Occasional Paper

The Consequences of Brexit for European Defence and Security

Sarah Lain and Veerle Nouwens
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Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies
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Executive Summary

IN THE WAKE of the triggering of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, which formally began the UK’s exit process from the EU, this paper will examine some of the ways that the UK contributes to EU security in justice and home affairs, especially in relation to counterterrorism, and through the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In terms of justice and home affairs, the paper will focus specifically on the EU’s current intelligence and information-sharing platforms, especially those involved in counterterrorism. On the CSDP, it will look at the EU’s defence agencies and CSDP missions and operations. The objective is to understand some of the ways the UK contributes in these areas and what the UK might potentially lose post-Brexit, as well as what the EU might lose, if negotiations result in the UK withdrawing from participation in EU security structures. The paper will also identify some areas of mutual interest where continued cooperation between the UK and the EU post-Brexit may be desirable.

This paper is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of the many ways in which the UK contributes to EU security structures or the benefits it gains from involvement in these structures. As such, it does not examine the UK’s role in issues such as anti-money laundering or criminal asset freezing, nor does it discuss the UK’s role in platforms such as Eurojust or the European Anti-Fraud Office (L’office européen de lutte antifraude, or OLAF). Rather, it looks only at some of the contributions that the UK makes, focusing in particular on counterterrorism.

The paper is based on a review of the existing academic literature, government and EU policy documents and legislation, and information from law enforcement. It stemmed from a December 2016 workshop jointly organised by RUSI and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). The objective was to discuss the consequences of Brexit for European security and defence. During the workshop, parliamentarians and experts from the UK and Germany shared their views and insights on what the EU and the UK might lose with a British departure from CSDP and joint institutions such as Europol. Below are some of the key findings from the research:

Justice and Home Affairs

1. **The UK participates in several EU information-sharing and law enforcement cooperation mechanisms.** These include: Europol, the EU’s law enforcement agency; the second-generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), an IT system that helps law enforcement share real-time alerts on people of interest;¹ the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS), which allows the secure exchange of information on criminal convictions between member states;² the Passenger Name Record (PNR)

Directive, which mandates EU-wide transfer of passenger data from airlines to member states’ authorities, including information such as travel dates, travel itineraries and contact details; and the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN), which sits within the European External Action Service (EEAS) and provides strategic analysis to the high representative/vice president based on contributions from member states’ intelligence and security services. The UK was due to connect to the Prüm framework – under which the police forces of EU member states will be able to automatically share DNA, fingerprint and vehicle registration data – in 2017; although the future of this is now in doubt due to Brexit.

2. There are clearly benefits, for both the UK and the EU, of participating in these mechanisms. EU INTCEN (previously SITCEN) and the PNR directive were both established with strong British support. Both the UK and the EU have benefited from the UK’s involvement in Europol. The UK is among the ten largest contributors of Europol staff. Moreover, according to Europol chief Rob Wainwright, himself British, around 40% of Europol’s cases have a ‘British dimension’, highlighting the degree to which the UK not only provides information, but also benefits in terms of national security. The Prüm system has also contributed to national security by aiding in the identification of terrorist suspects – it helped to identify Salah Abdeslam as a suspect in the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015.

3. There is little precedent for cooperation between these EU mechanisms and countries that are both outside the EU and Schengen. Europol cooperates with various non-EU countries under both strategic agreements and operational agreements, although these are separate from the information-sharing mechanisms among EU states. The EU has strategic agreements with Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. The agreement with Russia states that there will be cooperation through ‘exchange of strategic and technical information of mutual interest ... exchange of law enforcement experience ... exchange of legislation, manuals, technical literature and other law ... [and] training’. Operational agreements,
which the EU has with several states (including Australia, Canada, Colombia, Norway and the US), allow for more in-depth cooperation. For example, the agreement with the US provides for specific ‘points of contact’ that are responsible for coordinating activities, and also provides for the assignment of liaison officers to enhance cooperation. There are bilateral relations between the EU and non-EU countries for PNR – agreements have been concluded with the Australia, Canada and the US. However, there is little precedent for non-EU and non-Schengen countries to participate in other EU information-sharing mechanisms. Therefore, if the UK and the EU decide that it is in the interests of both parties to continue to cooperate when Britain leaves the EU, new legal and practical frameworks may need to be created.

Common Security and Defence Policy

1. **The UK makes a considerable financial contribution to EU missions.** Although it is difficult to find exact figures, a House of Commons research briefing in August 2016 stated that the UK share in military operations made up 14.82% of common costs. Information provided by the Foreign Office to a House of Lords European Union Committee report in February 2016 indicated that the UK contributes approximately 16% of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget that funds civilian missions.

2. **The UK has contributed key assets to assist with operations.** The UK is one of the few nations that can contribute an operational headquarters, as for Operation Atalanta off the Horn of Africa. Britain also provided a frigate for this mission for three months in 2008–09 and for four months in 2011. The UK provided a survey ship for the assessment phase of Operation Sophia and a frigate during the operational stage of the mission.

3. **The UK has played an important role in developing the CSDP, but more recently it has been viewed as blocking further defence integration among EU states.** The UK’s role in developing the CSDP was highlighted in the British-French Saint-Malo Declaration.

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14. European Commission, ‘Passenger Name Record (PNR)’.
in 1998, when both countries agreed that ‘the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises’.\[19\] However, in recent years the UK has been viewed as a state that is blocking further defence integration, embodied in its opposition to establishing an EU Permanent Operational Headquarters (POHQ), which the UK fears would duplicate NATO capabilities.\[20\]

4. **Brexit may lead to increased defence cooperation among the remaining EU states; but this is not a given.** To some in the EU, the UK’s departure opens up new opportunities for pushing through plans that will allow for further integration and cooperation on EU-wide approaches to defence and security. This has been highlighted by the fact that, since the Brexit vote, more serious discussions have taken place about further initiatives in European defence research, armed forces and command headquarters. However, the EU should not be overly optimistic about how easy more integrated EU defence cooperation will be without the UK. There are other EU countries that also oppose greater EU defence integration which, without the UK as a member, will have to make the case stronger themselves.

5. **There is clearly room for common ground and future cooperation on common defence issues between the EU and the UK.** This is especially the case since – unlike for the intelligence and information-sharing mechanisms for justice and home affairs – there is greater precedent for non-EU countries to cooperate on CSDP missions and operations.

6. **The UK should identify the areas in which it would like to continue cooperating with the EU on CSDP and the form of this cooperation prior to negotiations.** The reaction of Brussels will depend on the manner in which the UK presents its case, including whether it uses its strength of capabilities and contributions as leverage. The UK will likely lose its seat at the decision-making table, and so its ability to influence any future participation in CSDP will form a major part of the debate over defence and security cooperation post-Brexit.

