THE CASE FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN ZIMBABWE

Knox Chitiyo

Royal United Services Institute

OCCASIONAL PAPER
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Executive Summary

This paper is intended to stimulate a discourse on the security sector and its reform in Zimbabwe. It makes the case that Security Sector Reform (SSR) must be a fundamental component in Zimbabwe’s stabilisation and reconstruction, and suggests ways forward to achieve this. Zimbabwe’s economy has revived since the establishment of the Government of National Unity in February 2009, and there is now hope for the future. But Zimbabwe’s renaissance is poised on a political knife edge and the security sector will have the casting vote on whether the nation’s recovery is durable or temporary. Understanding the military, promoting a new dynamic in military relations, and encouraging SSR is vital to ensure the transition leads to sustainable development.

There are seven key developments which are ‘frontloading’ security and SSR onto the national agenda in Zimbabwe. The first is the establishment and first meeting of the National Security Council, the key forum and civilian oversight for civil-military relations. Second, the National Organ on Healing and Reconciliation has begun the difficult, but vital, task of social peace-making. The military is a core component of this; there can be no reconciliation without the participation of the security sector, and they in turn will have to acknowledge the violence that has been unleashed against civilians over the past four decades. Third, the regional and international community is beginning to engage with Zimbabwe. This economic engagement will have to be buttressed by a better strategised and co-ordinated approach to political and security sector engagement with Zimbabwe. Fourth, Zimbabweans themselves (including many in the security sector) have expressed the desire for a new national security agenda. Fifth, political violence, although much reduced, continues, and there has also been a surge in organised and random crime in Zimbabwe. Only a return to traditional, depoliticised security sector mandates and capabilities (particularly in policing) will enable these threats to be addressed. Sixth, the 15 September 2008 Global Political Agreement (GPA) which led to the creation of the GNU, was explicit about the need to improve security in Zimbabwe. As the GPA reaches its first anniversary, there will be intense scrutiny of what has been achieved in the domains of security and the rule of law. Finally, Zimbabwe has a history of excellence in international peacekeeping operations but security at home has to be better aligned with international competency.

The fact that security has now been formalised on the national agenda is a major breakthrough. This paper suggests that SSR be embedded within a new National Defence and Security Strategy (NDSS) for Zimbabwe. But the paper also acknowledges that rethinking and remaking security in Zimbabwe is unlikely to occur in a neat, linear fashion. Although exhibiting many of the problems of a post-conflict country, Zimbabwe cannot be seen as a ‘classic’ post-conflict nation because peace in this instance was brokered between politicians rather than between military groups. The settlement in Zimbabwe is a political agreement, which essentially leaves the security sector untouched. SSR in Zimbabwe will therefore not follow the conventional post-conflict template. It may be messy and open-ended. Nevertheless, what matters is that national security dialogue and processes occur, and that they are driven primarily by Zimbabweans.
Zimbabwe has taken immense strides towards stabilisation and reconstruction under the GNU. But political violence and systemic infractions of the rule of law continue, and could derail progress if left unattended.

Zimbabwe needs a National Defence and Security Strategy (NDSS) to define a road map for security in Zimbabwe. This would need to integrate traditional defence policy with the state and security sector’s responsibility to provide human security to all of Zimbabwe’s people. The NDSS would be part of a wider, multi-sectoral political, economic and judicial review/reform process which has already begun.

SSR would be an integral part of the NDSS.

The NDSS and SSR process must be Zimbabwean-led. There is a role and need for international assistance; but Zimbabweans should drive the process.

The NDSS – including SSR – should be a consultative process involving all the necessary stakeholders. It should not be punitive. Police reform is the most urgent priority.

Zimbabwe needs a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. There can be no sustainable peace and security in Zimbabwe without formal acknowledgment of the violence by both perpetrators and victims. Reformative justice and reconciliation is a vital part of SSR in Zimbabwe and should be supported.

The UK, which helped to train the Zimbabwean military, still has an important role to play in Zimbabwe’s security transformation. There is scope for a mutually beneficial Zimbabwe-UK security and development partnership, based on non-partisan ‘inclusive engagement’ by the UK with all of Zimbabwe’s political, military and civilian stakeholders.

**Key Points**

- Zimbabwe has taken immense strides towards stabilisation and reconstruction under the GNU. But political violence and systemic infractions of the rule of law continue, and could derail progress if left unattended.
- Zimbabwe needs a National Defence and Security Strategy (NDSS) to define a road map for security in Zimbabwe. This would need to integrate traditional defence policy with the state and security sector’s responsibility to provide human security to all of Zimbabwe’s people. The NDSS would be part of a wider, multi-sectoral political, economic and judicial review/reform process which has already begun.
- SSR would be an integral part of the NDSS.
- The NDSS and SSR process must be Zimbabwean-led. There is a role and need for international assistance; but Zimbabweans should drive the process.
- The NDSS – including SSR – should be a consultative process involving all the necessary stakeholders. It should not be punitive. Police reform is the most urgent priority.
- Zimbabwe needs a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. There can be no sustainable peace and security in Zimbabwe without formal acknowledgment of the violence by both perpetrators and victims. Reformative justice and reconciliation is a vital part of SSR in Zimbabwe and should be supported.
- The UK, which helped to train the Zimbabwean military, still has an important role to play in Zimbabwe’s security transformation. There is scope for a mutually beneficial Zimbabwe-UK security and development partnership, based on non-partisan ‘inclusive engagement’ by the UK with all of Zimbabwe’s political, military and civilian stakeholders.
## Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFZ</td>
<td>Air Force of Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIPPA</td>
<td>Access to Information and Privacy Act</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BMATT</td>
<td>British Military Advisory and Training Team</td>
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<td>CIO</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Organisation</td>
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<td>DCS</td>
<td>Defence and Security Commission</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DFC</td>
<td>Defence Forces Commission</td>
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<td>DfID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>ESC</td>
<td>Electoral Supervisory Committee</td>
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<td>ESR</td>
<td>Economic Sector Reform</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FLS</td>
<td>Frontline States</td>
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<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Liberation Front of Mozambique</td>
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<td>GEC</td>
<td>Government Executive Committee</td>
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<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>GPA</td>
<td>Global Political Agreement</td>
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<td>IS</td>
<td>Internal Settlement</td>
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<td>JCSC</td>
<td>Joint Command and Staff Courses</td>
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<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOMIC</td>
<td>Joint Monitoring Implementation Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
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<td>MDC-M</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change-Mutambara</td>
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<td>MDC-T</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Constitutional Assembly</td>
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<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Command Centre</td>
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<td>NDSS</td>
<td>National Defence and Security Strategy</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>PISI</td>
<td>Police Internal Security and Intelligence unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>POSA</td>
<td>Public Order and Security Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSR</td>
<td>Political Sector Reform</td>
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<td>RBZ</td>
<td>Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Mozambican National Resistance</td>
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<td>RF</td>
<td>Rhodesian Front</td>
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<td>SABC</td>
<td>South African Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>South African Development Community</td>
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<td>SRC</td>
<td>Social Revolutionary Council</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>STERP</td>
<td>Short Term Economic Recovery Programme</td>
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<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<td>UANC</td>
<td>United African National Council</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>ZANLA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army</td>
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<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)</td>
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<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People's Union</td>
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<td>ZDF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Defence Forces</td>
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<td>ZEC</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>ZIPRA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People's Revolutionary Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZNA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZNLWVA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association</td>
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<td>ZPS</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Prison Service</td>
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<td>ZRP</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Republic Police</td>
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1. Introduction

Zimbabwe’s Government of National Unity (GNU) was created on 15 February 2009. It is fair to say that Zimbabwe’s fragile coalition has achieved much more than many had hoped. There are a number of positives: inflation, once an otherworldly 90 sextillion per cent\(^1\) in November 2008 (a figure surpassed only by Hungary’s economic crash in 1946)\(^2\) has been dramatically reduced. Urban supermarkets once again have full shelves. The worthless Zimbabwe dollar has been replaced, for trading purposes, by the South African rand and the US dollar. The GNU has managed to use its new found moral authority and political capital to persuade civil service employees to return to work. There has been a marked decrease in political violence nationwide; and the creation of the Organ on National Healing and Reconciliation and the four days of National Healing (24-26 July) are positive developments.\(^3\) The fact that the GNU is still functioning and enacting policy, months after its creation, is itself a minor miracle and a rebuff to doomsayers who had insisted that internal schisms would immediately cripple the GNU.

Nevertheless, the GNU faces short-, medium- and long-term challenges. Its commitment to power-sharing is working well in some areas, but the inevitable counter-narrative of inter- and intra-party power struggles directly impacts on the delicate balance of power between the key stakeholders, and affects daily activities. The crisis of expectations and the chronology of delivery are also fundamental challenges for the GNU. The government has to balance the pressures of real-time immediate challenges and expectations with medium- to long-term issues that must be addressed, but which cannot be solved by a ‘quick fix’. Immediate problems include the need to secure substantive development aid, and address the land question – in particular the continued invasions and take-overs of commercial farms by militias, security sector operatives and the political elite – as well as the continued destitution and displacement of farm labourers (an estimated 400,000 since 2000).\(^4\) Critical infrastructure rehabilitation (health, education, water and sanitation, and transport) is also vital. These are indisputably first order tasks which the government has rightly prioritised in the Short Term Economic Recovery Programme (STERP) of March 2009.\(^5\)

However, there is another challenge, which appears to have been relegated to the second rank in terms of importance, but is nevertheless a challenge that is central to Zimbabwe’s stabilisation, reconstruction and sustainable development. This is the question of the security sector in Zimbabwe. In the memorandum of understanding of the Global Political Agreement of 15 September 2008, which led to the creation of the GNU, there is explicit recognition of the need

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1. Introduction

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\(^1\) 90,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 per cent.

\(^2\) During the Hungarian hyperinflation in July 1946, prices doubled every 15 hours. In November 2008, prices doubled every 24 hours in Zimbabwe.

\(^3\) President Mugabe passed an Extraordinary Gazette which listed 24-26 July 2009 as days for National Healing and Reconciliation in Zimbabwe. He pointed out that the National Healing Days are intended to promote non-violence in Zimbabwe.


\(^5\) STERP is a road map for stabilising and reconstructing Zimbabwe’s key agricultural, mining, manufacturing and tourism sectors. The plan explicitly links political governance to economic development.
to make the security sector part of the democratic process. In March 2009, Zimbabwe’s parliament passed the National Security Bill, which established a National Security Council (NSC) to oversee the military. In August 2009, the NSC’s first session yielded a historic first official meeting between Prime Minister Tsvangirai and the military chiefs. This ‘ice-breaker’ meeting has put security on the national agenda; but there remain doubts about the extent to which the military elites recognise the GNU, the need for civilian oversight of the military, or the need for SSR.

Depoliticising and reprofessionalising the security sector, and demilitarising Zimbabwe’s political economy, are vital steps; reform is a process which representatives of all three political parties, and some members of the security sector, have called for. To date, much of the debate and policy planning on reform in Zimbabwe is occurring in a disconnected fashion. STERP is a valuable vision statement for Zimbabwe’s economic future but there needs to be a comprehensive mutual vision of a holistic, interlinked Political Sector Reform (PSR), Economic Sector Reform (ESR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) process. This report will give the historical context of current Zimbabwean politics and security sector challenges. Perhaps more importantly, it is intended to serve as a preliminary discussion forum and to make the case that national dialogue about the security sector should not be remaineded until after national elections. Indeed, the security sector has been intimately linked to Zimbabwe’s electoral history over the past decade – they have been the sponsors, managers and agents of political violence at election time. There already exist some informal discussions between the armed services and wider society about transitional justice and the role of the military. This discussion should be encouraged, but it needs to be complemented by a more formal, policy-led approach to the security sector in Zimbabwe. During the 1980s, the creation of a unified Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) was an essential component of nation-building. This is a different decade, and Zimbabwe faces a different situation. Yet, in many respects, the fundamental challenges remain the same: first, to integrate the security sector as one of the drivers, rather than the spoilers, of national reconstruction; and second, to re-introduce professionalism, not politics, as the institutional ethos of the military. Finally, although it is important to situate Zimbabwe’s SSR narrative within a national context, it is also important to view Zimbabwe’s security within the wider global dimension of new security discourses in the age of uncertainty.
2. Overview of Security in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe’s formal security sector comprises the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF), the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) and the Zimbabwe Prison Service (ZPS). Allied to the formal security sector is the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) and the ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front) Youth League. From the time of the Liberation War (1965-79) to the present there has always been an uneasy and uneven duality between professionalism and politicisation within the security sector. The Rhodesian Security Forces were a highly professional, but increasingly ideological force, while the guerrilla forces of ZANLA and ZIPRA, after a shaky start in the 1960s, established a quantitative superiority over the Rhodesians and qualitative parity by 1979. However, both forces – and ZANLA in particular – were highly politicised and ideological military groups.

The second ‘peak’ of politicisation occurred from 1981 to 1987 when the ZDF fought wars on multiple fronts; in Matabeleland, the special forces 5th Brigade launched the Gukurahundi campaign against suspected ‘dissidents’ in northern Matebeleland, resulting in the slaughter of an estimated 20-25,000 civilians. Simultaneously, the ZDF were deployed in Mozambique to protect the vital rail and road links to Mozambican ports, as well as shoring up FRELIMO forces in the war against RENAMO. The ZRP and CIO were also engaged in counter-subversion against South African military operatives who were destabilising the Frontline States (FLS) alliance against the then apartheid-based state. During this period, the external South African threat, and internal insurgencies, resulted in Zimbabwean forces and FLS forces becoming ever more politicised. The fundamental tenets included adherence to the ideology of (black) African liberation; the conflation of national security with the security of the state; the increasing melding of the party, state and government; and the close ‘liberation alliance’ between the party and the military. The third and most extreme peak began in 1997 when the state began its alliance with the war veterans (ex-combatants). At the time, most of the ZDF personnel were also ex-combatants from the Liberation War, and this brought the formal military into the ‘circle in the round’.

The post-2000 formalisation of the alliance between ZANU-PF and the security sector was designed to prevent the MDC’s access to the levers of state power. The MDC’s popularity, as evidenced in general and presidential elections in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2008, was a major threat to ZANU-PF’s hegemony. From 2000 until the establishment of the GNU in 2009, politics in Zimbabwe was dominated by military exigencies.

There were five major trends. First, by 2008, there was no real distinction between the party, the state and the government. Second, the formerly opaque politics/military/business nexus and ‘covenant’ became open and structured. Third, politicisation and political loyalty, rather than professionalism, became the guiding ethos within the security sector. Fourth, Zimbabwe’s political economy, the ‘strategic sector’ and many state institutions were also militarised and politicised. Fifth, presidentialism was also institutionalised. It would be simplistic to characterise the security sector as militarily or politically homogenous – there have been serious problems regarding morale, politicisation and training – but the combination of institutional esprit de corps, politicisation, patronage and proximity to power means that the security sector still remains broadly loyal to the ZANU-PF grouping within the GNU. The threat of a recalcitrant and interventionist security sector poses a major problem to the survival of the GNU and to the ability of the GNU to usher in sustainable, democratic development and reconstruction. Engaging with the military and creating a framework for non-partisan civil-military relations is thus a necessity.

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3. Military Operations and the Militarisation of Institutions

There have been a number of large-scale and lesser military operations in Zimbabwe since 2000. These major operations have always coincided with national elections, and they are listed here for three reasons. First, the suffering that was inflicted on the victims of this state-sponsored political violence won even more support for the opposition. Second, the extreme, sustained and systematic violence led to a legacy of lasting bitterness against the state and the military by many sections of Zimbabwean society. Many are pressing the MDC to try and convict the perpetrators and the managers of the crimes, and this in turn makes the military elite even more recalcitrant. It also makes the space for inclusive civil-military relations more problematic. Third, the operations reinforced the deadly skills and camaraderie of the Chimurenga generation, and also established a generational continuity through the recruitment of youths into the militias and the formal armed services. This inculcation of political violence as morally justifiable, and its utility in the ‘just war’ ideology of the state, is one of the major issues for the GNU and its successor to address.

Operation Tsuro

From March to July 2000, Operation Tsuro (‘Rabbit’) was launched. This involved approximately 1,500 war veterans, 1,000 soldiers of the 5th Brigade, 300 CIO operatives, approximately 200 members of the police, and 5-6,000 ZANU-PF volunteers, including ZANU-PF youth members. Operation Tsuro had three objectives, which included forcibly taking over the farms of the 1,600 white commercial farmers, and intimidating and using violence against known or suspected opposition supporters to ensure that they voted for the ruling party. By the time Operation Tsuro ended, it was estimated that 700 farmers had been driven off their land, 135 opposition members had been killed, and dozens more traumatised by violence.7 Bright Salani, a schoolteacher based in Cheche, near Mozambique, described the recruitment of the youth:8

Young party members are selected according to their local branches and sent for seven days of indoctrination at the King George VI (KGVI) army barracks in Harare. There, they are taught assassination skills ... they are shown how to stab someone in the chest ... the recruits are also given instructions on burning the houses of opponents. They were then sent out at night to kill MDC members or burn their houses.

The police were not instant converts to Operation Tsuro, and their co-option took time. In the early phases of the operation, some police units attempted to protect the farmers and arrested the war veterans. This led to occasional skirmishes between police and the invading gangs; one of the more famous instances was the so-called ‘Battle of Mvurwi’ on 26 May 2000, which resulted in one war veteran being killed and thirteen others being injured after a police station was besieged by militias.9 Four factors accelerated the police transition from neutrality or opposition to enthusiastic participation in the operation. These included official instructions not to intervene; the compulsory retirement of white officers from the ZRP from 2000-01; growing solidarity between the police, the army and the war veterans; and the promise that police personnel would also acquire formerly white-owned land and equipment.

2002 Elections

The 2002 presidential elections were also run as a military operation. A national command centre (NCC) was established, initially at the Sheraton Hotel, but later relocated to Manyame Air Base

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8 Ibid.

9 The war veterans were attempting to rescue twelve of their colleagues who had been arrested for inciting violence.
near Harare airport. The NCC’s task was to ensure that Mugabe won the elections. The strategy involved the military taking command of the electoral institutions; the tactics included the use or threat of force to ensure voting compliance. The Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC) was staffed with retired and serving officers, with Colonel (Rtd) Sobusa Gula-Ndebele appointed as head of the ESC for the duration of the elections. Two of the six members of the ESC were army staff, and the management of the electoral process was run as a military operation. The MDC also claimed that 146 militia bases had been established to co-ordinate the army, police, CIO, war veteran and youth strategy.10

Another development was the militarisation and use of trained youth auxiliaries during the election. In 2000, Border Gezi, who was the minister for youth, gender and employment-creation at the time, released a document entitled ‘National Youth Policy of Zimbabwe’. He stated that his aim was to teach discipline, and impart life skills and patriotism, to a generation which he felt had lost its way. In April 2001, the revised and expanded youth project was launched as the Border Gezi Training Centre in Mount Darwin at the former 2nd Brigade army barracks. Most of the instructors were war veterans, soldiers, police and CIO members. Contrary to later reports, genuine skills in carpentry, agriculture, management and the environment were taught, but so too was violence and ideological rigour. By the time of the 2002 elections, upwards of 20,000 young people had been trained and five major camps had been established nationwide. During the elections the war veterans operated as the party’s shock troops, with the youths as auxiliaries. The army provided logistics and monitored the operations, while the police and CIO gathered intelligence. Mugabe won a narrow victory.

