Conference Report

International Day of UN Peacekeepers
16th Annual Conference

Ewan Lawson
187 years of independent thinking on defence and security

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International Day of UN Peacekeepers: 16th Annual Conference

Conference Welcome

The conference was opened by UK Minister for the Armed Forces Mark Lancaster, followed by Deputy High Commissioner for Canada Sarah Fountain Smith. Mark Lancaster highlighted why peacekeepers matter, focusing on how they protect the innocent and create the space needed for peace, and hence why effective peacekeeping is important globally. He underscored the UK’s commitment to peacekeeping, demonstrated through its activity at the UN Security Council (UNSC), assistance in developing the capabilities of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs)\(^1\) and support of the Women, Peace and Security Network in collaboration with Bangladesh and Canada. He also noted the UK’s support for the initiatives of the UN secretary-general on countering sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by peacekeepers and increasing the number of female peacekeepers.

Sarah Fountain Smith discussed Canada’s history of sustained commitment to UN peacekeeping since 1957 and dedication to the women, peace and security agenda. She spoke of the Elsie Initiative, an element of Canada’s feminist foreign policy that seeks to increase the meaningful participation of women in peacekeeping, and which also guides Canada’s support for TCCs through training and technical assistance packages.\(^2\) She also highlighted the Vancouver Principles, arising from the 2017 UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial conference hosted by Canada, and in particular their focus on preventing the recruitment and use of child soldiers. Finally, she outlined Canada’s continued commitment to UN peacekeeping, including the provision of air transport support to the UN logistics hub at Entebbe in Uganda, as well as Canada’s provision of an air task force to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

When There is No Peace to Keep

The discussion in this session was intended to explore some of the challenges of peacekeeping missions where levels of violence remain high and political processes are stalled or even non-existent.

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1. For the purposes of this report, ‘TCCs’ refers to countries that provide police as well as military personnel to UN operations.
Diane Corner: Former Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for MINUSCA (Central African Republic)

It was noted that no peace agreement has so far succeeded in taking root in the Central African Republic (CAR), and that the country has consequently experienced thirteen international interventions, of which MINUSCA is the state’s third UN peacekeeping operation. The primary challenge to the mission stems from the lack of a legitimate and functional host state, which emphasises the need for meaningful political processes to be concurrent with peacekeeping operations. MINUSCA has seen robust peacekeeping, including the use of attack helicopters to counter aggressive spoilers, as a necessity. Despite some of the mission’s successes, UN forces cannot be omnipresent and have often been caught off guard by fluid, fast-paced changes to the situation on the ground. While the threat of force may be as useful as force itself, this threat must be credible to be effective. While there have been significant casualties from fighting, MINUSCA has also lost peacekeepers to accident and illness. There have been problems with the performance of some contingents, demonstrating how most attempts to improve standards once troops are deployed are often too little and too late. The UN must be principled and consistent in refusing contingents that are not adequately prepared, but it was noted that there is also pressure on both mission leadership and officials at UN headquarters in New York to meet mandated troop levels. However, it was also noted that well-performing contingents could contribute to raising standards across the mission by their example. There is also a need to improve strategic communications between the mission and the host state, civilians and armed groups. There are opportunities to share best practices in this regard between different UN missions.

Katie Hislop: Former Commander of the UK Contingent in UNMISS (South Sudan)

The UK contribution to UNMISS was comprised of approximately 400 specialist medical and engineering personnel. Key to the initial success of the mission was building relationships with non-traditional partners among TCCs, particularly Rwanda and Mongolia, who would be providing the main force protection for the contingent. This also necessitated the creation of shared procedures and practices for responding to crises. The chain of command for the contingent was complex, in that it was part of the mission’s civilian support pillar rather than part of the military force. This led to some challenges in prioritising tasks between the civilian and military components of the mission, given the relative paucity of resources. Mobility is a particular challenge in South Sudan, given the lack of transportation infrastructure across the country. It was noted that the creation of bespoke task forces incorporating contingents able to deliver niche capabilities, as the UK did in combining engineers with a field hospital, appeared to be a particularly effective model.

