Reforming NATO Force Generation
Progress, Problems and Outstanding Challenges

A RUSI Report

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Preface

RUSI has a long-standing interest in force generation, not just in the specific context of our work on NATO transformation, but also as an important issue within the broader remits of our Transatlantic, Defence Management, Military Capabilities and UK Armed Forces research programmes. When the NATO Secretary General visited RUSI in the summer of 2004, however, we were alerted to the urgency of Alliance force generation as an issue worthy of detailed study in its own right.

Mr de Hoop Scheffer used his pre-Istanbul Summit address at RUSI to highlight force generation and operational funding as two crucial and interrelated areas in which urgent reform was required. The Secretary General had spent most of his first six months in office moving from capital to capital in an attempt to muster forces for the Alliance’s ISAF mandate in Afghanistan. The flaws of this ‘begging bowl’ approach to force generation were already painfully clear to him. Discussions on the margins of the speech confirmed that his concerns were shared within the UK Ministry of Defence and the wider British defence community.

It was against this background that RUSI was commissioned, in October 2004, to conduct a year-long study and analysis of NATO’s processes and principles of operational force generation. This report is the culmination of that study. Its release has been timed to coincide with NATO’s second annual Global Force Generation Conference (GFGC), and it is designed in part as an interim assessment of the reforms initiated since the first GFGC in November 2004. We hope, too, that the report’s recommendations will help to shape intra-Alliance discussions on force generation and operational funding as NATO prepares its agenda for the next heads of government summit, provisionally scheduled for November 2006.

This project has been led, and the final report written, by Mark Joyce, the Head of RUSI’s Transatlantic Programme. The funding for the project was provided by the UK MoD, the NATO Public Diplomacy Division and Manpower Software plc, a commercial provider of force generation software. We are grateful to all our sponsors for their ‘no strings’ approach to funding this project. Whilst all have contributed freely of their experience, expertise and opinions, we have at no time been subject to any significant pressures, even when our views have differed from those of our sponsors. We are confident that our conclusions and recommendations are robust and will make a valuable contribution to ongoing discussion of these crucial issues.

We owe our thanks to representatives from a number of Alliance ministries of defence, as well as to members of the NATO International Staff and International Military Staff. Special thanks must go to Captain Tim Lowe RN, Principal Staff Officer to DSACEUR, Air Commodore Martin Routledge RAF, Director NATO in the UK MoD, and Diego Ruiz Palmer, Head of Planning in the NATO Operations Division, each of whom has offered invaluable advice over the last year and provided detailed comments on drafts of the final report. General Sir John Reith, DSACEUR, and Admiral Sir Ian Garnett, Commandant of the Royal College of Defence Studies, were both extremely generous with their time and provided invaluable guidance in the early stages of the project.

This report is a RUSI analysis and does not represent the corporate views of NATO, the UK Ministry of Defence, Manpower Software plc or any of the individuals referred to in the text or the annexes.

Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold CB FRAeS
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Executive Summary

ES1. In June 2004, NATO’s Istanbul Summit Communiqué called for a review of Alliance procedures for mobilizing and deploying national forces for Alliance operations. ‘Force generation’, as this process is known, was widely perceived to have failed during the early stages of NATO’s command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. This perceived failure led to a series of reforms of NATO’s force generation procedures in the months immediately following the Istanbul Summit. This report seeks to analyze those reforms, to consider conditions for their successful implementation, to identify outstanding problems and challenges, and to make recommendations for further reform ahead of the next Alliance summit in November 2006.

ES2. The report argues that, whilst the early stages of ISAF helped to highlight certain generic problems in NATO’s approach to operational force generation, it is important not to adopt an excessively ISAF-centric approach to reform. NATO’s experiences in force generation have covered a variety of operational challenges, including peace enforcement, peacekeeping, embargo operations, preventive deployments, training assistance, disaster response and provision of security for a major public event. There is uncertainty and disagreement as to what types of operations the Alliance will undertake in the future. We should therefore be wary of simplistic diagnoses or ‘one size fits all’ prescriptions.

ES3. The force generation processes which appeared to have broken down in the summer of 2004 had in fact been relatively effective across a wide range of operations before then, and have been since. In 1999, there was a strong consensus behind the need for military intervention in Kosovo. The desire in 2005 of certain European countries to repair relations with the United States, though precluded by domestic politics from sending troops to Iraq, contributed to a renewed enthusiasm for consolidating and expanding NATO’s military presence in Afghanistan. The principal value of the early stages of ISAF, in terms of force generation, was to highlight the importance of political cohesion as the crucial variable in determining the timeliness of NATO’s military deployments.

ES4. Promoting and maintaining political cohesion behind Alliance operations is a fundamental issue underpinning NATO’s broader military and political ‘transformation’. Improvement of force generation procedures might, in turn, help to generate momentum behind wider military and political reform initiatives. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is currently in the process of drafting a Comprehensive Political Guidance document, which might in the medium term provide a more robust political and strategic framework within which to pursue the Alliance’s ongoing military transformation. The priority for force generation reform in the short term, however, should be the removal or minimization of systemic disincentives to nations participating militarily in operations when political agreement has already been reached.
The report argues that there are four principal disincentives to nations contributing militarily to an operation having approved it politically:

ES5.i Domestic political dynamics
ES5.ii Competing claims on national forces
ES5.iii The demands of ongoing military transformation programmes
ES5.iv Inequalities in burden sharing resulting from NATO’s ‘costs lie where they fall’ approach to operational funding

Even if a nation is able to overcome initial domestic scepticism towards an operation, the tempo of that operation might quickly take it beyond the mandate for which a national government has secured domestic support. The deployable national forces nominally ‘available’ to NATO are, in most cases, also earmarked for a range of other actual and potential commitments, and NATO is essentially competing for use of its member nations’ forces, a competition in which it is often at a significant disadvantage. Most member nations are engaged in expensive military transformation programmes, the demands of which can create a reluctance to take part in new Alliance operations. This reluctance is often compounded by NATO’s ‘costs lie where they fall’ arrangement for operational funding, which tends to place a disproportionate burden on those nations that have made the largest and most sustained investments in modernizing their armed forces.

There is a growing demand for NATO to place a more precise value on national contributions, giving nations a more reliable idea not only of how much an operational commitment is going to cost in real terms, but also how this compares to the costs being borne by other allies across the full spectrum of the Alliance’s current and recent operations and other NATO funding commitments.

We argue that NATO has made important progress since the Istanbul Summit towards addressing these concerns, by establishing a more systematic, transparent and long-term approach to operational force generation under the leadership of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR); by improving the channels of communication within NATO, and between NATO and the nations; and by seeking to promote and demonstrate to the nations a more equitable division of operational labour.

