Partners for Global Security
New Directions for the UK–Japan Defence and Security Relationship

Edited by Jonathan Eyal, Michito Tsuruoka and Edward Schwarck
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The views expressed in this report are the authors’ own, and do not necessarily reflect those of RUSI or any other institutions with which the authors are associated.

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Preface

The United Kingdom and Japan are seeking to increase bilateral co-operation in politics, security and defence. The two countries are natural partners. Indeed, in the words of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, they are ‘a priori partners’, insofar as they share fundamental values and interests in upholding the liberal international order. Consolidating their relationship, the UK and Japan signed a memorandum on defence co-operation in June 2012 and reached agreements on defence-equipment co-operation and the security of information in July 2013. These were followed by the first-ever ministerial ‘2+2’ (foreign and defence) meeting in London in January 2015. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Royal Navy also collaborated in providing disaster relief in the wake of Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in the autumn of 2013. Practical co-operation and dialogues at various levels are becoming increasingly common.

Against this backdrop, the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) in London and the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) in Tokyo, as their respective countries’ leading defence think tanks, launched a joint research project in early 2014, which has resulted in this Whitehall Report, also to be published in Japanese in due course by NIDS. This research was enabled by a long-lasting partnership which includes an ongoing exchange of visiting fellows. The RUSI–NIDS relationship was boosted by the June 2012 memorandum on defence co-operation between the UK and Japanese Ministries of Defence, which specifically encouraged the two institutes to pursue further research co-operation.

The main purpose of this report is to present a broad picture of the current UK–Japan defence and security relationship and discuss where further bilateral co-operation might be realised. More specifically, it aims, on the one hand, to provide British audiences with an analysis of the recent developments in both Japan’s foreign, security and defence policy in relation to the UK and prospects for UK–Japan collaboration. On the other hand, it offers Japanese audiences British experts’ analysis both of the UK’s interests in Japan and Asia, and, likewise, of prospects for UK–Japan collaboration. While interaction and co-operation between the two governments is intensifying, the level of public knowledge of what is taking place does not seem to have risen accordingly. This report seeks to fill this widening gap, thereby laying an intellectual foundation on which to advance discussions on the UK–Japan relationship.

The Introduction, written by Jonathan Eyal (RUSI), takes a broad look at the principal items on the two countries’ security agendas—such as China, Russia, the US and cutting-edge defence technologies—and highlights challenges that both London and Tokyo need to address, such as how to manage expectations and differences over the handling of China.

Chapter I, by Tomohiko Satake (NIDS), examines the recent development of Japan’s security and defence posture and identifies three characteristics: the relaxation of self-binding measures; the diversification of security partnerships, including with Europe; and value orientation.

The second chapter, by Edward Schwarck (RUSI), then turns the report’s attention to the UK’s perspective, outlining the country’s security policy with regard to the Asia-Pacific, including the role of defence engagement. It argues that the UK is trying to improve its diplomatic and security relationships with countries across the region, but that it may prove difficult for it to remain neutral in relation to the region’s political disputes as these ties deepen.

Chapter III, by Peter Roberts (RUSI), delves more deeply, examining the differences between European and Pacific approaches to maritime security; it also addresses the critical issues of international norms and regulations relating to the governance of the seas, such as freedom of navigation. In light of China’s increasingly assertive behaviour, the chapter highlights the role of the US and the possibility of quadrilateral co-operation between the UK, Japan, India and Australia.

In Chapter IV, Michito Tsuruoka (NIDS) examines Japan’s new—and fast-expanding—defence-diplomacy activities in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. It argues that UK–Japan relations can be strengthened through such activities and highlights, inter alia, the significance of enhancing the interoperability of Japanese and British forces, including through joint exercises.

Going beyond the Asian regional context, Chapter V by Akira W Jingushi (NIDS) explores UK–Japan co-operation in support of peace and stability in Africa, identifying similarities and differences between the two countries’ approaches to the continent. It concludes by arguing for increased bilateral collaboration in security-sector reform and capacity-building assistance in military engineering in Africa. Trevor Taylor (RUSI) then examines, in Chapter VI, the prospects for UK–Japan defence-equipment co-operation. While acknowledging the potential in this area, he identifies practical challenges that must be addressed by both sides before collaboration can proceed further.

The list of subjects covered in this Whitehall Report is not exhaustive: there are many areas that it was not possible to address in detail, such as
co-operation in the domains of intelligence, cyber-security and outer space. These remain as future areas of joint research.

We would like to express our gratitude to all those who have made this project possible, in both the UK and Japan. It should be noted, of course, that the views expressed in this report are solely the authors’ and do not represent those of any institution with which the authors are affiliated.

Jonathan Eyal, Michito Tsuruoka and Edward Schwarck
Editors
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Introduction: Japan and the UK – An Agenda for a Strategic Partnership

Jonathan Eyal

It is not difficult to lapse into clichés and stereotypes whenever one looks at the strategic relationship between the UK and Japan. Both are island-states, both are monarchies, both are formerly big powers now slightly on the wane, both have a long, documented history as nation-states, both are major trading states with a stake in upholding a rule-based system of free trade and dispute resolutions, both are democracies. And, yes, both drive on the left side of the road.

The clichés are not always of the broadly positive variety. For as French philosopher Guy Sorman reminded us in a recently published study with the dry, mischievous eye which only the French are capable of casting upon the British, the parallel destinies of the Japanese and the British include ‘a widespread distaste for the great continents from which the narrowest of seas divide them’, as well as a persistent vulnerability ‘to the siren song of isolationism’.  

1 Seen from this perspective, therefore, the claims of the Japanese and the British to represent open societies and to be chief creators and important stakeholders in the globalisation process are a sham: they both remain mostly inward-looking and preoccupied with the challenges faced by their own original cultures. Both try to keep immigrants at bay either through social segregation or through tight border controls, and the more the pressure of globalisation increases, the more defensive the Japanese and British societies apparently become. Finally, both countries are prisoners of their history: in Japan, this is manifested through the current nostalgia for the Edo period (1603–1868), while in the UK, this nostalgia comes in various shapes and colours, from an increasing discourse about the beneficial impact which the British Empire allegedly had on its old colonies, to the right to nationalism in Scotland and other parts of the UK. This ‘retro’ trend allegedly translates into the refusal of young Japanese to learn a foreign language, something mimicked in the UK, where fewer and fewer are learning foreign languages.