Operation Murambatsvina

The third major operation was Operation Murambatsvina (‘Drive out rubbish’), which followed the parliamentary elections of 2005. During a three-week operation in May-June 2005, police and army units used bulldozers to demolish hundreds of shacks and houses in high-density urban areas nationwide, leaving an estimated 300,000 people homeless (there were slivers of poetic justice: a few of the ‘destroyers’ returned home to find that their own homes had been levelled by over-zealous colleagues). The government stated that the operation was necessary to reduce urban crime and improve service delivery in the cities. Urban crime had undoubtedly become a serious problem in Zimbabwe, but there is also little doubt that the assault was state retribution for urban support for the MDC. The operation, which left tens of thousands of people homeless, resulted in increased international condemnation for the government. It also led to increasingly frosty relations with the UNHCR; the government was incensed by UN Special Envoy Ann Tibaijuka’s report on Operation Murambatsvina. This report, which was published in July 2005, laid bare the desolation and devastation caused by the operation.11

Smaller operations have included Operation Taguta/Sisuthi (‘We have eaten’) in November 2005; Operation Garikai (‘Live well’); and Operation Dzikisai Madhishi (‘Remove your dishes’). Operation Taguta was an attempt to create a command agriculture system reminiscent in some ways of the Bolshevik prodrazvyorstka agricultural requisitions of the 1920s. Small- to medium-scale plot holders, who normally planted a variety of cash crops, were ordered to plant only maize. In some areas, particularly in Matebeleland, other crops such as sweet potatoes and ground nuts were ploughed over by the army. The traditional crop cycle was severely disrupted, leading to increased food insecurity and the threat of starvation in more remote areas. Although the operation was marketed as a way of ‘rationalising’ Zimbabwe’s agricultural economy, many saw this as further

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10 Zimbabwe Situation, 22 February 2002.
punishment by the government of pro-opposition areas. Operation Garikai was officially launched as a massive housing project, the aim being to build small houses for those who had been displaced by Operation Murambatsvina, and to reduce the waiting list of those who had been waiting for years for government accommodation. Whatever the intention, Operation Garikai was riddled with inconsistencies and became a national scandal, with many of the houses being taken by the military or relatives of the political elite. In mid-2008, the army and police units launched Operation Dzikisai Madhishi. In a series of co-ordinated actions, Harare residents were forced to remove their satellite TV dishes; the state perceived the dishes as purveyors of ‘anti-Zimbabwean’ Western propaganda.

Operation Makavotera Papi?
The fourth major operation was Operation Makavotera Papi? (‘Who did you vote for?’). This operation involved a combined forces military assault on the rural areas, particularly in Masvingo, Mashonaland South province, and Manicaland. These were former ZANU-PF strongholds that were to be punished for voting for the MDC in the March elections. The operation was prepared by the military but involved the police, CIO, war veterans and the dreaded ‘Green Bomber’ youth militias. Schools were turned into military headquarters, and the provinces became ‘operational zones’. Senior army staff co-ordinated the strategy, the aim being to terrorise people into voting for ZANU-PF in the June run-off election, or to force long-time MDC supporters to flee the area and thus lose the chance to vote (voters can only do so in their registered district). The tactics were implemented by the war veterans, police and CIO. Torture camps were established, and villagers were forced to attend day and night indoctrination sessions (pungwes) where ‘traitors’ would be publically tortured or killed. Torture techniques included falanga (beating the soles of the feet), electric shock treatment, and the ‘submarine’ (the victim’s head is kept below water to the point of near asphyxiation). Such was the mayhem that the MDC were forced to withdraw from the run-off after it became clear that there was no way that a genuine election could take place.

Zimbabwe’s ‘Blood Diamonds’: Operation Chikoroza Chapera and Operation Hakudzokwi
In late 2008, the security sector launched a series of paramilitary attacks against illegal gold and diamond panners. Operation Chikoroza Chapera (‘No more mining’) involved the police and army in co-ordinated attacks against legal and illegal gold panners. Scores were injured and there were a number of fatalities. Operation Hakudzokwi (‘No return’) was launched against the 30,000 diamond panners in the Chiadzwa diamond fields in the Marange area of eastern Zimbabwe. This operation, which is ongoing and which is reputed to have led to the deaths of more than 300 civilians, has become a focal point for the investigation of abuses by Zimbabwe’s security sector. A number of reports have profiled human rights abuses by the security forces of gold and diamond panners. In March 2009, a Partnership Africa Canada report was highly critical of Zimbabwe’s management of its minerals extraction. In June 2009, a Human Rights Watch report castigated the security forces for major human rights abuses in the diamond fields. The report spoke of civilians from the area being rounded up and forced to work in the fields as virtual slave labour. It also catalogued the violence used against the panners, and the subsequent killings. In July 2009, a report by a team of investigators

from the Kimberley Process\textsuperscript{15} recommended that Zimbabwe should be suspended because of the state’s failure to manage the diamond fields. This report also recommended that the military should be withdrawn from the diamond fields.

Zimbabwe’s military insists that many of the gold and diamond prospectors were illegal diggers, and that a criminal ‘mafia’ was profiting from the process. That much may be true, but it is also indisputable that the military murdered civilians in the diamond fields. Zimbabwe’s internal ‘blood diamonds’ saga harks back to earlier accusations of the Zimbabwean state and military profiting from DRC’s ‘blood diamonds’. The diamond fields are already a site of conflict within the GNU. None of the parties within the GNU want Zimbabwe to be blacklisted from the Kimberley Process. The MDC has stated that it needs diamond revenue for Zimbabwe’s economic recovery; ZANU-PF has benefited financially from the diamond fields; and the military are in no hurry to withdraw from the area despite reports that the GNU will hand the administration and security of the diamond fields to a private company. It is likely that struggles for the control of Zimbabwe’s mineral resources will become increasingly politicised as the two main political parties look for sources of revenue amidst ongoing political power struggles. The diamond and gold fields will thus remain sites of violence.

\textbf{External Operations: Mozambique and the DRC}

The Zimbabwe Defence Forces have also been involved in two major external conflicts since 1980: Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The ZDF was sent into Mozambique in 1982 to protect Zimbabwe’s vital transport artery, the Beira Corridor, from RENAMO insurgents. By 1984, the ZDF’s mandate had widened to include a formal alliance with FRELIMO against a resurgent RENAMO. From 1982 until the Rome Accord of 1991, the ZDF deployed approximately 15,000 troops, mainly in southern Mozambique, to prevent the collapse or partition of the country. By 1987, Mozambique had become a regional war: Tanzania, Zimbabwe and FRELIMO had allied against RENAMO and the South African government of the time. ZDF special forces (particularly paratroops) were often used in raids on RENAMO bases in Gorongossa, but it was a costly war of attrition with no clear winners on either side.

The ZDF were deployed into the DRC in 1997, in support of President Laurent Kabila who was facing a major insurgency in the east. This conflict, which would involve seven African countries, would become known as Africa’s ‘First World War’ and would pit Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and the DRC government against Uganda and Rwanda. Regular soldiers, criminal gangs, militia groups and insurgents were also used as proxy forces for the key stakeholders in a conflict which would claim millions of lives. The ZDF was deployed around Kinshasa to protect the government, and was also present in force around the major diamond region of Mbuji Mayi. The DRC intervention changed the dynamics of the Zimbabwean military; in 2002 various trade and service agreements between the Zimbabwean and Congolese government formalised the ZDF’s role as military entrepreneurs who profited from access to diamonds, cobalt and other Congolese resources. Zimbabwe’s military, business and political elite became part of a global network of diamond dealers who profited from the Congo war. Although Zimbabwe’s military presence in the DRC was downscaled in 2002, the Harare-Kinshasa diamond ‘axis’ has remained, with Harare itself becoming a major entrepôt in the illicit diamond trade. The Congo trade and Zimbabwe’s internal diamond ‘industry’ have cemented the Zimbabwe military’s role as the dominant class in Zimbabwe’s business community.

\textbf{The Joint Operations Command}

The Joint Operations Command (JOC) was the dominant force in Zimbabwe for the better part of a decade. The JOC, which operated at grand strategic level, was the successor to the tactical-level Rhodesian JOC. For the first two decades after 1980, the JOC mainly concentrated on purely military

\textsuperscript{15} The Kimberley Process is an international certification scheme to ensure trade in diamonds does not fund violence, <http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/>. There is also likely to be a report from the Kimberley Process team which visited Zimbabwe in July 2009.
affairs, which included the Gukarahundi war in Matebeleland, the ZDF operations in Mozambique, and the DRC campaign in the late 1990s.

The 2000 elections resulted in the remilitarisation of Zimbabwean politics (military force had already been used to break ZAPU – Zimbabwe African People’s Union – as a political entity in the 1980s, but this had mainly occurred in Matebeleland). In 2000, however, military force was used nationwide against the political opposition. Just as importantly, the JOC re-emerged as the real managers of Zimbabwean politics, and in the process established the military elite as the ruling class of Zimbabwe.

In 2002, the JOC comprised the former commander of the ZDF (the late Brigadier General Vitalis Zvinavashe); ZNA commander Lieutenant General Philip Chiwenga; AFZ commander, Air Marshal Perrence Shiri; and Police Commissioner Chiuri. The head of the ZNLWVA also participated in the weekly meetings. Initially, the JOC’s mission was to work out a military strategy to ensure ZANU-PF’s military survival during and after national elections. The weekly meetings involved Robert Mugabe, in his capacity as head of state, president of ZANU-PF and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Initially, the JOC operated under the tacit management of the party, but by the time of the 2005 elections it was clear that the JOC was no longer an instrument of the state. It had become an alternative to the state, and was, in effect, a parallel government.

By 2008, the securocrats had appropriated most of the levers of state power and coercion and there were some new faces at the JOC meetings. The ‘front rank’ of executive decision-makers within the JOC up to January 2009 included the current commander of the ZDF, Brigadier General Philip Chiwenga; ZNA commander, General Philip Sibanda; AFZ commander, Air Marshal Perrence Shiri; CIO director-general, Brigadier (Rtd) Happyton Bonyongwe; commissioner of prisons, Major General (Rtd) Paradzai Zimondi; and minister of defence, Emmerson Mnangagwa. Behind the front rank are the ‘advisers’ who sit in on meetings and whose advice is sought, but who are not decision-makers. They include Gideon Gono, Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) chief; ZNLWVA leader John Sibanda, and party stalwarts Sydney Sekeremai and Didymus Mutasa.

**Distribution of Power**

Although some have indicated that major jurisdictional disputes and turf battles occurred within the JOC, in fact these disputes were kept to a minimum, unlike the very overt political power struggles within ZANU-PF. There are four main reasons for the apparent unanimity: consensual decision-making, collective memory, loyalty, and the fear of collective punishment.

The JOC’s weekly sessions were normally chaired either by Robert Mugabe or by the commander of the ZDF, General Chiwenga. In terms of weighting for decision-making, the president held primacy, followed by the commander of the ZDF, with the others having parity. However, the JOC’s decisions were usually arrived at through consensus, with the military supremos striving to be a collective, rather than an individualist, decision-making body. There were several reasons for the emphasis on working in unison, the principal one being collective memory. Collective memory was vital for two reasons within the JOC. First, four out of the seven post-2000 leaders were current or former army officers. They had a long history of joint operations and established the modus vivendi of mutual collaboration. Second, the JOC chiefs never forgot the internal ZANU purges of the 1960s and 70s when dozens of recruits and leaders were killed, and they were keen to avoid internal divisions which could presage a return to factional war. In this regard, the JOC also used its war against the MDC as a way of creating a JOC ‘brand’ and preventing intra-military fratricide. Third, all the military chiefs were (and still are) at the head of their profession and already had substantial power and influence as CEOs of their respective departments. Fourth, JOC leaders were aware of their collective responsibility for the violence unleashed on Zimbabwe’s citizenry during the 1980s and after 2000. It has been estimated that the cumulative toll for the Gukarahundi and post-2000 military operations is more than 40,000 dead, 10,000 missing...
and more than 300,000 internally displaced persons.\textsuperscript{16} There have been calls for the JOC commanders and their acolytes to be put on trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Whether this happens or not, fear of retribution was clearly a major factor in the JOC’s decision-making.

The establishment of the GNU in February 2009 informalised the JOC. Although no longer called the JOC, the military chiefs have continued to meet in private and with some of the ZANU-PF leaders. These meetings will in all likelihood continue, although not formally, under the JOC name.

In early 2009, there were strong suspicions that the JOC, which supposedly ceased to operate following the establishment of the GNU, had now been reconstituted as the Social Revolutionary Council (SRC). According to the Zimbabwe Metro, ‘the group is led by Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa as chairman, Minister of State Didymus Mutasa as its secretary, and RBZ Governor Gideon Gono as treasurer, and members of the army and air force’.\textsuperscript{17} Although the reports remain unverified, it is clear that the GNU has triggered new clusters

\footnotesize{\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{NAME} & \textbf{INSTITUTION} & \textbf{POSITION} \\
\hline
Lt Gen Mike Nyambuya & Ministry of Energy & Former Minister \\
Brig Ambrose Mutinhiri & Ministry of Youth Development & Former Minister \\
Saviour Kasukuwere (ex-CIO) & Ministry of Youth Development & Current Minister \\
Lt Col Herbert Nyanhongo & Ministry of Transport and Communication & Former Deputy Minister \\
Col Christian Katsande & Ministry of Industry and International Trade & Current Permanent Secretary \\
Justin Mupamhanga (ex-CIO) & Ministry of Energy and Power Development & Current Permanent Secretary \\
Col Joseph Mhakayakora & Ministry of Construction & Current Director \\
Maj Anywhere Mutambudzi & Department of Information & Current Under Secretary \\
Brig Elisha Muzonzini & Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Current Ambassador, Kenya \\
Maj Gen Edzai Chimonyo & Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Current Ambassador, Tanzania \\
Maj Gen Paradzai Zimondi & Ministry of Prisons & Current Commissioner-General \\
Air Commodore Mike Karakadzai & National Railways of Zimbabwe & Current General Manager \\
Col Godfrey Nhemachena & Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe & Current General Manager \\
\hline
\end{tabular}}


\textsuperscript{17} Zimbabwe Metro, ‘Mnangagwa Chairs Social Revolutionary Council’, 11 April 2009.
of power in the military and across the party-political spectrum. For the past decade, the military had been unyielding in its opposition to the MDC; however, on Defence Forces Day (11 August 2009), both MDC parties were in attendance for the first time. In a highly symbolic act, the head of the Air Force of Zimbabwe, Air Vice Marshal Perence Shiri, and the commander of the Zimbabwe National Army, Lieutenant General Phillip Sibanda, both appeared to salute Tsvangirai. There has been a great deal of speculation that the salutation heralds a decisive split within the former JOC between the ‘accommodationists’ who saluted the prime minister; and the police, prisons and Zimbabwe Defence Forces ‘hardliners’, who did not salute. However, there is little evidence to support media speculation of a major rift amongst the former JOC chiefs. It is more likely that they saluted former ZDF commander Solomon Mujuru, who was sitting next to Tsvangirai on the day.

There have always been low-intensity power struggles within the GNU, and this tradition will continue; but it is too early to assume that there are irreversible schisms between the military elites. The NSC deal and salutation was in fact the result of intense political bargaining between the MDC and ZANU-PF, and the MDC still lacks the power of compulsion against the military. What is certain is that Zimbabwe’s security sector is no longer the sole preserve of ZANU-PF. Both of the major parties in the GNU seek to maintain, or attain, a competitive advantage in the security sector. Similarly, the military chiefs will use the inter- and intra-party power struggles within the GNU for their own advantage. The creation of the NSC has informalised, not destroyed, the JOC. But the NSC may factionalise the former JOC, as different military groupings cluster around political groups. This may be the case with the SRC, which is a means for the party to regain primacy in the power contestation between ZANU-PF and the military. The SRC is seen as having an anti-GNU and anti-MDC agenda, but it may also be a vehicle through which Mnangagwa can ultimately position himself for a clear run as Mugabe’s successor.

The Militarisation of Institutions

A number of Zimbabwe’s key institutions were, and still are, ‘policed’ by the military. Table 1 shows some of the state institutions which have, or had, military personnel.18

This table is by no means exhaustive, but it does give an idea of the extent to which the military is embedded within Zimbabwe’s political economy. Reducing the extent of military penetration, and achieving a more equitable political distribution of portfolios, has become a major issue between the MDC and ZANU-PF.

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Zimbabwe was in an undeclared civil war from 2000–08. The GNU period has brokered a political ‘armistice’ between ZANU-PF and the MDC but the situation remains tense, and there is a risk of return to high-intensity political violence.

From 2000, the security sector turned Zimbabwe into an operational zone. The aim was to use military force to counter the MDC’s popularity and to ensure that the MDC could never fully convert its popularity into political success.

There has been a fusion of roles between the army, intelligence services and police in Zimbabwe. The traditional differentiation between the organisations has been blurred.

There was a surge in politicisation of the security sector after 2000. This spiked during the electoral period of March-July 2008. There was a parallel increase in the use of political violence by the security sector.

Zimbabwe’s political economy remains factionalised and militarised, despite some improvement since 2008.

Despite being affected by the national crisis and internal upheavals, the security sector did not collapse or become incoherent after 2000.
4. Security Sector Organisations: Structure, Capabilities and Challenges

The Central Intelligence Organisation
Arguably the most influential, and certainly the most pervasive, organisation of state bureaucracy is the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO). The CIO is not the only intelligence-gathering organisation (there is also the Police Internal Security and Intelligence unit – PISI – as well as the ZNA Intelligence Unit), but the CIO is the best funded and networked, and has the highest number of specialist staff. There are an estimated 8-10,000 permanent CIO personnel within Zimbabwe, with dozens of others in the diaspora. However, there are also many informal CIO personnel and auxiliary staff. Apart from its core mandate of intelligence-gathering, the CIO has also engaged in paramilitary operations and is heavily implicated in Zimbabwe’s culture of violence. The CIO is notorious for abductions and the use of torture to extract information. Although the CIO is funded by taxpayers’ money, it is awarded through non-public President’s Office funds, making it difficult to determine the CIO’s annual budget and expenditure. Nevertheless, salaries remain an issue for the CIO rank and file. As part of the President’s Office, the organisation has access to funds that are not readily available to other military sectors. CIO operatives wield considerable ‘private’ power, but CIO boss Bonyongwe is lower in the security hierarchy than Chiwenga and Sibanda (ZDF commander and ZNA commander respectively).

The Army and the Air Force
The Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) has strategic power within the military-political nexus. The ZDF is embedded within the CIO, police and prisons, all of which have been thoroughly militarised, both in outlook and methodology. The ZDF comprises the ZNA (approximately 30,000 serving personnel) and the Air Force of Zimbabwe (approximately 5,000 personnel). The ZDF is configured for a ‘two war’ capacity (internal and external, and conventional and counter-insurgency warfare). The ZNA has five brigades and is equipped with a variety of tanks (including T-54/55s) and armoured cars. Since the Mozambique operation in the 1980s the army has placed particular emphasis on artillery and air defence; there is an array of self-propelled and towed artillery and mortars. The Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ) has older Hawker Hunter jets as well as more modern Chinese-built Chengu F-7 interceptors and some MiG-23s. There are also two Ilyushin-76 cargo aircraft. The AFZ has paid particular attention to creating a strong air defence network across the country. The ZDF’s conventional force posture is necessitated by ZDF deployments to regional or international conflicts (Mozambique in the 1980s and Angola, Somalia and the DRC in the 1990s). In the new millennium, the government has perennially stoked up fears of a British and/or US military ‘regime change’ intervention. There is no doubt that there has been post-2000 contingency planning in London, Washington and the EU for either a citizen extraction operation in the event of civil war in Zimbabwe, or a humanitarian intervention, which would inevitably have political consequences. For the state, the ‘invasion’ theory has been used as a means of retaining a major conventional war capacity, even though in real terms Zimbabwe does not face a major threat of invasion.