These reforms have been criticized on two principal levels. First, at a time when most European forces are undergoing fundamental restructuring and retooling, and when the geographical and functional parameters of NATO operations remain uncertain, some nations have argued that streamlining of the existing force generation system is a wasted effort. Second, it has been argued that NATO’s force generation reforms since the Istanbul Summit are insufficiently ‘transformational’, and that NATO should be seeking to align its approach to operational force generation more closely to long-term changes in NATO’s force structure and capabilities.

Whilst acknowledging that better utilization of new national and multinational force structures will have clear benefits for NATO force generation in the long term, we do not believe this negates the need for NATO to develop a more robust force generation process for crisis response operations in the short term. The report argues that the most pressing challenge for NATO in force
generation is further to improve its existing processes so that there is a minimum of systemic disincentives to nations contributing militarily to an operation having approved it politically. This challenge is in large part one of ensuring and demonstrating greater equity in operational burden sharing between the nations. This, in turn, is largely dependent on establishing earlier visibility of NATO’s force requirements and of the likely ability and willingness of individual nations to meet these requirements. If the force generation discussion for a particular operation can begin in tandem with, or even in advance of, the political discussion in the NAC, the inertia which often hinders the downstream process will be greatly reduced.

ES11. The report recommends that:

ES11.i NATO should consolidate and advance the reforms initiated since the Istanbul Summit by creating a single, fully populated database of national forces available for Alliance operations.

ES11.ii NATO should replace, or radically overhaul, its method of monitoring and assessing the availability of national forces for specific types of Alliance operations.

ES11.iii NATO should accelerate reforms of operational funding arrangements, aiming to announce them as a headline initiative at the next Alliance Summit, if not before.

ES11.iv In parallel to intra-Alliance discussions on reforming operational funding arrangements, each nation should be invited to conduct a review of its own approach to the funding of operations, moving, where possible, towards funding operations from contingency budgets.
Introduction

1. On 18 June 2004, ten days before NATO heads of government gathered for the Alliance Summit in Istanbul, Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer delivered a speech at the Royal United Services Institute in London. Pre-summit media coverage had been dominated by two issues: the imminent handover of sovereignty from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the Interim Government in Iraq; and the upcoming presidential elections in Afghanistan. Both issues had important implications for NATO. It was becoming increasingly clear that one of the first acts of the Iraqi Interim Government would be a formal request to the Alliance for some form of assistance in the stabilization and reconstruction effort. It was also clear that the presidential elections in Afghanistan would present a significantly heightened challenge for forces operating under the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), probably necessitating a temporary increase in troop levels.

2. In this heated political context, some were surprised when the Secretary General used his speech at RUSI to call for reform of NATO’s operational force generation procedures, an arcane and unglamorous subject rarely broached in public forums. In Afghanistan, he argued, the Alliance had made an ambitious political commitment without any clear idea of where the necessary forces would come from. Force generation for ISAF had consequently depended to an unacceptable degree on improvisation and bargaining between NATO and the member nations. This ‘begging bowl’ approach to force generation, he argued, was intolerable as a standard operating procedure and could not be allowed to continue. With demand for NATO’s services on the increase – in Iraq, in Afghanistan and elsewhere – the Alliance’s approach to force generation must be improved as a matter of urgency.

3. When the Istanbul Summit Communiqué was issued ten days later, there were signs that the Secretary General’s message had had some impact. Force generation was not covered in the headline initiatives, but was dealt with towards the end of the document, where the nations were called upon to show ‘greater willingness and preparedness in providing forces and capabilities’ and to ‘enhance the political decision-making process through in-depth consultations’. The Communiqué welcomed ‘progress in the work to improve the force generation process for NATO-agreed operations and the NATO Response Force, including by moving towards a longer-term and more comprehensive and pro-active approach.’ The structure and tone seemed to indicate, however, that reform of force generation was an issue on which there remained more questions than answers.

4. Against this background, RUSI was commissioned in October 2004 to conduct an analysis of NATO’s processes and principles of operational force generation. The objectives of the project were:

4.i To provide an independent forum in which to debate force generation reform, engaging key practitioners within NATO and drawing on a broad range of military, government, commercial, academic and other expertise;
4.ii To produce a public-domain report that would both contribute to ongoing discussions of force generation reform at NATO and in the member nations, and to inform the European and North American academic, political and media communities on the challenges facing NATO in operational force generation and its responses to these challenges.

5. The principal method has been a series of private interviews and public workshops. On 13 May 2005 we held a first workshop, in London, at which discussion focused on military and commercial experiences in force generation. A second workshop, at NATO HQ, on 30 June, provided an opportunity to broaden the debate, engaging experts and stakeholders from across the Alliance. The workshop agendas are included in Annex B and C. In total, around 100 people were consulted.

6. In order to set the force generation issue in context, the report first presents a brief narrative of NATO’s evolving operational roles since the end of the Cold War. It then describes a generic NATO force generation process and discusses the strengths, weaknesses and limitations of this process. The report then analyzes the principal disincentives to nations contributing militarily to Alliance operations having approved them politically, before giving an account of NATO’s force generation reforms since the Istanbul Summit, considering conditions for their successful implementation, and identifying outstanding issues, problems and challenges. Finally, the report draws conclusions and makes recommendations for further reform.
NATO Operations

7. The history of operational force generation within NATO is a relatively short one. The Alliance initiated its first ever military operations in 1992, when it loaned a mobile headquarters to the United Nations to serve as the headquarters of the UN Protection Force in Bosnia Herzegovina, and launched Operation Sky Monitor to provide surveillance of Bosnia’s airspace.

8. The subsequent thirteen years have seen a steady expansion of NATO’s operational roles, both functionally and geographically. These operations have included, in Bosnia, the Deny Flight air exclusion zone operation, the Sharp Guard maritime enforcement operation and the Deliberate Force air campaign; in Kosovo, the Eagle Eye air reconnaissance operation and the Allied Force bombing campaign; and in Albania the Allied Harbour humanitarian relief operation. These various operations were precursors to the Alliance’s two large peace-enforcement operations in the Balkans: IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia and KFOR in Kosovo. In addition, NATO has led successive stabilization and weapons collection operations in Macedonia, starting with Operation Essential Harvest in 2001.

9. Each of these new operations represented, at the time, a unique new set of force generation challenges. NATO had no pre-established force generation mechanisms for crisis response or other non-Article 5 ‘discretionary’ operations. It also had no experience in deploying land forces outside of NATO territory, into theatres where the logistical infrastructures and other supporting mechanisms which underpinned defensive Cold War planning were not available. Logistical and other combat support units inherited from the Cold War were still mostly configured to sustain high-intensity operations by large, national formations inside NATO territory, rather than lower intensity, enduring, expeditionary operations, conducted by relatively small national contingents incorporated into multinational formations.