As is the case with all stereotypes and broad generalisations of this kind, they do contain a grain of truth – but only a grain in both cases, wrapped in a great deal of ignorance which, hopefully, this Whitehall Report will help in dispelling.

Facing Common Threats?
There is currently a wide spectrum of threats to Japan’s territory and sovereignty. The erratic behaviour of the North Korean regime, including test-firing ballistic missiles over Japanese territory, represents an enduring security

threat. Russian military activities in its far east have also been intensifying, and may likewise become a source of concern, especially given the unresolved historical issues and the protracted bilateral dispute over the Kuril Islands. However, it is China’s military rise, accompanied by its increasingly belligerent behaviour in the East and South China Seas, which is posing the greatest challenge. The number of Chinese incursions into the waters and airspace around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has increased markedly since 2012, raising the risk of accidental clashes.

Theoretically, the UK faces less of a challenge in its part of the world. Notwithstanding its economic and financial troubles, Europe remains, by most measures, a stable and prosperous continent; NATO and the EU ensure continental stability. Furthermore, there are no territorial disputes between the overwhelming majority of European states, while the few disputes that linger in the Balkans are between countries which cannot threaten the overall stability of the European continent. However, even in Europe, darker clouds are gathering. First, there is the problem of Russia, a country now bent on challenging Europe’s status quo. Then, there is the danger of the disintegration of existing states, with all the multitude of problems this creates. There are also major difficulties surrounding the internal arrangements, coherence and viability of existing European-based institutions such as the EU and NATO.

At first sight, there is little in common between the security threats which the two countries face; but a more judicious look would identify quite a few common security themes:

- Given that Russia is both a European and an Asian power, a showdown between Russia and the Europeans has repercussions in Asia, and so the handling of Russia is a theme which unites Japan and the UK
- It is fallacious to claim that the rise of China has no impact on Europe: it has a huge impact on Europe’s standing in the world, on its trade capabilities, and ultimately on the rules underpinning the international order which sustains British and wider European prosperity. Clearly, the challenge presented by China is more acutely felt in Japan than in the UK, if only because of their respective geographic positions. However, the UK has an inherent stake in the way Japan manages China, in the same way that Japan has a stake in the way the UK deals with China, as the latest controversy over participation in the Chinese-sponsored Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank indicates
- Japan and the UK have a direct stake in defeating international terrorism and religious fundamentalism in the Middle East and in parts of Southeast Asia, where the problem is now at its most acute. Both the British and the Japanese have seen their citizens murdered in the Middle East and North Africa, and therefore need little reminder of what is at stake
• The challenge of preventing nuclear proliferation is as significant for Japan in Asia as it is for the UK in Europe and the Mediterranean basin.
• As medium-sized states facing significant security challenges, both Japan and the UK rely on leading-edge technology as a force multiplier to shore up their strategic posture. Co-operation in developing new military technologies therefore not only makes perfect sense, but can also reduce costs for both sides.
• The two countries have close – indeed, unique – relations with the US. Both see the US as the bedrock of their security, and both act as friendly critics of US posture on global matters. They both, therefore, have a stake in ensuring that the US remains engaged in their regions, and in promoting better burden-sharing arrangements with Washington.
• Promoting capacity-building, multilateralism and the rule of law within peace-building and peacekeeping operations undertaken within the framework of the UN or various non-governmental co-operation frameworks is in the interests of both states, and features highly in the priorities of the two governments.
• Ultimately, democracy, the rule of law and human rights are more than just empty slogans. A security partnership between the two countries would help strengthen young and vulnerable democracies around the world and would act as a reminder that there is a viable, vibrant alternative to the authoritarian model of development promoted by China.

The bottom line of the argument set out in this Whitehall Report is that Japan needs the UK for a broader diversification of its foreign and security network of relationships; the UK needs Japan as a technological partner but also as an ally in promoting the governance of the global good; and both countries need each other in upholding the principles which underpin the global order today, and which are increasingly undermined by the security challenges emerging from Russia and China, to name but two important actors.

**Seizing the Opportunities for Co-operation**
There are a number of ways in which the governments of the two countries have signalled their intention to prioritise their security relationships. The most obvious of these has been increased defence spending. Here, Japan’s intentions to boost spending are probably greater than those of the UK; nevertheless, there is a realisation in London that the defence budget, raided repeatedly during the austerity period initiated in 2010, cannot suffer much more in the way of cuts.

The two governments also agree on the need to enhance their capabilities by identifying key technologies on which they can co-operate. One apt example is the decision by the UK and Japan to jointly develop missile technology.
for fighter jets, through Project Meteor, led by Franco-British missile manufacturer Matra BAE Dynamics (MBD) along with other European firms. Not only is this a good ‘pilot’ case of joint technological co-operation, but it also spearheads Japan’s move to lift its self-imposed ban on weapons exports. It is also worth recalling that the two countries share similar procurement objectives: they are both keen on developing early-warning surveillance-aircraft capabilities, the acquisition of a next-generation fighter aircraft, the F-35, as well as the development and acquisition of unmanned aerial vehicles (also known as reconnaissance drones). There is a further common interest in diversifying security partnerships – not because either Japan or the UK is ‘hedging’ against a supposedly declining US, but because it makes sense for any country to diversify its defence procurement and development options, if only to keep defence markets competitive and acquisition costs down. In this respect, Japan’s recent diversification of its focus beyond its core alliance relationship with the US is no different from the UK’s broadening of its procurement to encompass European companies and global defence-manufacturing partnerships.

Yet beyond that, there are a number of clear, sensible and perfectly realisable objectives which the two countries can pursue. These are outlined in the following chapters of this Whitehall Report, but can be broadly summarised as follows:

1. Less vision, more action. There is no need for the two states to establish new security co-operation structures. The excellent personal relationship between the two current prime ministers – both of whom have a realistic prospect of remaining in power for a number of years yet – buttressed by the regular ‘2+2’ dialogues between the Japanese and British defence and foreign ministers and a raft of technology co-operation agreements and memoranda of understanding, are quite enough for all eventualities.

