditures are covered, the remaining funds are divided among the ministries – of which Brazil has 38. To complicate matters further, Congress heavily amends the budget law. As of 2024, members of Congress were responsible for allocating 24% of the federal budget. 

In this scenario, once obligatory expenditures were met, the military would still have to fight for a larger slice of the remaining budgetary pie. And, as always, it’s difficult to win the guns-versus-butter debate. As a result, the armed forces would probably find themselves reduced in size yet still spending a disproportionate share of their (now smaller) budget on personnel.

Is There Anything That Can be Done?

Yes, there is. It’s not an easy task, and it would require a lot of effort and creative thinking, but I do see a solution to the problem.

First, there needs to be a serious discussion about the share of GDP allocated to defence. If we can reach 2%, that’s great – but we’ve already seen how hard that would be. A more realistic target might be somewhere between 1.5% to 1.6%, a compromise between the 2% NATO guideline and the current 1.08%. But if we must settle for 1.1%, so be it. We need to plan based on reality, and not wishful thinking. Whatever the percentage, it must be fixed for the defence budget. In Brazil, where everything tends to end up in the Constitution, this likely means some form of constitutional amendment.

Next, we must set a realistic goal for personnel spending and establish a timeline to achieve it. For this thought exercise, let’s assume the final target is 40% to 50% of the defence budget, with a defined percentage reduction each year to take us there. Achieving this would require a comprehensive review of military career structures. This might include adjusting promotion timelines, creating new ranks to alleviate the burden of costly upper ranks, and perhaps implementing some form of ‘up or out’ policy. Voluntary layoff programmes could also be part of the solution. In the end, we would need a clear, structured plan to reduce personnel expenditures gradually and sustainably.

Of course, all of this would be incredibly difficult. Fewer personnel would mean fewer military bases, and, for many cities, military bases serve as key economic pillars. No congressman or congresswoman wants to see a base in their home district close. However, defence planning requires hard decisions, and it’s time for Brazilians to face some of those realities.

Finally, while we get the personnel numbers right, we would also have to start thinking about how to invest in equipment and operations. To do this effectively, I would like to see Brazil move beyond single-service parochialism and embrace joint planning. This would ensure that every capability we acquire meaningfully improves our ability to deter, defend and defeat. But that’s a topic for another discussion.

© Rodrigo Albuquerque Pereira, 2025, published by RUSI with permission of the author

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