7. **The UK will continue to have strong bilateral defence relations with some EU countries, such as France and Germany.** For example, the UK provided bilateral airlift support to France after the latter’s unilateral intervention into Mali in January 2013,\[21\] and the UK and Germany are reportedly set to sign a new defence cooperation deal, despite Brexit.\[22\]

8. **NATO will continue to be the major platform through which the UK conducts multilateral defence policy.** Although the election of President Donald Trump has caused some unpredictability over US defence policy, recent comments by his administration have at least reinforced Washington’s commitment to its NATO allies.\[23\]

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I. Justice and Home Affairs

JUSTICE AND HOME Affairs (JHA) became one of the three pillars in formal EU policy under the Maastricht Treaty in 1992–3. It was within the JHA pillar that EU members could cooperate on addressing immigration and asylum, civil law, policing and criminal law, including counterterrorism, serious crime and fraud. The UK has been actively involved in (and was instrumental in creating) a number of EU platforms and mechanisms that allow for the sharing of information and intelligence, the aim being to reduce the risks from terrorism and crime by fostering closer cooperation on issues such as counterterrorism and law enforcement.

However, the UK has also sought limitations on the say the EU can have over JHA. In the 1990s, the UK requested the right to decide whether to opt in or out of EU proposals on JHA, demonstrating its desire to retain more sovereignty in this area than many other member states. If the UK chooses to opt out of EU initiatives, as it has in some cases, it still retains a seat at the negotiating table, albeit one that does not bring with it a vote on the shape of the proposal.

The UK has played a leading role in developing the EU’s capabilities and initiatives and establishing new links among EU members, and has been seen as valuable in this role, given its integrated intelligence capabilities and law enforcement agencies. The UK strongly supported the development of what is now the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN), an intelligence analysis function housed in the EU’s External Action Service (EEAS): the UK was one of the seven member states which founded EU INTCEN’s predecessor organisation, known as the EU Joint Situation Centre (EU SITCEN). The UK strongly supported (and thereafter opted into) the Passenger Name Record (PNR) Directive, approved by the European Parliament in 2016, which requires airlines to share passenger data with member states’ authorities. The UK also opted in to the European Arrest Warrant, established in 2004 as an EU-wide extradition mechanism, superseding the bilateral extradition arrangements between member states that existed previously. And the UK connected to the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) in 2015. SIS II is described by the UK government as:

a European-wide IT system that helps facilitate European cooperation for law enforcement, immigration and border control purposes. The UK connected into SISII on 13 April 2015 but only participates in the law enforcement aspects as we have maintained control of our own borders.

Although the UK’s existing security capabilities are significant, its cooperation with the EU on JHA matters has, according to politicians and officials in the UK and EU institutions, been valuable in enhancing the UK’s national security. For example, Rob Wainwright, Director of Europol, said in early 2016 that:

> over the last ten years, unique EU cooperation instruments such as Europol, and information sharing through institutionalised systems connecting 28 countries, have become a mainstream part of how Britain protects its borders, economic well-being and people.\(^4\)

Former British Prime Minister David Cameron said in a speech before the EU referendum that EU powers and instruments, such as the European Arrest Warrant, Europol, the PNR Directive, SIS II and cooperation on DNA and fingerprint data, collectively comprised a ‘key weapon’ in counterterrorism.\(^5\)

Following the triggering of Article 50, the UK’s relationship with the EU on security mechanisms and information-sharing platforms will have to be negotiated. To do so, the UK and the EU will have to assess the benefits to the EU of the UK’s contributions to EU security structures, as well as the benefits the UK draws from contributing. This section aims to go some way towards assessing these benefits, especially as they relate to counterterrorism. However, it should be stated from the outset that, given the sensitivities surrounding the information relating to EU security structures, it is difficult to definitively quantify the extent to which the UK’s contribution to EU law enforcement and intelligence and information-sharing mechanisms has resulted in the prevention of terrorist activity or the disruption of criminal networks.

**Intelligence and Information-Sharing Platforms**

National security falls outside the competence of the EU and its institutions. This means that, in general, intelligence exchange and intelligence sharing is conducted bilaterally by member states with each other and with states outside the EU. However, the EU has established an intelligence analysis capability – EU INTCEN – and also exchanges counterterrorism information on law enforcement channels. Law enforcement is part of the JHA pillar and therefore within the EU’s competence, but the UK’s opt-out from the JHA pillar means that it currently only participates in (‘opts into’) specific JHA mechanisms.

**EU INTCEN**

The UK was a founder of EU INTCEN. Prior to 2012, EU INTCEN was called EU SITCEN, which was set up in 2002 as a forum to exchange sensitive information between the intelligence services

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\(^5\) David Cameron, speech on the UK’s strength and security in the EU, given at 10 Downing Street, London, 9 May 2016.
of Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK. EU INTCEN’s current mission is to provide intelligence analyses, early warning and situational awareness to the European External Action Service (EEAS) and to the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, as well as representatives from member states in the Political and Security Committee (PSC). Analysis is based mainly on information from intelligence and security services of member states, open sources, diplomatic reporting, consular warden networks, international organisations, NGOs and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations. It feeds into decision-making bodies in the fields of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the CSDP and EU thinking on counterterrorism. INTCEN is not an operational agency, and although there has been discussion of formalising it into a more operational intelligence capability, this has not progressed.

**Europol**

The system that facilitates communications within Europol is called the Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA), and evidence shows that the UK has been an increasingly active user of this platform. According to Europol data, ‘[t]he UK exchanged 26% more messages on SIENA in 2015 than in 2014; and initiated 22% more cases on it over the same period’. The UK is one of the top ten countries in terms of contributions to Europol staff. Europol has also provided specific support to member states at times of crisis. For example, after the Paris attacks, Europol assigned approximately 60 officers to support French and Belgian investigations.

Following the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, efforts were made to improve coordination between law enforcement and intelligence agencies inside the EU and externally by facilitating the exchange of information. Against this backdrop, Europol established the European Counter Terrorism Centre in January 2016 to act as a central hub through which law enforcement agencies could increase information sharing on foreign fighters, terrorist financing, online terrorist propaganda and extremism (Internet Referral Unit) and illegal arms trafficking.

**PNR Directive**

Passed in April 2016, the PNR Directive requires airlines to transfer passenger name data – personal information collected and held by air carriers – to the law enforcement authorities of

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7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
11. Others are the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Romania, Poland and Greece. See Europol, ‘Consolidated Annual Activity Report 2015’, 12 May 2016, p. 49.
member states.\textsuperscript{13} This is something that the UK has advocated for some time.\textsuperscript{14} Although many member states were already able to use PNR data under national law, the decision to set up an EU-wide PNR system was aimed at harmonising the legal provisions of member states on this issue. Countries outside the EU will normally require either a direct agreement with the EU or bilateral agreements with individual member states in order to acquire PNR data. Professor Steve Peers at the University of Essex notes that the EU has already signed such agreements with the US, Canada and Australia.\textsuperscript{15}

\section*{Prüm}

Prüm is a cross-European agreement which allows member states to check if suspects are featured in other member state DNA and fingerprint databases. The UK was due to be connected to Prüm in 2017,\textsuperscript{16} even though there is now uncertainty surrounding this decision after the UK voted to leave the EU.\textsuperscript{17} A pilot period of using this system in 2015 proved highly effective in bringing a number of non-terrorist offenders to the attention of the police. Thus far, the benefits of the system are clear: the biodata exchange through Prüm between French and Belgian authorities following the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015 greatly aided their ability to identify Salah Abdeslam, one of the accused.\textsuperscript{18} At present, only Norway and Iceland have concluded third-party agreements with the EU over access to Prüm. They are, however, both part of the Schengen area.

