Divided Opinions After Failed Coup Underscore Bolivia’s Political Fragility

In the space of approximately three hours on 26 June, a contingent of soldiers led by then Commanding General of the Bolivian Army General Juan José Zúñiga mobilised in the Plaza Murillo of Bolivia’s administrative capital La Paz. Shortly afterwards, an armoured vehicle forced open the main gate of the Palacio Quemado, the former seat of government, leading to a heated verbal standoff between President Luis Arce and Zúñiga, who Arce later accused of being the lead conspirator behind an attempted coup d’état. In a confusing chronology of events, the situation appeared to resolve itself after Arce swore in a new military high command and demanded that Zúñiga retreat.

The international community widely condemned the attempted coup, demonstrating an intolerance of any effort to subvert a state’s constitutional order by toppling a democratically elected government. 

Nonetheless, the nuances of Bolivian politics are largely misunderstood by international audiences. As opposed to a straightforward case of a failed military takeover of a civilian government, the events in Bolivia were steeped in controversy. In fact, they have left the country more polarised than ever. While thousands demonstrated their support for Arce in a so-called ‘march for democracy’ on 12 July, many Bolivians have dismissed the events of 26 June as a self-coup, or autogolpe,by Arce to increase his popularity ahead of the 2025 presidential election. Understanding the context of the alleged coup attempt is imperative for outsiders seeking to engage with Bolivia.

Repeating History

Arce has depicted his standoff with Zúñiga at the entrance of the Palacio Quemado as an act of heroism in defence of democracy. In a speech to his supporters on 12 July, Arce accused ‘the right and fascism’ of trying to cover up the coup, and in an interview with BBC Mundo on 16 July, he said that foreign interests had intended to take over the government and gain control of Bolivia’s strategic resources.

The narrative mirrors rhetoric used by the left-wing ruling party Movement Towards Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo: MAS) during an earlier case of military involvement in Bolivian politics. On 10 November 2019, the military command suggested former President Evo Morales (2006–19) resign to restore order after prolonged nationwide protests that accused his government of electoral fraud. Morales was replaced by an interim government led by former President Jeanine Áñez (2019–20), a senator of the right-wing opposition ideologically at odds with MAS, who alienated a large section of Bolivia’s majority indigenous population by saying the bible had been brought back to the government. 

The events of 2019 exacerbated polarisation in Bolivian society, leading to regular clashes between supporters and detractors of MAS. When MAS was elected with over 55% of votes in 2020 in elections deemed free and fair by the Organization of American States’ electoral observation mission, the Arce government framed the military intervention in 2019 as a coup. The MAS-aligned judiciary has since systematically prosecuted the individuals involved – such as Áñez and the governor of Santa Cruz department, Fernando Camacho, who was a key organiser of the 2019 protests – under broadly defined terrorism charges, which human rights groups have criticised as unsubstantiated and disproportionate.

Since 2019, Morales and the rest of MAS have blamed the right-wing political opposition and US interest in Bolivia’s natural resources – in particular the country’s deposits of lithium, a critical resource for the production of lithium-ion batteries needed in the clean energy transition, of which Bolivia has an estimated 21% share globally – for his forced resignation. Morales alleged that the exclusion of US companies from tender processes to industrialise lithium in Bolivia had motivated the US to interfere in Bolivian politics. 

To date, efforts to harness Bolivia’s potential for lithium production have failed for various reasons, including technical challenges and local opposition to lithium mines. However, this could change under agreements made in 2023 for the Chinese consortium CBC, the Chinese company Citic Guoan Group and the Russian state firm Uranium One Group to invest in lithium mining projects in Bolivia. Arce’s regurgitation of Morales’ rhetoric after the events of 26 June indicates that the MAS government will very likely continue to exclude the US from lithium extraction opportunities.