Quantity of weaponry is one thing, but the quality and morale of personnel has been problematic. Over the past five years there has been a significant exodus of lower- and middle-ranking officers from both the ZNA and the AFZ. Many of the personnel were unhappy with the increasing politicisation, low pay, indifferent accommodation and the decreasing professionalism of the security sector. Nor was the disaffection confined to the lower ranks; in June 2007, 400 low- to mid-ranking ZNA personnel were arrested in connection with an alleged coup attempt. Many were court-martialled and there were numerous ‘disappearances’. There were also a number of mysterious deaths including those of three senior officers in the ZNA and the AFZ. In December 2008, soldiers in Harare rioted when they failed to access their money from a local
financial institution. More recently, there was a scuffle over food amongst the army rank and file in Masvingo on Defence Forces Day 2009. Mucheke camp in Masingo has reportedly been hard hit by an exodus of personnel in 2009. Nationally, desertions, resignations and retirements have acted as a safety valve for disaffected military personnel to exit the service before they became a problem, but conditions of service remain an issue for many of those who remain. The army has tried to counter the disaffection and threat of mutiny by increasing salaries, ensuring that the soldiery are paid on time, and recruiting former youth militia into the formal armed forces. This decision, which involved the lowering of army entrance requirements from four O-levels to two in 2003, was highly contentious at the time and led to many leaving the army. Nevertheless, the youth militia now appear to have been integrated into the ZDF. The army has done the bulk of the planning, and provided the logistics and weaponry for the various military offensives since 2000. The air force has lost a number of its most experienced pilots and aircraft technicians over the years, but has recruited and trained new personnel to plug the gaps.

Over the years there have been fears of a major army mutiny, or series of mutinies. The abortive putsch in 2007 increased the speculation, but there has been little evidence that most serving personnel supported, or would support, an overthrow of the state. Nor is there much likelihood of fratricidal violence between army groups. Political indoctrination and fear of losing their salaries are part of the reasons for the army's loyalty. But institutional loyalty and esprit de corps are also important; new recruits are trained to take pride in their regimental history and in the concept of loyalty to their unit.

Since the formation of the GNU in February, the ZDF has been much less visible than in the past. This does not reflect a major diminution of its power; rather it reflects most soldiers’ decision to take a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude to the GNU. Salaries and living conditions are the most relevant topics for the rank and file and the GNU’s promise to address these issues has kept the soldiers at bay – for now. However, the MDC is under pressure from supporters and the Western donor community to take a more assertive role vis-à-vis the security sector. ZANU-PF regards the security sector as its stronghold. There is therefore a risk that the establishment of Zimbabwe’s National Security Council could result in the security sector becoming a battleground between the two main parties. There will also continue to be internal schisms within the military as the armed forces mirror political power struggles.

The Zimbabwe Republic Police
The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), together with the war veterans, has become the day-to-day enforcer of state security. The police have had to adopt an increasingly wide remit from 2000. They have continued to cover their traditional mandate of anti-crime policing, but the militarisation of the police has resulted in their deployment in paramilitary operations as part of the JOC. The police sector has been the hardest hit by staff turnover. Within the organisation, the Law and Order Section (better known as the riot police), Police Support Unit and the PISI have become the dominant groups in terms of logistical support, status and career progression. This led to disaffection among those entrusted with traditional policing, many of whom felt very strongly that the police were being de-professionalised and were becoming the enemies, not the protectors of the citizenry. From 2000 to 2005, the more vocal personnel were transferred, removed from the service or relocated to the Commissioner’s Pool, where they are often without a desk or command.

There are currently approximately 25,000 serving police personnel. The ZRP is organised by province...
and comprises uniformed national police, the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), traffic police, the Police Support Unit, and the PISI. There have been systematic and sustained youth recruitment drives for the police. Transport and equipment for regular policing still remains a major problem, but the riot police, who are often used for urban crowd control, are fully equipped with the latest riot gear and have access to the armoured carriers from which they can be quickly deployed to urban trouble spots. The PISI and riot police are closely networked with the CIO and with military intelligence units, and have operated as paramilitary units (complete with AK-47s) on occasion.

**Challenges Facing the ZRP**

Police abuse has been a major problem since 2000. The ZRP became part of the security system that criminalised the opposition and encouraged the use of violence. Repressive laws such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), which bans demonstrations and certain types of public meetings, have been used as justification for the clampdown on public gatherings. There has also been a massive upsurge in violent and non-violent criminal activity nationwide in 2009. Broadly speaking, the challenges facing the police can be grouped under three headings:

**Police-Civilian Relations**

- Lack of appropriate training in crowd control techniques, with violence often being used to quell demonstrations. Batons and clubs are often used indiscriminately against the public, and there have been many fatalities from blunt instrument trauma.
- Firing of live rounds into crowds. One of the most notorious incidents occurred on 11 March 2007 when university student Gift Tandare was shot dead by police at a demonstration by MDC supporters. Two other people were subsequently fired at whilst in mourning at his house. Morgan Tsvangirai and a number of senior MDC officials were also assaulted by police on the same day.\(^\text{20}\)
- Use of torture and beatings of criminal and political suspects, particularly those suspected of supporting the MDC-T.
- Politicisation of police-civilian relations. In 2008 in particular, political affiliation was often the chief determinant of whether, and how effectively, police forces would investigate cases brought by the public. This applied particularly to cases of criminal and political violence. Slippage was most common in cases involving MDC supporters. 2008 was the high-water mark for this type of politicisation, but it still remains a problem.

**Anti-Crime Operations**

- Shortages of personnel to investigate crimes
- Lack of equipment and vehicles for crime investigations
- Lack of follow-through on criminal investigations.

**Institutional/Internal Police Challenges**

- ZRP internal politicisation and victimisation: Much of the work of civil society groups focuses on the political violence meted out to civilians by the security sector. This reportage is essential, but it is also worth noting that many police officers have themselves been victimised by politicised colleagues. It has been alleged that there was a purge of police officers who showed ‘insufficient’ political zeal in 2008. Those who had attempted to investigate MDC reports of political violence were particular targets. Many were forced to resign and some were themselves brutalised in police headquarters. The politicisation of the police is not simply a legacy issue – the top police commanders are partisan, and this tension between politicisation and professionalisation has impacted, and will continue to impact, on the efficiency of the police. A number of ex-police officers who have sought asylum outside of Zimbabwe have confirmed that the ZRP will remain politicised for the foreseeable future.

\(^{20}\)Ironically, the beating which Tsvangirai and other MDC activists received had the opposite effect to what was intended; it earned the MDC domestic and international support and helped to resuscitate the party’s fortunes.
Elections are always the trigger for surges in politicised police operations.

- **Systemic abuse of police recruits**: A recent article highlighted the case of female police recruit Pamela Mudzingwa, who was allegedly beaten unconscious in front of witnesses at Morris Depot (Harare) by Chief Inspector Mawone in 2008. She later died from her injuries. Over the years, and particularly since 2000, there have been reports of gender and political abuse of new recruits. It is not possible at this stage to determine the extent of the abuses, but a number of serving or former police officers have acknowledged that there is a problem.

- **Police procedural shortcuts**: Shortages of staff and equipment, and the politicisation of the police force, have contributed to many of the standard police procedures not being observed. Dockets often disappear and cases are either not investigated properly or are not investigated at all. The collection and handling of evidence is often below par. A former ZRP member put it thus:21

  A lot of times, especially in political cases, we never seriously tried to get evidence to match the charges. The suspect’s confession was the evidence. It’s probably still happening now.

- **Conflict between police recruits**: This occurs mostly between those of the National Youth Service and non-politicised recruits. It has been particularly acute among junior officers.

- **Repressive legislation and lack of due process**: This encourages arbitrary police (and wider security sector) coercion and impunity.

- **Poor conditions of service**: Low pay and sub-standard accommodation for the police rank and file have adversely affected morale. This conjunction of a trained force living in hardship has had dangerous consequences. In 2008 in particular, it led to some policeman becoming ‘predators’, extorting money from the public at roadblocks and other police-public interfaces.

- **Police corruption**: Institutional problems, particularly low salaries, have increased the levels of corruption within the ZRP. This is not a catastrophic problem as yet, but it is something which needs to be addressed immediately.

- **Selection for UN Peacekeeping Operations**: The ZRP and the ZDF have a deservedly high reputation for competence in international peace operations. However, the internal ZRP vetting and selection process for assigning officers to UN operations is sometimes based more on political loyalty than operational competence. It is important that selections for these important and sensitive operations be made through a transparent process. UN operations are important revenue earners, and are also an excellent marketing opportunity for the nation. It is important that the officers be seconded for UN operations on the basis of proven professionalism, not political zeal.

The challenges highlighted above do not mean that the ZRP is an incompetent force. Although politicisation and militarisation have taken their toll on morale and ethos, the majority of ZRP personnel are dedicated to their anti-crime activities, but are handicapped by a serious lack of resources and by the perennial skewing of their means for political ends. The structures of traditional policing have not collapsed, and the ZRP has a relatively good rapport with the public in terms of daily ‘soft’ policing (for instance, car accidents or domestic disputes). The public do report their problems to the police, and the latter try to respond, but they are critically hampered by a lack of vehicles. The ZRP have acknowledged the crisis in anti-crime policing. In August 2009, police spokesperson Andrew Phiri stated that

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21 Interview with former ZRP officer, Mike Mambo, London, 19 April 2009.
the ZRP needs to be expanded from 30,000 to 50,000 personnel to fight crime. The ZRP is now embarking on a recruitment drive and has drafted in neighbourhood watch groups to assist in anti-crime tasks. These are important developments, and should be supported; but these nevertheless do not address the parallel crisis of politicised policing in Zimbabwe.

The Zimbabwe Prison Service

The Zimbabwe Prison Service (ZPS) numbers approximately 5,000 staff. Contrary to the popular belief that the ZPS is constituted as a civilian organisation, the ZPS mandate explicitly states that ‘[t]he ZPS is a uniformed paramilitary organisation under the Ministry of Justice, Legal and Paramilitary Affairs’. There have been three major internal issues within the ZPS. The first is the appointment of former army officers to the ZPS executive. The ZPS Director-General, Paradzai Zimondi, is a retired army brigadier. There were a number of other army appointees, and this initially caused friction with long-serving senior ZPS officers who resented the army taking over their institution. Many also felt that the military appointments had ruined their promotion prospects.

The second issue is the victimisation of junior officers by their seniors. There have been a number of incidents over the past few years, the most recent being the March 2009 summons and disciplining of three junior officers by Mashonaland Region Assistant Commanding Officer Nelson Chikwature, who were alleged to have denounced ZANU-PF. (The officers denied this and stated that they were, in fact, celebrating salary payments.) Staff victimisation has been a long-standing problem: in his meeting with ZPS officers-in-charge and other commanding officers on 20 March 2009, Zimondi stressed that the culture of victimisation of junior police officers should end. Zimondi, who is renowned for his ferocious support of ZANU-PF, also surprised his audience by urging the officers to support the GNU (however, he also stated that he would ‘find it hard’ to salute Tsvangirai).

The final – and greatest – problem within the ZPS is the horrific conditions most prisoners in Zimbabwe’s jails have to endure. There are forty-two main prisons nationwide with a holding capacity of 18,000, though there is disagreement over how many prisoners are held in Zimbabwe’s cells. The ZPS has stated that there are currently 12,971 prisoners, but unofficial sources have put the figures at nearer 30,000. Many of the prisoners have yet to be convicted – or even tried. In March 2009, a secretly filmed South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) documentary on Zimbabwe’s prisons laid bare indisputable evidence that many of Zimbabwe’s prisons are effectively death camps where brutality, lack of food and sanitation and paucity of medical care is killing dozens of prisoners daily. Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa subsequently dismissed the SABC footage as ‘false’.22 However, in July 2009 Deputy Police Commissioner Chimbeza admitted that the ZPS is ‘an embarrassment to the criminal justice system’.23

The ZNLWA and the Youth League

The Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) and the Youth Brigades are the main militia groups, and are arguably the most highly politicised groups within the security community. These two groups were the ‘shock troops’ for the farm invasions, assaults on farm labourers, and attacks on the opposition, particularly in the rural areas and small towns. The war veterans number about 30,000, with an estimated 10-15,000 on call for military ‘operations’ at any given time. The war veterans are often equipped with traditional weapons such as axes, clubs, knives and even spears. This is because firearms are the preserve of the ‘formal’ security sector; in addition, these weapons, and the horrific injuries they can inflict, are seen as being more fearsome than guns. The ZNLWVA has been plagued with internal factionalism and there are a number of splinter groups. Nevertheless, it remains a formidable threat. The Youth Brigades, who came to be known – and feared – as the ‘Green Bombers’, number approximately 15,000. They were created as part of the National Youth Training

22 Zimbabwe Situation, 2 April 2009.

23 Zimbabwe Independent, 4 July 2009.
Service in 2001 and have also become notorious for political violence, particularly in Operation Taguta and Operation Makavotera Papi?. Over the years, many former youth brigade members have been recruited into the formal military sector and are now part of the junior officer corps in the army and police. The recruitment of teenagers for military operations has opened the state to accusations that the youth brigades were child soldiers, an accusation which ZANU-PF has always denied.

**Non-State Actors: Opposition Forces**

Although the state has a near monopoly of force, and the MDC has stated its intention of bringing about peaceful change, it would be inaccurate to see the opposition as entirely defenceless. Both MDC groups, and the MDC-T in particular, have internal security departments. These are manned by former security sector personnel, and are designed mainly to protect party officials, staff and MDC supporters. There are also youth leagues, which are used to counter those of the ZANU-PF. During and after Operation Makavotera Papi?, the MDC was able to organise small groups of local self-defence units which included youth and village groups. This led to a number of pitched battles in Masvingo and parts of Mashonaland between the MDC groups and the police and war veterans. In December 2008, civil society activist Jestina Mukoka and MDC head of security, Chris Dhlamini, were among those arrested for allegedly recruiting and training Zimbabweans to begin a military insurgency against the state. In real terms, however, the MDC groups do not have the capacity to mount a serious military challenge to state forces.

Had a political settlement not been reached, there was a real threat that disaffected former military personnel would have formed a new liberation alliance to wage what some called the ‘fourth chimurenga’ against ZANU-PF.

**The Judiciary**

Although not formally part of the JOC and the security sector, part of Zimbabwe’s judiciary has become an auxiliary of the security sector. From 2000, the state led what former High Court judge Benjamin Paradza called a ‘systematic government crusade to purge the judiciary’. In 2000, war veterans invaded the Supreme Court, threatening the judges. Eleven of the most experienced High Court judges subsequently left the bench from 2000 to 2003. The purge of long-serving Chief Justices Gubbay, Dumbutshena and others between 2000 and 2005 led to a divided bench. Although the judiciary has not been padded with military personnel, many of the judges and magistrates were political appointees who fulfilled a party agenda. Others refused to be compromised and insisted on an independent judiciary. This has led to internal power struggles between pro-state and independent judges, magistrates and lawyers. Added to this are power struggles between the judiciary, the executive and the security sector. The judiciary has been criticised for supinely allowing the passage of a raft of repressive legislation, particularly during the time of former information minister Jonathan Moyo. The security sector, particularly the police and prisons, have routinely shown contempt of court by re-arresting, or refusing to release, political prisoners despite High Court judgements ordering their release. On occasion, the High Court judges have made what are clearly politically-motivated decisions. The former Attorney General, Sobuza Gula-Ndebele, and current Attorney General Johannes Tomana, as well as the minister of justice, are all ZANU-PF, and this strengthens political partisanship within the justice system. The tacit alliance between sections of the judiciary, the securocrats and ZANU-PF means that judicial reform is a necessary part of security sector reform.

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## Summary of Key Challenges and Opportunities for SSR Discourse

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<tr>
<th>Challenges</th>
<th>Opportunities</th>
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<td>» The security sector remains highly politicised and partisan</td>
<td>» The creation of the GNU has created the political space in which to audit the security sector</td>
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<td>» The sector retains a high capability and inclination to use politically</td>
<td>» It is clear to all that comprehensive investment and sustainable development are tied to security and the rule of law. This gives the security sector a key role to play in nation-building</td>
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<td>motivated violence against civilians</td>
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<td>» The sector faces serious internal/systemic problems which need to be</td>
<td>» Despite the recent problems, Zimbabwe’s security sector, and the army in particular, have an international reputation for operational excellence in the field. This can be built upon</td>
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<td>addressed</td>
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<td>» Morale and professionalism need to be raised.</td>
<td>» The military has the expertise and capacity to take a leading role in Zimbabwe’s economic recovery.</td>
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5. Zimbabwe’s Politics and the Military

It is impossible to discuss security in Zimbabwe without assessing the current political situation. The military has long been embedded in the politics of Zimbabwe and has created rival parallel structures since 2000. The interventionist military in Zimbabwe is a symptom, not the cause, of Zimbabwe’s malaise. The real problem has been the crisis in political governance, and this has led to the appropriation of political space by the military; this is why a constitutional review process is now beginning. SSR is thus intimately linked to Political Sector Reform.

It cannot be over-emphasised that political will amongst all the stakeholders is crucial to beginning an SSR dialogue and process in Zimbabwe. Without agreement in principle, and the will to begin the process, nothing positive will happen.

The Government of National Unity

Zimbabwe has a tradition of both inclusive and coalition governments. An example of the former is the first ZANU-PF government of 1980-85, which included a few rival party members in the ruling party’s cabinet. The 1987 Unity Government was a coalition government which included ZANU-PF and ZAPU. In both cases, the ruling party, which had key electoral support, remained the dominant partner.

Although seen by many as a repeat of the 1987 Unity Accord, the current GNU is substantially different. Unlike ZAPU, which began as a truly national organisation in the 1960s but became increasingly tribal in the 1970s, the MDC has a national base. Second, all three political parties in the GNU retain their individual party structures and will contest elections separately. (ZAPU was formally incorporated into ZANU-PF in 1987 and ceased to trade as an independent political entity.) Third, the GNU is a transitional rather than a permanent arrangement; it is a process rather than an outcome. Indeed, the intrinsic tensions within the GNU ensure that it cannot become a permanent solution to Zimbabwe’s crisis, even if some of the principals wanted it to be. In terms of historical precedents for the current GNU, a more accurate comparison would be with the Internal Settlement of 1978 between the ruling Rhodesia Front (RF), and ‘moderate’ black leaders Abel Muzorewa (UANC), Rev Ndabaningi Sithole (ZAPU), Chief Jeremiah Chirau, and Chief Kaiser Ndiweni. The Internal Settlement (IS) resulted in an Executive Government, with the party leaders sharing the prime ministerial portfolio on a rotational basis. The IS was deeply flawed from the outset because the RF still controlled all the state levers of power. Also, the externally based nationalist groups were deliberately excluded from the arrangement and this ensured the continuation of the war. Nevertheless, despite its flaws, the IS was Zimbabwe’s first multiparty executive authority.