\section*{SIS II}

Since April 2015, the UK has formed part of the second-generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), through which law enforcement agencies of member states have access to operational data on terrorist suspects and criminals. The SIS II assists law enforcement by sharing real-time alerts, principally on people of interest that are, for example, wanted for arrest for extradition, such as missing persons, witnesses, absconders or subjects of criminal judgments. While this includes monitoring the movement of individuals participating in organised crime, the SIS II has also helped member states to track foreign fighters returning from Syria and Iraq as they move through Europe.\textsuperscript{19} In April 2016, the UK received 25 hits on ‘foreign alerts in relation to

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{14} HM Government, ‘The UK’s Cooperation with the EU on Justice and Home Affairs, and on Foreign Policy and Security Issues’, p. 5.
\bibitem{17} Hansard, House of Commons, ‘Exiting the EU: New Partnership’, Commons Debate, 17 June 2014, Column 1226.
\bibitem{18} HM Government, ‘The UK’s Cooperation with the EU on Justice and Home Affairs, and on Foreign Policy and Security Issues’, p. 6.
\end{thebibliography}
individuals who could pose a risk to national security’. Although the SIS II helps to facilitate European cooperation for law enforcement, immigration and border control, the UK participates only in the law enforcement aspects, because it is not part of the Schengen Area. It is unknown whether the UK will be able to negotiate access to the SIS II following Brexit, as all countries with access are either full EU member states or part of the Schengen Area.

ECRIS

The European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS), established in April 2012, provides for the secure exchange of information on criminal convictions between the authorities of EU member states. The European Commission has proposed extending ECRIS to include criminal records of third-country nationals convicted in the EU, and to oblige member states to collect and exchange fingerprint data from third-country nationals. The UK is part of this data-sharing system, but no non-EU countries, even those in the Schengen free travel area, currently have access to ECRIS. Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein instead use the Council of Europe’s 1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters or informal Interpol channels. However, in addition to being a more costly and time-consuming alternative, there is also no obligation to exchange information within a specific timeframe through these systems.

The UK’s Debate on the Use of EU Intelligence-Sharing Platforms

The majority of RUSI’s contacts among UK security officials have highlighted the importance of European connections in mitigating the current terrorism threat. The EU, too, recognises the UK’s contribution to EU security. It was not by coincidence that the UK’s EU Commissioner Sir Julian King was given the important portfolio of Security Commissioner. In doing so, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker signalled the important place the UK holds in contributing to the EU’s security. This was not lost on King – at his European Parliament hearing, he stated that the ‘UK will have to continue to work on counter-terrorism with the EU and boost police and intelligence cooperation’.

As already mentioned, there is little precedent for non-EU or non-Schengen Area members to participate in some of these mechanisms. One UK government report highlighted the relevance of this for the Prüm, SIS II and ECRIS. As a non-EU member, if the UK is not able to participate in these mechanisms, it will have to negotiate a bilateral agreement with either the EU as a whole.

or with individual member states to gain access. As one analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies noted, ‘Brexit would result in the UK being denied access to these datasets, at least until a series of bilateral data-sharing agreements with European states could be concluded’.25

Europol is one of the most prominent structures for UK security, and the UK is an active player in it. According to Europol’s director, Rob Wainwright, around 40% of Europol’s cases have a British dimension,26 highlighting the degree to which the UK not only provides information but is also able to benefit in terms of national security. Compared with information-sharing mechanisms such as Prüm, SIS II and ECRIS, it is much easier to envisage continued UK participation with Europol, given that seven other non-EU countries,27 not all of which are part of the Schengen Area, contribute liaison officers. Moreover, Europol’s liaison officers are able to use the SIENA platform. The UK could follow this path if the status quo cannot be maintained.

Some practitioners have argued that the UK’s participation in Europol is not vital for protecting the UK’s national security. Richard Walton, former head of Counter Terrorism Command at New Scotland Yard and a Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI, has argued that Europol, ‘while a useful discussion forum, is largely irrelevant to day-to-day operations within the counter-terrorism sphere’.28 Walton argues that, while it is important for sharing information, the benefits should not be overstated, particularly as Europol does not run operations. However, other serving and former British officials dispute this judgement, particularly with regard to Europol’s relevance for organised crime and wider law enforcement cooperation. Indeed, as Wainwright stated in his testimony to the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, Europol is particularly relevant for the UK in its efforts to tackle cybercrime, people smuggling, trafficking in humans and drug trafficking.29 Furthermore, in her oral evidence on Brexit and the future of EU–UK security and police cooperation presented to the Select Committee on the European Union, UK Director of Public Prosecutions Alison Saunders said that:

the databases are there. It is about having access to them. My law enforcement colleagues who appeared before you made the point that opting into Europol is really very important because it gives us access to all the databases without having to do any bilateral agreements.30

As intelligence information (as opposed to law enforcement counterterrorism information) is largely outside the competency of the EU, Brexit might be seen as being largely irrelevant to questions of intelligence sharing. However, the security services of EU member states, along with those of Norway and Switzerland, do meet in two forums, known as the Club of Berne and the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG). The Club of Berne was formed in 1971 with the UK as a founding member, and it created the CTG as a forum to focus specifically on the terrorist threat in September 2001.31 Although these forums fall outside the EU’s formal structures and lack legal status, they are nonetheless aligned informally to the EU by, for example, matching the presidency of the Club of Berne and CTG with that of the EU. Moreover, the CTG was identified by the Club of Berne as the body responsible for implementing the European Council’s 2004 Declaration on Combating Terrorism, and the CTG subsequently placed a counterterrorism analysis cell within the EU SITCEN.32

Most experts assume that the UK will continue to be a member of the Club of Berne and CTG after exiting the EU, not least as it joined the Club of Berne prior to its accession to the European Economic Community in 1973. However, leaving the EU may reduce the UK’s influence within these forums, as was argued by a former director-general of the UK’s Security Service (MI5) before the 2016 EU referendum.33

II. The EU Common Security and Defence Policy

Background

THE UK’S COMMITMENT to the CSDP saw a strategic shift in the signing of the British–French Saint-Malo Declaration in 1998, signed by then Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Jacques Chirac. The declaration was seen as a response to the conflict in the Balkans, which had highlighted the limitation of the EU’s capabilities in responding to crises in its own neighbourhood – in the Balkans the EU relied instead on NATO to intervene. The Balkans conflict highlighted the need for the EU to have the capabilities to conduct crisis management and to rapidly deploy military forces, as well as civilian support. The declaration mentioned the need for a common defence policy, stating that ‘Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology’. This was not intended to duplicate contributions to NATO, but instead to contribute to:

strengthening the solidarity between the member states of the European Union, in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs, while acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members.

This would pave the way for the European Security and Defence Policy, subsequently renamed in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty to the CSDP, part of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The Lisbon Treaty states that the CSDP should provide the EU with ‘operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets’ that can be used ‘on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter’. These were expanded from the Petersberg Tasks, which were first agreed at the Western European Union (WEU) Council of Ministers in 1992. The expanded tasks included joint disarmament operations; humanitarian and rescue tasks; military advice and assistance tasks; conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks; crisis management; and post-conflict stabilisation.

