Concluding Chapter One - The Death of Bin Laden

By Tobias Feakin, Director, National Security and Resilience, RUSI

There is no doubt that with the death of Al-Qa'ida's figurehead,  an element of their potency and influence will be lost.  During the past fifteen years Osama Bin Laden was the key persona, spokesman, and visual embodiment of Al-Qa'ida. Through his messages on TV and on the internet, he expounded the ideology that was developed by himself and Ayman al-Zawahiri, promoting the global jihad.  A vital element of this ideology was to move Al-Qa'ida from being a physical group of individuals geographically constrained, into an evolving ideology which could inspire others to take up arms against the 'West' and strike out globally. Bin Laden realised that this shift to becoming a 'movement' was the key to the success of Al-Qa'ida's long-term goals.

Prior to the 9/11 attacks the 'Al-Qa'ida core' was pivotal to the strength of the organisation, around a dozen or so members of the inner circle surrounded by around a hundred extremely motivated loyalists drawn from around the Muslim world.  Below Bin Laden was his deputy Abu Ayoub al-Iraqi otherwise known as Mamdouth Salim, and underneath him were the consultative committee drawn from Mujahedeen who fought in the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1970s/80s who had sworn a pledge of allegiance to bin Laden in 1989.  Since their forced withdrawal from Afghanistan the core leadership hid itself away within the tribal regions of Waziristan, scattered over both the Pakistani and Afghani sides of the border.  Due to the ferocious nature of the allied forces' pursuit of the core of Al-Qa'ida became increasingly small in numbers, yet retained an incredibly tight knit structure.  Despite the denial of territorial space for Al-Qa'ida by increased NATO operations in Afghanistan since 2005, the small number of operatives had been strengthened somewhat by the relationships it has formed with Pashtun extremists and separatist groups that live in the border regions.  Thousands of Arab jihadis had made their homes in this region, with many marrying the Pashtun widows of Taliban fighters, which ensures their continued protection and the loyalty of the local tribes.  And this is where it was assumed for many years that Bin Laden was hiding, so it came as a surprise to many that he was discovered in a secure house less than a mile from Pakistan's main military academy in Abbottabad.  And this raises a serious question mark over the potential involvement of Pakistani Military and Intelligence services in Bin Laden's hide out.  Even though Zardari's administration had ramped up their efforts to counter the Taliban and Al-Qa'ida, the influence of the Pakistani intelligence services, the ISI, is still undeniably strong.  Within the ISI there remains a reluctance from some members to fight what they see as fellow Muslims. The ISI have traditionally been blamed for a great deal of support for violent Islamic groups in its fractious relationship with India:

"The ISI's sphere of influence extends beyond its national borders: militant groups seeking to undermine the administration in Kashmir were reputedly established by the ISI and trained by Pakistani Army, and Islamist groups within India are actively encouraged by the organisation.  Much of the region's chaos can be blamed on the ISI's meddling and manipulation, but it is too late to put the genie back in the bottle."[1]

However, this raises even more serious questions about the extent to which ISI members were involved in the hiding of Bin Laden, and the repercussions of evidence found to further support this line will be highly damaging for Pakistan.  That the US operation to kill Bin Laden involved no Pakistan forces and the Pakistani government had not been informed about the attack, would indicate that their involvement was a risk not worth taking, despite the serious implications this could have had if the operation had failed.

 

The Changing Shape of Al-Qa'ida

Throughout the 2000s Al-Qa'ida's global presence and impact have dramatically widened as the organisation transformed into a network of loosely affiliated franchises operating more or less independently of a leadership on the run.  Al-Qa'ida's ideology, long-term strategy, training materials and justification of jihad are freely available on the Internet, enabling any independent cell or group to operate within its framework.  There is no longer as much of a reliance on a centralised base, which was enjoyed in Afghanistan, and few of the terrorists have any form of personal contact with the inner core of leaders.  Bin Laden's final resting spot exemplified the difficulty he was having in providing the messages to those he wished to influence, the building was cut off from modern communications technology, no telephones, and no internet connection, the only communication being his small number of messengers who would carry messages to the outside world.  This ended up being his downfall, as intelligence agencies had managed to infiltrate the network of messengers and extract enough information to form a picture upon which to act. 

 

Over the past three years we have seen the diminishing influence that he has had on Al-Qa'ida operations, but the 'movement' which he inspired spreading to new centres of focus, sprouting new franchises in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsular. Most prominent of these countries has been in the Yemen where the growing influence of the charismatic preacher Anwar al-Awlaki and Al-Qa'ida in that country has caused growing concern to international governments.  Recent attacks from 2009 onwards in both the UK, Europe and the US have all demonstrated the influence that al-Awlaki and his group now have on taking the global jihad into the 2010s, more so that the Al-Qa'ida 'core'.

 

The long-term aims of Al-Qa'ida remain despite Bin Laden's demise, and his influence as a martyr will continue to grow in the months and years to come as will the glorification of his death being leap upon by both sides.  There is no doubting that the death of Bin Laden is the closure of the first chapter of the story of and battle against Al-Qa'ida, and that this will undoubtedly slow the momentum of the organisation.  This is something that should be greeted happily as a partial victory in the ongoing struggle against international terrorism.  However, the ideological message and influence of Bin Laden has clearly been globally dispersed and the weeks and months head will demonstrate how the various factions and offshoots of Al-Qa'ida will regroup, and ultimately react to the death of Bin Laden and open the next chapter of the story. 

NOTE

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[1]A. B. Atwan(2009) - 'Al-Qa'ida and the Taliban - Dangerous Alliances in Afghanistan and Pakistan', pp. 125-148 in A. P.  Schmid and G. F.  Hindle, After the War on Terror - Regional and Multilateral Perspectives on Counter-Terrorism Strategy (London:  RUSI Books, 2009).