Creating the GNU: Pressure-Cooker Politics

The GNU was welcomed with a mixture of relief, trepidation and anger amongst Zimbabweans. For most, the GNU is seen as the only pragmatic compromise capable of averting the annihilation of Zimbabwe. There was also no doubt that the MDC had little choice other than to join the government. There was incessant pressure from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), particularly following the SADC Summit of 28 January 2009, where both Mugabe and Tsvangirai were handed an ultimatum by the SADC. Mugabe needed the MDC as a political partner to avoid the financial collapse of ZANU-PF. But Tsvangirai was also on the back foot; his moral authority counted for little against the realities of regional power politics. Without regional recognition and South African support, the MDC would have remained removed from the centres of power, regardless of their domestic and international support. Secondly, it was clear that had the MDC not joined, President Mugabe would have formed his own cabinet, thus condemning the MDC to the political wilderness. It was also clear that the ruling party had prepared a military, judicial and political onslaught to decimate MDC structures and personnel in a follow-up to the murderous offensives of spring 2008’s Operation...
Makwhotera Papi?. As MDC member Langton Bhebe pointed out:\textsuperscript{25} People can criticise us for joining hands with ZANU-PF; but if we had not joined, we would have no hands.

The GNU and Power Politics
Overall, the GNU has fared better than many expected. Despite the plethora of ministries and the bureaucratic and policy bottlenecks, a consultative process has emerged between the various parties across most ministries. In addition, although political violence still remains a problem, there is no longer the pervasive climate of fear which existed prior to the GNU. Dollarising the economy has reduced much of the rampant foreign currency profiteering, and the GNU has pledged to bring stability to the civil service and the health and education ministries in particular. The psychological and symbolic impetus created by the GNU cannot be overestimated; Zimbabweans feel that, for the first time in a decade, there is a real chance to stabilise the country and to re-enter the global community. However, there are several issues which remain to be resolved within the GNU and across the broader political spectrum. In general terms, it can be said that the GNU remains a site of struggle, where two contrasting national narratives jostle. Power-sharing has been addressed by the distribution of ministries across the three parties. But the GNU is also a crucible for inter- and intra-party power struggles. Some of the key issues include:

Presidential and Prime Ministerial Powers
The Zimbabwean Constitution stipulates that the president has the right to appoint or dismiss ministers. The GPA stipulates that the president has to consult with the prime minister before appointing or removing cabinet members. (The MDC dispute this clause saying that in the original GPA agreement, the president needs the assent of the prime minister before making this executive decision.) The president and the prime minister have clashed over the appointments of the Reserve Bank governor, the provincial governors, and most recently, the president’s decision to remove control of the ICT Ministry from Nelson Chamisa. Morgan Tsvangirai has stated that he has a ‘good working relationship’ with Mugabe, and that ‘the President does nothing without my approval’. The two men have regular meetings and it is true that there is little of the personal invective that characterised their relationship in the past. Nevertheless, the continued farm invasions, and the ongoing harassment of MDC personnel, have raised doubts as to whether the prime minister is willing to challenge the president on matters of principle or substance.

Qualitative Power Distribution
Although there is a rough numerical parity in ministerial portfolios, ZANU-PF retains a qualitative superiority in terms of its control of ‘strategic’ ministries. These include the ministries of defence, local government, agriculture, justice and legal affairs, and foreign affairs (home affairs is co-chaired with the MDC-T). This means that the security sector, the judiciary, and land policy remain a ZANU-PF preserve.

Permanent Secretaries
Currently, the thirty-four permanent secretaries who had been appointed by ZANU-PF prior to the GNU remain in place. Both MDC groups have insisted that this is unacceptable, and have demanded a more equitable distribution of posts.

Provincial Governors
ZANU-PF appointed provincial governors prior to the establishment of the GNU. The MDC groups pointed out that this was a clear violation of the letter and spirit of the GPA, and some of the appointments were rescinded. This remains a major point of contention between the MDC-T and ZANU-PF. It is also likely that the appointment of governors for Masvingo, Manicaland and Mashonaland will prove to be highly contested. Masvingo is traditionally one of the most bitterly challenged and most coveted provinces in Zimbabwe and that will not change anytime soon.

\textsuperscript{25} Interview with the author, Johannesburg, 4 March 2009.
**The Land Question**

Although there is a tentative consensus emerging amongst the political stakeholders on the need for a land audit, a gulf of opinion and policy remains over the status of white commercial farmers. Farms continue to be invaded and occupied by militia groups, security sector operatives, and peasants. ZANU-PF has not critised the takeovers, and it is clear that the invaders have at least their tacit backing. The GPA, to which the MDC was also a signatory, stipulates that the land reform process is ‘irreversible’. The MDC, on the other hand, points out that the SADC Tribunal has upheld the appeals of the commercial farmers. The continued farm assaults complicate the GNU’s task of raising development funds from the international community. In addition, ZANU-PF and the military’s refusal to allow MDC deputy minister of agriculture nominee, Roy Bennett, to be sworn in seriously undermines the credibility of the GNU and the MDC’s authority. Bennett, who is a farmer himself, is popular with local farming communities of all races. He is seen as a man who can help to ‘unlock’ Zimbabwe’s land crisis.

**Shared Vision**

The three parties lack a mutual vision of where they want Zimbabwe to go. There is an emergent and valuable symmetry regarding the process, but there is a fundamental disagreement over outcomes. For now, the dialectic of party-political interests holds supremacy over discussion and agreement of what constitutes the national interest.

**Elections**

The term period of the GNU remains uncertain. There is increasing conflict between advocates of a short (two year) and a long, four to five year GNU. Both sides believe the transition is tied to elections. Whatever the electoral timetable, there are some serious challenges which have to be negotiated. The first challenge is agreeing the composition of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC). In common with many other state institutions, the ZEC has been militarised and politicised over the years, particularly in the June 2009 elections. Second, there has to be agreement on when municipal and national elections are to be held. Third, there has to be agreement on how the elections are to be conducted, to ensure transparency, accountability and freedom from violence. The military cannot remain as the elections manager, as has been the case since 2000; the electoral process must be ‘civilianised’. Fourth, the question of international monitoring of the electoral process has to be addressed.

**Intra-Party Struggles and Alliances**

Two principles dominated appointments within the GNU (for a full list of appointments, see the Appendix). The first was inter-party proportionality. The party leaders (particularly Mugabe and Tsvangirai) had to ensure proportional representation in the GNU. Neither man could be seen to ‘lose face’ by having notably fewer places at the table. The result was, and remains, quantitative and qualitative struggles on the number of posts per party, and the effective power which can be wielded by the appointees. The second factor was intra-party interest. The massive size of the GNU was the result of the need for party leaders to accommodate their most powerful supporters. Each man had to placate his own party coterie by ensuring positions for their key supporters. The GNU, which has locked the three parties in a coalition of the unwilling, is about power-sharing, and it has made Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai into the unlikeliest of allies. But it is much more about power struggles between the parties and within each grouping. The GNU is thus more of an arena than a forum.

The heavyweight parties within the GNU are ZANU-PF and the MDC-T. The MDC-M is not, on its own, a major power within the GNU. However, the MDC-M plays an important role as the ‘referee’. In addition, it is courted by the other parties, both of whom need Mutambara’s group to tilt the balance of power in their favour during the weekly cabinet meetings. Within the MDC, Tendai Biti and Nelson Chamisa are the most vocal and assertive, and have not been afraid to challenge ZANU-PF,
particularly with regard to the farm invasions, and Gideon Gono’s actions as head of the RBZ. ZANU-PF still controls the state, and is the gatekeeper of hard power in Zimbabwe. ZANU-PF’s alliance with the military elite remains intact and their control of the information, agriculture and security portfolios means that while they cannot stop reforms, they can try to make it happen on their terms. The MDC’s control of the finance ministry, and the marginalisation of the RBZ, gives the MDC some financial leverage against ZANU-PF. Although the MDC’s popularity and credibility within the GNU has increased because it is addressing the most immediate economic problems, there are limits to the MDC’s clout. Resources are few; donor funding so far has been hesitant, and has been delivered to humanitarian aid organisations rather than through the government. The Ministry of Finance desperately needs cash, both to pay the civil service, and to ensure that they remain useful to ZANU-PF. This is what lies at the heart of the power struggles within the GNU. The MDC-T is the gateway to ZANU-PF’s own financial survival, but should the finance ministry fail to access funding then it will be enfiladed both by ZANU-PF and an increasingly restive populace. The inter-party struggles within the GNU are policy battles, political turf wars and, most importantly, struggles over money.

Zanu-PF: the Tensions Within
ZANU-PF continues to be a factionalised organisation. Robert Mugabe, and party veterans Nathan Shamuyarira and Sydney Sekeremai, are the unifiers within the party. But the rivalry between Vice President Joyce Mujuru (who is backed by her husband, former defence forces commander Solomon Mujuru) and current Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa continues. There are two prizes which they seek: the party chairmanship, and more importantly, the national presidency. Mujuru, as vice president, has the greater constitutional authority, and has support from the powerful Women’s League; she also has strong Liberation War credentials, and has made tactical alliances with former ZAPU colleagues and some sections of the MDC. However, Mnangagwa has increased his party-political base, and he has powerful allies – he was a full member of the JOC, and also has backing from the war veterans. The ZANU-PF national congress will be held in December 2009, and there is likely to be a bruising battle between the Mujuru faction and the Mnangagwa group. In April 2009, the Mujuru group voted with the MDC-T against a Mnangagwa group nomination for chairperson of a parliamentary women’s committee. This reportedly incurred the wrath of some ZANU-PF MPs who oppose Mujuru’s ‘collaboration with the enemy’. The MDC would favour a tacit alliance with the Mujuru group because they see Joyce Mujuru as more moderate than Mnangagwa, who is part of the military aristocracy. The MDC are also looking to the elections; they would rather contest the national elections against Mujuru than against Mnangagwa, because Mujuru would be less likely to call in the military.

Although the Mujuru-Mnangagwa rivalry is interesting, it only forms the backdrop to much bigger issues facing ZANU-PF. The party has two major problems for the medium term, and both are related to the question of national elections. The first question is the vexatious succession question within ZANU-PF, in other words the issue of who will be the party candidate for the elections. The question of who will succeed Mugabe (who is the first secretary of ZANU-PF as well as president of Zimbabwe) has long spawned bitter struggles between the party heavyweights. In mid-July 2009, the ZANU-PF Midlands Province Co-ordinating Committee passed a resolution which endorses Mugabe as the Supreme Leader of the party. In theory, this lays to rest the succession question by ensuring that Mugabe remains as head of the party for the duration. But it is likely that the direct succession battles between Mujuru and Mnangagwa have become indirect ‘succession by proxy’ conflicts between the two protagonists. The August death of Vice President Joseph Msika, and the resultant contestation between the proposed ‘heirs’ of both the Mujuru and Mnangagwa camps, shows that the succession struggle continues. It is likely, therefore, that Mugabe will remain ZANU-PF’s candidate for

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presidential elections as and when they are held; but there remain doubts as to whether he can win. In addition, internal battles over who will fill various provincial, Women’s League, and Youth League posts remain. These struggles have occasionally been violent in the past, and could be again.

The second problem for ZANU-PF is to articulate policies that will win national support. This will not be easy; although ZANU-PF retains support through liberationist memory and because of land redistribution, continued political violence, repressive legislation and economic mismanagement will continue to cost ZANU-PF the popular vote. The GNU has given ZANU-PF a haven in which to prepare for the next elections, but finding a non-violent political strategy and vision to contest the elections remains a formidable challenge. The party is also split between the ‘long-termers’, who advocate a prolonged GNU of up to five years; and the ‘short-termers’ who prefer a GNU of no more than two years. There are also rifts between ZANU-PF officials who are perceived as fraternising with the MDC, and hardliners who to see the MDC as the ‘enemy’.

The role of the military is another problem for ZANU-PF. Robert Mugabe is the only ZANU-PF leader with a national following, but he is unlikely to win the next election. On the other hand, offering a new candidate could lead to a catastrophic defeat for ZANU-PF. Either way, another defeat for ZANU-PF at the national polls could once again bring in the military – but the soldiers would not be gatekeepers of ZANU-PF hegemony. They would be protecting their own territory and would thus be usurping ZANU-PF as much as the MDC.

Despite all its problems, ZANU-PF remains, and will continue to be, a major player in Zimbabwean politics. The party still has substantial support within Zimbabwe, and also retains its regional networks. The GNU has bought time for ZANU-PF to examine its strengths and weaknesses, as well as those of Morgan Tsvangirai and the MDC. ZANU-PF is regrouping itself and is reformulating its strategies to weaken the MDC within the GNU and to defeat the MDC when the GNU comes to an end.

The MDC-T
The MDC-T was a reluctant entrant into the GNU. Had it not joined, Robert Mugabe would have formed his own government and the MDC would have been decimated by the security sector. Nevertheless, despite their initial reluctance to join the coalition of need, the MDC have staked out their turf in the GNU terrain. As the economic gatekeepers within the GNU, it is the MDC that has the keys to international support. They have also earned increasing African support, particularly within the region. Nevertheless, there are internal issues which could polarise the MDC or lead to a breakaway group(s). The decision on whether to join the GNU or not was bitterly divisive within the MDC National Executive, and among supporters. The MDC’s inability to end political repression, stop land invasions, or oust Gideon Gono from the Reserve Bank, continues to alienate the radical wing of the party. The MDC’s parliamentary caucus has also been vocal about the need to stand up to ZANU-PF.27 Others, particularly some civil society groups, are dismayed by what they see as the MDC’s abandonment of the transitional justice project. They also see the reconciliation project as appeasement. Although since resolved, the inter-party disputes over governorships, permanent secretaries and ambassadors rankled supporters, who felt that the MDC settled for political tokenism, having been co-opted by ZANU-PF.

There have also been questions about Morgan Tsvangirai’s leadership of the MDC and his ‘quiet diplomacy’ approach towards Mugabe. More radical MDC supporters (particularly those in the diaspora) have alleged that Tsvangirai has been too soft in his dealings with Mugabe and the security chiefs who continue to have civil society and MDC activists arrested and beaten. During his June 2009 tour of the US, UK and Europe, Tsvangirai was taken to task by Zimbabweans who questioned his judgement in his dealings with ZANU-PF. A number of MDC ministers have also been implicitly

critical of Tsvangirai’s dealings with ZANU-PF. The disruption of the recent All Stakeholder Constitutional Conference in Harare by ZANU-PF supporters pressured Tsvangirai and Mutambara to remonstrate with Mugabe. All three leaders issued a joint statement criticising the incident and urging freedom of expression in the conference. Despite facing criticism from disaffected current or former MDC supporters, Tsvangirai remains immensely popular in Zimbabwe and he now has the legitimacy in Africa which had previously eluded him. He is also the ‘bridge’ between the MDC and ZANU-PF and thus plays a fundamental role in Zimbabwe’s reconstruction. He has been urged to be more confrontational with ZANU-PF, but this advice ignores the reality that ZANU-PF still controls the instruments of coercion. Tsvangirai has to walk a fine line between aggressively pressuring President Mugabe and ZANU-PF to adhere to the GPA and building on the pragmatic partnership of the GNU stakeholders.

Tribal and racial allegiances are also an issue within the MDC. The MDC, like ZANU-PF, has to placate its tribal constituencies; Ndebele supporters have long clamoured for greater representation in the party, as have sub-tribal groups such as the Karanga and the Zezuru. Race is another issue; the MDC has almost total support from Zimbabwe’s white community, and Deputy Agriculture Minister-designate Roy Bennett has popular support. But the party remains vulnerable to ZANU-PF charges that it serves an ‘imperialist’ agenda, and has thus been cautious about the number of white representatives it has brought in at the top level.

The MDC-M
The MDC-Mutambara was a willing signatory to the GNU. The two MDC groups have traditionally had a fractious relationship; the original breakaway in 2005, and the new group’s insistence on retaining the MDC name, caused a great deal of acrimony (there were pitched battles between rival supporters in 2005-06). Relations between the two groups are now much improved, but remain precarious as each party in the GNU seeks a competitive advantage. The MDC-M needed the GNU just as much as ZANU-PF. Mutambara’s group had fared badly in the March 2008 elections, and has never been seen as the ‘real’ MDC. The GNU brought legitimacy to the MDC-M. More importantly, with ten seats in parliament and ministerial portfolios, the MDC-M has emerged as a power-broker in government. Nevertheless, the party faces internal rifts over Ndebele representation within the party and within cabinet (the party’s power base is mainly in Matebeleland); and party policy within the GNU. Juggling their roles in the GNU is a delicate balancing act, and the party is frequently accused of being biased towards one party or the other. There have also been questions over the allegiances and intentions of party leader Mutambara; he has more than once faced censure from his subordinates over his apparent pro-ZANU-PF stance. Internal struggles have also surfaced within the MDC-M; in April 2009, six senior party officials were suspended from the party for alleged ‘indiscipline’. Both the MDC-T and the MDC-M will be worried by the re-emergence of ZAPU, particularly the MDC-M, which could lose its Matebeleland support base.

Other Groups
Zimbabwe has a strong civil society. There has been an alliance between the MDC and civil society for the past decade but the alliance has been frayed by the MDC’s decision to join the GNU and, more recently, by rifts over the constitutional revision process. The National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) has long championed a constitutional process which is driven by civil society, not the government or parliament. The NCA opposes parliamentary control of the process and this has led to clashes with the MDC as well as ZANU-PF. The NCA is probably the best known of Zimbabwe’s civil society groups, but their failure to gain majority support from other civil society organisations over the parliamentary issues has left the NCA looking increasingly marginalised.

28 On 8 May 2009, six senior MDC-M members were suspended by the party for ‘indiscipline’. They included Abednico Bhebhe (MP, Nkayi West); Norman Mpofu (MP, Bulili East); and Njabuliso Mguni (Lupane North). Also suspended were former MP Job Sikhala; National Youth Chairman Gift Nyandoro; and commercial farmer Alex Goosen.
ZAPU was re-launched under the leadership of former ZANU-PF home affairs minister Dumiso Dabengwa. ZAPU is positioning itself as a national, rather than a tribal organisation, but they may struggle to attract support outside of Matebeleland and the wider Ndebele diaspora. Dabengwa has been criticised for his role as an ‘enforcer’ of the state’s machinery of repression during his two decades as a member of ZANU-PF. There are also questions over whether the new ZAPU is merely a reincarnation of the old, or whether it is, in fact a new entity. The new party is still building its structures, and bases its appeal on Ndebele nationalism, collective memory of the Gukurahundi atrocities, and demands for development projects in Matebeleland. The revived ZAPU will challenge both MDC groups, and would almost certainly be a political power-broker in Matebeleland.

Simba Makoni, the former minister of finance, left ZANU-PF in February 2008 and stood as an independent candidate for the presidential elections in March 2008. He was soundly defeated by both Tsangirai and Mugabe, receiving 10 per cent of the vote. In late 2008, Makoni launched his own party, Mavambo, although legal disputes and accusations of fraud by party members have forced him to launch yet another party. He is often spoken of as a mediatory figure within ZANU-PF and there have been occasional rumours that the party may select him to contest the next elections as their presidential candidate. This is unlikely; Makoni is a technocrat. Even if he does return to ZANU-PF, he has no major power base within the party and would almost certainly be outflanked by party heavyweights, Mnangagwa and Mujuru or by the younger generation of ZANU-PF officials.