2. Ibid., p. 2.
3. Ibid., p. 1.
4. ‘The Lisbon Treaty’, Title 5, Chapter 2, Article 42.
Currently, the EU conducts a mixture of military operations and civilian missions, the majority fall into the latter category. Military operations include: capacity building among authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina through Operation Althea; disrupting human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Mediterranean in a bid to tackle the migration crisis as part of the European Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med) Operation Sophia; military training missions for the armed forces of the Central African Republic, Mali and Somalia; and the EUNAVFOR Somalia counterpiracy operation off the Horn of Africa. There are numerous civilian missions, ranging from civilian security sector reform in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine), to a reform programme for the civilian police service in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan), to the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya.7

The UK’s Role in the CSDP

Apart from advocating for a common defence policy, the UK has also been involved in promoting the creation of two other initiatives within the CSDP. The first was a Franco–British initiative that led to the creation of the EU Battlegroups in 2004. These are eighteen battalion-sized multinational military units that are made up of contributions from member states and are under the control of the Council of the EU. They rotate so that two groups are ready to deploy at all times; although they have not yet been deployed. Participants at a 2003 Franco–British summit at Le Touquet suggested that the EU establish a defence capabilities development agency.8 This emerged in 2004 as the European Defence Agency (EDA) and was first headed by the former director-general of international security policy at the UK’s Ministry of Defence, Nick Witney. The aim of the agency was described as developing defence capabilities in the field of crisis management, promoting and enhancing European armaments cooperation, strengthening the European industrial and technological base and creating a competitive European defence market.9

Several analysts have been critical of the CSDP for failing to reach its full potential, in part because of the perception that its response is often slow and at times fragmented. Thierry Tardy of the European Union Institute for Security Studies has described much of what the CSDP does as ‘sub-strategic’.10 Professor Karen E Smith of the London School of Economics and Political Science has said that the CSDP engages mainly in ‘small scale missions that are not the main expression of a strategy and do not drive major changes in the recipient state or region’.11

Some critics would blame the UK for the lack of a more cohesive and integrated CSDP, given that it is Britain that has opposed some of the forms of further defence and security integration

that others have advocated. The best known example is the UK’s opposition to the creation of a Permanent Joint Headquarters to provide command and control for EU missions and operations using the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) mechanism. This mechanism is specified in the Treaty of Lisbon and allows for groups of member states to undertake deeper defence collaboration, even if not all of them wish to participate. This is decided by a qualified majority in the Council.12

In 2011, then Foreign Secretary William Hague explained the UK’s opposition to the creation of a Permanent Joint Headquarters, and said that any proposal would trigger a veto from the UK:

we are opposed to this [idea] because we think it duplicates NATO structures and permanently disassociates EU planning from NATO planning … a lot can be done by improving the structures that already exist.13

Hague suggested that European governments should instead improve links between national headquarters and asked for contributions from military commanders earlier in the planning of military operations.

In acknowledgment of the UK’s opposition to this, a communiqué in 2012 from eleven EU member states, including France and Germany, called for a new model defence policy, designed to create a ‘European Army’ and more majority-based decision-making in defence and foreign policy, in order to ‘prevent one single member state from being able to obstruct initiatives’.14 Then Prime Minister David Cameron highlighted the UK’s staunch opposition to this idea in 2016, saying that ‘national security is a national competence, and we would veto any suggestion of an EU army’.15

The UK’s opposition to the idea of an EU operational headquarters is in part doctrinal, but also the result of the perceived risk it poses to manoeuvring between NATO- and EU-led missions. For example, Operation Althea, a capacity building and training programme for authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was originally a NATO Stabilization Force operation. This was concluded in 2004 and subsequently became a European Union Force (EUFOR) operation. Operation Althea is still conducted with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.16 British General Sir Adrian Bradshaw served in 2014 as both the EU Operation Commander and the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe for NATO for Operation Althea.17 Therefore, a more integrated EU military component, if it was not compatible with or duplicated aspects of NATO, would make the CSDP less effective.

The UK has also resisted other proposals for closer defence integration in the EU. For example, the UK rejected the French proposal for a permanent EU fund for financing armed operations.\textsuperscript{18} In 2013, before an EU summit on defence, European military and security experts drew up plans to send an EU battle group on a mission for the first time, intended to go into the Central African Republic to support France’s mission there. However, the UK, which was leading the battle group at the time, did not support the idea. As a result, France refrained from raising the issue at the summit.\textsuperscript{19} Carnegie Europe’s Judy Dempsey has argued that this was because of the planned referendum on the EU in the UK. The UK government did not want to ‘give the country’s Eurosceptics any additional leverage’.\textsuperscript{20} Until November 2016, the UK has rejected increases in the EDA’s budget for five years in a row.\textsuperscript{21}

That is not to say that the UK is against enhancing the effectiveness of the CSDP through closer cooperation. The UK’s 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) emphasises the UK’s desire to foster closer coordination and cooperation between the EU and NATO, and it echoes the EU Global Strategy’s desire to focus on a full-spectrum approach – through this cooperation – to counter cyber and other ‘hybrid threats’.\textsuperscript{22} The SDSR emphasises the need to make the EU more competitive and flexible, something other EU leaders have advocated, yet it is still resistant to truly integrative measures, in part for political and ideological reasons. The UK has also been frustrated by other member states’ lack of investment in improving their own capabilities.\textsuperscript{23}

To many analysts, the UK’s departure from the EU opens up opportunities for pushing through plans that will allow for further integration and commitment to EU-wide approaches on defence and security. This, over time, could make the UK’s participation in CSDP initiatives more complex and render the UK more of an outsider in terms of the substance of its cooperation. On the other hand, given that the UK provides assistance that is significant to CSDP operations, as will be discussed later in this paper, there is an element of ‘win-win’ to continued cooperation. However, it would be wrong to assume that the remaining EU members will be in consensus on defence after the UK has left. Some states, particularly Ireland, Austria, Sweden and Finland, have also opposed more binding mutual defence commitments. As one EU defence expert has noted, these countries have been ‘hiding behind’ the UK and will now have to ‘stand up for themselves’ after the UK departs the EU.\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Ibid}.
\item Hubert Zimmermann and Andreas Dür (eds), \textit{Key Controversies in European Integration} (London: Palgrave, 2016).
\item RUSI–FES round table, Berlin, 1 December 2016.
\end{enumerate}
III. EU Defence Policy Post-Brexit

What Will the UK Lose Post-Brexit?

BY LEAVING THE EU, the immediate loss implication in terms of the CFSP and CSDP will be
the UK’s role and influence in the decision-making process for missions and operations.
It will lose its ability to have an impact on EU defence policy.