Niels Woudstra: Former Commander of the Dutch Contingent in MINUSMA (Mali)

It was argued that rather than referring to ‘robust peacekeeping’, there is a need to make use of the UN’s own lexicon for the full spectrum of peace operations. This lexicon could be usefully linked to a mission’s mandate with a clear distinction between missions authorised
under Chapter 6 or Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. It was suggested that this distinction might also be usefully linked to the international organisation charged with the intervention by the UNSC mandate, with the UN focusing on its comparative advantage in those activities short of peace enforcement. Contingents need to be prepared to use their inherent right to self-defence to maintain escalation dominance, which underpins the Dutch approach to peacekeeping. In MINUSMA, it was noted that frequent contingent rotations, partially driven by perverse financial incentives for TCCs, compromise mission cohesion, institutional memory and the ability to entrench lessons learned. Interventions are further complicated by logistical deficiencies, which in the case of Mali include insufficient water supplies, poor or damaged equipment and a lack of medical infrastructure to service field hospitals.

Discussion

The discussion primarily focused on specific aspects of the missions in CAR, South Sudan and Mali, as experienced by the speakers. More generally, it was noted that there will always be potential problems with contingents from TCCs with poor human rights records. However, it was also noted how experience with peacekeeping could have a positive impact on the military and police in a TCC, and indeed how relatively small contributions from more developed militaries could raise the standards of other TCCs. The UN must maintain control, as its credibility (rather than that of the TCC) is generally what is at stake. This in turn links to levels and standards of preparation by TCCs, but also developing a shared understanding of different contingents’ level of capability so that contingents can be employed where best suited. It was also suggested that there are situations where the UN should focus its attention on the implementation of the mandate and source the peacekeeping troops to be provided by other international organisations. Perhaps most significant, given the scale of a number of ongoing operations, was the view that a small, credible peacekeeping force is more effective than a large one, where its main focus may inadvertently become ensuring its own protection, as opposed to supporting vulnerable populations in the host state.

Folke Bernadotte Memorial Lecture

Ian Martin: Former Executive Director of Security Council Report and Head of UN Missions to Libya, East Timor and Nepal

Although I am a long-standing member of UNA-UK, this is the first time I have been in the right country at the right time to be present for this celebration of UN peacekeepers, and I congratulate UNA-UK and RUSI and all those who initiated and who organise this day. I am delighted too to commemorate Folke Bernadotte, assassinated 70 years ago this year precisely because he was a United Nations mediator for peace.

Last Thursday, an attack on a UN convoy in the Central African Republic killed one Mauritanian peacekeeper and wounded eight others. Last month in Mali, one peacekeeper from Burkina Faso, one from Nigeria and two from Chad died in three separate incidents, after four Bangladeshis had died in March. On 27 January, a Pakistani peacekeeper died in an ambush in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, where in December fifteen Tanzanian peacekeepers were killed and 43 wounded when their base was attacked. The total number of peacekeepers killed last year was the highest since 1994.

This day of commemoration takes place at a time when there are recent successes of UN peace operations to celebrate. Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, where missions have now closed, would not have emerged from their nightmares without their years of UN peacekeeping. I take personal pleasure in witnessing peaceful political transitions being accomplished by the national actors after UN peace operations in Timor-Leste and Nepal. But we also have to acknowledge that today four of the UN’s largest missions – in Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and South Sudan, are facing grave difficulties.

Looking back, it is amazing to recall that when Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced in 2014 that he intended to commission a review of UN peace operations, this came as a surprise. It was already fourteen years since the previous major review gave rise to the Brahimi report, and four years later it is clear that radical changes in the context of peace operations made a further review, if anything, overdue.

So I was pleased to be a member of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, now forever dubbed HIPPO, which reported in 2015. We knew that its timing posed a problem. By the time our report was published, the end of Ban’s term would be fast approaching; while some changes could be hoped for, major reform would inevitably have to await the leadership of the next secretary-general and new department heads. Yet a new secretary-general might not want to be associated with a predecessor’s initiative, and the initial impact of a review on member states is not easily sustained.