**Monitoring the GNU: JOMIC and the GEC**

The weekly cabinet meetings are the primary forum for discussing government policy; as well as being a crucible for inter-party bonding, the cabinet sessions are also unsurprisingly a forum for internal GNU disputes over policy. The Government Executive Committee (GEC) is a less formal body which is both mediatory and advisory. It includes the president, the prime minister, the two vice presidents, and the two deputy prime ministers. The GEC is essentially a mini cabinet, where the most pressing issues, such as the farm invasions, the swearing in of Roy Bennett, the appointment of governors and ambassadors, and the information technology ‘battle’ are discussed although seldom with any resolution.

The Joint Monitoring Implementation Committee (JOMIC) is a multiparty forum provided for in the GPA. Its role is to monitor the ideals and targets specified in the GPA. JOMIC is chaired on a monthly rotational basis; the current members include Nicholas Goche, Emmerson Mnangagwa, Patrick Chinamasa and Oppah Muchinguru (ZANU-PF); Elton Mangoma, Elias Mudzuri, Tabitha Khumalo and Innocent Chagonda (MDC-T); Welshman Ncube, Priscilla Msihiaibw-Mushonga, Frank Chamunorwa, and Edward Mkhosi (MDC-M).

JOMIC has emerged as the most visible interface between the GNU and the public, and this has been both a blessing and a curse for the body. On the one hand, it means that JOMIC receives a great deal of information, direct from the public, on what is happening across the country. On the other hand, it faces a crisis of expectations. Citizens expect JOMIC either to address their complaints directly, or to pressure the GNU to do so. There have, for instance, been demands from commercial farmers, farm workers, and the donor community for JOMIC to order a halt to the farm invasions. JOMIC has so far not been able to stop land invasions, nor has it been able to get police investigations of those who have ‘illegally’ taken land. In addition, political detainees Chandi Mudzingwa, Chris Dhlimani, and Shadreck Manyere (MDC) remain incarcerated, despite an insistence by the MDC that this violates the GPA. JOMIC has, however, forcefully censured the state media for hate speech and there has been a resultant toning down of the political rhetoric, as well as an ongoing re-professionalisation of the media. JOMIC is a monitoring body which has no control over GNU policy. It has proved influential with regard to ‘soft’ challenges, and it is also playing a mediatory role between the GNU partners. Although its power is limited, JOMIC does have authority: it is mandated in the GNU, and has SADC backing.

The SADC is the ultimate guarantor of the GNU. The GPA and the GNU were established under
SADC auspices, and the organisation has promoted the GNU under an ‘African solutions for African problems’ banner, and has a particular interest in ensuring the success of the GNU. It is unclear whether former South African president, Thabo Mbeki, will continue in his role as South Africa’s and SADC’s point man for Zimbabwe. There has been intense speculation that Mbeki may be replaced as mediator on Zimbabwe by Kgalema Montanthle, the outgoing acting president of South Africa. The Zuma administration has expressed support for ensuring a stable transition in Zimbabwe. President Jacob Zuma has also expressed the need for Zimbabwe to uphold human rights and democracy and to have fair elections. This is important as South Africa is a major driver in Zimbabwe’s renaissance.

The Constitutional Question
In September 2007, MDC and ZANU-PF legislators agreed on a framework for a constitutional review process, as well as a road map for national politics. The resultant document, which became known as the ‘Kariba Draft’, was an important step on the tortuous road which ultimately led to the GPA and the constitutional review. In April 2009, the GNU established a twenty-five member Parliamentary Constitutional Committee. The committee’s task is to draw up the framework of, and make recommendations for, a new Zimbabwean constitution. The committee comprises legislators from ZANU-PF and the two MDC groups. To ensure that the outcome does not become entangled in the process, the committee has been given a specific timetable for delivery – recommendations should be presented to parliament by June 2010; if accepted, there will be a national referendum on the proposed constitution. If the constitutional proposals are approved, then the new constitution will be in place by October 2010.

There is no doubt that Zimbabwe needs a new constitution; the current (Lancaster House) constitution has had nineteen amendments since it was first introduced in 1979. Although it is still a valuable document, it was crafted during wartime, by political leaders whose main priority at the time was to end the war rather than to craft a legislative masterpiece. Although the constitution has proved to be surprisingly durable, it requires an overhaul. The main reason for this is that it has been frequently abused, and misused, by the executive of both the settler and post-settler state in Zimbabwe. The state has frequently made constitutional amendments so as to give the patina of legitimacy to many repressive actions. Secondly, the Lancaster House constitution is essentially a British constitution, and was, in fact, crafted largely through the expertise of British legal teams. This was necessary and useful at the time; but, thirty years on, there is a need – and popular sentiment demands it – for a uniquely Zimbabwean document, and one which is done through national consultation. Third, it is no longer possible to continually amend the constitution – it is more practical to craft a new document, one which builds on the strengths of the current version, whilst incorporating new aspirations.

The constitutional review process is not new. From June-December 1999, a Constitutional Commission was appointed by President Mugabe to make recommendations for a new constitution ahead of the 2000 general election. This was a vast exercise which involved 400 commissioners appointed by the president; they embarked on a process of public consultation with thousands of Zimbabweans. Although the commission was designed to examine the wider parameters of constitutional reform, the unrelenting message that emerged from the public was that the powers and term of office of the president needed to be reduced. The leading advocate of sweeping constitutional change was the NCA, an alliance of civil society groups. The NCA objected to the selection process and criteria of the commissioners, pointing out that the majority of them were known to be pro-ZANU-PF. The NCA believed that this would lead to a superficial outcome which did not reflect the real desires of the people. The NCA was thus one of the most vocal advocates for the No vote in the constitutional referendum of February 2000.29

29 The vote was much closer than media reports suggested: 54.7 per cent voted No while 43.5 per cent voted Yes.
Almost ten years later, the NCA is attempting to repeat history; NCA leader Lovemore Madhuku has stated that the constitutional process should be driven by civil society, not politicians. Madhuku has stated that the NCA ‘will campaign against it, and ask people to reject the flawed constitution during the (2010) referendum.’

There is undoubtedly an element of entitlement driving the NCA’s complaints; they have been the bedrock of the constitutional reform discourse, and they may well feel proprietary about the process, and resent parliament ‘taking over’ their agenda. Nevertheless, the point is valid: the process cannot only be driven by parliamentarians because it will result in a constitution which is the stepchild of sectarian politics.

The NCA’s position has driven a rift between it and its former allies, the MDC. It has also fragmented the NCA itself, with many of the alliance members siding with the GNU on the efficacy of using parliament for the constitutional process. The outcome of the constitutional process is vital not just in terms of governance, but also in terms of the security sector’s relationship with the state. The rejection of the 2000 constitutional referendum was a ‘big bang’ moment in Zimbabwe’s history; it set in train a sequence of events which ultimately resulted in the military becoming a parallel state. Zimbabweans must have the freedom to express their views in the 2010 referendum; but great care should be taken to ensure that there are safeguards in place to prevent the military once again appropriating political space after the referendum.

The New Constitution: a Crucible for Violence?
The new constitution is intended to promote nation-building, but the constitutional process is becoming dangerously divisive. There is a great risk that the constitutional process, far from promoting a single national vision, will instead become a national fire-starter. There are two main fault lines. The first fault line is between groups such as the NCA, who insist that parliament cannot be the driver of a ‘people-led’ constitution; and supporters of the parliamentary initiative. This replicates the methodological splits of a decade ago.

The second fault line is between those who believe that the ‘Kariba Draft’ constitution nominally agreed between the MDC-T and ZANU-PF in 2007 should form the basis of the new constitution; and those who believe that the Draft is inherently flawed because it gives too much power to the executive. There are well-founded fears that ZANU-PF hardliners will launch another paramilitary campaign to ‘educate’ the public to ensure that the Kariba Draft becomes the basis of a new constitution. The campaigning has already begun, with teachers in some areas being ‘educated’ in the benefits of the Kariba Draft by war veterans and youth militias.

Parliament
There are two parliamentary chambers in Zimbabwe: the Senate (upper house), and the House of Assembly (the lower house). The equilibrium of power is finely balanced; following the March 2008 elections, the MDC has 100 seats in the House of Assembly, with ZANU-PF on 99 seats, and the MDC-M with ten seats. There is one independent MP. Although the MDC has a majority, this is more notional than real; for legislation to be passed, there needs to be a two-thirds majority. This means that all the parties – and the MDC in particular – either have to reach consensus on legislation, or broker inter-party deals to push through new parliamentary acts. ZANU-PF has a substantive majority in the Senate, which has the power to vote against and block legislation.

50 Zimbabwe Times, ‘Madhuku up in Arms over Constitution’, 1 March 2009

51 The ‘big bang’ was sparked by the No vote in the referendum. The vote accelerated the radical convergence of big ticket issues and processes, including the constitution, land and the emergence of a national opposition party. It is unlikely, but not impossible, that 2010 or 2011 could see another convergence of issues. Land and the power of the military will remain major issues, but social issues such as employment, health, housing and basic services will be the main factors for Zimbabweans in what could be an election year.
There have been fears that the power struggles in the GNU will be replicated in parliament and the institution could be crippled by internecine bickering as each party adopts a zero-sum strategy of blocking each other. There are certainly fractious debates; but Zimbabwe’s parliament has now become the crucible of an emerging democracy. Parliamentary committees have been strengthened and there is now much greater parliamentary scrutiny of the executive than before. For most Zimbabweans, however, parliament will only prove its credibility when repressive legislation such as the POSA and the Access to Internet and Privacy Act are repealed.

Parliament has also become a battleground between the two main parties. Since the creation of the GNU, five MDC-T MPs have been arrested and imprisoned on various charges of corruption and fraud. Another eleven MDC MPs are facing charges. The arrests, and lengthy jail terms, fuel speculation that ZANU-PF’s aim is to overturn the MDC’s wafer-thin parliamentary majority (by law, if an MP is absent from the House of Assembly for more than six months, they automatically lose their seat). The arrests of MDC MPs may cause a crisis within the GNU, and also pose a serious challenge to Tsvangirai’s leadership, as MDC supporters demand that he confront ZANU-PF and the Attorney General over this and other issues.

Will the GNU Survive?

It is fashionable to assume that either the internal contradictions of the GNU will cause it to tear itself apart or that it will be removed by the military. Moreover, failed GNU attempts in Angola (1992), Sudan (2006-07), and the travails of Kenya's current GNU are cited as evidence for the inevitability of failure of Zimbabwe’s GNU.

It is, however, highly likely that the GNU will last out its term. It is a coalition of the unwilling, but each party has more to gain inside the coalition than outside. It is almost unthinkable that ZANU-PF would leave the GNU; the party is counting on its MDC partners to bring in international finance, remove the spectre of war crime prosecutions, and persuade the West to end targeted sanctions. Were ZANU-PF to withdraw, and insist on ruling Zimbabwe alone, there would be an immediate cessation of international engagement, and even their former allies in the region and on the continent would struggle to support such a regime. There would be international pressure for an early election, and this is something the party wants to avoid, as it uses the GNU ‘breathing space’ to put its house in order.

Neither of the MDC groups is likely to withdraw from the GNU. For the MDC-T, any decision to withdraw would be as contentious as the decision to enter the GNU. Withdrawal would leave the MDC in the political wilderness, and would leave a hole in the centre of Zimbabwean politics; the gap would almost certainly be filled once again by the military, and the anti-MDC pogroms would begin again. Popular sentiment will also compel the MDC to stay in the arrangement; without the MDC in the government, there will be little chance of development aid. The small but palpable achievements of the GNU to date will disappear leaving behind a betrayed citizenry. For the MDC-M, the GNU is a political lifeline; they have no refuge outside of it.

What is more likely is the GNU’s ‘death by a thousand cuts’ from defections from within each party, particularly the MDC-T. This is already starting to happen: on 22 April, a founder member of the MDC handed in his resignation from the party. In his resignation letter, he stated that he ‘can no longer carry on with a party that is now an enthusiastic partner of ZANU-PF and an aide de camp to its unrepentant criminal gangsters’. Communications Minister Nelson Chamisa has threatened to resign after his powers were eviscerated by Mugabe. Others, particularly the MDC’s parliamentary caucus, criticise Tsvangirai for failing to make a stand on matters of principle and policy.

The NCA and other civil society groups may reconstitute themselves as more overtly political

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groupings, and take the radical wing of the MDC with them. Meanwhile, the military elite and ZANU-PF hardliners, either singly or in tandem, are an additional locus of power. They remain a threat to the GNU, and they will continue to use coercion to compel the MDC to withdraw from the coalition. There is also the risk of a direct military takeover, although the likelihood of this happening is now much lower than it was prior to the GNU. The MDC groups are no longer simply opposition groups; they are now a formal part of the political establishment. This gives the MDC a political legitimacy that offers a degree of insulation against a formal military takeover.

Assuming that the GNU does hold together, the greatest risks will come as the constitutional process nears completion and a date for national elections is set. The question of when (and whether) to have national elections is likely to increase political tensions. Zimbabweans are divided over whether there should be elections within eighteen months; many, particularly within the MDC-T, insist that this must happen. But there is no guarantee that the constitutional process will be completed by then, or that the security environment will be stable enough. Some believe that a long-term GNU is necessary to enhance Zimbabwe's chances of success. Zimbabwe's constitutional process is increasing fears of violence, and the timing and handling of national elections could do the same. Both a short-term GNU and a long-term GNU are both dangerous propositions. The majority of Zimbabweans want elections within two years but are apprehensive: elections since 2000 have been triggers for violence and military intervention. This will be the case again unless there are very specific measures in place to ensure a transparent electoral process and the protection of civilians. On the other hand, prolonging the GNU beyond two years will also cause disaffection, particularly amongst MDC supporters; and it would lead to intra-MDC as well as MDC/ZANU-PF violence, and a return to brutalist politics.

The Military in Zimbabwe: Spoilers or Enablers?
The security sector remains the biggest ‘known unknown’. What is certain is that the military has the capacity to contain or roll back political transition through the use of force, coercion and co-option. The military can also be an enabler for peace and sustainable development, either by remaining neutral or by proactively engaging in security reform and peace-building in Zimbabwe. It is unclear just what role the military will play. Much depends on the politics of the GNU, and Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and international developments.

An Interventionist Military?
The withdrawal of MDC groups from the GNU would leave a vacuum to be filled by the military. The GNU is being promoted as a patriotic project and an MDC withdrawal will inevitably be portrayed as being ‘unpatriotic’ by ZANU-PF. There would almost certainly be a surge in military repression if the MDC left the protective tent of the GNU and allied with civil society groups that have been critical of the GNU.

The second factor which could bring in the military is a failure by the GNU to pay the civil service and the military. Currently, the GNU is under pressure from civil service groups, such as teachers, to increase salaries (in foreign currency) to enable families to cope with the high cost of living and the shortage of foreign currency. Teachers’ unions have threatened a wave of rolling strikes if their demands are not met. The Zimbabwe Confederation of Trade Unions, which was the progenitor and ally of the MDC, has also flexed its muscles and threatened union strike action. A series of major strikes could play into the hands of the military; they could cite the need to maintain law and order and use violence and coercion to break up any demonstrations. If this were to happen and the MDC were to be perceived as being unable to rein in, or worse still, were supporting violent crowd control methods, this would fatally undermine the GNU and the MDC. Failure to pay soldiers on time could also bring in the military. There is also the risk that the GNU and the MDC could be held hostage if soldiers demand rolling pay increments which the government cannot afford. This could result in mutinies, which in turn would bring in other military groups to crush the mutineers, thus demonstrating the weakness of the state and allowing the JOC to reconvene.
The third factor which could cause the military to intervene is the prospect of a ZANU-PF defeat during national elections. The new constitution will not have a provision for both a prime minister and a president, and will be more of a ‘winner takes all’-style democracy. For the military elite, the prospect of the ‘opposition’ winning the next election is highly unpalatable. If electoral defeat for ZANU-PF becomes inevitable, then the service chiefs might be tempted either to control the result (as has been the case since 2000, and especially in 2008), or to force the winners to perpetuate the power-sharing arrangement which now exists. In other words, they would want yet another coalition government. Without arrangements for electoral transparency and monitoring – mechanisms to ensure the safety of the voters – then the military will certainly take charge and short-circuit the transitional process.

The fourth factor would be any attempt to try the military elite. There have been calls for the service chiefs who ordered the military ‘offensives’ and brutalities against the opposition to be put on trial. There is certainly a strong moral case for this, but any attempt to begin a process of justice and punishment against the elite would bring immediate reprisals against the MDC groups and civil society. Although some security sector personnel may support a justice process, the majority, who are bound by ties of institutional and party loyalty, would not. Not only would they fear the political repercussions, and the risk of being imprisoned; they also see a judicial process as a grave threat to the institutional coherence of the security sector itself. A serving member of the ZNA expressed it thus:33

I’ve been in the army for 32 years; I’m a professional, not a politician ... but I can tell you that we will never allow the MDC to put our commanders on trial. We can talk with the opposition about improving conditions in the army, but not about putting machefu [commanders] on trial. What about the Rhodesian army massacres of our people at Nyadzonia and Chimoio? Many of the white commercial farmers were soldiers in those days. They also have blood on their hands. We could have shot them or put them on trial in 1980 and 2000, but we did not. We just took back what was ours.

This is not to say that there should never be a justice process in Zimbabwe; there needs to be a process, but it must be thought through first. The current formal and informal reconciliation processes may mark the beginning of a restorative justice process which will lead to a Zimbabwean Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This ‘soft justice’ could in turn pave the way for a ‘hard justice’ that includes reparations and prosecutions for perpetrators of political violence. Proposals for a ‘truth for amnesty’ methodology have met with popular resistance from the victims of violence. It may be that the truth for amnesty will have to be twinned with a ‘justice for truth’ approach which provides for reparations and punishment, even if symbolic for the perpetrators. Transitional justice in Zimbabwe cannot be prescriptive; it has to be socially embedded. Just as importantly, it requires the participation of the security sector. Any transitional justice process which is formulated only as a punitive measure against the military cannot succeed. It will require a phased approach, with the main emphasis initially being on truth telling and traditional justice and reparations. Formal prosecutions and punishments will not be easy to achieve. Nevertheless, a Zimbabwean transitional justice process, however imperfect, at least offers a reconstructive counter-narrative to the mainstream narrative of military impunity.

The Military as Enabler
Nevertheless, the military no longer has things all its own way. The MDC’s control of the finance ministry is a powerful bargaining chip. The security sector is not homogenous, and many of the personnel are opposed to the political use of armed forces; they are also discontented with salaries and conditions of service. It is clear that there is now a struggle for the hearts and minds of

33 Author’s interview with a lieutenant colonel, who spoke under condition of anonymity, Johannesburg, February 2009.
the security sector, particularly the police and the army. The MDC’s weapon is pay and an appeal to professionalism; ZANU-PF relies on patriotism and institutional memory. Moreover, the Zimbabwean parliament, the Home Affairs Ministry and sections of the judiciary, have become more insistent that the security sector, especially the police, should follow legal procedures in its operations. The National Organ on Healing and Reconciliation has begun to take testimonies from both victims and perpetrators of human rights abuses and this is an important step. In other words, there is a gathering tide of accountability for the security sector, and this will not be easy to reverse. In addition, the MDC and civil society groups now have the legitimacy of the SADC which they lacked before the GNU.