The decision-making structure for this is quite complex, and the UK will lose influence at
multiple levels within the EU structure. The EU allocates a CFSP budget, out of which civilian
CSDP missions and operations are financed. The European Council, consisting of the heads of EU
member states, and the Council of the European Union, including member states’ ministers,
are responsible for taking decisions on CSDP, and such decisions are taken unanimously. The Foreign
Policy Instruments (FPI) of the European Commission administers the CFSP budget. The FPI is
also responsible for the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (ICSP) and Foreign Policy
Regulatory Instruments (Crisis Response and Peace Building). The ICSP does provide short-term
CFSP programmes where Commission Programmes are not mandated or able to respond.¹

The FPI works alongside the foreign policy department of the EU, the European External Action
Service (EEAS). The EEAS leads on CFSP, including CSDP. There are some CSDP structures within
the EEAS that are relevant to the planning of civilian missions, including the Civilian Planning
and Conduct Capability (CPCC), European Union Military Staff (EUMS), and the Crisis Management
and Planning Directorate (CMPD). These three are crucial to CSDP mission planning and conduct.

1. The CPCC operationally plans and runs civilian CSDP missions. It supports CMPD in the
development of civilian strategic options if required. It also prepares the draft mission
budget with FPI. It coordinates with the Commission to help work on a comprehensive
approach, and works with the EUMS to identify and implement civil–military
coordination requirements.
2. EUMS provides military strategic and advance planning.
3. CMPD is an integrated civilian–military strategic planning structure for new CSDP missions
or operations. It is in charge of conducting strategic reviews of existing CSDP missions and
operations. It is also the coordinating body of EU–NATO and EU–UN dialogue on CSDP.

The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is a permanent body composed of representatives
of the 28 EU member states at ambassadorial level. The Treaty of Lisbon states that the PSC
shall ‘exercise, under the responsibility of the Council and High Representative, the political
control and strategic direction of the crisis management operations’.² The European Union

¹. HM Government Stabilisation Unit, ‘Working in European Union Common Security and Defence
². ‘The Lisbon Treaty’, Title 5, Chapter 2, Article 38.
The Military Committee (EUMC) is composed of the member states’ chiefs of defence. It directs all military activities and provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on military matters. The Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) provides information, formulates recommendations and gives advice on the civilian aspects of crisis management to the PSC.

This highlights the multiple areas where EU membership, and contributed personnel, can influence decisions and act as checks and balances on the EU’s priorities. More importantly, however, not only will the UK lose the option to act in these various bodies, but it will also lose EU membership as a platform to encourage EU action on issues in its own national interests. For example, in October 2014, Cameron used the European Council meeting to encourage the EU to step up international cooperation to combat the spread of Ebola. This resulted in Cameron securing a €1 billion funding pledge from the EU to fight Ebola in West Africa, as the UK increased its own financial support by £80 million. The UK’s funding went to other organisations working in the field, such as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund, demonstrating how the EU is a useful platform for pushing priorities and gaining real material support for non-EU initiatives.

The UK could also lose the influence its EU membership provides on matters it views as important to European security. The UK has been a strong advocate of sanctions on Russia in the wake of its aggression in Ukraine, which has provided reassurance to Eastern countries in the EU. The UK’s Ministry of Defence has said ‘to date the EU is our primary tool for reducing vulnerability to Russian malign influence’. Although there is much more work to be done on a more cohesive EU approach towards Russia, this will again be an area that the UK will be less likely to be able to influence. That being said, the UK is likely to continue to take a strong stance against Russia, which will be welcomed by many still in the EU. For, if the UK were not to take a strong stance, then it could have negative knock-on effects for other member states, as some of the Eastern European countries have welcomed the UK’s strong stance. Upon the vote to leave the EU, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevicius expressed his concern that ‘the voices of the more principled positions [within the EU] will be weaker’ when it comes to dealing with Russia as a result of the UK’s departure.

The UK is also likely to lose interest in things it knows it cannot influence from outside the EU. As RUSI Deputy Director-General Professor Malcolm Chalmers has noted:

> [Given the UK’s] capabilities and interests, it may be asked to contribute to future missions on an ad hoc basis. Yet its willingness to do so on a substantial scale will be diminished if it cannot also share in the

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development of the missions’ purposes and rules. Other states are also likely to be wary of giving the
UK a significant formal role in CSDP mechanisms, even if the UK were to request it.\(^7\)

How Could the UK Still Participate and Have Influence?

Despite this, participation in the CSDP is something that the UK government would seemingly
like to continue. Richard Whitman has offered three scenarios for how continued cooperation
might look.\(^8\) The first would be as an ‘integrated player’ whereby the UK remains outside the EU
but inside the CSDP (a ‘reverse Denmark’, if you will). In this scenario, the UK would continue
with its existing commitments to current CSDP military and civilian operations, remaining on the
roster for battlegroups, and thus integrating with the EU’s foreign and security policy to ‘mutual
benefit’. The second would be as an ‘associated partner’, which would be based on the current
relationship between the EU and Norway. The UK could broadly align with EU declarations and
policies, such as sanctions, and could participate in aspects of CSDP implementation, but would
not be involved in planning. The third scenario has been dubbed the ‘detached observer’, where
the UK would be politically and organisationally separate from the EU, following a model more
like the US, where participation in CSDP missions is done on a case-by-case basis.

Prime Minister Theresa May and her cabinet have stated that the UK will seek to cooperate
closely with EU partners on security and defence. However, as Chalmers has noted, May has
‘been clear in her view that national interest should be the main driver for UK foreign and
security policy’.\(^9\) To emphasise this, he quotes Nick Timothy, one of May’s aides at the Home
Office and formerly one of her two Chiefs of Staff:

we need to rediscover the principles of a traditional, realist, conservative foreign policy. Value stability.
Respect sovereignty. Do not make foreign policy part of an ideological crusade. Do not try to recreate
the world in your own image … Always act on the basis of the national interest.\(^10\)

Secretary of State for Defence Sir Michael Fallon has echoed this, saying that Brexit should
not inhibit future cooperation with missions that are in the national interest.\(^11\) That is not to
say that participation in CSDP by other member states is not directed by national interest, nor
that national interests cannot help guide the direction of certain CSDP decisions, as long as
there is support within the EU. However, if CSDP cooperation continues, the UK will no doubt
want to be more selective about when and where it cooperates. The key question is therefore
how the cooperative process will work and what goodwill there will be to find a mutually
beneficial system.

\(^8\) Richard Whitman, ‘The UK and EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy After Brexit: Integrated,
Associated or Detached?’, National Institute Economic Review (No. 238, November 2016).
\(^9\) Author interview with Malcolm Chalmers, RUSI, 9 November 2016.
\(^10\) Nick Timothy, ‘The Chilcot Report is Finally Coming, But We Already Know We Haven’t Learned the
LLN 2016/051, 13 October 2016.
This could see the UK potentially withdraw from certain operations. The Royal Navy has contributed significant presence and capability to the EU naval operation in the Mediterranean. Peter Roberts, Director of Military Sciences at RUSI, has argued that:

> participation in this mission was a clear political signal from London that it was aligned to the values of the EU and the concerns of European partner states. It was not, however, based on a national security concern directly. The UK’s national interests and policy regarding migration are highly differentiated from that of Europe.\(^\text{12}\)

Although most analysts would argue that this issue does fall within UK priorities, Whitehall has clearly diverged on the issue of how to tackle the resulting issues of migration. Re-examination of resources, commitments and priorities might well see the UK alter its participation in initiatives to deal with migration in the Mediterranean, possibly pushing for a greater NATO or UN presence. Such a decision would be a clear indication of the path that London is taking, and mark a departure from Europe in security matters.

