WARS IN PEACE
WARS IN PEACE
British Military Operations since 1991

Edited by Adrian L Johnson

Contributions by
Malcolm Chalmers
Michael Clarke
Michael Codner
Robert Fry
David Omand
Joel Faulkner Rogers & Jonathan Eyal
Trevor Taylor, John Louth & Henrik Heidenkamp

Foreword by Lord Richards of Herstmonceux
CONTENTS

Foreword ix
Lord Richards of Herstmonceux

Editor’s Preface xiii
List of Tables and Figures xv
Acronyms and Abbreviations xvii

Introduction 1
Adrian L Johnson

Michael Codner

II. The Two Towers, 2001–2013 49
Michael Codner

III. The Strategic Scorecard: Six Out of Ten 89
Malcolm Chalmers

IV. The Domestic Balance 137
David Omand

V. Of Tails and Dogs: Public Support and Elite Opinion 161
Joel Faulkner Rogers and Jonathan Eyal

VI. On the Offensive 191
Malcolm Chalmers

VII. Strategy and Operations 215
Robert Fry

VIII. Brothers in Arms: The British–American Alignment 237
Michael Clarke
IX. The Sinews of War  
_Malcolm Chalmers_ 267

X. Industry and the Military Instrument  
_Trevor Taylor, John Louth and Henrik Heidenkamp_ 291

Conclusion  
_Michael Clarke_ 321

_Notes and References_ 335
_Appendix_ 373
_About the Authors_ 381
ANYONE who has studied war, and better still had some experience of it as well, will vouchsafe the need to avoid it in the first place. But history is clear: there will sometimes be no alternative to standing up for oneself, for one’s friends or for what is right. Too many people, the intelligentsia to the fore, are in denial of this inevitability. To explain weakness and cover fragility, forcing them shamefully to talk big but act small, so-called statesmen will repeat the mantra that there is no military solution to a given crisis. That this is errant rubbish is self-servingly ignored. It takes a lot of willpower, organisation, skill, money and, yes, passion, but a strategy with military power at its heart, whether to deter or to fight, may be the only answer and can work if that strategy is right. This does not necessarily require the massive use of force, but rather a calibrated employment of the military instrument combined with steadfast political commitment. History repeatedly shows that those who get this calculus wrong dangerously risk their bluff being called and the law of unintended consequences kicking in. In times of crisis, military strength is comfortingly reassuring.

So it is important to reflect on the full record of UK intervention, which began well before the 9/11 attacks. If the campaigns of Afghanistan and Iraq left their mark on how the British public and politicians view and use the military, then so did the interventions of Kosovo and Sierra Leone. This volume rightly judges that the most important step change in where and how the UK used force was not
in 2001, but in 1991 – even if it is the wars of 9/11 that dominate current thinking.

There are of course vital lessons to be drawn from the campaigns of the last decade. Yet by stretching back to this earlier time, I would suggest that this volume does a service to the debate by highlighting some crucial campaigns where we got it right. The war against Iraq in 1991 successfully defended the international rule of non-aggression as one state sought to snuff out another. We didn’t get it right in Bosnia at first, but in 1995 NATO action imposed a peace that, while not perfect, at least ensured that the country’s political differences would not be settled by violence. In Kosovo, we acted in concert with our allies quickly to prevent a repeat of Bosnia. And in Sierra Leone I found myself in a unique position to make a decisive military intervention, with the requisite backing from Whitehall, to provide space and time for a renewed international and local effort to consolidate peace.

It is important also to be balanced. This may seem an obvious point, but with the benefit of hindsight it’s easy to say the things we shouldn’t have done, the choices that shouldn’t have been made. In the field or in a ministry at the time, however, it’s often less clear-cut. It is right, then, that this book unpicks the tough choices commanders and politicians had to make in difficult circumstances of uncertainty, pressure and risk. And I would add to this that it’s important not to be overly self-critical. I have never shied away from pointing out what we were doing badly; but even in Afghanistan, where we did have to make some pretty fundamental changes to how we went about things, the armed forces have learnt a lot and our conduct of counter-insurgency has improved – and we leave the country in a lot better state than we found it.