Nearly four years on, however, the analysis and recommendations of the HIPPO report have continued to be valued as the framework for developments and debate regarding UN peace operations. Its recommendations having been largely accepted by Ban; modest reforms were set in motion in 2015–16 before his term came to an end. Member state reactions to the report were generally positive, inevitably with some cherry-picking. HIPPO’s thinking, along with that of the other two major reviews published in 2015 – regarding peacebuilding architecture, and women and peace and security – featured prominently in the public exchanges between member states and candidates to be the next secretary-general – exchanges which UNA-UK did so much to promote through the ‘1 for 7 Billion’ campaign. The early initiatives of Secretary-General António Guterres showed his intention to take action which reflected HIPPO’s approach and recommendations. It is now a good moment to take stock, as he and the Security Council just did around a debate at the end of March, giving rise to a detailed presidential statement by the council.

The most frequently quoted phrase from the HIPPO report is ‘the primacy of politics’: that ‘lasting peace is achieved not through military and technical engagements, but through political solutions’, and therefore ‘politics must drive the design and implementation of peace operations’. We argued for an emphasis on conflict prevention and early engagement, to avert the need
for military deployments wherever possible – a priority that has been strongly embraced by Secretary-General Guterres. We were concerned that large UN peacekeeping missions have been operating where the UN has been able to do little to advance a political process. The Security Council has not sufficiently exercised its responsibility to set a political strategy and sustain pressure to make it effective, including when host governments fail to cooperate and fulfil their commitments.

HIPPO was tasked to review all peace operations – not only peacekeeping missions. The three missions I have headed as a special representative of the secretary-general were each what the UN calls special political missions – they did not have armed uniformed components authorised to use force; they were managed by the Secretariat’s Department of Political Affairs, not the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; and they were financed out of the UN’s regular budget, not the separate peacekeeping assessment. This conceptual, managerial and budgetary bifurcation has been seriously dysfunctional, especially where flexible transitions are needed to respond to changes in country situations.

HIPPO therefore recommended moving away from this distinction, and that we think in terms not of two types of UN missions, but of a spectrum of peace operations. The design of missions should not follow a template, as has too often been the case, but should be developed from the specific conflict context. When a new mission is to be deployed, we recommended two-stage mandating – getting an initial presence on the ground with a provisional mandate, but then returning to the Security Council with recommendations which reflect in-country engagement with the government, conflict parties and civil society. This proposal has been well received, but is as yet untested, since no new peacekeeping operation has been deployed since MINUSMA in Mali in 2013 and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic in 2014, before HIPPO was appointed. However, the Secretariat and the Security Council have in principle accepted the criticism of over-ambitious and unrealistic ‘Christmas-tree’ mandates, and the need for prioritisation and sequencing in what a mission can accomplish. Secretary-General Guterres recently declared that ‘Christmas is over’, although this is more easily said than it is reflected in reconfiguration of current operations.

HIPPO strongly reaffirmed the moral obligation of peacekeepers to protect civilians. In no way is this in conflict with the primacy of politics: the ultimate protection of civilians lies in the political solution of conflict. Protection of civilians is a whole-of-mission responsibility, and non-military approaches must be maximised. But UN troops must be ready to act robustly and proactively to protect civilians within the limits of resources, although expectations must be realistic when, as HIPPO pointed out, around 100,000 troops had been given a mandate to protect civilians across more than 10 million square kilometres.

HIPPO wrestled deeply with the issue of the use of force in UN peacekeeping, at a time of much tension between traditional peacekeeping espoused by many troop-contributing countries and the trend towards more robust mandates adopted by the Security Council. We were clear that while UN peacekeeping missions must have the capabilities and training to defend themselves and protect civilians in an operating environment of asymmetric threats, their composition
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and character are such that they should not be asked to engage in military counter-terrorism operations. Such operations should be undertaken by the host government, or by a capable regional force, or by an ad hoc coalition authorised by the Security Council. As a recent article put it, we need robust peacekeeping but not aggressive peacekeeping, and the UN should be an impartial agent of peace: peacekeeping is not war-fighting. In my opinion, the expectations of the Force Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to ‘neutralise armed groups’ and of MINUSMA in northern Mali crossed that red line. Calling on UN troops to use ‘overwhelming force’ threatens to destroy their impartiality, hinder their peace efforts, and increase rather than decrease their vulnerability and that of civilians.