2. Be realistic. While some senior Japanese government officials would like the UK to develop a higher-profile maritime presence in East Asia or respond more forcefully to the challenge of China’s increased military and political assertiveness, the chances are that no British government is likely to contemplate such an effort in the near future. What is required, therefore, is for both sides to adjust their expectations. The UK cannot expect Japan to approve every defence-co-operation deal London is interested in, and Japan cannot expect the UK to take an active role in an Asian military alliance.

3. Manage differences over the handling of China. While the two states share a common view of the dangers inherent in China’s rise to global-power status, the plain fact remains that they do not share the same opinions about how to deal with Beijing. These differences need to be managed, rather than papered over.
4. Be more innovative in promoting co-development and co-production defence projects. This should take place within the 2013 UK–Japan Defence Equipment Cooperation Framework.

5. Explore new channels of co-operation. These might include: joint training in counter-terrorism; the sharing of information about the handling of logistical challenges arising from overseas developments in which the UK has a considerable body of experience; and, last but not least, promoting good practice in the field of intelligence collection and analysis. The reform of Japan’s intelligence community is a sensitive issue which only the Japanese government can push forward. Nevertheless, the UK should stand ready to help if and when needed, particularly in assisting Tokyo in implementing the joint-intelligence-committee structure which helps in the sifting, analysis and provision of intelligence material to the cabinet – a structure which suits Japan’s constitutional model and seems to attract constant attention from the current Japanese government.

The two countries have had their patchy relationships before. However, since the times of the Meiji Restoration in the nineteenth century, the UK and Japan have been allies more frequently than enemies. There is no question that the future favours closer bonds between the two. Like all relations of this kind, there will be ups and downs, frustrations and missed opportunities. Still, the effort is worthwhile; on that, at least, there is total agreement in both Japan and the UK.

Dr Jonathan Eyal is the International Director at the Royal United Services Institute and Editor of RUSI Newsbrief. He has completed books on military expenditure in the former Warsaw Pact countries and a published study on military relations in the Balkans during the time of communism.
I. Japan’s Defence and Strategic Posture under the Abe Administration

Tomohiko Satake

Since returning to power in December 2012, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has sought to reinvigorate Japan’s security policy through the pursuit of several new initiatives. These include establishing the National Security Council and adopting the first-ever National Security Strategy; enacting the Special Secrecy Law which aims to protect highly confidential information concerning Japan’s national security; approving a new set of principles for the export of defence equipment and technology; passing a Cabinet Decision aimed at allowing the exercise of the right to collective self-defence (CSD) for the first time in Japan’s post-war history; and submitting new security legislation to the Diet to broaden the scope of activities undertaken by the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), incorporating the right to CSD.

Prime Minister Abe and his cabinet have also strengthened Japan’s security ties with other countries in the region and beyond, while bolstering the alliance with the US by updating the Guidelines for Japan–US Defense Cooperation. Furthermore, the Abe administration has attempted to build a more robust and integrated JSDF by increasing Japan’s defence budget for three consecutive years, reaching over ¥4.9 trillion (more than £25 billion) in 2015 – a 2 per cent increase from the previous year’s budget and, in absolute terms, the largest-ever amount in Japan’s post-war history.

With these changes in mind, this chapter examines three key characteristics of the security policy of the Abe administration: the relaxation of self-binding policies; the diversification of external security co-operation; and value orientation. Having examined these three trends, the chapter concludes that, although each of these can be understood as an extension of the post-Cold War security policies pursued by previous Japanese governments, the Abe administration has attempted to drive forward this change at unprecedented speed in order to enable Japan to play a greater role in maintaining and constructing a liberal international order.

The Relaxation of Self-Binding Policies

One of the most prominent characteristics of the Abe administration has been to loosen restrictions on Japan’s security policy, most of which were established during the Cold War. A good example of this was the cabinet’s decision in July 2014 to partially approve the exercise of the right to CSD by changing the interpretation of the Constitution. Although CSD is recognised as an inherent right of all sovereign countries under Article 51 of the UN Charter, its exercise had not previously been approved in Japan as it was
deemed to be beyond the ‘minimum necessary level’ of force needed to secure the country’s defence as permitted under Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Accordingly, the use of force has been strictly limited to responding to a direct armed attack against Japan.

Since the end of the Cold War, however, the JSDF has been gradually expanding its roles and missions within the framework of the US–Japan alliance. For instance, the revised Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation of 1997 enabled Japan to provide ‘rear-area support’ to the US military from non-conflict zones in the event of ‘situations in areas surrounding Japan’. This does not necessarily have to constitute a direct attack on Japanese territory; it need only be a contingency with important repercussions for Japan’s peace and security.\(^1\) Moreover, after 9/11, the Koizumi cabinet dispatched JSDF ships to the Indian Ocean on a refuelling mission in support of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom. The Japanese government justified these activities by arguing that they did not form an ‘integral part in the use of force’ overseas, which is prohibited by Article 9 of the Constitution.\(^2\)

Allowing the exercise of CSD can be understood as an extension of these incremental changes to JSDF roles within the alliance framework. By pursuing CSD, Japan would for the first time be able to use force should an armed attack occur against a foreign country that is in a ‘close relationship with Japan’.\(^3\) Accordingly, for example, the JSDF would potentially be able to protect US ships attacked by a third country on the high seas or engage with international mine-clearance activities even while a conflict is ongoing. Yet such an activity is only possible when a situation poses ‘a clear threat to the Japanese state or could fundamentally threaten the Japanese people’s constitutional right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’.\(^4\) In addition, the use of force should be limited to the ‘minimum extent necessary’, and is

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2. Since the Japanese government does not allow the use of force overseas except in self-defence, it has to avoid any activity that can be understood by other countries as being integral to the use of force (buryoku koshi to no ittaika) when undertaking activities in support of international peace. Although the Cabinet Decision in July 2014 maintains this position in principle, it for the first time explicitly recognised that support activities, such as supply and transportation, performed in areas away from ‘the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted’ by a foreign country does not constitute ‘an integral part in the use of force’ by Japan. See Government of Japan, ‘Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People’, 1 July 2014, <http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/decisions/2014/_icsFiles/afieldfile/2014/07/03/anpohosei_eng.pdf>, accessed 23 June 2015.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
only possible when ‘there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people’.