10. To overcome these challenges, NATO relied wherever possible on established multinational formations to lead operations: the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force for operations Sky Monitor and Deny Flight; the Standing Naval Forces for Operation Sharp Guard; the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force for Operation Allied Harbour; the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) for KFOR. In each case, the employment of these formations provided an established multinational staff and a nucleus of forces around which a larger body of forces could be generated.

11. NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan presented a demanding new challenge for NATO force generation. Alliance forces were deployed thousands of miles into a territory vastly larger than either Bosnia or Kosovo and with extremely poor lines of communication. Unlike IFOR and KFOR, which in the initial stages involved some 60,000 and 40,000 troops respectively and had a country-wide scope, ISAF started as a small operation – less than 5,000 men – centred exclusively on Kabul, and subsequently expanded as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were set up first across Northern Afghanistan, and then to the West and South of the country. As well as the shift in geographical scale, the force requirements associated with ISAF were also functionally different from those encountered in the Balkans. For example, the remoteness of the PRT locations from Kabul, and their dispersed pattern across Afghanistan, placed a greatly increased premium on operational ‘enablers’, such as in-theatre fixed-wing air transport, helicopters for re-supply, reinforcement and extraction, other mobile logistics and medical facilities.
12. NATO’s training mission in Iraq and assistance to the African Union in Darfur during 2005 have presented yet another new set of force generation challenges. There has been an increased emphasis, for example, on capabilities other than traditional ‘forces’: trainers in the case of Iraq; staff personnel with expertise in planning and capacity building in the case of the African Union. The Alliance provided AWACS early warning aircraft to patrol Greek airspace during the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, and deployed parts of the NRF naval and air components to assist the European disaster relief effort following Hurricane Katrina in September 2005. At the time of going to print, NATO was considering deployment of parts of the NRF to assist in the international relief effort following a major earthquake in Pakistan and India.

13. NATO’s experiences in operational force generation have so far included peace enforcement, peacekeeping, embargo operations, preventive deployments, training assistance, disaster response and provision of security for a major public event. Responses have in most cases had to be improvised and adapted as the Alliance has taken on this rapidly expanding portfolio of operational commitments, over a range of distances and against a variety of challenges and adversaries. We should be wary, then, of simplistic diagnoses or ‘one size fits all’ prescriptions. Reform of NATO force generation certainly should not be solely an exercise in ‘how to do ISAF (or any other isolated operation) better’. Although it seems increasingly likely that expeditionary crisis response, peace enforcement and peace support operations will be important roles for NATO in the future, it remains unclear whether the Alliance will be able to continue to project forces globally (on the ISAF model), should restrict itself primarily to crisis response operations in the Alliance’s ‘near abroad’ (on the KFOR model), or shift its focus to an entirely different range of roles. The challenge for force generation reform, then, is to identify generic problems in NATO’s existing processes and approaches, where targeted initiatives are likely to improve performance in future operational commitments, wherever, on whatever scale and against whatever types of challenges and adversaries these may be.
### Fig 1 – A sample of NATO’s operations since 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Deployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sharp Guard</td>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>June 1993 – June 1996</td>
<td>Enforcement of Maritime Exclusion Zone</td>
<td>9 Frigates 3 Destroyers Various Aircraft including eight E-3A and two E-3D Early Warning Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberate Force</td>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Aug 1995 – Sept 1995</td>
<td>Air Campaign</td>
<td>428 Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR/SFOR</td>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Dec 1995 – Dec 2004</td>
<td>Peace Enforcement</td>
<td>60,000 troops at height</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eagle Eye</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Oct 1998 – Mar 1999</td>
<td>Aerial Reconnaissance</td>
<td>Various Aircraft including Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied Force</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Mar 1999 – June 1999</td>
<td>Air Campaign</td>
<td>3 Aircraft Carriers 2 Cruisers 10 Frigates 9 Destroyers 3 Submarines 277 Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>June 1999 – present</td>
<td>Peace Enforcement</td>
<td>46000 troops at height</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied Harbour</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Apr 1999 – Aug 1999</td>
<td>Humanitarian Relief</td>
<td>8080 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Aug 2003 – present</td>
<td>Peace Enforcement</td>
<td>6500 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Assistance</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Aug 2004 – present</td>
<td>Officer training</td>
<td>Training Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>Olympic Games Greece</td>
<td>Aug 2004 – Sept 2004</td>
<td>Aerial Reconnaissance</td>
<td>AWACS aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Union</td>
<td>Darfur</td>
<td>Apr 2005 – present</td>
<td>Training and Airlifting AU troops</td>
<td>Training Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Sept 2005 – present</td>
<td>Disaster Relief</td>
<td>Co-ordinating Personnel 15 x C130/C160 Transport Aircraft 3 x Cargo Ships</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reforming NATO Force Generation
The Force Generation Process

14. Although the Alliance’s operational experiences are varied, it is nonetheless possible to describe a generic NATO force generation process. The process typically begins in the North Atlantic Council (NAC), where the nations make and announce a decision to undertake a new operation. Following this decision, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) nominates a Joint Force Commander, who is in turn ordered to develop a Concept of Operations, a Troop to Task Analysis and, in partnership with DSACEUR, a draft Statement of military Requirements (SOR). By preparing these documents simultaneously, and by working within the framework of the NAC’s ‘top-down guidance’, DSACEUR and the Joint Force Commander seek to ensure that the Concept of Operations and SOR are consistent both with the Alliance’s political goals and with its military capabilities.

15. After NAC approval of the Concept of Operations, SHAPE releases an ‘Activation Warning’ (ACTWARN), informing the nations and NATO Commands that a force is required, outlining the mission and providing key planning dates. SHAPE then issues the initial SOR and establishes formal contact with the nations. This is followed by the release of an ‘Activation Requirement’ (ACTREQ) message, formally requesting the nations to commit forces against the requirements identified in the SOR.

16. Following the ACTREQ, SHAPE will usually convene a force generation conference, chaired by DSACEUR and with representatives of all the nations and the Joint Force Commander in attendance. In some cases a formal conference will not be required; in others, the ‘conference’ may take place by correspondence. Following the conference, nations submit their force offers formally through a ‘FORCEPREP’, detailing exactly what forces they are prepared to contribute and specifying any national limitations or ‘caveats’. A battalion of troops might, for example, be contributed on the condition that it is not used for counter-narcotics operations. A force balancing conference (or period of correspondence) may be required in order to consolidate all national FORCEPREP messages and attempt to fill critical shortfalls in the initial SOR. SHAPE will then release revised SORs as appropriate.