Inclusive Engagement
Much will depend on the attitudes of domestic and international stakeholders. Inclusive engagement which recognises that all the parties in the GNU are stakeholders, and should be approached as such, will be crucial. International stakeholders will be tempted to take an ‘exclusive engagement’ approach, which sees one or other party as the ‘bad guys’ and therefore not worthy of engagement. This approach is not constructive, and nor is an approach which freezes out the military. Such attitudes will cause problems within the GNU and will harden military attitudes. If the benchmarks for transition are met (the GNU survives the credibility test; a new constitution is presented and accepted; and secure and credible elections are held), then it is more likely that the military will itself become either a neutral observer of an SSR process or perhaps even a participant. If none of these requirements are met, then there is a high likelihood that the security sector will continue to supplant the political process, and enforce armed neutrality.

Summary of Key Challenges and Opportunities for Politics and the Military in Zimbabwe

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<th>Challenges</th>
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<td>» The GNU has expressed the need to create a secure environment in Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>» The power struggles could obscure the need to create an enabling security environment</td>
<td>» Local and international human rights and humanitarian organisations have begun talks with the GNU on human rights and human security issues</td>
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<td>» The constitutional process could lead to violence if it is mismanaged or manipulated</td>
<td>» The widening of political space in Zimbabwe, and the emergence of non-state political groups, furthers democracy and also acts as a ‘safety valve’ against the emergence of other violent groups</td>
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<td>» National elections have been a trigger for military intervention and political violence over the past decade. The challenge is to end this destructive cycle.</td>
<td>» There is an opportunity, and a need, to address security issues before Zimbabwe’s next general elections.</td>
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6. Security Sector Reform in Zimbabwe: an Overview

Definition
There is not space here to dwell on the conceptual framework behind Security Sector Reform; indeed there is a vast academic literature, outlined below, which analyses the theory and practice of SSR. There is much of value, particularly with regard to works that assess the process from a real-world, case-study perspective. Although there is broad agreement by most analysts and practitioners that SSR involves reforming the military, there is divergence over whether it should primarily target the military (‘narrow but deep’) or whether it should be part of wider reform which includes non-hard security state institutions such as the judiciary (‘wide but shallow’). There are also divergences over whether SSR should be part of a governance and security paradigm, a security and development paradigm, or both. There are also differences of opinion regarding process and sponsorship, and whether SSR should be flexible and open-ended, or chronologically fixed and benchmarked. There is, therefore, no universally applicable definition of SSR.

For the purposes of this report, however, SSR in Zimbabwe is defined as ‘the reformation of the security, political and judicial system to ensure both institutional efficiency and to promote the public good’. This is a very broad description, but the point is that SSR in Zimbabwe needs to be multi-sectoral. From the Rhodesian period to the present, state institutions have been politicised and militarised. The greatest need is for a cultural transformation – a change in the belief and value system amongst the ‘guardians’ of security in Zimbabwe.

Literature Review
There is a small but growing literature on Zimbabwean SSR, with various reports and summaries available. Most of the analysis is folded within discussions of the wider economic and political situation in Zimbabwe, but there are several works worthy of mention.

Michelle Gavin’s report on Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe for CFR urged the US to quickly re-engage with Zimbabwe once the political situation made re-engagement feasible. Gavin’s work in 2007, like many others of the time, framed US re-engagement with Zimbabwe in a post-Mugabe environment. The political accommodation of the GNU has, of course, posed a diplomatic challenge to the US. Nonetheless Gavin’s study is valuable because it urged the US to recalibrate its confrontational diplomacy approach to Zimbabwe. Gavin suggests that:

The US should support good faith efforts to rethink the appropriate role of the military in Zimbabwe, an exercise that will involve rolling back the militarisation of so many government functions and thinking through likely security needs and military missions in the future. Training programmes, exchanges and technical assistance for developing more transparent and more efficient procurement and management systems should all be extended to these forces, in addition to HIV/AIDS prevention programmes. Respect for basic human rights and the rule of law must be the strong elements of the training curriculum.

‘The Crisis in Zimbabwe: A Case for “Root and Branch” Security Sector Reform?’ also has suggestions of note. The paper points out that ‘in a post-crisis Zimbabwe, the deployment of the military must be constitutionally mandated and limited in order to protect citizens from the use and abuse of this institution by political leaders in the future’. It also makes the interesting point that the current military

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environment reflects a built-in flaw from Operation Merger, which brought together ZANLA, ZIPRA and the RF to create the Zimbabwe National Army. Although Operation Merger was successful in that it prevented an almost certain relapse into civil war, ZANU-PF dominated the military structures. The military, despite being a national construct, swiftly became an instrument of the state and the party, just as the Rhodesian army had been a vehicle for the Rhodesian Front. The article also suggests that the 1991-94 Nyalili Commission in Tanzania could be relevant to Zimbabwe. The Commission made recommendations for reforming state institutions, including the military. It recommended that politicised soldiers make a choice: either join politics full-time or professionalise. The Commission also called for an end to party politics in the selection and vetting of potential recruits into the military.

The International Crisis Group produces regular updates on the Zimbabwe situation. Their most recent report of April 2009 gives a largely positive review, and insists that there must be immediate and comprehensive Western support for Zimbabwe. However, the report is less sanguine in its assessment of Zimbabwe’s military. It concludes that the security sector elites do not support the GNU, and they have the motivation – and the resources – to break the GNU project.36

Also of note is the recently published Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism report on the GNU. The report, which assesses the extent to which the GNU is fulfilling the spirit and the letter of the GPA, raises particular concerns about the police services in Zimbabwe:37

The ZRP continues to enforce the law in a partisan manner, and the culture of impunity for police who are perpetrators of human rights violations, remains intact. There were documented accounts of police involvement, from the command level to individual police officers in the continuing assault on the farms. Police have failed to investigate, arrest, and prosecute known and/or identifiable perpetrators of politically motivated retributive violence.

Finally, one of the most interesting comparative works on DDR and SSR is ‘Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: the Experience of Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ by Martin Edmonds, Greg Mills and Terence McNamee. The authors point out that Rwanda’s success in DDR and SSR is due to ‘an almost religious commitment to the idea that reform must be locally owned and driven, not imposed ... Kigali has been able to set its own agenda based on its assessment of what need[s] to be done to meet the country’s requirements – in defence development and human security – and invite international partners to complement its efforts where local capacity and resources is lacking.’38

Africa and SSR
SSR is now part of Africa’s development and security discourse. From 2000 to the present, nation-building and post-conflict programmes in countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi and the DRC have included SSR as a major component. Nor is SSR limited to post-conflict or transitional situations; it is equally applicable to ‘stable’ environments. SSR in Zimbabwe would thus be part of an existing narrative. This point has been reinforced by Major General Martin Agwai (former deputy force commander of the UN peacekeeping


mission in Sierra Leone), who pointed out that ‘African nations must stand up and accept the torch of responsibility for transforming their own security services’. In addition, African governments and militaries, in line with global best practice, regularly update their national defence policy and national security strategies in a public forum. Zimbabwe has not undergone a major defence review since the 1990s; such a review, which would include SSR, is long overdue.

Is There a Need for SSR?
Many of the gatekeepers of security and politics in Zimbabwe either see no need for reform or only acknowledge a need for a very narrowly focused type of reform. Those who believe in the latter feel that the only reform that is required is a small transformation within specific institutions, and one which relates to traditional administrative issues.

However, the majority of Zimbabwean citizens have expressed, through various forums including elections, the media, and formal and informal gatherings, their belief that the security sector needs to be reformed sooner rather than later. ‘Soft’ SSR has already begun; the Public Sector Commission will soon be auditing the public sector to monitor costs and productivity. This is in part a response to the 2009 May Day complaints from public sector workers who protested about the income discrepancies between themselves and the military officers who sit on the boards of companies. In addition, there have been questions tabled in parliament about the role of the security sector, and the continued farm invasions keep the spotlight on security issues. Some of the military personnel have themselves expressed a need for improving their organisations. Although not yet embedded within the first rank of tasks facing Zimbabwe, there is little doubt that Zimbabweans are attaching more significance to the security sector issue. This is crucial: a variety of international organisations, including the UN and Human Rights Watch, have stated the need for SSR in Zimbabwe, but what really matters is that Zimbabweans themselves (including the military) have embraced the need for change.

What Kind of SSR?
The SSR process should be constructive, not punitive; the aim is not to punish the military. SSR in Zimbabwe should have two main objectives:

Civilian-Military Covenant: This first goal of SSR would incorporate pragmatic processes to make the military part of a social covenant with the people.

Institutional Reform: This aims to refurbish the internal architecture and vision of the security sector in Zimbabwe so as to improve efficiency and morale. Zimbabwe’s security sector plays a major role in regional as well as domestic security. Zimbabwe will be expected to play a significant part in the establishment of the regional Africa Standby Forces brigades in 2010. Reviewing internal competencies and problems is a vital part of ensuring that the security sector is ‘fit for purpose’.

The military elite has downplayed the problems within the military, and between the military and society, but rank and file members of the security sector have themselves expressed the need for reforming their institutions. In September 2008, a large group of soldiers were confined to barracks at 2nd Brigade headquarters in Harare. A soldier who was interviewed later stated that ‘the problem is not just about money … there are many things which need to be fixed in this army’. One former high-ranking officer in the ZRP has said that Zimbabwe’s security sector needs a ‘total overhaul’.

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41 Interview with a former military intelligence officer, who spoke under condition of anonymity, Harare, 10 December 2008.
7. Key Challenges to SSR in Zimbabwe

Problem 1: Politicisation
The main problem facing SSR in Zimbabwe is the depth of politicisation and militarisation of many of Zimbabwe’s sectors and state institutions. It is estimated that three quarters of commissioned officers across the various sectors are either ex-combatants or former Youth League/Youth Brigade members. This has led to a mutually reinforcing, generational politicisation in the armed forces. The longest serving, most senior and most influential members of the hierarchy see their mission as the retention of their jobs and the maintenance of the dominance of the party at whatever cost. Their tools include the use of violence, coercion and persuasion. This puts them at odds with a Zimbabwean citizenry that wants the security community to provide equitable human security rather than narrowly defined state security. The result is a mutual distrust and antagonism between the citizenry and the guardians of security. Much of the population thus believes that the security sector is a destroyer, not a provider, of security.

Post-2000 politicisation has been the result of various factors, including the polarisation of public sector staff between those who were politically active and those who were not. In addition, from 2002 onwards, greater numbers of pro-ruling party staff were recruited or promoted. At the same time, known or suspected opposition sympathisers, or professionals who attempted to distance themselves from politics, became the targets of political victimisation and career discrimination. In many instances, their line managers often became pseudo-political ‘commissars’ to ensure that the work ethic conformed to the political line. The result, in many instances, has been a political culture informed by the worst sort of political correctness, with professionalism sometimes seen as an optional extra. The embedding of serving or former security services personnel has resulted in service personnel being sandwiched between institutional cultures of politicisation and militarisation to the detriment of professional values. Low salaries, dissatisfaction with conditions of service and uncertainty about the economic situation have been the primary causes of decline in productivity, but there is little doubt that resentment against political interference has also been a contributory factor. This has perhaps been most evident among teachers, who are often targeted by militia groups. Headmasters are also often pressured to prove their loyalty to ZANU-PF and to promote the party. Within the armed forces, political loyalty has been, and remains, a major factor for recruitment and operations. This, together with the use of violence against civilians or ‘disloyal’ forces, has affected morale and discipline. Many of Zimbabwe’s citizens therefore see the security sector as a toxic asset.

Problem 2: Denial by Security Elites
The second and more fundamental problem is that there is as yet little real evidence of a culture shift within the military. There are few signs of political will to address the fundamental problems within, and caused by, the security sector. The GNU has stated its commitment to regularising salary payments for the military. This is a good start (as well as being politically prudent), but it tinkers with, rather than addresses, the real issues. Since the inception of the GNU, progressive legislation has been passed; the National Security Act, which was gazetted by Zimbabwe’s Parliament in April 2009, provides for the establishment of a revised National Security Council (NSC). The NSC, originally established by ZANU-PF from 2003-07 as a forum to co-ordinate economic and security strategy, will now have multiparty representation and is designed to allow for civilian oversight on security matters.

Nevertheless, for now, the securocracy sees scant need for reform, motivated in part by the asymmetry of power within the GNU. Although the MDC has some soft power within the coalition (particularly through control of the key finance ministry), ZANU-PF still dominates the hard power ministries of defence, home affairs, state security, and justice, media and home affairs (which is co-chaired with the MDC-T). The security sector also remains outside the MDC’s control – the military have increasingly become a counterweight not just 7
The case for security sector reform in Zimbabwe

to the MDC but also to ZANU-PF itself.) The MDC groups thus have very little leverage with which to persuade or compel the security sector elite to permit serious reform; it is also questionable as to whether, and to what extent, ZANU-PF wants security sector reform. The civilian political leadership thus has a weak capacity to negotiate SSR with the military.

This is also the result of the realities of Zimbabwe’s situation. In a classic internal post-conflict situation, security sector dialogue is the result of political accommodation between the key political and military stakeholders. There will usually be a number of rival military groups, each of which functions as a counterweight and deterrent to the other(s). The need to accommodate diverse militaries within the umbrella of a single national force is what spurs security sector discourse in a classic post-conflict environment. This is not the case in Zimbabwe at present; the situation remains fluid and highly unstable as Zimbabwe enters what may be called a transitional conflict situation. The MDC groups do not have a military counterweight to the ZANU-PF/security sector axis. The MDC-T does have its own security sector and youth wing, but the numbers of personnel involved are miniscule. The MDC’s security is defensively orientated: although some of the personnel are ex-military, their task is to provide protection for the MDC hierarchy and activists. They are not a military force, and they cannot engage militarily with the overwhelming firepower of ZANU-PF. Having corralled the MDC using a mixture of political carrots and military sticks, the security sector elite thus sees no need to discuss or dilute their military sovereignty and positional advantage to a group whom the military elite view as civilian amateurs.

Summary of Key Challenges and Opportunities for SSR in Zimbabwe

**Challenges**

» Many in the security and political sectors see no need for SSR in Zimbabwe

» The fragile and contested political terrain acts as a brake on SSR discourse and implementation

» The security sector has to be an active participant and partner in SSR; there is no guarantee that they are ready to engage just yet

» Changing the mindset from state security to citizen security is a major challenge.

**Opportunities**

» Zimbabwe’s citizens desire reform of the security sector

» Many current and former members of the security sector have expressed the need to reform their organisations

» Zimbabwe is re-emerging into the global community, and the SSR discourse is a major part of global development. Now is the time to begin the SSR dialogue and process

» The GNU has initiated a national reconciliation and healing process. SSR can be part of this

» The National Security Council has now been established.
8. Recommendations for SSR in Zimbabwe

I. Create an SSR Discourse
There needs to be a national defence and security sector dialogue. Zimbabwe has never had a participatory national dialogue on security, and this is long overdue. The relationship between some sections of the security sector and much of the populace is often one of mutual mistrust and fear. Dialogue is a pre-requisite in building a vision and roadmap for defence and security in Zimbabwe. It is vital to begin an open discussion within the military, and between the military and the citizenry, on what they see as the primary roles of the security sector in Zimbabwe, and to gauge mutual responsibilities and expectations. It is particularly important to hear the opinions of security sector personnel on perceptions of their role. The dialogue should be open, and open-ended. Although regional, continental and international practitioners and analysts should also input on the debates, the security sector and defence debate in Zimbabwe should be Zimbabwean-led.

Situate SSR within Zimbabwe’s ‘Vision 2040’ Discourse
The GNU has stated its commitment to creating a national vision for Zimbabwe. There have been a number of workshops with stakeholders to discuss how and what a national vision of Zimbabwe means, and how it can be achieved. Vision 2040 is, in essence, a framework for nation-building and ending what has been – and continues to be, in some respects – a two-state Zimbabwe. The security sector and SSR need to be a core component in Vision 2040. There cannot be sustainable development in Zimbabwe with a politicised military, and a professional security sector would make an enormous contribution to Zimbabwe’s renaissance.

II. Write a National Defence and Security Strategy
There needs to be a National Defence and Security Strategy (NDSS), which draws a roadmap for Zimbabwe’s current and future defence and security requirements. It should also outline the ways in which these requirements can be met. The NDSS would combine the traditional values of national sovereignty and state security with the imperatives of ‘people’s security’. The NDSS would need to take as its core value the state and security sector’s responsibility to provide physical and psychological security for Zimbabwe’s people.

III. Integrate SSR into the NDSS
SSR will be a core component of the NDSS.

IV. Sequence SSR
SSR needs to be part of a wider, comprehensive process. SSR also needs to be sequenced – not everything can be done at once, and the process will take time. There are eight entry points that can allow SSR to begin immediately in some areas; other SSR processes would have to be done over the medium- to long term.

Short-term SSR

Entry point 1: Regularise the National Security Council
The National Security Act (March 2009) provides a legal framework for the creation of a National Security Council (NSC). The original NSC included ministers and security sector chiefs. It operated between 2003 and 2007 and was designed to manage what had increasingly become Zimbabwe’s ‘war economy’. The security chiefs in the NSC were also on the JOC; together, they formed a military-political cabal which ruled Zimbabwe as a private fiefdom, but who were unable to manage Zimbabwe’s economic crisis. The new NSC is envisaged as a multiparty grouping which will monitor Zimbabwe’s national security. It includes: President Mugabe as Chair; Vice Presidents Joseph Msika and Joyce Mujuru (ZANU-PF); Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC); Deputy Prime Ministers Thokozani Khupe (MDC-T) and Professor Arthur Mutambara (MDC-M); Finance Minister Tendai Biti (MDC-T); Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa (ZANU-PF); and the Home Affairs Ministers Kembo Mohadi and Giles Mutsekwa. The security sector chiefs will also be ex-officio members of the NSC.

There are significant differences between the MDC’s draft position paper for the NSC and what was approved by parliament in the National 8
Security Act. The MDC’s draft stipulated that the NSC would have a managerial function; it would have responsibility for overseeing the security sector and directing operations. As gazetted, however, the NSC will not have any managerial capacity and will only review national defence policies. Nor will the security sector commanders necessarily be accountable to the NSC. Nevertheless the NSC, which had its first meeting in August 2009, is a key forum for political-military dialogue and civil-military relations. Over time, it could become an engine of transformation within the security sector, and between the security sector and the public. As such the NSC should be supported, provided it fulfils its core remit of bringing accountability and civilian oversight to the security sector. The NSC will provide a pluralist forum where the coalition partners can discuss security affairs with the service chiefs.

Entry Point 2: Revisit the Defence Forces Commission

The Defence Forces Commission (DFC) deals mainly with internal administration and morale in the ZDF. The MDC and, perhaps more importantly, members of the armed forces have expressed a desire for the DFC to be more pro-active regarding morale and conditions of service within the military. The DFC needs to undertake a national consultation with the military to listen to grievances.