Given these restrictions, it is highly unlikely that the JSDF would become directly involved in conflict theatres far from Japanese territory under the principle of CSD, although there is no geographical limitation for its pursuit. Even in areas surrounding Japan, as Michael Green and Jeffrey Hornung argue, ‘the major role of the [JSDF in the US-Japan alliance will remain logistical support and defensive missions such as missile defense or anti-submarine warfare’. Under these circumstances, the Japanese government would no longer need to spend enormous time and energy arguing that a particular mission, such as the refuelling of US military ships, does not constitute an ‘integral part in the use of force’. In this sense, as Kenneth Pyle argues, allowing CSD is ‘significant but only the latest step in the revision of Japanese security policy’ – an incremental process underway since the end of the Cold War. While it could enable the JSDF to co-operate with the militaries of the US and other countries in a swifter and more seamless manner, it will not fundamentally alter the relationship between the JSDF and the US military, nor does it significantly change the roles, missions and capabilities of Japan’s military.

Another example of Japan’s relaxation of self-binding policies is the new set of Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, announced in April 2014. These principles are: clarification of cases where transfers are prohibited; limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted as well as strict examination and information disclosure; and ensuring appropriate control regarding additional usages of the equipment or its transfer to third parties. Unlike the previous principles (Three Principles on Arms Exports and Their Related Policy Guidelines) – which, in effect, prohibited Japan from exporting arms regardless of the destination – the new principles enable the government to transfer defence equipment to foreign countries provided the export contributes either to the active promotion of peace and international co-operation or to Japan’s security.

Yet even under the previous three principles on arms exports, on a number of occasions Japan exported defence-related equipment, or sent its defence equipment overseas, on the basis of ‘exemptions’. The number of such exemption measures increased significantly after the Cold War, as Japan became ever-more committed to international peacekeeping and

humanitarian-assistance activities. Given this, in December 2011, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government announced new guidelines, establishing set conditions under which exemption measures could be applied: either in cases related to peace contribution and international co-operation; or in cases regarding the international joint development and production of defence equipment that contributed to Japan’s security.

Even after announcing these new guidelines, however, there were several cases that required additional exemption measures, including the participation of Japanese companies in the international logistics chain for the manufacture of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and the JSDF’s provision of ammunition to other UN contingents in South Sudan. This is why the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government established the new Three Principles in April 2014, which have comprehensively consolidated the policy guidelines by setting clear standards regarding the transfer of defence equipment and technology. In other words, the establishment of new principles was an attempt to build a more comprehensive and systematic set of rules to regulate Japan’s export of defence equipment and technology, which had, in fact, been attempted by previous governments a number of times.

The Abe administration also announced Japan’s new Development Cooperation Charter (DCC) in February 2015. While maintaining the principles of previous Official Development Assistance (ODA) charters – which limited Japan’s development co-operation to non-military purposes – the DCC for the first time made it clear that Japan could provide development co-operation, including ODA, to ‘the armed forces or members of the armed forces in recipient countries’. The decision reflected the reality that the military was playing a greater role in efforts relating to countering epidemics, post-conflict reconstruction and recovery, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In fact, Japan had already provided ODA to foreign militaries for non-military purposes: for instance a hospital owned by a foreign military but used for civilian purposes. Like the new three principles on arms exports, therefore, the DCC does not fundamentally alter Japan’s development co-operation policy; instead, it sets a clear policy standard in accordance

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8. Between 1984 and 2011, for instance, Japan provided defence-related equipment to other countries or sent its defence equipment overseas eighteen times, justified as ‘exemptions’.
12. Ibid.
with a rapidly changing environment that demands greater contributions from Japan in helping to build regional and global order.

**The Diversification of External Security Co-operation**

The Abe administration has not only enhanced its traditional alliance with the US; it has also expanded its security co-operation with regional and global partners under the banner of diplomacy ‘that takes a panoramic perspective of the world map’. Among these partners, the current administration places special importance on co-operation with Australia and India.

In July 2014, Prime Minister Abe and Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott agreed to upgrade the security partnership to a ‘special strategic partnership’, which will elevate the already-strong bilateral security and defence co-operation to a ‘new level’. Based on this initiative, the Abe administration is exploring potential co-operation with Australia on its Future Submarine Project, as well as negotiating an agreement that would ‘reciprocally improve administrative, policy and legal procedures to facilitate joint operations and exercises’ between the JSDF and the Australian Defence Force.

With India, meanwhile, Japan issued a joint statement on ‘Intensifying the Strategic and Global Partnership’ in January 2014, which promised to further deepen Japan–India security co-operation, including through regular consultation between the secretary general of Japan’s National Security Secretariat and India’s national security advisor. In July of that year, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force joined the US–India bilateral maritime exercise *Malabar* for the first time in five years. Furthermore, during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first visit to Japan in August and September 2014, Abe and Modi confirmed their intention to strengthen the comprehensive security and defence co-operation between their two countries and welcomed the signing of the ‘Memorandum of Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Defense’, which included the regularisation of bilateral maritime exercises. At the same meeting, the leaders also agreed

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15. Ibid.
to elevate the Japan–India strategic co-operative partnership to a ‘special strategic and global partnership’.18

Prime Minister Abe has also put special emphasis on Japan’s multilateral relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as demonstrated by his tour of all ten ASEAN countries in 2013. At the ASEAN–Japan Summit Meeting in December 2013, which commemorated the 40th anniversary of Japan–ASEAN relations, both reaffirmed their intention to strengthen ‘peace-oriented values’ through respect for ‘universally recognized principles’ of international law, resolving disputes by peaceful means including dialogue and consultation, and renunciation of the threat or use of force.19 In a joint statement, the two pledged to hold ‘an informal meeting between ASEAN and Japan involving ministers in charge of defence matters to discuss this issue and other non-traditional security challenges’, which was later realised through the Japan–ASEAN Defense Ministerial Roundtable Meeting held in Burma in November 2014.20