This makes all the more important HIPPO’s strong emphasis on partnership with regional organisations. This was endorsement of a trend already under way, and which is essential as regards conflict prevention and mediation, as well as in relation to military operations. It has found overwhelming acceptance – except when it comes to funding arrangements, where the US in particular resists UN funding for peace operations of regional organisations, most notably the African Union. Such cooperation is now enshrined in the Joint UN–AU Framework for Enhancing Partnership in Peace and Security, but the warm collaboration at the top of the organisations has yet to be consistently reflected in country contexts.

HIPPO’s call for a people-centred approach in peace operations has also been widely echoed, but if it is to be more than rhetoric, it must be implemented and assessed at the country level. These days the Security Council listens more to critical civil society voices, as it should, not only during its visiting missions to the field but also in the council chamber. Individual peace operations are rightly being pressed to engage more, especially with women, and to include more women peacekeepers to enable them to do so better.

Two critical tests for the relationship between peace operations and the local population are the extent to which a mission responds to threats to civilians from armed actors – including those linked to the host government – and to sexual exploitation and abuse by its own personnel, uniformed or civilian. Engagement with the local population is one of the best sources of intelligence regarding threats to civilians – and indeed regarding threats to personnel of the mission. Local people will understand that a mission cannot be everywhere and prevent every act of violence, but they will not excuse failure to protect where a mission clearly does have the means. Secretary-General Guterres has now gone far beyond the recommendations of HIPPO in his measures to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse, to ensure responsiveness to victims, and to insist on the responsibilities of member states contributing personnel. Pressure to insist on the implementation required of the leadership of every peace operation and of every member state – before, during and after deployment of its personnel – must continue to be unrelenting.

Alongside his immediate initiatives on sexual exploitation and abuse, and to promote gender parity within the UN, Guterres signalled his intention to act on HIPPO recommendations in several ways. The HIPPO report, like the Brahimi report before it, was highly critical of the poor capacity of the Secretariat for strategic analysis, planning and review of peace operations; this has been significantly strengthened by the establishment of a Strategic Monitoring and
Evaluation Unit in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General. A series of strategic reviews of major missions – some requested by the Security Council, some initiated by the Secretariat – have begun to be carried out by teams with independent leadership, utilising data analysis, and subjected to ‘red-teaming’. The push by the Trump administration to cut budgets has contributed to pressure for more radical strategic reviews of individual operations, but the actual budget decisions have been anything but strategic, and are in danger of exacerbating the divergences between mandates and resources which set peace operations up for failure.

Guterres also immediately announced his intention to restructure the Secretariat’s peace and security departments – which HIPPO said have been ‘hampering the effective assessment, design and conduct of peace operations’. His proposals, now being considered by member states, would in my view improve the structure in three key respects. In place of the duplication and rivalry of regional divisions in two departments, a single political-operational structure under regional assistant secretaries-general would ensure that peace operations are designed and managed within their regional context and in closer consultation with the relevant regional organisations. Second, the management of both peacekeeping operations and large field-based special political missions by the same department would better enable situation-specific responses tailored to context, and smoother transitions as those contexts evolve. Third, the integration of the Peacebuilding Support Office with Political Affairs would ensure that political strategies to prevent conflict and sustain peace comprise the necessary development dimension.

Guterres’ parallel proposals for management reform have among their objectives providing the delegation of authority which is absolutely essential to those who provide services in the field, and to expedite service delivery and recruitment. From the HIPPO perspective, the changes in management and policy, and the operational support which is proposed to be provided to both Headquarters and the field by a single department, must be rigorously assessed according to whether they do meet the distinct needs of the field.

Early this year, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations drew up an action plan following the report of a review on improving the security of peacekeepers, and in late March Secretary-General Guterres announced a new initiative he dubbed ‘Action for Peacekeeping’. He called for streamlined mandates; political solutions; partnership with regional organisations; improved training and preparedness of peacekeepers; alignment of human and financial resources with mandates; and member state influence to sustain the consent of host countries. Each of these should mean further momentum for implementation of key HIPPO recommendations. His initiative is aimed at what he called ‘a quantum leap in collective engagement’, mobilising all partners and stakeholders, including at a high-level event on the margins of the General Assembly this September.