In reality, the UK could still participate in EU missions and operations, despite their likely loss of influence in the decision-making structures. Moreover, the Berlin Plus arrangements allow the EU and NATO to work closer together, as it provides for EU access to NATO planning, NATO command options and use of NATO assets and capabilities.\(^\text{13}\) Further cooperation is something NATO and the EU would like to do more, as demonstrated by the joint declaration signed in Warsaw in July 2016, which would allow the UK to have a voice, albeit in a different format.\(^\text{14}\)

**European Defence Agency**

Outside the EU, the UK would no longer have a seat on the Steering Board of the European Defence Agency (EDA), which is made up of defence ministers from participating member states. But withdrawing from the EDA may not be a disaster for the UK. A Cranfield report on Brexit and the future of UK defence Acquisition highlighted how the EDA had not reached its full potential on joint defence acquisition:

> in most cases, joint defence acquisition has taken place on an ad hoc basis, through either bilateral ... or multilateral ... arrangements, away from organisation such as the European Defence Agency (EDA) ... Although there have been opportunities for the UK to increase its participation and even assume more of a leadership role with the resultant growth in opportunities for UK industry, the UK has seen these organisations as having a greater benefit to smaller countries and something of a bureaucratic roadblock as far as acquisition cycle times are concerned.\(^\text{15}\)

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12. Interview with Peter Roberts, Director of Military Sciences, RUSI, 16 November 2016.
14. NATO, ‘Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’, 8 July 2016.
A UK withdrawal from the organisation could also save contributions to common costs, which in 2014–15 amounted to £3.319 million. The UK could, however, continue participating in EDA projects as a third-party country. For example, in 2006, Norway signed an administrative agreement with the EDA allowing it to participate in the agency’s research and technology projects.

The UK recently decided not to block certain activities of the EDA, possibly as a demonstration of goodwill, but also as a possible reflection that the agency is not considered a core priority. In November 2016, the EU agreed to increase its military research budget for the first time since 2010, raising the funding in 2017 by 1.6% and taking the budget to €31 million. As already mentioned, the UK had previously blocked any such increase five years in a row. This keeps the EDA’s budget at 2016’s level in real terms. However, Mogherini was optimistic about the increase, saying that ‘[i]t is still a symbolic increase. It is a clear demonstration of all EU member states, including the United Kingdom, to increase the budget of the agency to reflect the work to be done’.

There is also the option of cooperation through the Letter of Intent Framework Agreement, which was signed in 2000 by the defence ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK. This aimed to create the legal framework to assist industrial restructuring with the objective of promoting a more competitive and robust European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, particularly concentrating on security of supply, transfer/export procedures, security of information, treatment of technical information, research, and harmonisation of military requirements. Although the EDA overtook this framework, the agreement is still in place. Whitney has argued that letters of intent could be reinstated as a way for the UK to participate, although an agreement would need to be made so that such a framework does not undermine the EDA. He suggested that the Framework Agreement group could use the EDA as a secretariat, so their activity is visible to, and known by, EDA members.

**Bilateral Relations**

A side effect of the Brexit debate is that it has emphasised the UK’s ability to continue cooperation on security and defence through its strong bilateral relations. The SDSR stresses the UK’s key bilateral defence and security relationships with France, Germany and Poland. The EU itself is listed after NATO, the US, France, Germany and specific European partners in the SDSR.

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The UK has bilateral defence relations with France. The Lancaster House treaties, signed in 2010, agreed to develop a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) involving all three armed services, as well as cooperate further on developing equipment and capabilities. In April 2016, the UK and French armed forces tested the CJEF by conducting Exercise Griffin Strike in the Salisbury Plain Training Area, as well as at sea. This was aimed at testing equipment, procedural and interoperability training using vehicles and equipment from both countries together. It took place simultaneously with the NATO Exercise Joint Warrior, much of which took place off the coast of Scotland. In February 2016, a French brigadier general was appointed deputy commander of a British Army division for the first time, and a British colonel took up a similar role in the French army. At a UK–France summit in March 2016, both sides agreed to continue interoperability by launching a new project under the Future Combat Air System, which will see the development of unmanned air vehicle prototypes through an investment of $2.2 billion. This builds on a feasibility study phase, which began in November 2014. Although the warmth of these relations cannot be guaranteed, it still highlights the UK’s ability to have European defence and security relations outside the EU.

The UK specifically mentioned Germany as a partner on security, intelligence and defence relationships in the 2015 SDSR. In January 2016, a new UK–Germany Ministerial Dialogue on Capability Cooperation was announced to drive forward reductions in support costs to common aircraft, in particular A400Ms and Typhoons. Germany’s own 2016 White Paper also specifically mentions the UK, saying that Berlin aims to ‘further expand in all areas of common interest’. There seems to be substance to this desire for cooperation based on recent reports that the UK and German defence ministries are working on ‘a joint vision statement on future co-operation’.

Another new potential variable in the UK’s own defence and security policy with the US is how relations will develop with the Trump administration. The SDSR confirms Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with the US. It argues that the ‘unparalleled extent of UK–US cooperation on nuclear, intelligence, diplomacy, technology and military capabilities plays a major role in guaranteeing our national security’. Historically, the UK has pursued greater interoperability with the US over that of EU member states. As Roberts has noted, ‘the UK has consistent specified equipment compatible with the US forces over that simply for European partners’. For example, the 2015 SDSR emphasised US–UK interoperability through collaboration on aircraft carrier programmes, with a stated goal

29. Interview with Peter Roberts, RUSI, 16 November 2016.
of achieving the ability ‘to fly aircraft from each other’s ships’.30 In 2016, the UK also purchased nine Boeing P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, originally developed for the US Navy.31 During her visit to the US in January 2017, Prime Minister May heard Trump reconfirm the ‘special’ status of the UK–US relationship. However, some analysts have warned that the UK may benefit from re-examining its dependence on US defence technology.32

Trump caused concern in Europe and within NATO by saying that he would support member states on NATO’s Article V only if they paid their ‘fair share’ of 2% defence spending.33 However, during May’s visit, she said in the president’s presence that he had reconfirmed his support for NATO.34 Concerns over how committed the US is to European security, particularly on issues such as Russia, could provide impetus for the EU to focus on security and defence. German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen said EU security would continue to depend on the US and NATO, but Trump’s victory meant that Europe would have to be ‘more self-reliant on security issues’.35 She said NATO was still ‘the cornerstone of our collective defence’, but that the EU should have ‘strategic autonomy’.36

Other Multilateral Relations

The UK remains a member of the Organisation of Joint Armament Cooperation (Organisation conjointe de coopération en matière d’armement, or OCCAR), an intergovernmental organisation created in 1996 by the defence ministers of France, Germany, Italy and the UK. It currently involves collaborative armament programmes between Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK and allows non-OCCAR members to participate in its programmes.37 OCCAR’s current programmes with UK participation include the A400M tactical and strategic airlift, the Maritime Mine Counter Measures and the FSAF/PAAMS surface-to-air anti-missile systems.38

The 2015 SDSR stressed that ‘NATO is at the heart of the UK’s defence policy’.39 The UK will continue to be a strong contributor to NATO, if not strengthen this contribution. The UK has taken an active role in reassuring NATO partners to the East, some of which are also EU members.

