Having won a fourth six-year term in office, Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez has ensured that his Bolivarian Revolution will prevail for now. However, despite having secured victory at the polls, key security challenges and the risk that a political crisis could still unfold in Venezuela in the period ahead have not disappeared.
While fears were high that Venezuela's neck and neck presidential race between the incumbent Hugo Chávez and opposition coalition candidate Henrique Capriles might culminate in a violent political crisis, it did not. In fact, despite some isolated incidences during the run up to the election, Election Day itself (Sunday 7 October) went ahead without any violence or unrest being reported. The result: an uncontested victory for President Chávez who, with an immense voter turnout of 80.94 per cent, the highest turnout in Venezuela for decades, won with 54 per cent of the vote.
This triumph represents an enormous public relations success for Venezuela's democratic credentials, a testimony to its ability to hold free and fair elections and a clear demonstration that Chávez still enjoys the support of the majority of Venezuelans despite his many shortcomings. Now that the dust has settled, what can we expect to see from Chávez in the period ahead, what are the major challenges that Chavez's administration will face and what are the future prospects for Henrique Capriles and Venezuela's defeated opposition coalition?
Venezuela's Two-Horse Race Revisited
This year's presidential election race was the most competitive race in Venezuela for over a decade. For Chávez, the election campaign consisted of mobilising his support base, while ensuring that his prospects for re-election were not overshadowed by the secrecy surrounding his ill-health; the state of which was widely believed to be worse than publicly acknowledged. In contrast, Capriles' campaign sought to capitalise on his youth and good health, adopting Chavez's former campaign style by packing in a schedule of rallies and grass-roots meetings across the country. This, combined with the fact that Chávez was having to compete against an opposition coalition - Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD) - which was for the first time united behind a single candidate, made a victory for underdog candidate Capriles look increasingly plausible and the possible outbreak of violence - stirred up by either a disgruntled Chávez, his loyal supporters or even the Venezuelan military -a daunting reality.
What To Expect Next From Hugo Chávez
Having now gained a mandate for a further six-year term, Chávez has succeeded in securing at least the short-term future of 'Chávismo' (his personal brand of left-wing populism) and his broader agenda for socio-political reform commonly dubbed the 'Bolivarian Revolution'. As a result of this victory the immediate risk of violence has receded. The coming months are likely to see the Chávez Administration continue to pursue its efforts to centralise power in Venezuela; perhaps by strengthening its control over the Venezuelan economy and ordering further nationalisations (most likely in the banking, food and health sectors).
With regards to foreign, defence and security policy, Chávez is likely to continue offering his support for left-wing allies across Latin America in an effort to spread the 'Bolivarian Revolution'. This will be pursued by reinforcing Venezuela's relations with ALBA countries (a regional bloc that aims for social, political, and economic integration in Latin America and the Caribbean), such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Cuba and Nicaragua - who benefit from soft loans and Chávez's Petrocaribe scheme which provides Venezuelan oil at subsidised rates. He will also likely continue to pursue a policy of opposing perceived colonialism within Latin America; something which is likely to see Venezuela continuing to back Argentina's sovereignty dispute with Britain over the Falkland Islands.
As Latin America's chief anti-US agitator, Chávez is also likely to continue overtures to US adversaries, such as Iran - with whom Venezuela announced earlier this year that it was building unmanned drone aircraft as part of a wider programme of military cooperation. The coming months are also likely to see Chávez strengthening relations with Colombia, as both share cross-border security issues - primarily tied to serious organised crime - and are currently working together on pushing forward Colombia's on-going peace process with the FARC; the region's most prominent left wing guerrilla insurgency.
Key Challenges for the Chávez Administration
Yet, despite Chávez's having secured re-election, both he and his administration must still overcome a number of significant challenges if it is to ensure future social, political and economic stability. Firstly this means addressing the country's high levels of domestic insecurity. Venezuela has one of the highest murder rates in the world and crime affects people at all levels of Venezuelan society. Given Capriles' success in securing the support of undecided voters, reducing Chávez's victory margin to just 10 points, Chávez can therefore not be complacent on issues such as crime, corruption, social inclusion, institutional decay, criminal complicity, police brutality, polarisation, impunity, Venezuela's crumbling infrastructure, and its underperforming industry.