Furthermore, the Abe administration has enhanced Japan’s security co-operation with European partners, especially the UK, France and NATO. At the Japan–UK summit of May 2014, the countries’ respective leaders agreed to hold 2+2 (defence and foreign ministerial) meetings on a regular basis, negotiate the conclusion of an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, and enhance joint training between the JSDF and UK armed forces.21 The first 2+2 meeting was subsequently held in London in January 2015, a year after the Abe administration had held the first 2+2 meeting with France. Regarding NATO, the first ‘Joint Political Declaration between Japan and NATO’ was announced in April 2013 during a visit by the secretary general of NATO to Japan.22 In a speech delivered at the North Atlantic Council in May 2014, moreover, Prime Minister Abe called NATO a ‘reliable natural partner’, and announced the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme, which included strengthening high-level dialogue between Japan and NATO,

promoting defence exchanges, and promoting practical co-operation in pursuit of international peace and stability.\textsuperscript{23}

Co-operation on defence equipment and technology has played a key role in this expansion of Japan’s security partnerships. For example, Japan concluded an agreement with Australia concerning the transfer of defence equipment and technology in July 2014, which provided the foundation for co-operation on Australia’s Future Submarine Project. In January of that year, Japan agreed with India to launch working-level consultations to promote defence-equipment and technology co-operation, while continuing negotiations for the sale of the Japanese US-2 amphibious aircraft to India. Japan has also continued to consult with ASEAN countries on possible equipment and technology co-operation since it was first discussed at the Fifth Japan–ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum in February 2014.\textsuperscript{24} Furthermore, Japan has concluded an agreement with the UK concerning the reciprocal transfer of arms and military technologies, and has set up a committee for dialogue with France on co-operation in the field of defence equipment and export controls.\textsuperscript{25}

It should be noted, however, that Japan’s diversification of security partnerships is not necessarily a new phenomenon. Since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the 2000s, consecutive Japanese governments, including the former DPJ government (July 2009–December 2012), have gradually expanded Japan’s security co-operation with regional and global partners.\textsuperscript{26} Bilateral co-operation specifically in relation to defence equipment and technology is also not new. Indeed, it was the DPJ government that first sought to promote the possibilities in this area (including joint development) with countries such as Australia, India and the UK. The current Abe administration took over and magnified this trend.

It should be also pointed out that, in spite of tensions with China – most notably over the East China Sea and over the two countries’ shared history – the Abe administration continues to seek ‘mutually beneficial relations’ with...
its neighbour, as agreed during Abe’s visit to China in October 2006 during his first presidency, while simultaneously enhancing its hedging strategy against it. Japan’s continual efforts at engagement produced a meeting between Japanese and Chinese leaders for the first time in two-and-a-half years at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Beijing in November 2014, as well as the resumption of negotiations for the establishment of a maritime communication mechanism between the two countries’ defence authorities. Promoting confidence-building through security and defence exchanges with China has been among Japan’s top priorities as it has sought to diversify its external security relations since the end of the Cold War, and it remains so under the Abe administration.

Value Orientation
The Abe administration has emphasised universal values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and has enhanced Japan’s co-operation with like-minded democracies. Japan’s value-oriented diplomacy is rooted in the concept of the ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ (AFP) announced in November 2006 by then-Foreign Minister Taro Aso under the first Abe administration. Aso stated that Japan would support the stability and prosperity of countries that share its values with the aim of creating an AFP around the outer rim of the Eurasian continent. Aso also stressed that Japan has historically honoured these universal values, saying that ‘Japan deserves to be considered as one of the true veteran players out there on the field’.27 As Tomohiko Taniguchi notes, it was the first time in Japan’s post-war diplomacy that a Japanese leader had characterised the country ‘as a qualified torchbearer’ of these values.28

Yet as Aso also mentioned in his speech, this quest for value-oriented diplomacy was ‘nothing new for Japan at all’ and it was ‘in fact nothing more than giving a name to the diplomatic achievements that Japan has built up one by one in exactly this area over the last 16 or 17 years’.29 Japan’s 1992 ODA charter, for example, set out ‘four key points’ to be considered in aid implementation, one of which urged ‘attention to recipient accomplishments in democratizing, establishing market-oriented economic systems, and assuring basic human

29. MOFA, ‘Speech by Mr. Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign Affairs on the Occasion of the Japan Institute of International Affairs Seminar “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic Horizons”’. 
rights and freedoms’. Moreover, in 1996, Japan’s foreign ministry announced the Partnership for Democratic Development, which clearly emphasised the country’s support for democratic development and the better promotion and protection of human rights in developing countries through assistance in establishing appropriate systems, institutions and human resources.

Thus, since the early post-Cold War era Japan has continued to emphasise universal values as it seeks proactively to engage in international order-building; the AFP concept expounded under Abe has justified and comprehensively explained Japan’s effort in this regard, rather than developed a new strategic orientation. Nevertheless, with Aso and Abe perceived by some as ‘nationalists’ or ‘hawkish politicians’, the AFP provoked criticism in some quarters that Japan seemed to be shifting its foreign-policy orientation towards the containment of China. That the target countries of the AFP appear to encircle China only strengthened this criticism. Accordingly, the second (and third) Abe administrations have refrained from using the term AFP to describe the intent to enhance co-operation with like-minded and capable democracies, such as those mentioned above.

Nevertheless, a closer look at the AFP concept (and its related documents) reveals that it was based on a very liberal standpoint, demonstrated in the value it placed on the course of Japan’s post-Second World War peace-oriented diplomacy; its emphasis on the importance of human security; and its focus on non-military means to promote these values. It also respected the cultural diversity of developing countries by stressing that Japan’s objective was to support the development of, rather than impose, those values. While the AFP emphasised Japan’s co-operation with capable and established democratic partners, it also stressed its constant support for the self-sustaining development of newly democratic countries as well as non-democracies, such as Vietnam and Laos.