17. Numerous SORs may be drafted until the Joint Force Commander is satisfied that a minimum level of military requirement has been met. When this point is reached, SHAPE releases an ‘Activation Order’ (ACTORD), initiating the release of national forces to the Joint Force Commander.

18. It should be stressed that this is a generic description of the force generation process, and as such is potentially misleading if applied too literally. The stages between the NAC’s top-down guidance and the release by SHAPE of the ACTORD do not necessarily occur as a consecutive sequence: force balancing, for example, is displayed as one of the final stages but is in reality a continuous process accompanying every stage of force generation from the ACTWARN down. It would also be a mistake to view the ACTORD as the end of the process. In reality, it tends to be merely the end of the first stage, following which NATO must generate forces for a succession of troop rotations and revised concepts of operations as the mission evolves.
19. The Secretary General’s call in the summer of 2004 for urgent reform of the force generation process in part reflected concern that NATO was flirting with failure in Afghanistan. Having embraced ISAF in August 2003 as a critical test of NATO’s contemporary relevance and credibility, the Alliance had struggled during the first year to muster the minimum level of forces and capabilities with which to meet that test. Force generation became mired in a series of force balancing discussions and unfilled SORs, in which the force generators at SHAPE lacked a clear understanding of what forces and capabilities were, even in theory, available to them. Some of the nations, meanwhile, felt they were not being given sufficiently clear guidance as to what role their forces would be expected to perform, within what timeframe. As ISAF expanded beyond the initial commitment to securing Kabul to establish a network of PRTs across the North and West of the country, these national concerns became increasingly problematic. In the summer of 2004, with the Afghan presidential elections fast approaching, the NATO commanders in Afghanistan were facing a potentially explosive security challenge with substantially fewer troops and other capabilities than requested. They were making little attempt to hide their exasperation, and the Secretary General was under mounting pressure to take action.

20. Against this background, there was a widespread perception at the time that NATO’s force generation process had broken down. The pervasive sense of crisis perhaps obscured the fact that the same process which appeared to be failing in Afghanistan had in fact functioned extremely well during the Alliance’s first major out-of-area operation, in Kosovo, as well as during the multiple smaller-scale operations of the 1990s. Developments during 2005, moreover, subsequently demonstrated that the system continued to function well given the right circumstances. There was a substantial improvement during 2005 in the willingness of member nations to send troops to
Afghanistan, enabling the Alliance steadily to increase its PRT footprint to the West and South of the country with relatively little inertia between the revised concepts of operations and the offer of national forces. There have also been partial successes, albeit on a much smaller scale, in converting decisions to assist in Iraqi security training, to provide logistical assistance to the African Union in Darfur and to assist in post-hurricane relief in the United States into timely military action.

21. These successes all point to a fairly unremarkable conclusion: force generation works best when there is a high level of political cohesion amongst the member nations. In 1999, there was a strong consensus behind the need for military intervention in Kosovo, shaped in large part by memories of the disastrous delays in taking collective action in Bosnia earlier in the decade. In 2005, the desire of certain European countries to repair relations with the United States, but precluded by domestic politics from sending troops to Iraq, undoubtedly contributed to a renewed enthusiasm for consolidating and expanding NATO’s military presence in Afghanistan. A broad consensus that ‘something needed to be done’ in Iraq and Sudan meant that the transition from political decision to military action was, although by no means seamless, certainly without the sense of exasperation and impending crisis that engulfed the Alliance in the summer of 2004.

22. Although unremarkable in itself, this conclusion has potentially worrying implications. With an expanding membership, there is greatly increased scope for disagreement over the Alliance’s geographical and functional parameters. As a result, cohesion could become increasingly difficult to achieve and maintain in future military interventions. An agreed set of strategic objectives, and broad means for achieving them, is in theory contained in the Alliance’s Strategic Concept. The most recent version of this, however, was approved in 1999, and therefore predates both the latest expansion of the membership and the incremental reinterpretations of NATO’s strategic role represented by ISAF and by subsequent smaller-scale operations. At the Istanbul Summit, the NAC was asked to draft a ‘Comprehensive Political Guidance’ document, to provide a more robust political and strategic framework within which to pursue the Alliance’s ongoing military transformation. At the time of going to print, that document was still at the draft stage. Early indications seem to suggest that it will fall between the Strategic Concept on the one hand and documents providing guidance on specific planning fields, such as the Ministerial Guidance for Force Planning, on the other. It will probably remain broadly consistent with the conclusions of the 1999 Strategic Concept, but will seek to accommodate the changes in the global security environment, and in NATO’s responses to them, that have occurred in the intervening six years.

23. One method for reducing the risk of political disagreements in the event of a new operation is by formulating a relatively limited set of initial campaign objectives, to which it is less likely that sceptical nations will take exception. This approach was employed with mixed success in the case of ISAF. When NATO assumed command of the operation in August 2003, it was essentially taking formal responsibility for an established peacekeeping force, populated almost entirely by troops from NATO nations, and with a mandate restricted to Kabul. The relatively modest nature of this undertaking probably helped to steer the decision through the NAC. As the mission expanded during 2004, however, the political consensus began to fray and the willingness of some nations to participate fully in the force generation process diminished.
24. As the Secretary General suggested in his pre-Istanbul Summit address, it would be undesirable for the ISAF approach to take on the status of standard operating procedure. Although the incremental creation of PRTs has enabled NATO to build from modest beginnings in Kabul into a nationwide network of peacekeeping forces, it is not an approach that would lend itself to the faster-moving demands of a crisis response operation. The perception amongst some nations of ‘mission creep’ in Afghanistan, moreover, has installed a sense of heightened caution towards new operational commitments, the results of which can perhaps be seen in NATO’s training mission in Iraq. Although those nations who favoured a NATO role in Iraq were eventually able to secure approval for it in the NAC, they were only able to do so on tightly restricted military terms. NATO agreed to a training support role, which amounted in material terms to the deployment of a few hundred military personnel. The message coming out of the NAC was clear: ‘we are not signing up for a second ISAF’.

