A Dangerous Standoff: The Battle for Bosnia’s Institutions

Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) faces its most serious institutional crisis since 2001, when the largest Bosnian Croat party withdrew from the majority of the country’s institutions and attempted to establish an illegal parallel system in Croat-majority areas. Today, the threat comes from Republika Srpska (RS), a majority Serb region, whose leadership is actively trying to dismantle the foundations of the post-war state. While echoes of the past are unavoidable, today’s crisis also reflects new realities and changed dynamics.

Republika Srpska’s Challenge to Bosnia’s Constitutional Order

On 27 February 2025, RS lawmakers passed laws aimed at stripping state institutions of authority over the judiciary and law enforcement. These laws effectively declare that RS institutions no longer recognise the legitimacy of the state court and its central law enforcement agency. Another law, inspired by Russia’s foreign agent legislation, targets civil society organisations.

After these laws took effect on 7 March, the RS interior ministry tried to order the state-level police agency to vacate its premises, escalating tensions and increasing the risk of direct confrontation. The Constitutional Court swiftly suspended these laws, but RS authorities pressed ahead, introducing financial and employment regulations for individuals who are expected to shift to RS jurisdiction.

More alarmingly, RS has begun legislative activities aimed at forming its own border police and inteligence agency, and drafting a new constitution. The draft abolishes protection mechanisms for non-Serbs, asserts RS’s right to self-determination, allows for potential confederation with Serbia, and envisions an RS army – severing ties with Bosnia’s key state institutions established since the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed in 1995.

Milorad Dodik’s Gamble

At the centre of this crisis is Milorad Dodik, the RS president and a veteran of the country’s post-war politics. He calculated that geopolitical shifts – Donald Trump’s return to the White House, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán blocking EU responses, and Serbia’s passive stance – would create the conditions for his strategy to succeed. As well as his grip over RS institutions allowing him to enforce compliance, declaring, ‘the winners will be those who have the force to implement laws. And in this case, that is Republika Srpska.’

Yet, events have not unfolded as he expected. The near-confrontation between police forces left him without Orbán’s public support for the steps which followed. The Trump administration, keen to avoid another European crises, pushed back. US secretary of state Marco Rubio reaffirmed Washington’s support for Bosnia’s constitutional order, urging regional partners ‘to join us in pushing back against this dangerous and destabilising behaviour.’

The EU too has not remained passive. Germany signalled its readiness to impose sanctions, including for the first time those targeting individuals. Austria also, for the first time, called for sanctions against Dodik. The European Commission privately warned of cutting financial support to RS, while France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Turkey issued strong warnings. Turkey’s engagement is particularly notable, given Dodik’s past assertions of close ties with president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

The RS Opposition and Institutional Resilience

Domestically, the crisis has not played entirely in Dodik’s favour. For the first time since 2006, the RS opposition has found a compelling narrative – arguing that this crisis is not about the well-being of RS or Serbs but about Dodik himself, who is jeopardising the economy, stability and autonomy. State institutions, while under immense pressure, have proven more resilient than expected. Serb civil servants and officials have so far not abandoned them en masse, and institutions under attack continue to somewhat operate on the RS territory.

Dodik and his inner circle, however, show no intention of backing down. With two criminal cases against him, he has little to lose.

On 26 February 2025, the state court convicted Dodik in a first-instance ruling to a one-year prison sentence and a six-year ban from public office for defying the decisions of the international high representative. Since 1997, the holder of this office, created under the Dayton Peace Agreement, has had Bonn powers enabling him to dismiss officials, impose laws, and annul decisions. In 2023, facing growing resistance, the current officeholder, former German politician Christian Schmidt, criminalised the non-implementation of his rulings – a law now being tested for the first time in Dodik’s case.

A separate investigation into Dodik, as well as RS Prime Minister Radovan Višković and the current speaker of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska, Nenad Stevandić, is for attempting to undermine constitutional order, and was initiated in December 2024. After the steps taken by the RS authorities in the aftermath of the Constitutional Court’s decision to suspend the RS legislation, and the refusal by the RS leadership to appear for questioning, the state court announced on 17 March that it ordered pre-trial detention for all three. In theory, all law enforcement agencies, including border police, are now required to enforce this order. However, due to Dodik’s influence over RS security structures and broader stability considerations by other institutions, this has not yet been implemented. This standoff is a test of endurance.

Serbia’s Role and Two Visions for Bosnia

Serbia’s president, Aleksandar Vučić, has met Dodik twice since 26 February, while his prime minister and deputy prime ministers travelled to Banja Luka in a show of support. At home, Vučić sought to use the crisis to deflect attention from the ongoing protests challenging his rule. Abroad, he insisted he is ‘doing everything possible to… keep Republika Srpska within Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ But his actions embolden Dodik. In Summer 2024 – Vučić and Dodik orchestrated the All-Serb Assembly, which endorsed RS’s non-existing right to unilaterally reclaim all state-level competencies transferred since 1995, including defence, taxation, and law enforcement. Both knew these moves would be unconstitutional and would provoke a crisis. That was the goal.

The vision of a stronger RS at the expence of the state – one which would allow for the eventual annexation of Serb-majority areas – existed among Serb intelectuals and politicians since Dayton was signed in 1995. A version of this vision had already fuelled the wars of the 1990s, displacing two million people, killing 100,000, and culminating in the genocide in Srebrenica. To prevent its realisation, Dayton aimed to restore Bosnia’s multi-ethnic character through refugee return, war crimes prosecutions, and special mechanisms of protection for the rights of Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats across the country.