One can see a similarly liberal element in the February 2015 DCC, which stresses Japan’s value orientation more than previous charters through its assertion that ‘Japan will provide assistance so as to share universal values such as freedom, democracy, respect for basic human rights and the rule of

law as well as to realize a peaceful, stable and secure society’.\(^{34}\) Like the AFP, the DCC emphasises Japan’s efforts in promoting human security, as well as ‘cooperation aimed at self-reliant development through assistance for self-help efforts as well as dialogue and collaboration based on Japan’s experience and expertise’.\(^{35}\) As already noted, Japan’s development co-operation remains strictly limited to ‘non-military purposes’, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief activities. This fundamental philosophy of value-based co-operation has not changed since the AFP was announced in 2006 (indeed, it can be seen as a consistent trend since the end of the Cold War). In this light, it is clear that the Abe administration has simply continued to push this kind of value-oriented diplomacy so that Japan can further contribute to the liberal international order through non-military means.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has provided an overview of the Abe administration’s efforts to galvanise Japan’s security policy with special reference to three dimensions: the relaxation of self-binding policies; the diversification of external security co-operation; and value orientation. As the chapter has revealed, however, these three points are not necessarily characteristics unique to the Abe administration. Instead, the recent reinvigoration of Japan’s security policy can be understood as an extension of incremental changes made, by both LDP and DPJ governments, since the end of the Cold War, rather than as a fundamental shift in previous policy.

Nevertheless, by further accelerating efforts regarding these three dimensions, the Abe administration has sought to increase Japan’s contribution to upholding the liberal international order more than ever before. Indeed, the change in various security policies under Abe has perhaps been swifter than under any consecutive government in post-war Japanese history. Such a trend is likely to continue so long as the Abe administration maintains a solid political foundation domestically, and so long as the changing security environment in the Asia-Pacific requires Japan to play a greater role in ensuring the defence and security of the region and beyond.

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\(^{34}\) MOFA, ‘Cabinet Decision on the Development Cooperation Charter’.

\(^{35}\) *Ibid.*
II. Understanding the UK’s Security Policy in the Asia-Pacific

Edward Schwarck

The economic and political rise of the Asia-Pacific is challenging the UK’s ability to uphold the post-war rules-based order that it helped to shape, and from which it derives security and prosperity. Yet with a relative lack of diplomatic leverage to attain its desired outcomes or the capacity for overt military involvement in the region, the UK has instead prioritised building a network of strong bilateral relationships through which it can exert influence, while avoiding involvement in the region’s rancorous political disputes. This may be sensible in the short-to-medium term, as the UK consolidates its presence and establishes lasting mechanisms to facilitate its engagement there. However, impartiality will be difficult to maintain as the UK’s relationships with opposing parties deepen and expectations of a more meaningful British role increase in turn.

First- and Second-Order Considerations

UK foreign policy is based on several considerations: increasing its presence in the supranational institutions through which global affairs are managed; strengthening relationships with emerging and traditional powers; and directing this policy towards post-recession economic recovery. With regard to the Asia-Pacific, Foreign Office Minister Hugo Swire summarised the UK’s strategy as resting on strengthening commercial links, ensuring market access and robust legal frameworks to protect UK companies invested in the region, and support for a ‘rules based, not power based, regional order’. The last goal is to be achieved through modest military involvement and strong regional bilateral defence relationships.¹

Further clarification of British security interests in the Asia-Pacific can be found in a speech made at the 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue by the UK’s then-defence secretary. Philip Hammond described the UK’s ‘stake’ in Asia as deriving from its status as a ‘maritime nation and a country which still relies upon the world’s sea lanes for the delivery of 95 per cent of [its] trade; as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and [as] one of the world’s strategic nuclear powers’.² The UK’s 2014 National Strategy for Maritime Security likewise draws a link between the freedom of navigation as stipulated by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the UK’s prosperity and security,

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and the risk posed to both by ‘excessive geographical jurisdictional claims’. While the Asia-Pacific – and China’s expansive ‘nine-dash-line’ claim in the South China Sea – is not mentioned specifically in this context, the East and South China Seas are singled out as areas of ‘concern’ with regard to the freedom of navigation.

This is an explanation of the UK’s policy but what this means in practice remains unclear. Indeed, London has repeatedly refused to be involved in the region’s security issues – such as the crisis that followed China’s declaration of an air-defence identification zone (ADIZ) in November 2013. Senior UK ministers have also stated that the territorial disputes, whether in the South or East China Seas, are ‘regional issues’ that should be ‘resolved by the countries in the region’. The result is a common refrain in the media that the UK government is uninterested in Asia-Pacific security, and preoccupied with maintaining the commercial and diplomatic relationships that feed its ‘Prosperity Agenda’.

Understanding how deeply UK security is linked to the Asia-Pacific requires a division of the country’s security concerns into two categories. First-order security concerns include those that pose a direct threat to the security of British nationals and interests. Second-order considerations include, *inter alia*, broader UK interests such as human rights, regional security, maritime law, free trade and open markets, nuclear non-proliferation, democracy and energy security – all trappings of what is sometimes referred to as the ‘liberal international order’.

**First-Order Considerations**

In first-order terms, the Asia-Pacific is manifestly not a priority in UK defence thinking. The UK faces no overt conventional threats from Asian powers nor does it maintain alliance commitments like the US. There are also very few direct threats – whether state or non-state – to UK nationals and commercial interests in the region, as is the case in South Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Furthermore, any security commitment in the region is complicated for the UK by the difficulties of conducting military operations in a faraway region, as well as by the growing sophistication of the weapon systems that Asian states can now deploy – making any UK commitment in the region unlikely to be consequential.

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The Asia-Pacific is thus largely absent (appearing only in a trade and commercial context) in one of the key documents which frames UK thinking on the threats facing the country and the means to counter them: the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS). Nor is Asia addressed in detail in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), which lays out the size and shape of the UK armed forces and the operational contingencies they are expected to face.

Furthermore, as the UK defence establishment concentrates on the resurgence of terrorism and armed conflict in the Middle East, Russian aggression in Ukraine and instability along Europe’s southern border, the liveliest debates surrounding the future of UK defence in the build-up to the 2015 NSS and SDSR are taking place without reference to the Asia-Pacific. For example, questions over whether the UK should prioritise national protective capabilities to counter threats to the homeland or maintain its strong contribution to international peace and security are all devoid of an East Asian dimension.