25. One lesson of NATO’s involvement in Iraq could be that, through the search for political consensus, the Alliance risks condemning itself to a future of increasingly modest operational commitments. This is to some extent a counsel of despair, because there are no signs of the nations being willing to water down the consensus principle in the foreseeable future. The despair should be tempered, however, by the more positive historical lesson discussed above: when the nations have deemed an intervention to be important, they have been able to commit both politically and militarily to some relatively ambitious operations. The sense of urgency and cohesion created by a crisis – in Kosovo in 1999 and, on a smaller scale, in New York in 2001, and in Sudan, the US Gulf Coast and Pakistan in 2005 – has tended to work as a powerful incentive for achieving political consensus and timely military deployments.
Disincentives to Participation

26. Assuming the consensus principle is here to stay, the key challenge for NATO is to enhance the willingness and ability of nations to contribute to an operation militarily – if asked to do so by DSACEUR – having approved it politically. This is not only, or indeed primarily, an issue of force generation. In order for capabilities to be ‘generated’ for an operation, they must first of all exist. It is precisely to this challenge that NATO’s broader military transformation agenda and the Prague Capabilities Commitments are addressed. NATO’s experiences in Afghanistan made it clear, however, that even when a political consensus has been reached in the NAC and the necessary military capabilities are in theory in place, there remain significant disincentives to nations making their forces available.

26.i Domestic political dynamics
Although a nation can be fully committed to an operation in the NAC, a lack of domestic political cohesion can damage its ability to contribute militarily to that operation. Some member nations are constitutionally required to submit all military contributions to parliamentary approval, a requirement which can lead to a breakdown in support for an operation between approval in the NAC and resourcing discussions in the force generation conference. Even if a nation is able to overcome initial domestic scepticism, the tempo of an operation might quickly take it beyond the mandate for which a national government has secured some measure of domestic support. ISAF provides a case in point: having secured domestic support for a small-scale peace support operation in the relatively permissive environment of Kabul, national governments quickly found themselves having to seek approval for a rapidly expanding operation, with far higher financial costs and increased risks of casualties.

26.ii Competing claims on national forces
Another powerful disincentive to military participation is provided by the range of competing claims on the forces of most member nations. The deployable forces nominally ‘available’ to NATO are, in most cases, also earmarked for a range of actual and potential commitments, including national, UN, EU and various coalition operations. NATO is, then, essentially competing for use of its member nations’ forces, a competition in which it is often at a significant disadvantage. When taking part in a UN operation, for example, nations will generally be paid a ‘per diem’ for their military contributions. NATO operations, in contrast, require participating nations to finance their own contributions.

26.iii Military transformation
At the 2002 NATO Summit in Prague, Alliance leaders agreed to country-specific targets and deadlines for improving and developing new military capabilities in more than 400 specific areas, including: CBRN defence; intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; deployable C4ISR; precision guided munitions; strategic air and sealift; air-to-air refuelling; and deployable combat support units. Meeting the Prague Capability Commitments is, for most of the nations, an expensive process, requiring either significant increases in defence spending levels or major revision of spending prior-
ities. In many cases, pursuit of the Prague targets is proceeding in tandem with fundamental changes in force structure. Additionally, most member nations continue to finance operations directly from their defence budgets, as opposed to separate contingency funds. As such, participation in operations can be actively detrimental to nations’ chances of meeting their military transformation targets.

26.iv Operational funding

Funding is, perhaps, the most powerful disincentive to nations participating militarily in a NATO operation, and underpins the three other major disincentives discussed above. The current system of ‘costs lie where they fall’ makes many nations reluctant to contribute. It is a system under which those nations who make the biggest and most sustained investments in modernizing their military capabilities are, as a result, the nations who are consistently asked to make the biggest operational commitments and, by implication, the biggest financial contributions. The shift towards expeditionary operations conducted over progressively greater distances has increased costs in, for example, strategic transport and in-theatre logistics. Much of the inertia in generating forces for ISAF can be credited directly to a refusal amongst certain key nations to continue to bear what they perceive to be a disproportionate share of these increased operational costs.

27. Force generation and operational funding are inextricably linked, and reform of one is unlikely to progress very far without reform of the other. There is a growing demand for NATO to place a more precise value on national contributions, giving nations a more reliable idea not only of how much an operational commitment is going to cost in real terms, but also how this compares to the costs being borne by other allies across the full spectrum of the Alliance’s current and recent operations and other NATO funding commitments.
Reform Initiatives
and Outstanding Problems

28. The Istanbul Summit Communiqué, although light on detailed initiative in the area of force generation, echoed the Secretary General by emphasizing the need for urgent reform. In the second half of 2004, NATO responded to this call by embarking on three interrelated sets of initiatives:

28.i Streamlining the force generation process under the leadership of DSACEUR
By re-confirming and bolstering DSACEUR’s role as the day-to-day leader and co-ordinator of force generation, both for existing and potential future operations, the Alliance established clear ‘ownership’ of the reform process and sought to avoid conflicting initiatives between NATO HQ and SHAPE. DSACEUR now compiles a weekly Limited Distribution (LIMDIS) force generation assessment, circulated to SACEUR, the Secretary General and the Chairman of the Military Committee, reporting on ongoing force generation activity and allowing for a rapid and well-informed exchange of information between SHAPE and NATO HQ.

28.ii Establishing an annual ‘Global Force Generation Conference’
In addition to promoting greater force generation awareness amongst the nations through constant and targeted engagement, DSACEUR was also given responsibility for co-ordinating an annual ‘Global Force Generation Conference’, at which NATO’s force requirements over a year would be mapped within the framework of its and the nations’ full global operational commitments. The conference was designed to facilitate a more integrated, long-term approach to force generation by securing from nations firm commitments to operational contributions for the next twelve months, whilst also seeking provisional commitments for the following year.

28.iii Development of force generation database management tools
Alongside the bureaucratic reforms outlined above, DSACEUR commissioned research to develop a force generation database management tool. According to DSACEUR’s specifications, this should cover all NATO operations and commitments (and, where appropriate, commitments to other international organizations and coalition operations), enabling NATO to make better informed and more long-term judgments on which nations are best placed to provide forces, ensuring that recognition is given to existing and previous contributions to NATO, thereby achieving more equitable burden sharing.

29. In line with these specifications, two prototype software packages were submitted to NATO in late 2004. Both tools offered instruments for converting raw data on national military capabilities, political restrictions and caveats, and past and present operational commitments, into potential force packages with specific operational applications. The tools’ principal aims were to improve the linkage between NATO force planning and operational force generation. If provided with the input of full and reliable national force data (a crucial variable, to which we will return later), the tools offered the prospect of automating and accelerating the frequently arduous and ill-informed process by which NATO’s force generators currently attempt to fill SORs.
30. If NATO decides to procure one of these force database management tools, the force generation process will remain in principle unchanged: a political decision would still have to be taken in the NAC; a concept of operations and SOR would be issued to the nations; national contributions would be offered and a series of shortfall analyses and SOR revisions would be conducted by the military commanders and force generators at SHAPE until a minimum level of military requirement was met. Each stage of the process, however, would be underpinned by an agile software tool, which potentially could make available in seconds information which previously would have been constructed and analyzed over periods of hours or days (with a high likelihood of error due to the lack of precise national force data). Presented with a variety of force packages, matched against a range of operational scenarios, discussions between NATO and the nations would in theory be placed on an incomparably stronger basis. Most importantly, SHAPE would be able to provide the NAC with a more detailed estimation of military requirements – and of the nations best placed to meet these requirements – at the time of decision-making. In reaching this judgment, SHAPE could take into account potential disincentives to specific nations contributing specific capabilities: if a nation is heavily committed to another Alliance (or non-Alliance) operation, or if it has made a disproportionate financial contribution to recent NATO operations, this will be factored in. The chances of slippage between nations’ willingness to approve a new operation in the NAC and their willingness to resource that operation in the downstream force generation process should therefore be reduced.