With regards to the Venezuelan economy, despite strong oil-fuelled growth in 2012, the country's foreign-currency reserves are dwindling. This is in part thanks to a track-record of wasteful state spending, a rising debt burden and the country's dependency on oil, which constitutes more than 90 per cent of Venezuela's foreign currency inflows. In particular, a major challenge for Chávez will be his ability to successfully control the rate of inflation in Venezuela which is currently close to 20 per cent.
Issues relating to Chávez's health are also unlikely to disappear from Venezuela's political agenda. Should his cancer return it could prevent him from being able to fulfil his election mandate and complete this presidential term. If this scenario were to unfold and Chávez became incapacitated within the first four years of the six-year term, under Venezuela's constitution a new election would have to be called within thirty days. Against this backdrop, the overwhelming centralisation of power in Venezuela twinned with the absence of an obvious political heir or a clear succession plan within the country's ruling party (PSUV), means that Chávista could still be vulnerable to fragmentation - something which could trigger an internal power struggle in the period ahead.
Should such a situation evolve, the key players that are likely to be involved are those whose interests would not be served by changes to the status quo. Of particular concern are politicised armed groups loyal to the Bolivarian Revolution, such as the Colectivos - a group based in the 23 de Enero district of Caracas - and the 'National Bolivarian Militia' another armed civilian group, often referred to as the president's 'private army'. Should Chávez's heath suddenly deteriorate again, the PSUV could attempt to instigate major unrest on the streets of Venezuela using groups like the Colectivos or the Militia in order to declare a state of emergency that could be used to postpone the vote or reject an undesirable result. The Venezuelan military would also have a pivotal role to play. In fact, there is no guarantee that the military would support an election that removes Chávez and the PSUV from power; especially as a significant number of Venezuela's senior military figures owe their rank to Chávez, and perhaps perceive their futures to be tied to the perpetuation of the status quo. While the Bolivarian Revolution remains on course for now, its future is therefore by no means secure.
What Now for Capriles?
Despite being understandably downtrodden, Capriles - who succeeded in gaining 45 per cent of the vote - was nonetheless dignified in accepting defeat; urging his supporters to view this as a starting point from which to go forward. Next on the agenda for the opposition will be the Venezuelan state governorship elections in December which will give the coalition an early chance to try and improve on their share of seven, out of 24, states which they control. Crucial to their prospects will be maintaining the MUD alliance which enabled the opposition to close the gap that had existed between Chávez and his closest rival by almost 20 percentage points.
While all the opposition leaders rallied behind Capriles following his resounding primary victory in February, this unity may not last. Despite having gained the support of six million Venezuelan's in the presidential elections, the opposition's level of support could well begin to shrink following its defeat; especially if fears that a mass middle-class exodus from the country of disgruntled opposition supporters come to fruition. For Capriles, a significant challenge will be his ability to convince the country's poor that, despite his wealthy background and appearance, the benefits they have gained under Chávez would not be at risk. While this message may be effective, the opposition will still have to compete against a ruling party who openly used state resources to fund their campaigns and who hold a monopoly over Venezuela's national media output.
Now the Dust Has Settled
The secrecy surrounding Chávez's health has increased concerns over the potential of a new election if he is incapacitated within the first four years of his new term. Should such a situation unfold, the violence which was largely avoided this time may not remain absent in an election in which everything is seen as at stake. That said, Chávez could simply attempt to hold a referendum to change Venezuela's constitution to guarantee that power would automatically fall to his new Vice-President Nicolas Maduro (the former bus driver who served as Venezuela's foreign minister since 2006) were his health to suddenly deteriorate.
In the meantime, Chávez has promised to be a better president, but it is unclear if he has the desire or capacity to tackle Venezuela's long term problems. If Chávez is to truly become a better president and ensure that his legacy is a positive one, he should therefore seek to address the current centralisation of power in Venezuela, the question of succession within Chávista and the power vacuum that his eventual departure from politics is destined to create within the PSUV in the period ahead.