36. Ibid.
In 2014, RAF Typhoon aircraft were deployed to Lithuania to take part in the enhanced Baltic Air Policing mission, alongside Poland, Denmark and France. In November 2015, the UK, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Norway signed a Foundation Memorandum of Understanding on the Joint Expeditionary Force, and since the referendum, the UK has committed 500 troops to Estonia and 150 to Poland to reassure these NATO allies.

At the Warsaw summit in July 2016, NATO and the EU agreed to work together more closely, which may enable the UK to engage with EU defence and security structures post-Brexit, albeit through the Alliance. A joint declaration was signed during the summit in 2016 between the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary General of NATO. They pledged to work together more closely on several areas: analysis; prevention and early detection of hybrid threats; cooperating on strategic communication and response; broadening cooperation operationally, particularly at sea to combat the migration crisis; increasing collaboration on cyber security and defence; stronger defence research and industrial cooperation; coordinating exercises, particularly on hybrid; and strengthening defence and security capacity in the east and south.

The UK has also been influential in multilateral issues, such as the Iran deal. The UK had double the leverage in these negotiations as both a member of the UN Security Council and the EU. France, Germany and the UK were prominent EU members that led on the negotiations from the European perspective, but they were also part of the E3+3 format, which also involved Russia, China and the US. Of course, following Brexit the UK would still exert influence through its Security Council seat.

What Might the EU Lose if the UK Cannot or Does Not Participate in the CSDP?

It is difficult to find exact figures of how much the UK provides to EU missions and operations in terms of spending, UK personnel, equipment and expertise. Numerous government departments and law enforcement agencies, such as the Ministry of Defence, National Crime Agency (NCA), Foreign Office and Department for International Development work on EU-related missions and operations, but also provide bilateral support to host countries. Often the differentiation between EU and bilateral contributions is not clear.

According to a House of Commons research briefing in August 2016, the UK share in EU military operations made up 14.82% of common costs. Information provided by the Foreign Office to a European Union Committee report in February 2016 indicated that the UK contributed

40. Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in London, United Kingdom, ‘Minister Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert Signs Foundation Memorandum of Understanding’, 30 November. 2015.
42. NATO, ‘Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’.
approximately 16% of the CFSP budget that funds civilian missions. The UK spends 2% of GDP on defence, making it one of the five EU member states meeting the NATO spending commitment. The other four are Greece, Poland, France and Estonia. In its recent White Paper, Germany said it aimed to spend 2% on defence and to invest 20% of this amount in major equipment over the long term.

A variable will be how much the economic impact of Brexit affects the UK’s ability to spend the required 2%. The budget in the Ministry of Defence’s 2015–16 annual report is given as £35.3 billion. It has earmarked £178 billion to spend on defence equipment over the next ten years until 2025. In August 2016, Trevor Taylor of RUSI said that if sterling stays weak, the cost of Britain’s defence imports could increase by approximately £700 million per annum from 2018–19. Chalmers has also said that defence could be included in any expenditure cuts that might result from Brexit. This could in particular affect the Ministry of Defence’s Equipment and Support Plan.

In terms of personnel, the UK is by no means the largest contributor to EU operations, but its contribution is still significant. The UK’s overall field personnel for CSDP civilian and military operations is relatively low, at 5–7% of all deployed personnel. Statistics from 2012 showed that the UK contributed 4.19% of total mission personnel from EU member states. Appendices 1 and 2 show the details submitted by the Foreign Office to the Lords Select Committee on the EU regarding UK contributions to CDSP military operations and civilian missions from 2007–15.

IV. Indications of the EU’s Future Plans

Although it is not necessarily always the most prominent actor, the UK clearly plays a constructive role in the CSDP. The UK has expressed a strong desire to stay engaged where it can on the EU’s defence and security policy. However, its decision to do so will depend on the trajectory the EU takes on defence and security policy.

Since the UK voted to leave the EU, some member states have – at least rhetorically – been taking the idea of a European army more seriously. On 8 September 2016, speaking in Lithuania, von der Leyen called for a European ‘defence union’ of 1,000 troops to deter Russian aggression in Eastern Europe.¹ She said this was intended to ‘add value’ to NATO, justifying this ‘Schengen of defence’ as ‘what the Americans expect us to do’.² Ahead of the defence ministers’ meeting in Bratislava on 27 September 2016, the Italian government proposed a ‘joint permanent European Multinational Force’ for member states to share forces, command and control, manoeuvre and enable capabilities.³ It also sought a new EU military headquarters for the force.⁴

However, on 12 September 2016, Germany seemed to pull back from the idea of a European army as von der Leyen produced an informal joint report with then French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian.⁵ Rather than advocating integrated armed forces, it revisited the idea of an EU military headquarters, with its own medical and logistical assets, such as airlift equipment. The aim would be to create a new command centre for coordinating medical assistance, a logistics centre for sharing ‘strategic assets’ and capacity to share satellite reconnaissance data. The report also said that battlegroups should be made operationally ready and called for a single EU budget for military research and joint procurement of assets. The Franco-German proposal said that this would start the creation of a ‘real’ common security policy, ‘an instrument created by the Lisbon Treaty that has not been used until today’.⁶

European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker also supported this idea. In his State of the Union address in September 2016, Juncker expressed his support for a single operational headquarters and for the EU to establish common military assets, as well as a shared European

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². Ibid.
⁴. Ibid.
The Consequences of Brexit for European Security and Defence

Defence Fund. The Franco-German proposal did, however, reiterate that the ‘political responsibility for defence lies in the first place with member states’.

In November 2016, in a bid to formalise the CSDP’s further development, Mogherini proposed to the EU Council an outline of the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence. This aims to define how the security and defence dimension of the EU Global Strategy will be implemented.

The plan identified the weaknesses in the current approach to CSDP and provided action points as a way to improve them. In particular, it identified the need for ‘deepening defence cooperation and delivering the required capabilities together’, as well as the need for the policy to be backed up by ‘credible, deployable, interoperable, sustainable and multifunctional civilian and military capabilities’. Some of the most relevant include:

1. EEAS to make proposals for member states’ consideration on revisiting the current priority areas for civilian CSDP missions in light of the changing security environment. There is a specific mention of countering hybrid threats, through building joint capacities in, for example, cyber and maritime security.
2. Deepening defence cooperation and reversing the fragmentation of the EU’s defence sector to enhance collective output. The ultimate goal would be to set up a Coordinated Annual Review on Defence in order to share national plans and intentions for spending and how they could be linked with a common effort, as well as identifying gaps in capabilities.
3. EDA should develop proposals on how better to produce more structured and effective cooperation as well as better aligning Research and Technology efforts.
4. Review structures and capabilities available for the planning and conduct of CSDP missions and operations, enhancing civilian and military synergies in particular.
5. Enhance the EU’s Rapid Response toolbox, including enhancing the common funding for the EU Battlegroups and conducting regular ‘live’ civilian–military exercises.
6. Provide for more comprehensive and shared financing, as well as mobilising budgets more flexibly.
7. Explore the potential of a single and inclusive Permanent Structure Cooperation, covering commitments on defence expenditures, capability development and operational engagement.
8. Enhance CSDP partnerships with organisations such as the UN, NATO, OSCE and the African Union.