Entry Point 3: Overhaul the Electoral System

According to the GPA agreement, elections should be held within Zimbabwe once the constitutional process is completed. It is unclear when the next general election will be, but it is imperative that the electoral process be overhauled to ensure free and fair elections and, more importantly, to ensure that the military does not subvert the process, as has been the case over the past decade. Civil society groups have made suggestions regarding the electoral review process. These suggestions include:

- The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission should be reprofessionalised, and its neutrality guaranteed.
- The judiciary needs to be reformed to ensure that it upholds the law in a non-partisan manner
- The composition of Parliament should reflect democratic elections
- There is a need for a comprehensive audit of electoral laws.

If the political will is there, all of these processes could be achieved in a relatively short space of time. Indeed, they would need to be done quickly because there are various by-elections scheduled for late 2009, and it is still unclear exactly how they will be managed. It is also essential to take steps to ensure that elections are not politicised or militarised. Measures could include:

- Legislation that forbids military personnel (army, police, CIO, war veterans and youth militia) from the management of elections. In 2008, the military took charge of the entire process (‘advising’ voters on how to vote; commandeering the ballot boxes; and ‘counting’ the votes)
- Providing for independent observers when the military votes in various barracks across the country – in 2008, soldiers and police reported that they themselves were under orders to vote for ZANU-PF and that their vote was not secret
- Allowing international as well as regional and continental election monitors for local and national elections
- Ensuring that the ZEC – the traditional elections manager – is staffed by non-partisan professionals and that it reports directly to parliament without interference from the military or other groups.

Overall, while it is important to review existing legislation and amend current laws or create new ones if necessary, the real challenge is not to create a mass of new laws, but to implement constructive legislation that is already on the books.

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Entry point 4: the Prison Service

It is vital to begin reform of the Zimbabwe prison system. Prisons are overcrowded, dirty and lethal. Food shortages are common for both warders and prisoners, and what little food there is, is often vermin infested, as are the blankets. Prisoners, both male and female, are often raped and beaten by other inmates and by prison staff. Infectious diseases such as cholera, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis claim the lives of many. It is estimated that at least thirty prisoners die every day in Zimbabwe’s jails – the dead are often left to rot in the same cells as the living. On 31 March 2009, the SABC aired its documentary on Zimbabwe’s jails; the smuggled film footage showed stick-thin prisoners living in conditions reminiscent of the worst twentieth century concentration camps.

The prison service is a natural entry point because it bridges the security and justice sectors. There are five steps which could be taken immediately. These include:

- ZACRO (the Zimbabwe Association for Crime Prevention and Rehabilitation of the Offender) should be encouraged to present an updated version of its 2008 report on the state of Zimbabwe’s prisons to Parliament. The minister for home affairs (under whose jurisdiction the Prison Service falls) and the commissioner-general for prisons would be invited to respond to questions about the prisons. This could be done within a few weeks.
- A parliamentary committee should be established to investigate/audit Zimbabwe’s prison system. This committee could be assisted in its work by the UN and by local organisations already in the field. The committee would make its report and recommendations within two months of its creation. The report would include budget estimates.
- Following the SABC video report, the UN was allowed to deliver food, clothes, blankets, medication and medical care to some of the prisons. This needs to be regularised. The ZPS, in collaboration with independent organisations, should submit a budget of requirements (food, salaries, medicines etc) for the rest of 2009 and for 2010.
- The ZPS is critically short of vehicles to transport suspects to court; there are only four trucks (often out of service) to transport prisoners from the three major prisons (Chikurubi, Khami and Hwahwa), as well as numerous smaller prisons. This means that in many instances prisoners’ cases are not heard because they cannot appear in court. There are an estimated 7,000 prisoners in remand prison. Many have been there for years without their cases being heard; the lack of vehicles to transport them to court is one of the reasons for this.
- A general amnesty for minor offences would clear the backlog.

Entry Point 5: the Zimbabwe Republic Police

Most SSR prioritises the army; SSR in Zimbabwe should prioritise the police. This is not to downplay the requirement for SSR in the military, but the ZRP occupy the legal as well as the military and paramilitary domains, and thus have much greater daily interaction with the public than do the other security institutions.

It is important that support be given for the ZRP to fulfil its traditional mandate of anti-crime policing. Over the past decade, the militarisation of Zimbabwe’s political economy and the politicisation of the security sector has resulted in ‘political’ policing, with some police units being used as paramilitary auxiliaries of the state. This has hollowed out the civilian police departments, particularly the CID which lacks up to date equipment, and has been hit by high turnovers of staff.

It would be inaccurate to say that the police in Zimbabwe are totally inefficient; in 2007, Police Deputy Commissioner Innocent Matibiri pointed out that research showed a reduction in certain criminal activities (smuggling, stock theft, poaching and armed robberies). He credited this to the work of the Police Support Unit and the CID. Nevertheless, there are still serious problems for law enforcement. Reforming the police is a long-term project but
certain things can be done relatively quickly. These include:

- Acquiring vital equipment such as up to date computers, and patrol vehicles
- Improving basic training, and emphasising human rights and respect for the law. This is already taught in police courses, but these fundamental values can never be over-emphasised
- Instituting an anti-torture policy (criminal suspects and political prisoners are routinely tortured)
- Encouraging better civilian-police relations through improved community policing
- Upholding the Police Code of Conduct which already exists.

Longer-term reforms could include the re-organisation and retraining of public order units, such as the riot police; and ensuring that crowd control does not entail the use of lethal force against civilians.

Entry Point 6: Education and Civil-Military Relations: the Return of ‘Big History’?

The security sector runs a variety of high-quality vocational and professional courses from diploma to degree level. More civilians should be encouraged to take these courses; they provide a valuable interface between civilians and the military and they could help to break down the barriers between them. Course content should also be expanded to include democratic discourses. The teaching of history at all levels should also be broadened to take a pluralist history perspective. Since 2000, the state has manufactured a ‘patriotic history’ narrative which places ZANU-PF at the centre of Zimbabwe’s Liberation War, with ZAPU being relegated to the margins. It also demonises the MDC, the Rhodesians and the West, particularly the UK. A return to ‘big history’ would include multiple narratives and put an end to historical demonisation. (This also works in reverse: Zimbabwe, and ZAPU in particular, has been demonised in the West, and it is important to restore proportionality).

In practical terms, security sector education could be complementary to the revival of education in Zimbabwe. There is a dire shortage of teaching materials and teachers in many subjects (particularly the sciences). Reviving the national education sector is a priority for the GNU and is one in which donor partners should engage rapidly. If national educational revival is twinned with increasing and improving educational opportunities, curricula and teaching for the security sectors, this would be beneficial.

Entry Point 7: Reconciliation

As occurred in 1980, the new government has stated its commitment to promoting nation-building through reconciliation. The GNU has created a National Organ on Healing and Reconciliation, which includes ministers from all three GNU parties. The job of the Organ is to promote national reconciliation, particularly between ZANU-PF and MDC-T supporters. Part of the means of doing this is by encouraging testimonies from both the perpetrators and victims of violence. To date, most accounts have come from the victims although some of the perpetrators have also come forward. In addition, President Mugabe’s Extraordinary Decree of July 2009 commits Zimbabweans worldwide to observing 24-26 July as days of national healing, reconciliation and non-violence.

These are worthy endeavours and should be supported. The Organ in particular should be given moral and financial support to undertake its activities. Grassroots reconciliation and healing efforts should also be supported by Zimbabweans and the international community.

Nevertheless it should not conceal the fact that true reconciliation cannot occur when political violence is still happening. Farms continue to be invaded and political violence against MDC and civil society remains. For 24-26 July to be more than wishful thinking, there needs to be a ban on political violence, and the police and judiciary must be encouraged and empowered to arrest and try perpetrators of political and other violence.

Entry Point 8: A Zimbabwean Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Zimbabwe needs a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The Zimbabwean TRC could
function along the same lines as the South African TRC or the recent Liberian TRC; in other words, it would be an evidentiary rather than punitive body. The TRC could be under the aegis of the National Organ on Healing and Reconciliation. Zimbabweans at home and in the diaspora have continually expressed their desire to know the truth about the violence inflicted upon them. The TRC is particularly necessary because in many cases the victims know who their attackers were, and often live in the same area as their assailants. The TRC would therefore help to ascertain not just who the perpetrators were, but also who gave the orders, and the likelihood of new campaigns of violence. A TRC would also be a site of cultural cleansing; in African culture, it is often believed that the victim of a violent death returns as a *ngozo* (vengeful spirit) to torment the living. Only when the truth about the assailant is revealed can the *ngozo* rest. It is unclear how far back the TRC would go; one could make the case that the Gukarahundi massacres in Matabeleland during the 1980s should also be included. There is also a great deal of unfinished business from the Liberation War of 1965-79, when both the Rhodesian security forces and the guerrillas killed civilians. The question of how far back the TRC would go is one which would have to be answered by the Zimbabwean people.

**Medium- to Long-term SSR**

Some of the SSR processes will need to take place over the medium to long term. Penetrating the ‘hard security’ strongholds will not be easy. Militaries worldwide, and especially in Zimbabwe, are protective of their turf, especially when civilians try to enter. Reforming the security sector will take time (years rather than months), and would have to be incremental. As ever, political will and the assent of the military is a pre-requisite for reform.

**V. Review National Security Strategy and National Defence Policy**

Zimbabwe’s national security strategy needs to be reviewed to ensure that there is public consultation about what is meant by national security. Although state security is an unavoidable element of national security, it should not be the dominant element. National security in a democracy should arguably be premised on the provision of human security to the nation. This citizen-centred concept of national security would in turn inform national defence policy (in other words, threat assessments, defence requirements, capabilities and budgets). Zimbabwe has very limited resources, and respect for proportionality and fitness for purpose is important for the military.

In real terms Zimbabwe’s military, particularly the ZDF, should be refocused towards external missions, particularly peacekeeping, where the military has a stellar record with UN, African Union and SADC forces. The security sector needs to be ‘unpacked’ with each sector performing its allotted tasks. The ZDF would thus return to their primary role of protecting national sovereignty and participating in regional, continental and global peace and security operations; and the police would return to their role as civilian guardians of public order and the law. The size and funding for each sector would then be based on these recalibrated mandates.

**VI. Create a Defence and Security Commission**

A Defence and Security Commission (DSC) could review defence and security in Zimbabwe, recommend reforms and point the way to a revised National Security Act. The DSC could follow a similar path to the Constitutional Commission which was established by parliament in April 2009 to draft Zimbabwe’s new constitution. There are specific timelines and guidelines relating to the constitutional process. The Commission members are MPs, and assessments will be made through consultations with a wide cross-section of Zimbabwean society. The Commission report is scheduled to be presented by February 2010, with the draft constitution in place by July 2010.

Similarly, the DSC could include civil society and security sector representatives, as well as MPs. It would have to consult with stakeholders from the hard and soft security sectors, as well as wider Zimbabwean society. The DSC should produce a ‘Report on Defence and Security in Zimbabwe 2010-20’, which would assess Zimbabwe’s defence and security status and requirements, and make
recommendations to be assessed by Parliament. If accepted by Parliament, the recommendations could become the basis for a revised National Security Act. The legislation would also be enshrined within the national constitution, as well as within the legal statutes of security sector organisations.

Security sector issues are already starting to be raised in parliament. In March 2009, John Nyamande, MDC MP for Makoni, raised the question of why the defence chiefs still refuse to salute Morgan Tsvangirai. Minister of Defence, Emmerson Mnangagwa, was not present at the time, but Nyamande has promised to raise the issue when parliament next convenes in May 2009. The ‘saluting’ issue indeed does have implications:

A lot of middle ranking and junior officers are of the opinion that if their comrades are reluctant to salute Tsvangirai, they should resign from the security forces ... people are uncomfortable with the status quo.

VII. Commission a Report on Defence and Security

The report would have to be both an aspirational and pragmatic document: aspirational in that it needs to be a transformational work which spurs new thinking about defence and security in Zimbabwe; and pragmatic because it cannot be divorced from political reality. The report would need to assess the strengths and weaknesses of current defence and security in Zimbabwe and outline the shape of Zimbabwe’s future defence policy. As was the case with South Africa’s 1996 White Paper on Defence in a Democracy, the report should be a confidence-building measure for Zimbabwe’s citizens and the wider international community.

Some of the issues which the report could examine include:

National Security
Zimbabwe needs a common vision of national security, and one which is people-, rather than state-, centred. The vision of ‘people’s security’, based on human rights, would inform National Defence Policy and definitions of the national interest. Helping to craft and articulate the Zimbabwean people’s vision of national security, and the policies around it, would be one of the key tasks of the report. Some key questions include: is Zimbabwe’s current defence policy relevant to the nation’s internal needs and the wider strategic environment? What is the national interest, and is the definition of national security appropriate to a pluralist society?

Democracy and the Military
Security sector practice needs to be aligned with the democratic provisions of the national constitution and the military’s own service regulations. The report would make recommendations on how this could be done so that non-partisan civilian oversight over the military becomes normative.

Military Professionalism
This would entail an assessment of the levels of professionalism within the security sector. Recommendations could be made on areas where there are major weaknesses.

Depoliticisation
The levels and types of politicisation within the security sector would be examined, and recommendations made as to ways in which the military could be depoliticised. The report would also look at the levels of politicisation and militarisation in the public sector. This could be done in collaboration with the Public Sector Commission.

Role and Functions
The report would need to issue clear guidelines on the role and limits of the military in a democracy. This includes two aspects: the first covers role definitions of the specific military institutions, including the ZDF (army and air force), the ZRP, the CIO and the ZRP. The second involves presenting recommendations for specific security sector legislation which formalises the rule of law, and promotes democratic accountability within the security services. There is, of course, no

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guarantee that the military would respect sector specific legislation, but without rules everything will be broken. In addition, many in the military have themselves expressed the need for more comprehensive, specific legislation which enhances professionalism in the armed forces.

**Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Militia Groups**

Technically the militias are not standing armies, so a different type of demobilisation is required. The report should suggest incentives for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and ways in which this could be handled, particularly in the case of the war veterans and the Youth Brigades (Green Bombers).

**Parliament and the Security Sector**

The report would assess the relationship between parliament and the military.

**Education and Training**

Zimbabwe has a strong tradition of education in the military. The Army and Police Staff Colleges already run highly rated courses in military and legal affairs.

**Security Sector Budgets**

The report would make recommendations on how greater transparency for security sector budgets can be achieved. Areas where cutbacks can be made should also be identified.

**Right-sizing**

Zimbabwe needs a military commensurate with its resources and needs. The report would evaluate what the size of the security sector should be. How many personnel (military and civilian) are required? Is the sector too large?

**Equipment and Control of Forces**

The report would distinguish between security sector needs and wants with regard to military equipment. Given that Zimbabwe’s security sector should, ideally, function as a democratic defence community, and one which provides human security to the citizenry, is there a requirement for state of the art light and heavy weaponry? Just as importantly, the report should detail the use of lethal weaponry and torture against civilians. It is important to ascertain what weapons were used, who issued them, and why. This has already been done by various human rights groups, but the intention of the DSC would be to issue guidelines on the behaviour of the military in a democracy.

**Command and Control**

The report would assess internal command and control structure in the security sector as well as between civil powers and the military.

**Women and Security**

In Zimbabwe, as elsewhere, women and children have not been spared from political violence and have often been specially targeted in some instances. Women have been raped, tortured, mutilated and killed, particularly during periods of electoral violence. Domestic and criminal violence against women is another, often interrelated, problem. Security reform proposals would need to be gender sensitive.

**Militarisation of Elections**

For the past decade, elections in Zimbabwe have been a catalyst for the military’s usurpation of political process and for political violence. The electoral run-off of June 2008 is a case in point; more than 300 civilians were killed, with hundreds of others being forced to flee their homes. There would need to be specific recommendations as to how the military can be prised out of ‘managing’ elections. The role of international monitors is another issue which may need to be discussed in the report and in parliament. National elections in Zimbabwe, as in other countries around the globe, need international monitors if they are to be credible. Depending on the security assessment included in the report, it may be necessary for small contingents of regional, continental and international police personnel to be posted in-country. Their role would not be to engage in local politics, but to provide a symbolic security presence at voting centres. The question of civilian protection units during elections is highly contentious. Throughout the decade, ZANU-PF has claimed that having foreign forces in Zimbabwe is a major threat to the state, as the soldiers are likely to be fulfilling
a regime change agenda. There is no simple answer as to whether protection forces could be needed, and what size they should be if required. What is certain is that the report of the DSC should raise the issue and that parliament should assess how civilians are to be protected during elections.

**Transitional Justice and Reconciliation**
The report would need to assess ways in which justice and reconciliation could complement security sector reform in Zimbabwe. The National Organ for Healing and Reconciliation has been established by the GNU, and testimonies by the victims and some of the perpetrators of political violence are being heard. Nevertheless, there are still some fundamental questions about process and outcomes which remain to be answered. Many of the victims are calling for retributive justice against their tormentors. The great challenge is to see whether, and how, transitional justice and reconciliation can be implemented in Zimbabwe as a complementary process to SSR.

**VIII. Empower the National Security Forum**
Although the Defence and Security Commission would be the main enablers in the security discourse in Zimbabwe, there would also be an important role for a National Security Forum. This would be an informal grouping of security practitioners, civil society, academics, and others – in other words all those with an interest in the outlines of Zimbabwe’s restructured political landscape. The forum could be an ‘ideas reservoir’ which would complement, not compete with, the DSC.

**IX. Enable Processes of Social/Informal SSR**
Although the primary focus of SSR in Zimbabwe lies in reforming military culture, there should not be an obsession with a top-down, mechanistic process or output. Socially based SSR is very important, and is already happening in Zimbabwe. This includes school programmes which raise awareness of the dangers of joining violent criminal and political gangs; and public awareness campaigns about security sector legislation (as part of constitutional awareness campaigns).

**X. Rework the Defence Budget**
Traditionally, Zimbabwe’s defence budget is one of the largest items of government expenditure. The level of spending on the military was reduced in 2009/10 with defence receiving 8 per cent of the total budget of US$1 billion, rather than the traditional 10-15 per cent.

Reducing the budget is a start; but the real issue is the quality of expenditure. Zimbabwe’s defence budget and its defence policies are inextricably linked. There needs to be a review of the country’s defence and security needs. Issues around modernisation, efficiency and reconceptualising the security sector in a constrained economy, are paramount. Zimbabwe’s defence budget could be a valuable tool for SSR and national reconstruction.
SSR should be part of a wider, comprehensive Political Sector Reform and Judicial Sector Reform process

Zimbabwe needs a National Defence and Security Strategy (NDSS). This would provide a road-map and a new dynamic for national defence and security, and for civil-military relations and human rights in Zimbabwe

SSR would be an integral component of the NDSS

SSR in Zimbabwe does not need to start from zero. There are various available entry points, and informal SSR has already begun

SSR includes all the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security institutions, including the ZDF, the ZRP, the CIO, the ZPS, the judiciary, and the militias

Particular attention must be paid to reforming the police and judiciary

SSR should be a Zimbabwean-led process. It also needs to be a consultative process which includes the security sector, the political establishment and civilian society

A Defence and Security Commission (DSC) should be appointed to audit the security sector. The DSC could also present a Report on Defence and Security in Zimbabwe. The report would outline the challenges and map a way forward for integrating state security and human security under the umbrella of national security

The National Security Council should be supported, and empowered, to regulate the security sector

A Truth and Reconciliation Commission should be established, not as a punitive body, but as part of national reconciliation, nation-building and security sector reform.
4. International Engagement with SSR in Zimbabwe: ‘Smart’ SSR?