31. These proposals have been under development throughout 2005, and will be demonstrated in part, as an experiment, during the second Global Force Generation Conference in November 2005. Whilst the database management tools are complex in operation, they are conceptually straightforward: if the nations provide a full database of what forces are available to the Alliance, for what operational roles, over what time frame and with what restrictions, the tools should produce a wide range of force options modelled against a variety of operational scenarios. Without the database in place, however, the tools can achieve very little. The tools are designed to synthesize all the available information; they cannot generate this information independently.

32. In the absence of anything more suitable, the default database for DSACEUR’s force generation staff during ISAF has been the ‘Defence Planning Questionnaire’ (DPQ), a survey in which the nations outline their broad defence planning targets over a five year period. The DPQ is essentially a relic of Cold War defence planning, providing a device through which NATO can assess the national forces theoretically available to it in the event of an Article 5 operation. The DPQ was not designed to be used as a tool for non-Article 5 force generation. The national DPQ returns can be re-interpreted to provide a partial but static view of what forces are likely to be available for non-Article 5 operations. Having earmarked a particular military capability as ‘available’ in the DPQ, nations reserve the right to review its availability should the Alliance actually seek to use it for a non-Article 5 operation.

33. The pool of national forces outlined in the DPQ is the same pool of forces on which nations will draw to meet other military commitments – to the UN, EU or elsewhere. Because it covers a five year period, the DPQ can occasionally prove spectacularly out of date: a nation may, for example, list as ‘available’ a fleet of helicopters based on nothing more than a procurement aspiration; if the procurement is subsequently cut or cancelled during the five-year period covered by the
DPQ, this will not be reflected until the next DPQ. In the event of a non-Article 5 NATO operation, nations may decide to contribute a capability with numerous caveats attached. The DPQ does not reflect these caveats. It is a static inventory, with categories that contain virtually no operational specificity.

34. Creating the database on which the effectiveness of force generation software tools will depend is to a considerable extent a political issue. The failure, so far, to create a fully populated and operationally useful database of national forces in part reflects scepticism among several nations that any significant value will be added through the increasingly sophisticated management of force data. There is a feeling that, at a time when most European forces are undergoing fundamental restructuring and retooling, and when the geographical and functional parameters of NATO operations remain uncertain, database management tools could be a wasted investment. Until there is clarity and agreement on what sorts of operations the national forces provided to NATO can be expected to perform, argue the sceptics, it is politically premature as well as conceptually problematic to develop new databases of national military ‘capabilities’.

35. Although it is certainly true that NATO’s operational parameters remain uncertain, it also clear that peace support operations and humanitarian intervention, to take two examples, have become de facto NATO tasks regardless of whether or not this is reflected in the Washington Treaty or the Strategic Concept.

36. Some critics have gone further and argued that, by ‘oiling’ the existing, top-down approach to force generation through streamlined bureaucratic processes, NATO is in danger of entrapping a failed system when it should in fact be concentrating on more radical, ‘transformational’ solutions. Such solutions might include aligning force generation more closely to changes in NATO’s force structure and ‘subcontracting’ much of the force generation burden to the national or multinational HQ level. By relying more heavily on ‘off-the-shelf’ force packages such as the NRF, or national and multinational Graduated Readiness Force Headquarters, some argue that NATO could greatly reduce the need to generate forces from scratch in response to new operational commitments. Instead, it could ‘tailor’ pre-existing capabilities for specific operations and ‘round them out’ with additional forces as necessary.
Conclusions

37. Whilst better utilization of new national and multinational force structures for long-term force generation is clearly a good thing, it does not negate the need for NATO to develop a more robust force generation process for crisis response operations. For as long as the Alliance maintains the fundamental principle of national sovereignty over military commitments, then the possibility will remain of significant shortfalls in available forces; even if national forces are classified as ‘available’ to NATO, for example under a rotation of the NRF, nations retain the right to refuse military participation in a non-Article 5 operation. Even when NATO is able to deploy the forces available to it under the NRF (or other ‘off-the-shelf’ capabilities), there is a strong likelihood that it will need to generate additional forces in order to meet the specific demands of a new operation. Far from being in contradiction, therefore, the long-term changes in NATO’s force structure and the ‘oiling’ of its force generation process since the Istanbul Summit should be seen as mutually reinforcing.

38. It seems clear that the reforms pursued under DSACEUR since the Istanbul Summit have made a significant contribution to an improved performance in operational force generation during 2005. NATO’s troop rotations in Afghanistan, incremental expansions of the PRT network and temporary deployments to provide extra security for the Parliamentary elections were all met in a timely manner, dissipating the sense of crisis which dominated discussions in 2004. Although this was to a large extent the result of political developments exogenous to NATO, it was clearly significant that DSACEUR had been able to secure firm national force commitments for 2005 – and provisional commitments for 2006 – at the Global Force Generation Conference in November 2004. Meeting shortfalls in these commitments, moreover, became significantly easier as a result of the reinvigorated, systematic and sustained engagement on force generation issues between SHAPE and the nations.

39. The fruits of this engagement were to some extent evident in NATO’s response to Hurricane Katrina in September 2005. When a formal request for NATO logistical co-ordination and transport assistance was made in the NAC, the Joint Force Commander was able to formulate a Concept of Operations, and SHAPE could earmark capabilities from the maritime and air components of the NATO Response Force (NRF), safe in the knowledge that these capabilities had already been generated. SHAPE was able to tailor these capabilities in accordance with the Concept of Operations and present the NAC with an estimated ‘bill’ for the mooted operation in advance of a political commitment.