Second-Order Considerations
Second-order considerations, however, are of greater relevance to the UK’s security interests in the Asia-Pacific. Post-war UK foreign and security policy has been based on permanent alliances and economic partnerships with fellow democracies such as the US and the countries of Western Europe. These alliances have allowed the UK to protect the liberal rules-based international order that it helped to create after 1945, from which it derives security and economic benefits. Within these alliances, the UK seeks to maintain a disproportionate level of influence over collective strategies, and leveraging this influence allows it to ‘punch above its weight’ in global affairs. The UK’s ability to maintain this role is underpinned by its permanent membership of the UN Security Council; its status as a strategic nuclear power; the fact it has the world’s fourth-largest defence budget, an extensive diplomatic network and the second-largest aid budget; and its close intelligence relationship with the US.  

The concerns of some European capitals about US ‘abandonment’ of Europe as Washington ‘pivots’ eastwards may be exaggerated. However, it is nevertheless true that the UK faces a world in which the transatlantic alliance is no longer the centre of strategic decision-making: economic and political power is increasingly shifting towards the Asia-Pacific. As the global economic crisis of 2008 painfully demonstrated, problems related to global governance and security can no longer be addressed without emerging

7. Ibid.
powers. These concerns have helped to focus discussion in the UK on how it should adjust its foreign and security policy.

Furthermore, East Asian powers – by virtue of their expanding interests or by the design of their policies – are increasingly working closely (in terms of geography and policy alignment) with Western counterparts such as the UK. Sometimes this presents opportunities: like-minded countries such as Japan and South Korea, for example, have taken part in Western-led operations in Afghanistan – a role that would have been difficult to conceive of twenty years ago. China, meanwhile, has joined multilateral counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, and is now willing to contribute troops in service of global disaster-relief, peacekeeping and other non-kinetic operations.

Yet this increased engagement can present challenges: Beijing has a history of supporting violators of international laws and norms, such as North Korea, Iran and Sudan, and continues to subvert orthodox interpretations of state rights within the ‘global commons’ – for instance, the maritime realm and cyberspace – by attempting to exercise sovereign control over the high seas and the Internet. That emerging Asian powers contribute to global security – rather than undermine it – is an obvious British interest which has been recognised by senior policy-makers. However, if all of these trends continue, the political and economic rise of the Asia-Pacific – a situation in which the UK’s position remains unclear – could diminish the UK’s influence in global affairs, and its ability to uphold the international order that it favours.

The challenge is complicated by the emergence of new institutions in the Asia-Pacific over which the UK bears little influence. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (a meeting of the defence ministers from the ten ASEAN countries and other regional states), the East Asia Summit, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation – and even ad-hoc groupings such as the Six-Party Talks – are now the forums in which regional politics is shaped. Furthermore, despite occasional talk of the UK’s ‘historical presence’, the country has not possessed military bases in the Asia-Pacific since the decision to retreat from ‘east of Suez’ by Harold Wilson’s government in 1968. Its current military presence in the region is modest, comprising ownership of a large fuel depot and berthing dockyards in the Sembawang port in Singapore, a Gurkha garrison in Brunei and a small (albeit close) set of defence relationships through the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). Two post-Korean War agreements, the UN Command Military Armistice Commission and the UN Status of Forces Agreement, provide a mandate for the UK’s presence in the region, although there are no British troops currently stationed on the Korean Peninsula.

Given the relative lack of traction enjoyed by the UK in the region, therefore, current policy is aimed at establishing a mechanism through which it can play a role. Yet the ability of the UK to achieve this objective is limited because of the physical distances involved, its limited historical presence (especially since the latter half of the twentieth century) and the prolonged neglect of its relationships in the region. In other words, the UK is rebuilding from a low base.

**Defence Engagement**

In a 2012 speech sometimes regarded as the definitive summary of British thinking on the Asia-Pacific, then-Foreign Secretary William Hague argued that the UK must greatly increase its level of engagement if it is to help shape the trajectory of the region. Hague called for Britain to move beyond its imperial past and to develop relationships in Asia based on ‘equality and partnership’. At the heart of the UK’s approach is a tendency towards multilateralism as an influence multiplier, buttressed by ‘deep bilateral relationships across the Asia-Pacific’, through which the UK can help to shape events.

The UK’s commitment to new and strengthened partnerships is manifested in what the Foreign Office terms a ‘network shift’. This entails the diversion of diplomatic resources towards the Asia-Pacific and other areas of emerging strategic importance. While the Foreign Office has experienced budget cuts of 30 per cent in real terms since 2010 – and received criticism for the analytical and capacity shortfall that has allegedly resulted – the UK has bolstered its diplomatic presence in East Asia, expanded the number of embassy personnel by sixty across the Asia-Pacific and increased the number and frequency of visits by senior government officials.

In security terms, the network shift centres on the use of defence engagement (defined as the use of defence ministries and the armed forces as tools of diplomacy) to strengthen relationships, support regional states in reforming their militaries and find new diplomatic allies. In this sense, the UK’s defence engagement conveniently plays two roles: one in service of the UK’s broader diplomatic goals – namely forming the relationships on which commercial

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and diplomatic objectives can be realised – and the other as a function of the UK’s security needs.

The UK’s adoption of defence diplomacy as the central pillar of its security policy in the Asia-Pacific is partially a product of necessity. Budget cuts imposed on the British military after the 2010 SDSR have provoked a rethink of how the country’s military assets can be used more strategically to maximise their benefit.\(^{16}\) The re-evaluation also stems from the UK’s inability to proffer a greater commitment as events elsewhere in the world take priority.

Addressing the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in May 2014, then-Secretary of State for Defence Philip Hammond outlined a regional security policy based on defence engagement with three broad categories of countries.\(^{17}\) The first includes countries that are former or potential adversaries, such as China. According to Hammond, the tensions generated by Beijing’s military expenditure and lack of transparency can be mitigated through sustained defence engagement. The UK’s engagement with China thus accords closely to what Lord Robertson, architect of the UK’s defence-engagement strategy in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, described as ‘disarmament of the mind’.\(^{18}\) The difficulties of regular interaction with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) notwithstanding, the UK is engaging China through an English-language learning facility in a major peacekeeping training centre in Hubei Province. In addition, there are regular exchanges between UK institutions and their Chinese counterparts on the subject of military medicine and the Ministry of Defence’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre now holds a dialogue with the Chinese Academy of Military Science on doctrine and strategic assessments.