Donor assistance from the regional and international community will be required. This can be state-to-state, or NGO-based funding. There are numerous organisations which have proven excellence and expertise in SSR; they range from smaller but highly effective African organisations, to state or regional organisations with a global reach, such as DFID (UK), the EU and the UN. The issue with donor funding for SSR, as with donor aid in general, is not about who is doing the funding. The question is about whether indigenous people are partners, with equity, or whether they are merely recipients who are being used to service unrealistic targets set abroad, and/or the profit margins of organisations. Donor aid, in the security sector in particular, needs to be smart aid which is based on realism, local needs and capacities; and most of all, common sense.

This in turn will encourage smart reform in the security sector. Smart reform entails SSR based on realistic, achievable goals which are guided by the local situation and by political and military reality. This is the approach advocated by this paper: there need to be specific targets for SSR, and these targets should be set by Zimbabweans. Foreign donors should be facilitators, rather than managers of the process. Ideals and idealism are important – indeed, security sector reform is surely the most constructive meeting place of ideals and reality – but there is no place for wishful thinking. Nor is there room at the inn for competing donor narratives, which have been the bane of so many donor interventions. Local people should be the lead actors, and should guide a coherent and coordinated donor strategy, which is embedded in the common vision of national security.

Donor participation is essential, but it should be streamlined to avoid confusion. Donors also need to be aware that SSR is not a linear, easily measurable process; it is often a messy, fitful process, particularly in countries such as Zimbabwe, which are not at war but which are not fully at peace either. Zimbabwe is currently in an internal armistice and SSR investors need to be guided by this reality.

Zimbabwe, and its security sector in particular, also need to take national peace-making and peace-building seriously. We cannot expect comprehensive investment when political violence and failures in the rule of law continue. The international community has expressed a willingness to assist in bringing security to Zimbabwe and in funding SSR. But this assistance can only begin if the Zimbabwean security community, and all the GNU stakeholders, acknowledge the problems and the need for reform. It is a two-way street. The dialogue between Zimbabwe and the global community on a partnership for ‘smart’ SSR in Zimbabwe needs to be energised. Entry points for donors include:

**International Training Teams**

The British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) and other international military advisory teams played a valuable role in professionalising the military in the early 1980s. Their experience would still be valuable, and it is important for BMATT and other teams to re-engage with the Zimbabwean military, where the exchange of ideas and the emphasis on military accountability will be important for democratisation in Zimbabwe. There is also an important role for Commonwealth engagement with Zimbabwe on security.

**China**

The Chinese military and the Zimbabwean security sector have a long history of partnership and China should be part of Zimbabwe’s international SSR discourse. The West often sees China as a spoiler and there is no doubt that China’s support for Zimbabwe’s military in recent years has exacerbated the country’s problems. But China has also contributed to Zimbabwe’s economy and was a key ally during the Liberation War; China cannot be omitted from any international approach to Zimbabwe’s security.

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64 Smart aid advocates more effective aid – quality over quantity. Similarly, there has been a rethink of SSR and its effectiveness. Smart reform is based on the local reality, not on foreign donor imperatives.
Foreign Military Courses
Military personnel who are not on the sanctions list (in other words, forbidden to enter the EU or the US because of links to, or participation in, human rights abuses) should be encouraged or sponsored to attend professional military courses abroad.

Exchange Programmes
Personnel from the US, UK and the EU should be encouraged to attend courses such as the Joint Command and Staff Courses (JCSC) at Staff Colleges throughout Zimbabwe. The annual JCSC draw local, regional and continental participation, and are highly regarded. Zimbabwe’s security sector and civil society can give guidance to regional and international donors, on specific ways and areas in which they can assist in education for the security sector.

Joint Training Exercises
This would be a valuable forum for professionalisation and the exchange of constructive values.

DDR
The donor community, together with the SADC and Zimbabweans, should pressure the GNU for some type of disarmament, demobilisation and social reintegration for the war veterans and youth militias. There should be an audit of weapons, and a decommissioning process should begin, overseen by local and international organisations. In the first instance, the disarmament process may be more symbolic than real – but it would still be a powerful symbol. The demobilisation and social integration process would not follow the traditional DDR route. The militias are not guerrilla forces or standing armies; they are recruited from working or unemployed groups in the towns and the rural areas. They are thus already part of the social fabric. In a sense this makes DDR harder, because the task is not to reinsert ‘prodigals’ back into society. The task is to change the mindset and access to weapons of a particular group within society. There is no simple, ‘quick fix’ but providing jobs must lie at the heart of any solution, and the international community can be a valuable partner in creating the environment for this to happen.

Policing
This is another area where donors can make a contribution, particularly in the domain of public order policing. The police have become notorious for violently breaking up public gatherings, and it is necessary that police tactics for crowd control be revised.

Agriculture
Zimbabwe’s agricultural system cannot flourish without security of tenure and security for farm labourers. The sector will require assistance from the international community to revive. Resolving the land disputes and ending farm invasions is a pre-requisite for comprehensive agrarian aid. The GNU will need to rein in the militias and establish the rule of law in the land sector to create an enabling environment for the resuscitation of Zimbabwe’s agriculture. It will be necessary to hold a stakeholders’ conference on land. The international community cannot pre-determine the outcome to Zimbabwe’s thorniest problem, but they can certainly give constructive assistance regarding land security and farming equipment.

Prisons
Food, clothing and medicines are urgently needed for the prisoners. In addition, vehicles are required to transport them to the courts so that their cases can be heard.
Summary of Key Recommendations for International Engagement with SSR

» Constructive international assistance and partnership on SSR in Zimbabwe should be welcomed, regardless of whether it comes from the West, the Far East, or other parts of the globe.

» There should be no preconditions about SSR in Zimbabwe, set by either the global community or by Zimbabweans themselves.

» Zimbabwe’s neighbours in the SADC and the African Union have a major role to play in Zimbabwe’s security.

» Zimbabwe’s diaspora, many of whom were in the security sector, should also be part of the SSR process in Zimbabwe.

» US-Zimbabwe state-to-state relations remain particularly fraught (although the US continues to provide essential humanitarian assistance for Zimbabwe). Repealing the Zimbabwe Democracy and Recovery Act of 2001, which put trade sanctions on Zimbabwe, would help to improve relations and avoid a military backlash in Zimbabwe. This is also an opportune moment for the US and the EU to develop a co-ordinated strategy for engagement with Zimbabwe’s security sector.

» There are a variety of entry points for the global community to engage with Zimbabwe on security issues. These entry points include training, education, and equipment and exchange programmes.

» The police and prison service are a priority area, and performance should be monitored and appraised, in exchange for capacity-building investment.

» Zimbabwe also has a responsibility to show progress in security and rule of law if it is to receive dedicated funding for security reform.

» Smart reform based on local conditions, imperatives and actors will have the best chance of success. Local and traditional processes and dialogues are vital and should also be supported.
Over the past decade, relations between the Zimbabwean and British governments have been acrid. Zimbabwe is a former British colony, and the state-to-state relationship has been one of ‘boom and bust’ since 1965. Relations were frozen during the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, as the UK urged sanctions against the Rhodesian state, while providing education and asylum opportunities for Zimbabwean refugees. From 1980-2000, relations between the two countries were largely cordial, and the UK BMATT performed an important advisory role in the creation of the ZNA. From 2000-08, the land redistribution programme, electoral malfeasance and widespread use of violence led to another freeze; the Zimbabwe government, for its part, accused the British and the Americans of orchestrating a regime-change project through the use of sanctions against Zimbabwe. Since the establishment of the GNU, there has been a thaw; and the UK has pledged to continue humanitarian funding (approximately £50 million annually). However, there will not be a stimulus package for development aid until law and order benchmarks are achieved by the GNU. The former British ambassador in Harare, Andrew Pocock, stated that London will no longer try to block IMF and World Bank funding for Zimbabwe: this was an important statement of intent.

Zimbabwe is not a dependency of the UK, and it has forged a host of alliances with African, Middle Eastern and Far Eastern partners; but it is important that the two countries re-establish good relations. The EU, of which the UK is a member, is still the largest donor to Zimbabwe; and UK, US, and UN humanitarian funding is proving critical on a day-to-day basis. UK support for Zimbabwe at the IMF and World Bank will be important in helping to unlock funding. And the GNU will count on British assistance to help persuade the Obama administration to repeal the Zimbabwe Democracy and Recovery Act which has placed crippling sanctions on ordinary Zimbabwean businesses. (This is separate from the ‘targeted sanctions’ against the ZANU-PF elite.)

Over the past decade, the Zimbabwe imbroglio has led to sometimes frosty relations between London and Washington on the one hand and the SADC (particularly South Africa) on the other. Improved relations with Zimbabwe are pivotal for the UK and the US to improve their relations with South Africa and SADC.

**Entry Points for UK-Zimbabwe SSR**

As mentioned earlier, the UK can, and should, engage with Zimbabwe on security issues, and create a mutual security partnership based on security of their citizens (which would be part of a wider EU and US security investment in Zimbabwe). London should continue to stress the importance of the rule of law, but it should no longer be the sole mantra. The rule of law discourse should now be complemented by a wider debate about security and the security sector. This would include discussions about defence policy and national security. The next year will be a period of uncertain change in the UK: the country is still in the throes of economic recession, there will be general elections in 2010, and defence policy is due to be reviewed. The domestic economy will take centre stage for the next five years, and whoever wins the next election will have to simultaneously balance the books, whilst maintaining the UK’s foreign policy and aid commitments. Britain has a relatively large Zimbabwean immigrant population (approximately 300,000). Many Zimbabweans would like to return home and help to rebuild the country, but are unsure about the security and economic environment. It is thus in the interests of both countries, and for Zimbabweans in Zimbabwe in particular, for the UK and Zimbabwe to re-establish security sector links and help to establish security.

The UK government will soon be launching its National Defence Review, and the National Security Strategy has also recently been published. Both of these documents have implications for UK policy in Africa and elsewhere, and could form an entry point for the discussion of defence policy.
commonalities and possible partnerships in some areas between the UK and Zimbabwe. Training and exchange, and military education programmes could be resuscitated and the UK could play an important role in monitoring or sponsoring a limited DDR programme for militias. Policing is another area where the UK could assist: ZRP anti-crime units are woefully underfunded and lack resources. Collaboration against criminal violence, drug trafficking, document fraud, and street crime are areas where links could be improved; anti-crime technology is another entry point for improving relations. Training is also an area which requires assistance. The UK could become an important partner for Zimbabwe in re-professionalising the police and the military. None of this is to say that the UK would be the only, or even the chief partner. Nevertheless, the UK-Zimbabwe security sector partnership played an important role in strengthening relations between the two countries, and in creating a composite force in the 1980s, and could do so again. This does not mean that the UK should take the blinkers off; Zimbabwe’s security sector has pursued a coercive mandate over the past decade, and the UK needs to be careful that it does not help to perpetuate this. But Zimbabwe’s security sector should no longer be demonised as ‘the enemy’. It is time for the UK to constructively engage with Zimbabwe’s security sector.

Key Recommendations for a Zimbabwe-UK Security Partnership

» Despite strains, the UK and Zimbabwe have maintained a relationship based on historical and contemporary shared interests. Provided it is based on mutual respect, this relationship remains important and should be supported.

» The BMATT played a major role in training the nascent Zimbabwe Defence Forces after independence in 1980. The UK still has a significant part to play through training courses, staff exchanges and joint anti-crime and intelligence activities. A Zimbabwe-UK security partnership could also help to improve relations between the two countries.

» Much of the UK thinking on engagement in Zimbabwe, particularly with regard to the security sector, is driven by the ‘post-Mugabe’ paradigm, and the siloing of aid to one particular group in the GNU. This only increases the political battles within the GNU and could increase the potential for violence. There needs to be a policy of ‘inclusive engagement’ with all the GNU stakeholders and the military, rather than ‘exclusive engagement’ with one or other group.

» The UK needs to be flexible in its Zimbabwe policy, particularly with regard to SSR and the military. There should be a willingness to engage, but there should also be awareness – by Zimbabweans and the UK – of the limits of engagement. The UK cannot ‘repair’ Zimbabwe’s politics or the military; and it should not try to. But a mutually beneficial security partnership, based on clear and mutually agreed goals, is possible.
19. Conclusion

There is no simple or single solution to the problem of political violence and the role of the security sector in Zimbabwe. Ending more than a century of politicisation of the military and the militarisation of Zimbabwe’s political economy will take time. The task of providing a new vision of security for Zimbabwe is one which needs the participation of all Zimbabweans, and the assistance of the wider regional and global community. The security sector must answer for the tides of violence that periodically engulf Zimbabwe. But the security sector has also played a key role in nation-building and public security, and can do so again. With national elections due within the next few years, the security sector must be encouraged to be one of the drivers of Zimbabwe’s renaissance. The nation’s future depends on it.
## Appendix: Appointments to the Government of National Unity

**The GNU Cabinet (April 2009)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Minister</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Robert Mugabe (ZANU-PF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vice President</td>
<td>Senator Joseph Msika (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Joyce Mujuru, MP (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Prime Minister</td>
<td>Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Women’s Affairs, Gender and Community Development</td>
<td>Professor Arthur Mutambara (MDC-M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Public Service</td>
<td>Olivia Muchena, MP (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Defence</td>
<td>Professor Elphas Mukonoweshuro, MP (MDC-T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Science and Technology Development</td>
<td>Emmerson Mnangagwa, MP (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment</td>
<td>Professor Henry Dzinotywezi, MP (MDC-T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Economic Planning and Investment Promotion</td>
<td>Elton Mangoma, MP (MDC-T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education</td>
<td>Stanley Mudenge (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Industry and Commerce</td>
<td>Professor Welshman Ncube (MDC-M)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of Home Affairs</td>
<td>Giles Mutsekwa, MP (MDC-T) (Co-Minister)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Home Affairs</td>
<td>Kembo Mohadi, MP (ZANU-PF) (Co-Minister)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of Regional Integration and Co-operation</td>
<td>Priscilla Misihairabwi-Mushungo, MP (MDC-M)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of Finance</td>
<td>Tendai Biti, MP (MDC-T)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of Health and Child Welfare</td>
<td>Senator Henry Madzorera (MDC-T)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of Local Government and Urban Development</td>
<td>Ignatius Chombo, MP (ZANU-PF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of Justice and Legal Affairs</td>
<td>Senator Patrick Chinamasa (ZANU-PF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of Agriculture</td>
<td>Senator Joseph Made (ZANU-PF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of Education, Sport and Culture</td>
<td>Senator David Coltart (MDC-M)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of Environment</td>
<td>Francis Nhema, MP (ZANU-PF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of Tourism</td>
<td>Walter Mzembi (ZANU-PF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of Constitutional Affairs Advocate</td>
<td>Eric Matinenga, MP (MDC-T)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of State Enterprise and Parastatals</td>
<td>Samuel Siyepa Nkomo (MDC-T)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of Information and Communications Technology</td>
<td>Nelson Chamisa, MP (MDC-T)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of Public Works</td>
<td>Theresa Makoni, MP MDC-T</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of Labour and Social Welfare</td>
<td>Theresa Mpariwa, MP (MDC-T)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of Transport and Infrastructural Development</td>
<td>Nicholas Goche, MP (ZANU-PF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of Mines and Mining Development</td>
<td>Obert Mpofu, MP (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of National Housing and Social Amenities</td>
<td>Fidelis Mhashu MP (MDC-T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Senator</td>
<td>Simbabrashe Mumbengegwi (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Media, Information and Publicity</td>
<td>Webster Shamu, MP (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Minister of Lands and Resettlement
Herbert Murerwa MP ZANU-PF

Minister of Water Resources and Development
Joel Gabuza, MP (MDC-T)

Ministers of State

Minister of State for Presidential Affairs
Didymus Mutasa, MP (ZANU- PF)

Minister of State (National Secretariat) in the President’s Office
Sydney Sekeremai , MP (ZANU-PF)

Minister of State in the President’s Office
Senator John Ncube (ZANU- PF)

Minister of State in the Vice President’s Office
Senator John Nkomo (ZANU- PF)

Minister of State in the Vice President’s Office
Senator Flora Buka (ZANU- PF)

Minister of State in the Prime Minister’s Office
Gordon Moyo (MDC-T)

Minister of State in the Deputy Prime Minister’s Office
Senator Sekai Holland (MDC-T)

Minister of State in the Deputy Prime Minister’s Office
Senator Gibson Sibanda (MDC-M)

Deputy Ministers

Deputy Minister for Public Service
Andrew Langa MP (ZANU-PF)

Deputy Minister for Women’s Affairs, Gender and Community Development
Evelyn Masaiti, MP

Deputy Minister for Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment
Thamsanqa Mahlangu, MP (MDC-T)

Deputy Minister for Economic Planning and Investment Promotion
Samuel Udenge, MP (ZANU-PF)

Deputy Minister for Higher and Tertiary Education
Senator Lutho Tapela (MDC-M)

Deputy Minister for Industry and Commerce
Michael Bimha, MP (ZANU-PF)

Deputy Minister for Regional Integration
Senator Reuben Marumahoko (ZANU-PF)

Deputy Minister for Health and Child Welfare
Douglas Mombeshora MP (ZANU-PF)

Deputy Minister for Local Government and Urban Development
Sesel Zvidzai MP (MDC-T)

Deputy Minister for Agriculture
Roy Bennett (MDC) (nominated, but not yet in post)

Deputy Minister for Education, Sport and Culture
Lazarus Dokoro, MP (ZANU-PF)

Deputy Minister for State Enterprises and Parastatals
Walter Chidakwa , MP (ZANU-PF)

Deputy Minister for Public Works
Senator Guy Georgias (ZANU- PF)

Deputy Minister for Labour and Social Welfare
Tracy Mutinhiri, MP (ZANU-PF)

Deputy Minister for Transport and Infrastructural Development
Tichaona Mudzingwa, MP (MDC-T)

Deputy Minister for Mines and Mining Development
Murisi Zvivai, MP (MDC-T)

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Moses Mzila Ndlovu (MDC-M)

Deputy Minister of Media, Information and Publicity
Jameson Timba, MP (MDC-T)
**Provincial Governors**

Zimbabwe has ten provinces, each with its own governor. In terms of status and authority, provincial governors are ranked just below full ministerial level. The equitable distribution of governorships is a major issue within the GNU. Currently, neither party has a governorship whilst both have insisted that this be resolved. The current governors are:

- Provincial Governor, Mashonaland East: Senator Aeneas Chigwedere (ZANU-PF)
- Provincial Governor, Mashonaland West: Senator Faber Chidarikire (ZANU-PF)
- Provincial Governor, Mashonaland Central: Senator Martin Dinha (ZANU-PF)
- Provincial Governor, Masvingo: Senator Willard Chiwewe (ZANU-PF); MDC nominee Lucia Matibenga
- Provincial Governor, Matabeleland North: MDC nominee Tose Sansole
- Provincial Governor, Matabeleland South: No appointee
- Provincial Governor, Manicaland: MDC nominee Julius Magarangoma
- Provincial Governor, Midlands: No appointee
- Provincial Governor, Harare: MDC nominee Senator James Makore
- Provincial Governor, Bulawayo: MDC nominee Seiso Moyo