Finally, it is important to be comprehensive. As ISAF commander in 2006, I experienced firsthand the particular constraints of operating in a multinational context where we – and I stress ‘we’, as this was a coalition endeavour – were ultimately at the mercy of the local political process and decisions made in other national capitals.
We may lament that in Whitehall, politicians may have failed to understand what strategy is about – some think that just working at a strategic level, the top level, is being strategic in itself. But strategy is about how the whole machinery of government performs, at home and abroad. We may also lament the mistakes the military made on the ground and the time it took us to adapt our approach most effectively. These are all fair points, but the UK was not alone in these interventions. It worked with allies – and was in most cases a junior partner to the US – and was embedded in an international environment it could not control. The value of this book is in tying together all these various strands – local, strategic and operational – that are all absolutely critical to understanding how better to go about military operations in the future, as much as they are in delivering a historical verdict on interventions of the past.

Looking ahead to the sorts of operations the military might be called upon to make in the future, they are unlikely to be much different from the sorts of wars of the last quarter-century. Events in Ukraine at the time of going to press do remind us of the risk of war between states, even today: the threat of conventional war has not disappeared. But most wars, I would wager, are likely to be ‘small wars’ between ill-defined, often non-state opponents. And these wars may not be over territory, but over ideas and symbols, and among rather than between peoples. Moreover, our wars will be fought with others and not by ourselves. The UK has had it as policy for many years now that, though we may conduct some operations independently, we will not go to war on our own – even if we still have yet to fully come to terms with what this means for us in terms of institutional constraints. One of the key lessons – or charges, rather – may be to work out how we ensure unity of effort in future multinational operations, even if unity of multinational command may be beyond us.

We may not be able to pick our battlefields in the future. But even so, we will need a careful approach to intervention and commit sufficient resources to realistic tasks. If we are going to intervene, do it properly; otherwise we risk only aggravating the situation. This
goes beyond just the military. Over a decade of recent operations countering insurgency have taught us that considerable advances in technology and military firepower are, by themselves, not enough. The military cannot win the war by itself, but only hold the ring enabling the locals to make the right decisions about their own future. At the same time, the civilian effort is primary. The military effort in Afghanistan in 2001 was not matched by a civilian one in 2002 and 2003, and we paid the price later. And in 2006, while many countries were focusing on military efforts, there was no reliable system to cohere the civilian and diplomatic engagement. I, a military commander, found myself having to devise one. This kind of failure could be the signal lesson of the last quarter-century.

Whatever the mistakes that have been made, we must not over-learn from our experiences. The international community took from Somalia in 1993 a phobia of intervention that would come at a terrible cost to the people of Rwanda a year later. Conversely, the success of Kosovo perhaps suggested to some leaders too optimistic a notion of what military force could achieve in transforming societies. We have to be realistic. While the military may have less than it would wish, it will still be required to protect this nation’s broad interests through the projection of military force. When lethal force is genuinely required, nothing else will do. The world today is not a safer place and the distinction between home and abroad is strategically obsolete. The lessons contained within this volume will therefore be of continuing importance: they should be learnt.

I commend this book for its perceptive analysis of British military operations over a remarkable period. It avoids both undue pessimism and triumphalism to give a comprehensive and balanced verdict on intervention. Let us hope that its reasoning and findings will be digested by the political and military leaders of tomorrow in a dangerous world.

Lord Richards of Herstmonceux

*Chief of the Defence Staff, 2010–13*

March 2014
SINCE 1990, the UK has undertaken a series of significant foreign military interventions of varying success in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Libya. Alongside these were operations in Northern Ireland and various other smaller missions abroad. At the time of writing, 782 British servicemen and women had died on these operations.