40. This was a very small operation in military terms and an uncontroversial one politically. It was, moreover, effectively an exercise in force tailoring as opposed to force generation, because by using components of the NRF the force generation process had been completed well in advance of the operational commitment. It may, however, provide an example of the sort of improvements to which the Alliance can aspire in more ambitious force generation scenarios if only it can consolidate and build on the reforms initiated since Istanbul. If SHAPE can provide the NAC with earlier visibility of the specific forces and capabilities required to undertake an operation, and of the nations best positioned to provide these capabilities, then the top-down approach to force generation could be radically compressed, with the stages between the NAC’s top-down guidance and SHAPE’s Activation Order conducted almost simultaneously. NATO may not always restrict itself
to operations for which the NRF provides pre-generated capabilities, but it might be able to consider new operational commitments in the NAC with a very much stronger understanding of the forces realistically available to it.

41. The Secretary General’s call in the summer of 2004 for reform of NATO force generation provided much needed momentum, and bolstered SHAPE with political muscle as it embarked on a series of reform initiatives in the following months. His comments must, however, be viewed in the appropriate political context, which at the time was dominated by a concern that NATO was in danger of failing to meet its ambitious commitment in Afghanistan. We believe this concern helped to exaggerate the extent to which the force generation problem was perceived as one of process, as opposed to politics. In NATO operations before and after ISAF, and in ISAF itself during 2005, the force generation process has tended to work well when the levels of political cohesion have been relatively high. In the early stages of NATO’s command of ISAF, it would be more accurate to say that the force generation process was inhibited by lack of political cohesion rather than intrinsically ineffective.

42. This is by no means to say that the process has been flawless, and the initial stages of commanding ISAF were a valuable exercise for the Alliance, highlighting in extreme form some important generic problems in established approaches to force generation. Most importantly, it underlined some of the disincentives to nations contributing militarily to an operation having approved it politically and the weaknesses of the existing system in minimizing these disincentives. It is in an attempt to address these problems that NATO has embarked since the Istanbul Summit on a series of reforms aimed at increasing the transparency and specificity of the Alliance’s military requirements, and enhancing NATO’s ability to monitor national military capabilities and their likely availability for Alliance operations.

43. These reforms will not remove the fundamental requirement for political cohesion in order to prosecute effective Alliance operations. Creating and maintaining this cohesion is ultimately an issue for the nations, and requires progress across a range of issues of which force generation is just one. Force generation reform cannot succeed without intellectual, political and strategic guidance.

44. The most pressing current challenge for NATO in force generation is to fine-tune its existing processes so that there is a minimum of systemic disincentives to nations contributing militarily having approved operations politically. This challenge is in large part one of ensuring and demonstrating equity in operational burden sharing between the nations. This, in turn, is largely dependent on establishing earlier visibility of Alliance force requirements and the likely ability and willingness of the nations to meet these requirements. If the force generation discussion can begin in tandem with, or even in advance of, the political discussion in the NAC, the inertia which often hinders the force generation process will be greatly reduced. Perceptions of inequality in burden sharing are intrinsically divisive and detrimental to political cohesion. By promoting greater equity in burden sharing, and by enhancing the visibility of its military requirements to the member nations during and in advance of the political decision-making process, NATO could potentially catalyze the broader process of creating and maintaining political cohesion amongst the nations.
Recommendations

45. We believe that the reforms initiated under DSACEUR’s leadership since the Istanbul Summit have contributed to an improved performance in force generation for existing NATO operations. Whilst acknowledging that some nations see changes in NATO’s force structures as a means of ‘transforming’ the Alliance’s approach to long-term force generation, we do not think this negates the need for more robust force generation processes. In the short term, we believe there is a great deal to be achieved by continuing to ‘oil’ the current system. In the long term, a more effective force generation system can only complement the broader reforms in force structure and capability. We therefore recommend that:

45.i NATO should consolidate and advance the reforms initiated since the Istanbul Summit by creating a single, fully populated database of national forces available for Alliance operations.

The reforms pursued since the Istanbul Summit will not remove the need for SACEUR – or, exceptionally, for the Secretary General – to take out his begging bowl from time to time. They should, however, help him to deploy it in a more informed and targeted way. There is a perception amongst some member nations that DSACEUR’s reforms are, at best, redundant and, at worst, actively unhelpful at a time when NATO’s force structures, capabilities and fundamental strategic raison d’être are in a state of flux. We believe this perception is unjustified, and that postponing further reforms pending a general agreement on grand strategic first principles is likely to result in operational paralysis. A more centralized force generation system, systematically linked to longer-term force planning, can only improve NATO’s operational performance, regardless of where and with what goals these operations take place. NATO’s timely military deployments during 2005 are in part testament to the effectiveness of the post-Istanbul force generation reforms. We believe DSACEUR could inject even greater agility into the force generation system if he were armed with an effective force generation database management tool. The effectiveness of such a tool will depend, however, on the creation of a fully and meaningfully populated force database. Persuading the nations to contribute to this database is fundamentally a political issue and the effort should, therefore, be led by the Secretary General.

45.ii NATO should replace, or radically overhaul, its method of monitoring and assessing the availability of national forces for specific types of Alliance operations.

The Secretary General’s hand would be greatly strengthened if his staff were able to put more operationally specific questions to the nations in the defence planning process. The DPQ is clearly flawed in this respect, and we recommend it is replaced, or radically overhauled. The DPQ’s categories have little relevance in the new era of non-Article 5 operations and it will have to be replaced by a new and much more specific survey if NATO is to overcome uncertainties on the part of national defence ministries as to how forces declared in a NATO database will subsequently be used. The new survey should include clear operational categories, such as: ‘immediately deployable forces’, ‘high readiness forces’ and ‘other deployable forces’. Such categories would not only increase the transparency of NATO’s planning, but would catalyze ongoing reforms in national and multinational force structures and capabilities.
45.iii NATO should accelerate reforms of operational funding arrangements, aiming to announce them as a headline initiative at the next Alliance Summit, if not before.

Recent Alliance operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere have been described by successive Secretaries General as valuable catalysts for the transformation of member nations’ armed forces. Under current funding arrangements those operations have had precisely the opposite effect. The Alliance should seek to move towards a situation where NATO’s military transformation and its operational commitments are genuinely symbiotic, rather than antagonistic. There are ongoing discussions of the common funding issue taking place within NATO, and these should at the very least produce an inventory of crucial operational enablers, in areas where there have been serious and consistent shortfalls and where common funding could produce significant short-term improvements in performance. There is a need, however, for enhanced and sustained engagement with the issue, of the sort applied to force generation reform more widely since the Istanbul Summit. The linkage between reform of NATO’s operational funding arrangements, force generation and the progress of the Alliance’s broader military and political transformation goals should be made a central theme of the next Alliance Summit in November 2006.

45.iv In parallel to intra-Alliance discussions on reforming operational funding arrangements, each nation should be invited to conduct a review of its own approach to the funding of operations, moving, where possible, towards funding operations from contingency budgets.