International engagement made progress possible. Today, almost 20 percent of Republika Srpska’s population are non-Serbs. But the other vision never disappeared. It was kept in check primarily by strong initial US leadership and the EU’s promise of full membership, which offered a vision of less visible borders and economic benefits. With the support of Serb politicians, including Dodik, Bosnia established key institutions such as a unified army, a tax administration, state-level police and judiciary, and a border police. These reforms succeeded because they ensured RS had a say in the newly established institutions and, more importantly, because they provided concrete advantages in relations with NATO and the EU.

The 2006 creation of a joint army came with a promise of full NATO membership – something that at that time most Bosnian Serb politicians embraced. Eventually, however, its realisation was blocked due to miscalculated conditionality set by NATO allies at the 2010 Tallinn Summit. By 2014, encouraged by Vladimir Putin and his illegal Crimea annexation, Dodik reversed course.

Other state-level institutions, from police agencies, to bodies in charged with issuing travel documents, had all been established to secure a 2008 free trade deal with the EU, and visa-free Schengen travel in 2010. But after that, the EU abandoned its momentum on integration. With no new benefits, there was no incentive to build or strengthen institutions. Bosnia entered political deadlock, and the vision of monoethnic territories and a stronger RS resurfaced.

No Easy Way Out of the Current Crisis

There is no easy way out of the current crisis – no quick fixes. But one thing is clear: it is up to the state-level institutions to show resilience and the EU to take the lead in supporting them. The EU must seize the unexpected but welcome window created by the Trump administration, recognising that sustained US engagement at the level seen in the past is unlikely. While public statements may continue, USAID and embassy cuts will limit US interest and influence. Meanwhile, the UK’s strategic dialogue with the EU and its readiness to engage in the Balkans make it a crucial partner. The EU must capitalise on this.

This EU’s lead starts with recognition that Bosnia and the Western Balkans region need a credible EU membership perspective. The new European Commission, led by its president Ursula von der Leyen and commissioner in charge for enlargement, Marta Kos, has pledged their ability to finalise technical aspects of membership negotiations with at least three Western Balkans states, Ukraine and Moldova by the end of the decade. As well as to make significant progress with other candidates, including Bosnia. Without full support from all member states, however, these promises ring hollow. Member states must therefore make a firm joint and public political commitment to prepare for EU’s institutions, policies and budget for enlargement.

Additionally, they should explicitly state that any candidate meeting the necessary obligations and demonstrating a robust rule of law will gain full access to the single market and its four freedoms before full membership, and as soon as they fulfill conditions. This would give the European Commission the mandate to act and strengthen the EU’s credibility in the region and beyond, including in Ukraine and Moldova.

Dodik has gone further than ever before in challenging Bosnia’s constitutional order, creating real risks of institutional collapse and violence. This escalation is dangerous – but it is also an opportunity to finally halt a long-term agenda of undermining state institutions. A mere pause should not be enough; what is needed is clear evidence that all decisions of the state-level Constitutional Court are respected, that all laws and by-laws adopted by RS institutions in defiance of the constitutional order are annulled, and that all political declarations – including various conclusions – are withdrawn. The EU must also reaffirm Bosnia’s existing institutions as essential for its current level of integration, including the free trade flow, visa-free travel, and future accession. If requested, the EU Special Representative and EU’s military mission (EUFOR Althea) on the ground must support domestic institutions in upholding stability and the rule of law.

A stronger EU commitment to Bosnia’s accession must be paired with clear expectations and guarantees. While Bosnia’s constitutional structure will remain in place and mostly unchanged, reforms are necessary to align it with EU standards and ensure it can effectively enforce single market rules. This includes ending the Bonn Powers of the high representative. Other key reforms, such as implementing European Court of Human Rights rulings, should be addressed through the EU accession process. A roadmap for democracy and the rule of law, established at the start of negotiations, would guide these discussions. Such perspective would allow stronger credibility to those who oppose Dodik’s activities – both within his own ranks and in the RS opposition.

Finally, the EU must address security guarantees for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In particular the future of the EUFOR Althea military mission, which depends on an annual UN Security Council mandate vulnerable to Russian and Chinese vetoes. A sustainable solution might be to shift the mission under a joint EU-NATO agreement with Bosnian collective head of the state, the Presidency, potentially involving the UK and Turkey. This would preserve EUFOR’s mandate and authority, ensuring stability until Bosnia joins the EU and comes under its mutual defence clause.

The EU and its partners have a choice: immediately push back against Dodik and Vučić, by drawing clear red lines and spelling out consequences, or risk Bosnia and the Western Balkans sliding into deeper crisis. The first step must be firm resistance to their destabilising actions, backed by tangible support for Bosnia’s institutions. This time, the EU must lead decisively – hesitation will only embolden those seeking to dismantle the state.

© Adnan Ćerimagić, 2025, published by RUSI with permission of the author.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author's, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

For terms of use, see Website Ts&Cs of Use.

Have an idea for a Commentary you’d like to write for us? Send a short pitch to commentaries@rusi.org and we’ll get back to you if it fits into our research interests. View full guidelines for contributors.