Every unhappy era is unhappy in its own way. It is commonly said that while the Cold War was a time of great threat, there was at least an element of predictability and certainty to it. By contrast, the following quarter-century has been characterised by a fluid and unpredictable security environment, albeit one absent any major and direct threat to the UK. With its armed forces no longer necessary as a bulwark against Warsaw Pact aggression in Europe, they were increasingly used in a series of more-or-less discretionary commitments.

This period may be a unique one in British history, categorically different from its days as either a concert power or a Cold War superpower’s ally. The UK’s continuing global influence and wealth offered it an opportunity to help mould, though not determine, the shape of the post-Cold War world order as a partner to the sole remaining superpower. At the same time, a second ‘Belle Époque’ marked by the further breaking down of barriers to trade and capital, and the inexorable spread of modern communications technologies, seemed to confirm the dominance of a liberal order. Yet challenges to this new order swiftly emerged. First, the attempted annexation...
of Kuwait by Iraq; then the collapse of Yugoslavia and spike in the number of civil wars worldwide; and then, perhaps most traumatically for the US, the rise of globalised terrorism showcased by the 9/11 attacks.

Throughout this period, the UK has been willing to threaten and use force in pursuit of a broad conception of the national interest. Few other states – perhaps only the US and France – have taken such a role since 1991. As the UK takes pause after years of costly and bloody campaigning in Iraq and Afghanistan, it must consider the lessons of over twenty years of a robust interventionist posture.

An Era of British Exceptionalism
While the problems the UK faced in this environment of uncertainty were not unique to it, its responses were. Its military was the second-most capable in the West after that of the US, and one of only three, with the French, able to undertake major expeditionary operations. While both the UK and France have been militarily active powers – the latter having intervened with regularity in African conflicts, for example – the UK has undertaken the larger operations in the period, and has done so in close concert with the US. France and the UK are themselves different to other rich and globally influential countries – like Germany, Canada and Sweden – whose resort to the military instrument is far more modest, or absent altogether. Likewise, France and the UK are in a different category to other regional powers such as Japan, Brazil or South Africa, which cannot or choose not to develop global power-projection capabilities.

Since the Second World War, even as it shed its imperial ambitions, the UK has endeavoured to ‘punch above its weight’. Post 1991, this has manifested itself in an attempt to retain full-spectrum military capabilities – the ability to fight at all levels of intensity, against a range of foes, with top-tier technology and training – linked closely to extensive diplomatic influence and developmental aid and expertise. Underlying these capabilities has also been a heightened sense of
responsibility: the willingness to play an active role in international affairs beyond a narrow definition of ‘the national interest’.

Britain’s wealth has underpinned this ambition. The UK remained a rich economy during this period: in terms of real GDP at purchasing power parity, it entered the period as the world’s sixth-largest economy and finished it – in the aftermath of the global economic crisis of the late 2000s – as the eighth-largest, one of only nine larger than $2 trillion in size.1 And, as an indication of the internationalist posture of successive governments in this period, the country has spent substantial sums on diplomacy and development. In particular, since 1997 the UK’s spending on overseas development assistance, as measured by OECD criteria, has overtaken that of Germany and France, making it the biggest donor state after the US, due to an increase from $4.56 billion in 1991 to $13.76 billion in 2012 (in 2011 dollars), a proportion of just under 0.6 per cent of GNI.2 Added to this is the diplomatic clout provided by a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

And, with this wealth, the UK has chosen to invest in military capability. Even with the post-Cold War peace dividend, the UK remained in the top tier of defence spending. According to SIPRI figures,3 in 1991, the UK had the fourth-largest defence budget ($49.9 billion), behind only the US ($397 billion), France ($61.5 billion) and Germany ($60.2 billion) (all in 2012 dollars). In 2012, the UK was still fourth globally, with a defence budget of $60 billion. While this figure was lower than that of the US ($682.4 billion), China ($166.1 billion) and Russia ($90.8 billion), it had now surpassed its continental peers France ($58.9 billion) and Germany ($45.8 billion). It has retained this position despite relative economic decline.