It is especially important that this initiative is successful in overcoming tensions between the Security Council, whose permanent members drive the mandating of peace operations, yet with the increasingly important exception of China contribute very few uniformed personnel, and the troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs). Pressure from TCCs, and commitments by the Security Council to improve consultation, go back not just years but decades, yet the level of
dissatisfaction remains acute – as I believe is justified. The return of some Western countries to peacekeeping, most notably in Mali, and in the case of the UK to South Sudan, is to be warmly welcomed. But there is an unhealthy divide between troops from the global South deployed to areas of danger – and in all too many cases taking casualties there – and westerners who dominate staff positions and whose niche capabilities are needed to mitigate risks, but who  despite their greater capabilities share little in those risks.

Let me then conclude with how I think the UK can best contribute to the current agenda of reform.

As a member of the Security Council, the UK has a major share of the responsibility for setting the strategy and mandates of peace operations – and that includes responsibility for how poorly the council has been meeting that challenge. The current process is over-dependent on three so-called penholders – France, the UK and the US, often referred to as the council’s P3 – which have arrogated to themselves the lead on almost all country situations on the council’s agenda. France is the post-colonial penholder for francophone countries, as well as providing five French diplomats in a row to head the Department of Peacekeeping Operations for the 20 years since it was promised this when it lifted its veto on Kofi Annan’s election as Secretary-General. The UK’s penholderships include Colombia, Cyprus, Libya, Somalia and Yemen; the last of these is particularly inappropriate in view of the UK’s support for the Saudi Arabian-led coalition, which has contributed to the council’s lack of effective action in the face of the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. While the P3 consult among themselves and ensure that Russia and China will not veto their drafts, the council as a whole engages in hardly any frank strategic discussion before its elected majority are given little time to go along with the penholder’s proposals.

The current process of strategic reviews offers an opportunity for a better process of council consideration of mandates – indeed it cries out for it. I welcome the intention of the UK to have a council discussion of the strategic review process during its August presidency. The UK could also open up a review of the council’s own mandating process, including the distribution of penholderships, and invite regional or other elected members to become co-penholders where it does retain the pen. To its credit, the UK Mission in New York has been working with Pakistan on proposals for improving consultation with TCCs, and it should press the Security Council to be open to significant change.

In its second role, as a major financial contributor – currently sixth after the US, China, Japan, Germany and France – the UK must ensure good housekeeping, but it should not follow the Trump administration’s non-strategic push for budget cuts. Rather it should ensure that the human and financial resources of peace operations are aligned with mandates, and that what is decided in the Security Council is funded in the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee. In the longer-term, the UK should drop its insistence that large field-based special political missions continue to be funded from the regular budget, and support the HIPPO proposal for a single peace operations account. It should join with other member states in seeking to persuade the US to agree to providing funds for African or other regional peace operations authorised by the Security Council from UN assessed contributions. And when 80 per cent of UN peacekeeping operations expenditures are military-related, and are shown to be of greater cost-effectiveness
than other international interventions, perhaps it is time for them to be absorbed by defence budgets, as one expert has recently suggested, rather than by raiding development budgets for peace operations.

The UK’s third role is as a contributor of uniformed personnel. HIPPO only partly had its tongue in cheek when we said that the panel ‘deems it particularly important that the forces of permanent members of the Security Council participate in UN peacekeeping operations’. It would, we said, put the parties to the conflict on notice that the Council is ready to invest in the settlement of the conflict, and could make a difference in the quality of policy deliberations in New York as much as it could affect effectiveness in the field. The UK’s 704 troops (321 of them in South Sudan and 249 in Cyprus), 32 staff officers and 4 military experts do not constitute the commitment that should be made by a permanent member with our military capability. A small number of British police officers made a fine contribution to the mission I headed in East Timor: today there are zero UK police serving in UN peacekeeping. The UK is strong in rhetorical support for the need for more women peacekeepers, but this should be reflected in actually sending increased numbers of women officers and troops; currently only 57 of the UK’s 740 peacekeepers are women.