We recommend that, in parallel to Alliance-level discussions of common funding, each nation conducts a review of its own funding arrangements for Alliance operations. One option under consideration should be the funding of operations from contingency budgets, as opposed to national defence budgets. Again, the inter-dependency of funding reforms, improved operational force generation and broader military and political transformation goals should be emphasized.
### ANNEX A: Glossary of Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbrevation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACTORD</td>
<td>Activation Order</td>
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<td>ACTREQ</td>
<td>Activation Requirement</td>
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<td>ACTWARN</td>
<td>Activation Warning</td>
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<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control System</td>
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<tr>
<td>C4ISR</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear</td>
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<td>DPQ</td>
<td>Defence Planning Questionnaire</td>
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<td>DSACEUR</td>
<td>Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>IFOR</td>
<td>NATO Implementation Force, Bosnia</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>JFC</td>
<td>Joint Force Commander</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>NATO Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>LIMDIS</td>
<td>Limited Distribution</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
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<td>SFOR</td>
<td>NATO Stabilization Force, Bosnia</td>
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<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
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<td>SOR</td>
<td>Statement of Requirements</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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ANNEX B: London Workshop Programme

Session One
Reforming NATO Force Generation: Existing Initiatives and Outstanding Challenges

Chairman
Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold CB FRAeS, Director, RUSI

Discussant
Lt Col Hugh Toler MBE, SO1 Force Generation, Operations Division, SHAPE

- What is the significance of NATO’s recent force generation reforms and initiatives, against the following criteria:
  1. Providing a more predictive force generation process?
  2. Enabling NATO to integrate all its available forces and operational commitments within a single, adaptable database?
  3. Allowing DSACEUR to make more informed judgments as to which nations are best placed to provide forces?
  4. Enabling nations to plan the availability of forces with confidence, ensuring that national defence budgets are used to best effect?
  5. Reflecting and balancing current and potential future operational requirements?

- What are the conditions for the success of these reforms?
- What are the key outstanding challenges?
- Do the British military’s experiences in generating forces for expeditionary deployments provide useful lessons/models for reform in an Alliance context?

Session Two
Reforming NATO Force Generation: A Question of Process or Politics?

Chairman
Dr Jonathan Eyal, Director of Studies, RUSI

Discussant
Major General Andrew Pringle CB CBE, former Chief of Staff and Director of Operations, UK PJHQ; Non-Executive Director, Manpower Software plc
Captain Tim Lowe, Principal Staff Officer to Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe

- What opportunities are presented by new force generation tools and technologies?
- What are the limitations of new technologies?
- What political challenges are presented at the national and intra-Allied levels by the reform of NATO force generation processes?

Session Three
National Perspectives on NATO Force Generation

Chairman
Dr Jonathan Eyal, Director of Studies, RUSI

- How does reform of NATO’s force generation processes relate to the Alliance’s broader political and military ‘transformations’?
- What are the implications of reformed force generation processes for NATO’s decision-making procedures and principles of operational funding?
- What are the implications of reforming NATO force generation processes for the Alliance’s relations with the EU?
- Can national experiences in generating forces for expeditionary deployment be adapted in a NATO context?
- What should be the priorities for reform at NATO’s 2005 force generation conference and beyond?
ANNEX C: Brussels Workshop Programme

Session One
Reforming NATO Force Generation: Principles, Existing Initiatives and Outstanding Challenges

Chairman
Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold, Director, RUSI

Discussants
Captain Tim Lowe, Principal Staff Officer to Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
Général de Brigade André Var, Deputy Military Representative of France, NATO

- Do national experiences in generating forces for expeditionary deployments provide useful lessons/models for reform in an Alliance context?
- Should we seek to adapt national force generation methods at the multinational level, or should Alliance force generation be guided by a different set of principles and expectations?
- What is the significance of recent NATO force generation reforms and initiatives, against the following criteria:
  1. Providing a more predictive force generation process?
  2. Enabling NATO to integrate all its available forces and operational commitments within a single, adaptable database?
  3. Allowing military planners to make more informed judgments as to which nations are best placed to provide forces?
  4. Enabling nations to plan the availability of forces with confidence, ensuring that national defence budgets are used to best effect?
  5. Reflecting and balancing current and potential future operational requirements?

- What are the conditions for the success of these reforms?
- What are the key outstanding challenges?
- How can we ensure greater coherence between NATO and EU force generation reforms?

Session Two
The International Staff and Force Generation Reform

Chairman
Dr Jonathan Eyal, Director of Studies, RUSI

Discussants
John Colston, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning
Diego Ruiz-Palmer, Head of Planning Section, NATO Operations Division

What political reforms must be achieved if we are to realize the full potential of new force generation tools and methodologies?
What is the role of the International Staff in achieving these reforms?
How can we ensure a greater coherence of effort in force generation between the International Staff, the military commands and the political leadership?
What are the implications of reformed force generation processes for NATO’s decision-making procedures and principles of operational funding?
How does reform of NATO’s force generation processes relate to the Alliance’s broader political and military ‘transformations’?

Session Three
‘Quick Wins’

Chairman
Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold, Director, RUSI

Discussants
Major General Andrew Pringle, former Chief of Staff and Director of Operations, UK PJHQ; Non-executive Director, Manpower Software plc
Sergiu Vintila, Head of Defence Section, Romanian Delegation to NATO

What steps can be taken in the short term to:

- Improve force generation for NATO’s existing operational commitments?
- Facilitate more predictive, transparent and reliable force generation for the NRF?
- Reform principles of operational funding?
- Develop metrics for valuing national force and capability contributions?
- Ensure earlier engagement of all member nations in the political decision-making process?

What should be the priorities for reform at NATO’s 2005 force generation conference and beyond?
About RUSI

RUSI is the leading professional forum in the UK for those concerned with national and international defence and security.

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Rigorous, expert, objective study and analysis of issues of national and international defence and security

Events
An independent forum leading debate amongst practitioners, policy makers and analysts in the defence and security communities

Publications
Timely, innovative and policy-relevant analyses of defence and security issues
In June 2004, NATO’s Istanbul Summit Communiqué called for a review of Alliance procedures for mobilizing and deploying national forces for Alliance operations. 'Force generation', as this process is known, was widely perceived to have floundered during the early stages of NATO’s command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

In October 2004, RUSI was commissioned to conduct a year-long study and analysis of NATO’s processes and principles of operational force generation. This report is the culmination of that study. Its release has been timed to coincide with NATO’s second annual Global Force Generation Conference (GFGC), and it is designed in part as an interim assessment of the reforms initiated since the first GFGC in November 2004. The report’s recommendations will help shape intra-Alliance discussions on force generation and operational funding as NATO prepares its agenda for the next heads of government summit, provisionally scheduled for November 2006.