But defence spending itself is no guarantee of capability, as quips about certain European militaries being little more than ‘unusually well-armed pension funds’ cruelly highlight.4 In this regard, the UK has excelled, unlike most of its European peers, investing heavily in the platforms and enablers vital to a global reach and to retaining a military capable of activity across a relatively wide (though not full) spectrum.
Indeed, the UK has maintained one of the largest equipment budgets in European NATO, both in absolute and relative terms. So, in one sense, the UK’s position as the second military power in the West is more secure now in 2014 than it was in 1990, to a degree but not simply because of the continuing reluctance of Germany to be as militarily active as the UK and France.

Set against this inherent, robust internationalism and the UK’s natural strengths, however, are the revealed limits of military intervention.

Much of the UK’s global influence has been sought through a close, grand-strategic alignment with the US: a longstanding assumption that, by being relevant to American decision-makers, the UK could in some way steer American policy. This may have invited British politicians and generals to overextend their commitment to discretionary interventions beyond what domestic political will would support or, indeed, what the British military instrument could achieve. This was most starkly shown during the Iraq ‘surge’ of 2007: while the US piled in troops to arrest the civil war, the UK was withdrawing from Basra (albeit in part to focus on revived operations in Afghanistan).

The seduction of technique – the idea that superior military equipment, training and conduct would suffice in generating political victory – was cruelly exposed as stunning ‘victories’ in Afghanistan and Iraq unravelled (and by growing signs that Libya still might). These examples therefore highlight the limits of transformation: in the UK’s wars from 1991, those in support of agendas seeking to remake societies have been the least successful. Rory Stewart notes in Can Intervention Work? that this may be an inherent limit of ‘over-intervention’ in which failure to appreciate local context and political reality is the ‘product of an entire culture’. Even the relatively successful examples of Bosnia, Kosovo and Sierra Leone demonstrate how transformation and peace-building are difficult, long-term endeavours; security, which can be provided by the military, is a vital
ingredient – but so is economic and political development, which cannot. And these limits do not just apply to the military agenda; what the developmental and diplomatic levers of state power can achieve is also questionable in remaking societies.

It may be that certain ends are simply too ambitious, too improbable to achieve. This may become even more pertinent in the future; for a great deal of UK action has taken place in coalitions in which the US was a vital player, providing high-end capability, essential logistics and political backing. But as Michael Clarke argues in this book, British-American strategic divergence since 2003 may indicate ‘trends that are not cyclical and which, if anything, will have a cumulative effect on the relationship for both military and political reasons’. The UK may find it more difficult to rely on the US as a key partner in the future. And without the means that the US provides, the UK’s and other allies’ political objectives may in a future crisis be even more difficult to achieve.

Nevertheless, the UK has been the most effective in interventions where it has been able to combine its unique advantages of military power with its diplomatic and developmental tools, and in mobilising a multinational coalition or international attention more generally. The ‘Strategic Scorecard’ chapter by Malcolm Chalmers (Chapter III) bears this out; the more clearly focused interventions – in terms of aims – with the broadest multilateral backing have achieved the greatest degree of success.

Looking at the record in this book, the interventions in Iraq in 1991 and Sierra Leone in 2000 may be the exemplars of success, each in a different way. In the Gulf War (an inter-state conflict), a broad UN-authorised coalition with strong US military leadership generated a preponderance of force for a focused, militarily achievable goal in defence of the universally ascribed norm of non-aggression. Hindsight may also reveal the wisdom of not pushing onto Baghdad and instead retaining the limited goals of the intervention. In Sierra Leone (an intra-state conflict), a judicious use of force in support of a legitimate
government and a UN peace operation halted the rebel advance; but alongside this, the UK thereafter also focused international attention on the Sierra Leonean disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme for former combatants, as well as addressing the regional sources of support for the Revolutionary United Front rebels.