Lastly, I have not yet said anything about the quality of mission leadership, but it is of crucial importance. HIPPO observed that there had not been a quantum improvement since the Brahimi report in 2000 was critical of the quality of mission leaders. The proper interest of the UK – and of every other member state – is not in seeking leadership appointments for its own nationals, whether in the field or in the Secretariat, but in insisting that the secretary-general operate a truly merit-based selection process, and supporting him in resisting inappropriate pressures, not least from the permanent members of the Security Council.

Secretary-General Guterres has described the ambition of his Action for Peacekeeping initiative as being to bring together all partners and stakeholders to develop a new set of mutually agreed principles and commitments. The rise of China as an increasingly important peacekeeping actor and funder, and the changing relations between states of the global North and the global South, mean that the latter will not meekly accept decisions dominated by the former. In the Security Council, what Guterres has called the return of the Cold War is making consensus on issues of intervention and sovereignty harder to find. Our government, our civil society and our research community must make every effort to build bridges in the work of the United Nations for peace.

Dame Margaret Anstee Memorial Seminar: ‘Future Peacekeeping’

Chandrima Das: Director of Peacekeeping Policy, UN Foundation

It was highlighted that declining US support for UN peacekeeping missions represent a significant challenge to the future of peacekeeping. The Trump administration has proposed cutting some $700 million from the overall budget, with US Ambassador to the UN Nikki Hayley arguing that where the mandate is no longer achievable, the mission should be terminated. While in the
past these proposals have always been balanced by the US Congress putting money back in, it is not clear how long this will continue. This points to the continuing debate around the nature of mandates being established by UNSC members who may not be significant TCCs.

Sophia Willits-King: Head of the UN Peacekeeping Joint Unit, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office

The UK’s reengagement with UN peacekeeping was described as being a continuation of the its continued strong support, even if the country has not always been a sizeable TCC. It was argued that the UK recognises its responsibility as a permanent member of the UNSC and that it cannot allow TCCs from the global South to shoulder disproportionate risks when it comes to peacekeeping. The UK is also a substantial financial contributor to both the UN generally and peacekeeping in particular. However, as a TCC, the UK’s contribution focuses not on scale but on making available the niche capabilities of a modern western military, hence its focus on medical and engineering support to UNMISS. This was further enabled by the drawdown in the UK’s military commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan and also innovative funding arrangements developed within the British government. Overall, the UK believes that UN peacekeeping plays a vital role in international peace and security at a reasonable cost, and that the UK intends to continue playing its part. It was further noted that while there was a need for reform of UN peacekeeping, incremental evolution should be encouraged over dramatic revolution.

David Mazur: Director of Strategic Planning, Canadian Armed Forces Strategic Joint Staff

Representing Canada, David Mazur noted that most UN peacekeeping missions cannot deploy within 60 days, which is far too long. It was felt that Canada could make a difference through a ‘SMART’ pledge (a commitment made in partnership with one or more member states to better meet the needs of peacekeeping missions) focused on air transport and aviation. Looking at Norway’s pledge with other states to provide air transport capabilities to MINUSMA, Canada has pledged military air transport aircraft to operate from the UN logistics hub at Entebbe in Uganda, where aircraft will be on an eight hour notice to deploy. The intention is that this will allow for a more rapid response. In addition, Canada has also committed an aviation support unit to MINUSMA consisting of both Chinook and Griffon helicopters. It was noted that collaboration between TCCs within the UN is often compromised by administrative and logistical issues, but there are opportunities for cooperative and collaborative efforts through organisations such as NATO.

David Curran: Research Fellow, University of Coventry

It was noted that there are conceptual and practical problems with UN ‘stabilisation’ missions. Specifically, these state-centric counterinsurgency-style interventions, such as MINUSMA,
nominally integrate an organic, bottom-up peacebuilding dimension, when in reality these strands are incompatible. This is further hampered by the problematic role of political elites in host states, while engagement with civil society remains a blind-spot in UN policymaking. This was noted in the HIPPO report. Crucially, there is no working understanding of what ‘stabilisation’ means in UN thinking. Expectations differ among stakeholders about what UN peacekeeping missions should achieve, which leads to problems of expectation management. There is thus an argument that the focus should be on the lived experiences of those who UN peacekeeping is supposed to protect; these ‘peacekept’ should be considered in determining efficacy.

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