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8. Andrew Rettman and Aleksandra Eriksson, ‘EU Joint Defence to Focus on South’.
11. Ibid.
On 22 November 2016, Members of the European Parliament passed a resolution on the European Defence Union, in which they called on member states to reach the NATO target of 2% GDP spending on defence. This would help to establish multinational forces and an EU headquarters to plan and command crisis management operations in order to enable the bloc to act when NATO will not. The resolution was approved by 369 votes to 255, with 70 abstentions. Central to the resolution was the pooling of military resources, whereby the EDA should have a strengthened coordinating role, the EU should establish multinational forces within the Permanent Structured Cooperation and make them available to the common security and defence policy, and the creation of a separate European Defence Research Programme with an annual budget of €500 million.\(^\text{13}\)

If the EU does implement fundamental changes to the civilian missions and military operations of the CSDP and makes EU defence and security more robust and integrated, then it could diminish the UK’s influence further, given its position outside the decision-making structures.

Some have been sceptical that removing the UK from the equation will be enough to address other fundamental issues that are hindering further EU defence and security integration and cooperation. As Daniel Keohane, of the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, has said:

> although it is hardly fair to blame the UK alone for the union’s disappointing military performance, EU defense cheerleaders have seized on Brexit as a golden chance to relaunch the policy. Given the substantial differences between the remaining 27 regarding their strategic cultures, security priorities and attitudes to the use of military force ... skeptics could be forgiven for thinking that EU defense will continue to promise lots but deliver little.’\(^\text{14}\)

Some challenges remain, and there will be limits to the political will in favour of further defence and security union. Without the UK, countries such as Austria and Ireland, which are also resistant to full defence and security integration, will lose a champion on the issue. True interoperability will continue to be an issue unless further military integration is accomplished. For example, there are nineteen different types of armoured infantry fighting vehicles across the EU. The US uses one type. However, such integration could detrimentally affect the dynamism and trade of the EU defence procurement market.

Foreign policy approaches also differ. The French defence minister said at the 2016 Shangri-La Dialogue that the EU should coordinate navy patrols to ensure a ‘regular and visible’ presence in the territorially disputed South China Sea.\(^\text{15}\) France has demonstrated that it is willing to act unilaterally in military affairs, as demonstrated by the interventions in Mali and the Central African Republic in 2013–14. Such interventionist action is at odds with some of the


EU states’ approach. Germany is certainly becoming more proactive in military and defence affairs. For example, after the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, Germany sent a frigate and reconnaissance aircraft to support the anti-Daesh coalition in Iraq and Syria. However, it is still unlikely to pursue a dramatic upsurge in military activity. This means that limits to the expeditions that the EU can make on the basis of a collective approach are likely to remain, with or without the UK.

This scepticism may be felt in Whitehall, but Keohane also offers a useful warning: ‘the skeptics ... may be misjudging the combination of the post-Brexit political mood and an increasing awareness among EU governments that they sometimes need to fend for themselves’. The rapid efforts by EU leaders and member state ministers to discuss how EU security and defence might be shaped post-Brexit, without Britain, highlight this mood.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Total Personnel</th>
<th>UK Personnel</th>
<th>Total Annual Budget</th>
<th>UK Contribution to Military Common Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Althea</td>
<td>Capacity building and training to armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>December 2004–present</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>1 x intermediate reserve company (up to 120 personnel) 6 x staff officers</td>
<td>€14.1 million</td>
<td>€2.22 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU NAVFOR Atalanta</td>
<td>Protects vessels in Somalia, deters and disrupts piracy and armed robbery at sea and monitors fishing activities off the coast of Somalia</td>
<td>December 2008–present</td>
<td>c. 1,050</td>
<td>Hosts Operational HQ (Northwood) Operation Commander Major General Martin Smith RM and core OHQ staff</td>
<td>€7.4 million</td>
<td>€1.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Somalia</td>
<td>Contributes to strengthening the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia</td>
<td>April 2010–present</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>1 x logistics officer; 1 x MA to Somali CHOD 1 x civilian security sector reform adviser</td>
<td>€11.3 million</td>
<td>€1.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Mali</td>
<td>Trains and advises the Malian armed forces (MAF)</td>
<td>February 2013–present</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>3 x force HQ staff; 27 x training team personnel; 2 x civilian humanitarian law trainers</td>
<td>€15.0 million</td>
<td>€2.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>Total Personnel</td>
<td>UK Personnel</td>
<td>Total Annual Budget</td>
<td>UK Contribution to Military Common Funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMAM RCA</td>
<td>Plays a role in strengthening the security sector in close cooperation with the UN</td>
<td>April 2014–present</td>
<td>c. 700</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>€29.6 million</td>
<td>€4.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR MED Sophia</td>
<td>Contributes to disrupting the business model of human-smuggling and trafficking networks in the Mediterranean</td>
<td>June 2015–present</td>
<td>1,137</td>
<td>2 x Royal Navy vessels; core OHQ staff (subject to review 30 November)</td>
<td>€7.5 million</td>
<td>€1.2 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Total Personnel</th>
<th>UK Personnel</th>
<th>Total Annual Budget</th>
<th>UK Contribution to CFSP budget that funds civilian missions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL Afghanistan</td>
<td>Supports the Afghan government to establish sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements</td>
<td>2007–present</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>€57.75 million</td>
<td>€9.24 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUBAM Rafah, Occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>Provides border assistance and monitoring at the Rafah crossing point on the Gaza–Egypt border</td>
<td>2005–present</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>€1.27 million</td>
<td>€0.2 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPOL COPPS, OPTs</td>
<td>Contributes to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership</td>
<td>2005–present</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>€9.18 million</td>
<td>€1.5 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>EULEX Kosovo</td>
<td>Rule of law mission to monitor, mentor and advise national authorities with regard to police, justice and customs</td>
<td>2008–present</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>€77m</td>
<td>€12.3m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMM Georgia</td>
<td>Monitors compliance with 2008 six-point plan agreement between Georgia and Russia</td>
<td>October 2008–present</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>€18.3m</td>
<td>€2.9m</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUAM Ukraine</td>
<td>Contributes to the development of effective, sustainable and accountable civilian security services</td>
<td>July 2014–present</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>€13.1 million</td>
<td>€2.1 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUCAP Nestor</td>
<td>Capacity building; regional approach in the Horn of Africa and Western Indian Ocean</td>
<td>2012–present</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>€17.9 million to December 2015, then €1.9 million</td>
<td>€2.9 million, then €1.9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>Total UK Personnel</td>
<td>Annual Budget</td>
<td>UK Contribution to CFSP budget</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>EUSEC RD Congo</td>
<td>2005–September 2016</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>€2.7 million</td>
<td>€0.4 million</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>EUCAP Sahel Niger</td>
<td>July 2012–present</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>€9.8 million</td>
<td>€1.6 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUCAP Sahel Mali</td>
<td>January 2015–present</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>€5.5 million</td>
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<td>EUCAP</td>
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<td>EUCAP</td>
<td>January 2015–present</td>
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<td>€2.7 million</td>
<td>€0.1 million</td>
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