The question over the appropriate use of the military instrument in foreign policy and grand strategy remains important even as the armed forces shrink to their smallest size since the nineteenth century; and although the interventionist urge may have been tempered, it has not been eliminated. As such, the lessons of this book, drawn from the wider post-Cold War interventionist period, will remain enduring.

A Wider Debate
There has been a recent flowering of analysis on the use of British military power and its outcomes, particularly with a growing perception of defeat in Iraq and Afghanistan.

At the level of troops-on-the-ground, the UK’s wars post 9/11 have severely tested assumptions of its competence in counter-insurgency and the ability of its institutions to adapt to unconventional conflicts. Journalistic works, giving a worm’s-eye view of combat, have shed important light on the conduct of British campaigns. A Million Bullets, for example, highlights an overambitious plan for Helmand accompanied by a disconnect between military and civilian efforts in a campaign marked by little unity of effort, particularly in its vital early stages. In Six Months Without Sundays, one officer quips to the author about the continuing gap: ‘It would be wrong to say we have a bad relationship with the PRT, because we don’t have a relationship with the PRT.’

Frank Ledwidge in Losing Small Wars takes a broader perspective, yet also concludes that ‘The form of “expeditionary warfare” on which Britain’s armed forces staked their future has proved to be beyond their commanders’ capabilities.’ David H Ucko and Robert Egnell, in an authoritative analysis of British counter-insurgency in Iraq
and Afghanistan, show how the roots of failure of these campaigns lay not only in the performance of the military, but also in their resourcing and strategic direction.\textsuperscript{11} A failure of adaptation from Cold War military structures has, in their view, also undermined British performance.\textsuperscript{12} Ledwidge’s critique is perhaps most damning of all: it was not just the politicians that erred; it was also the senior command of the military, none of whom ever resigned.\textsuperscript{13}

The question of strategic coherence – the matching of ends, ways and means from the highest-level of decision-making downwards – has dominated much of the literature.\textsuperscript{14} Some works, like that of Rory Stewart and Gerald Knaus, focus on the fundamental limitations of open-ended nation-building – where the ends outstrip both the means and the ability to understand a local context. They argue that the chief lesson of international intervention is therefore the need to adopt a policy of ‘principled incrementalism’.\textsuperscript{15} Others offer a more focused examination of the British experience. In his memoirs of his time in Afghanistan, former ambassador Sherard Cowper-Coles criticises the lack of a comprehensive political settlement in Afghanistan, which made irrelevant many of the tactical successes of the campaign; he also notes the limits of counter-insurgency technique in actually delivering peace.\textsuperscript{16} Sandy Gall, meanwhile, argues that what went wrong in Afghanistan can be summed up simply as ‘Iraq’: specifically, the diversion of effort and inability of the UK to fight effectively in two theatres.\textsuperscript{17} In \textit{British Generals in Blair’s Wars}, Jonathan Bailey argues that the problem was much deeper; that ‘a chasm grew between emerging foreign policy goals, the size and focus of the defence budget, and actual military planning.’\textsuperscript{18} Hew Strachan notes that, after 9/11, the UK subordinated itself to an American strategy that, itself, was deeply flawed.\textsuperscript{19} Both the US and the UK have fought limited wars with the rhetoric of major war since 2001; yet they ‘have not willed the means to wage them.’\textsuperscript{20}

In the widely discussed \textit{War from the Ground Up}, Emile Simpson suggests that the strategic mismatch emerges from the very nature
of contemporary warfare. Drawing on the Afghan experience, he posits a distinction between operations intended to establish military conditions for a political solution and those that directly seek political outcomes. Simpson argues that the trend in the modern world is away from the former; fewer operations will provide a decisive result for a sequenced transition from war to peace. This will present Western forces with an uncomfortable dilemma: limit engagement to conflicts where the conventional use of force offers a decisive outcome, or engage in more messy conflicts that depart from a ‘traditional’ conception of war, being in essence ‘armed politics’.