Popularity Contest

Sceptics of Arce have questioned the authenticity of the coup attempt, citing irregularities such as the military’s lack of lethal weapons and violence, the timing of the coup attempt, and the limited number of battalions involved. These doubts were amplified after Zúñiga told the press during his arrest that earlier that week Arce had told him ‘the situation is very screwed … something is necessary to raise my popularity’, insinuating that Arce had instructed Zúñiga to order the deployment to help him gain public support. Despite these allegations, there is no solid evidence to support the hypothesis of a self-coup. 

However, it is worth noting that Arce has indeed experienced a sharp fall in popularity since he was elected. According to a CID Gallup poll conducted in May 2024, Arce had an approval rating of just 18%. One of the main explanations for this is the deteriorating state of Bolivia’s economy. A depletion of the country’s foreign reserves, driven by declining domestic oil and gas output and a widening fiscal deficit, has led to a dollar scarcity in the country, raising fears of a steep devaluation of local currency. Elevated prices of imported consumer goods, combined with shortages of domestic fuel supplies and long queues at gas stations, have driven various sectors to protest so far in 2024.

To date, the Arce government has made few obvious efforts to address Bolivia’s economic challenges. Instead, it appears that the government has been trying to buy time ahead of the 2025 election, such as by authorising the sale of half of Bolivia’s gold reserves in May 2023. By February 2024 these had been depleted, causing Fitch Ratings to downgrade Bolivia’s rating to junk territory. 

However, on 16 July Arce asserted that the economy was in ‘a recovery process’ after investment in hydrocarbon exploration led to the recent discovery of a natural gas field with a potential of 1.7 trillion cubic feet, Bolivia’s largest discovery of natural gas since 2005. The discovery could offer a lifeline for Arce, restoring investor confidence in the sustainability of the country’s gas supply and renewing exports to neighbouring countries such as Brazil. 

Nonetheless, public discontent will almost certainly continue to impact Arce’s government in the lead-up to the 2025 election. Since late 2022, fierce competition between Arce and his predecessor and former ally Morales for the leadership and candidacy of MAS in the 2025 presidential election has split the party down the middle into supporters of Arce, known locally as arcistas, and supporters of Morales, known as evistas. 

The rift has driven political and social instability in Bolivia. Morales has mobilised his loyal support base to protest against Arce’s government on several occasions. After Bolivia’s Plurinational Constitutional Court ruled that Morales could not seek re-election in December 2023, Morales rejected the outcome and his supporters paralysed the country with road blockades that lasted more than two weeks and led to clashes between protesters and the police. Threats of renewed indefinite protests in July by coca growers’ unions, Morales’ main support base, if his candidacy is banned by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal indicate that the failed coup attempt did not unify MAS and win Arce the support of evistas. Instead, party divisions will almost certainly drive continued social unrest in the lead-up to the 2025 elections. 

Conclusion

The controversy that has surfaced in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt in Bolivia underscores the complexity and uncertainty of the country’s current political climate. While the recurring tendency for military interference in Bolivia’s civil affairs is a concerning testament to the fragility of its political institutions, the most significant consequence of the coup is very likely to be its role in deepening societal polarisation ahead of the 2025 election. 

Arce will almost certainly use the failed coup attempt to rally much-needed support from the Bolivian public. However, Morales and members of the opposition are very likely to employ the narrative of a self-coup to discredit Arce’s government and improve their own chances of election, playing to public discontent about the state of the economy. In this scenario of an increasingly divided populace driven both by intra-MAS rivalry and the longstanding enmity between MAS and the political opposition, there is an increased risk of protests and strikes by government supporters or detractors that could further disrupt the economy.

The coup may also have international implications. For instance, Bolivia’s ongoing social tensions and political instability could disincentivise foreign investment in its hydrocarbons sector, which is vital to reboot the country’s economy. Furthermore, Arce’s allegation that foreign interests were responsible for the coup indicates that the US is likely to continue to be excluded from the industrialisation of Bolivia’s lithium. This could serve as a geopolitical disadvantage for the West if Bolivia’s expansive reserves are eventually exploited solely by Chinese and Russian companies, given that Bolivian lithium has the potential to become an important source of the coveted mineral in the global clean energy transition. 

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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