Recent works have also shed light on the personal and institutional processes that may have complicated the generation of coherent strategy and operational designs in these messy conflicts. RUSI’s *The Afghan Papers* concludes that the army’s move into Helmand in 2006 revealed that the British political system was simply unable to cope with two major deployments at once; ‘the system as a whole seemed to have no strategic brain.’ Patrick Porter identifies an ‘intellectual vacuum’ in British statecraft in which ‘little ranking or prioritisation’ is done; tough choices, therefore, are avoided. Paul Newton, Paul Colley and Andrew Sharpe argue that the UK has ‘let slip both the mechanisms and more importantly the grammar with which to conduct the relevant strategic discourse within and around defence’. James de Waal’s work on British civil–military relations challenges the notion that individual personalities were the drivers of strategic failure: in his analysis, due to the design of the British political system, ‘tensions in the political-military relationship are a perennial part of defence policy-making’. The remedy, therefore, may lie in institutional reform and commonly understood frameworks, rather than hoping for the right kind of people in positions of power and command.

In sum, the tenor of these and other works is negative. The UK failed strategically and operationally in two of the most important interventions of the decade; worse, some argue that the roots of
failure were in fact sown in a moment of success; the Kosovo War encouraging hubris at the highest levels.

The Purpose and Structure of the Book
This narrative may obscure some of the important successes of British military operations in the post-Cold War period. To contribute to this debate, Wars in Peace goes further than these recent works to consider not just the wars of 9/11 since 2001, or ‘Blair’s wars’ since 1999, but the longer trajectory of intervention and the operational, domestic and international context in which it took place. The Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns are not discrete data points: they were the result of a particular configuration of international power and norms, as well as political and military currents at home. While it may be easy to see these campaigns as aberrations, born of a particular US administration’s response to 9/11, this volume suggests that they are best analysed in a wider post-Cold War context.

In this spirit, Wars in Peace comprehensively audits the UK’s use of the military instrument over this period: what it cost, what it achieved, and how it was conducted. Some of the themes in the book are cross-cutting and are tied together in the book’s conclusion, which presents an overall verdict on the period. It spans political, economic, operational and strategic analysis to present a full appraisal of almost a quarter-century of British military operations.

Michael Codner provides a concise historical narrative of the era to set the scene in his chapters ‘Fighting for Peace’ and ‘The Two Towers’ (Chapters I and II). He also considers the evolution of British military thought and practice: what the military was for; how it went about its tasks; and, more broadly, how it attempted to keep up with a US military whose capabilities continued to further outstrip those of its European allies.

In ‘The Strategic Scorecard’ (Chapter III), Malcolm Chalmers develops a framework to judge the impact of the UK’s wars abroad. Ten major interventions since 1991 are grouped under three main
headings, reflecting the country’s ambitions to be, respectively, a ‘force for order’, a ‘force for good’, and a ‘force for change’. All ten are then analysed using several different criteria and are ultimately judged by whether they generated a positive strategic outcome for the UK, in terms of these three objectives.

David Omand assesses the contribution to security at home in ‘The Domestic Balance’ (Chapter IV). A broad-ranging analysis begins with the military experience in Northern Ireland since 1991, before discussing the panoply of tasks the military is charged with vis-à-vis the homeland. His chapter considers the overlap between domestic security and operations abroad, concluding that, on balance, the UK may be considered safer today than on the eve of 9/11.

Also on the domestic theme, in ‘Of Tails and Dogs’ (Chapter V), Joel Faulkner Rogers and Jonathan Eyal measure, through historical data and recent polling, British public support for intervention and how this has interacted – sometimes uneasily – with elite opinion. They also consider what current polling may indicate about the future use of British military power, including the appropriate role of Parliament in its authorisation, in the aftermath of the Syria vote.

In ‘On the Offensive’ (Chapter VI), Malcolm Chalmers discusses the confluence of factors that permitted the UK to go on what he terms a ‘strategic offensive’ since 1991. He suggests that this was a marked switch from the predominantly defensive character of the military’s role during the Cold War, and discusses the degree to which the abatement of great-power competition helped to create the conditions that made this possible.

Within this context, Robert Fry in ‘Strategy and Operations’ (Chapter VII) dissects the broad sweep of British strategy over the era and its interface with operations on the ground. The wars of 9/11 revealed the limits of British power and strategy-making. Ends, ways and means were not suitably balanced, with predictable results on the ground. But more fundamentally, the UK has been unable to
exert a strategic effect in theatre, heavily subordinate in both Iraq and Afghanistan to the leadership and commitment of the US.

Sharpening the focus of the strategic analysis is Michael Clarke’s chapter, ‘Brothers in Arms’ (Chapter VIII), which places the British–American relationship of the last quarter-century in its fuller historical context before analysing the strategic and operational ‘special relationship’ between the US and the UK in the wars since 1991. It further considers what the latter-day campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan – if not the wars before them – may tell us about the next evolution of this defining alliance.

Material questions of cost and industry are raised in the next two chapters. In ‘The Sinews of War’ (Chapter IX), Malcolm Chalmers calculates the financial cost to the UK of its ten major military operations since 1991, and also the impact of its wider defence posture on its level of spending. He finds the net additional cost (above the defence budget) of the country’s military operations to have been £34.77 billion from 1991, with a possible £6–7 billion of additional medical and welfare costs. However, the overall cost of the UK’s activist military posture, and associated expeditionary capabilities well above the European norm, may have added another £100 billion to the baseline over the period.

Finally, Trevor Taylor, John Louth and Henrik Heidenkamp audit the industrial contribution to intervention in ‘Industry and the Military Instrument’ (Chapter X). The private sector has played an increasingly important role in sustaining British expeditionary operations in the period characterised by a need for assured access to key capabilities in wars not fought on a ‘come as you are’ basis – a notable difference from the Cold War, and likely to remain the case for some time.

**Wars in a Time of Peace**

The irony of the period may be that while the UK faced no direct military threat to the homeland in an era free of great-power conflict,
it engaged in a string of major military actions. In a very real sense, these have been wars in peace.

In a fully comprehensive audit, this book ties together the martial, political, economic and industrial facets of the military instrument. And while it considers the strategic success of each intervention for the UK – in particular, whether its people and interests were safer as a result – it also analyses the outcomes for the countries in which the UK has intervened to determine whether a reasonable course of action was taken, and if there were better alternatives at the time. In doing so, it highlights the difficult choices of intervention, where outcomes are not assured and inaction also carries risks. But difficult choices do not necessarily lead to failure, and where the UK has matched ambition and resources with effective use of the military instrument, strategic success has been achieved.

Decisions over whether or how to intervene may arise again sooner rather than later. While the rationale of the book is to examine the lessons of intervention for the UK as it looks beyond Afghanistan and the next defence review of 2015, its findings will also be of interest to those who study activist powers and the context of intervention more generally.

Intervention is an inherently difficult and risky undertaking. Policy-makers, analysts and the public should not be glib: it is difficult to tell \textit{a priori} whether a conflict is amenable to the use of force and whether a political solution is feasible. Excessive caution can mean inaction – which also has consequences.

Fundamentally, the question over the appropriate use of the military instrument in foreign policy and grand strategy remains important even as the armed forces, and the perhaps the interventionist urge too, shrink. We hope the lessons of \textit{Wars in Peace} will provide a useful handrail for current and future decision-makers as they consider the tough choices and dilemmas to come.