The second category of defence engagement is military co-operation with states involved in fragile political transitions, such as Burma or Thailand, aimed at promoting transparency and democratic control over the armed forces. This type of engagement serves a broader diplomatic agenda of promoting good governance and liberal democracy, and preventing these states from becoming sources of regional instability or terrorism.

The third category is strengthening partnerships with like-minded states such as Japan and Australia. The UK unquestionably sees these countries as vested partners in the region.\(^{19}\) Tokyo and Canberra are both established diplomatic

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19. Ahead of a visit to Japan in 2014, Foreign Office Minister Hugo Swire referred to Japan as ‘[the UK’s] closest partner in Asia’; he also noted that ‘Whether it is global trade or international peacekeeping our relationship with Japan is fundamental to UK foreign policy, not just in Asia but around the world’. See Colin Moynihan, *Hansard*, House of Lords, 16 January 2014, Col. 433.
allies which are also seeking to expand their global diplomatic presence. The UK is attempting to leverage these relationships to address common regional and global challenges, as well as to assist in the maintenance of the current rules-based international order. The UK has expanded its engagement with both countries through annual ‘2+2’ foreign and defence ministerial meetings. It has also signed agreements with Japan and Australia facilitating interoperability on expeditionary operations (such as peacekeeping and multinational counter-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden and Guinea); co-operation on defence procurement; exchange of military personnel; and the sharing of intelligence and threat assessments.20 These relationships further help to co-ordinate both joint positions prior to multilateral forums, such as Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review meetings, and UN sanctions implementation. For some activities – such as the training, by the Royal Marines, of a Japanese rapid-reaction amphibious force (designed to defend the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from attack) – the UK uses these relationships to play a vicarious role in managing the region’s territorial disputes.21

The final component of the UK’s defence engagement strategy is multilateral, primarily centred on the country’s role in the FPDA. Recent exercises have focused on defending against conventional security threats in the southern South China Sea. Ad-hoc contributions have also included the UK’s role in the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan humanitarian and disaster-relief operation, in which the UK participated alongside regional partners such as Japan. London has also sought to promote a closer relationship between ASEAN and the EU, with UK ministers now regular attendees at the annual EU–ASEAN ministerial meeting.

Balance and Limitations
The UK has pursued a security policy in the Asia-Pacific commensurate to the perceived threats in the region and the means London has at its disposal. The result is a policy that prioritises defence engagement as a mechanism for nurturing the strategic relationships through which the UK can exert influence, build consensus and improve interoperability. It is also a low-cost, low-risk policy that allows the UK to focus on security problems elsewhere and prevents entanglement in the region’s complex political disputes.

There are, however, factors that may have an impact on the UK’s ability to maintain this policy. First, the ongoing effect of budget cuts to the British

military cannot be ignored in any discussion on defence engagement. To be most effective, engagement needs to be sustained (relationships must be nurtured); furthermore, statements regarding the UK’s commitment to the region are most credible when that commitment is consistent. Successful engagement also depends on continued international respect for the capabilities of the UK armed forces. The loss of prestige that could accompany a weaker military may hamper the UK’s attractiveness as a source of expertise. Arguably, cuts have been applied most forcefully to those areas most necessary to defence engagement. While the quality of UK military assets remains world-leading, reductions in the number of platforms such as destroyers, helicopter carriers, maritime patrol aircraft, and short-takeoff-and-landing aircraft are consequential: these are most relevant to military exercises in the FPDA and others held in the region, including the US-led Rim of the Pacific Exercise. With the FPDA, in particular, reorienting its focus towards maritime security, the UK’s ability to deploy in a strategic area near to the conflict-prone South China Sea may be diminishing at a time when this region is increasingly important.

Second, questions surrounding the sustainability of UK engagement with the Asia-Pacific are complicated by the fractious nature of regional politics. The UK describes its approach as ‘all of Asia’: flexible in its relationships and blind to ideological boundaries. Unlike the US, which is compelled to walk a fine line between acting as security guarantor to its allies and an objective multilateral stakeholder, the UK can afford to adopt a more adroit approach, steering a middle course between competing regional visions. This explains the UK’s willingness to engage with countries such as North Korea (where it established an embassy in 2000) as well as its decision to become a founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in 2015 – allegedly one that caused concern in Washington and Tokyo. However, as relationships with like-minded democracies such as Japan are strengthened in other areas, the UK risks provoking the ire of Tokyo’s regional adversary, Beijing. In December 2013, for example, China voiced anger when the First Sea Lord, Admiral George Zambellas, pledged solidarity with Japan over Beijing’s recently declared ADIZ – a declaration made more provocative by the UK prime minister’s presence in Beijing at the time. The spat proved inconsequential but nevertheless highlighted the fault lines within the UK’s policy of pan-Asian engagement.

These fault lines are perhaps most visible in the UK’s relationship with China, the most complex balancing act in UK security policy in the Asia-Pacific. A close relationship with Beijing is clearly important in order to capitalise on its slow shift away from its traditional doctrine of non-interference – as demonstrated through its recent interventions in Mali and Sudan. Indeed, as the largest contributor of combat troops to UN missions among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, engagement with China on peacekeeping and humanitarian crises will be increasingly important in building an effective UK approach to the region. Likewise, the PLA’s role in counter-piracy should be (and arguably is) welcomed by the UK for its contribution to the security of the global commons. A China willing to project naval force may one day come to favour an open maritime system of unfettered naval access and freedom of navigation. There is also a growing alignment between the UK and China regarding post-conflict reconstruction and the non-proliferation agenda in relation to third-country states such as Afghanistan, Iran and North Korea.

Yet the UK should remain aware that ‘socialising’ China into normative standards of behaviour is an outdated prescription that yields little in the way of effective policy. There is strong debate over whether Beijing possesses a ‘strategic blueprint’ for its role in the region and in global affairs; and if it does not, there is the question of whether it can be guided in a direction that helps strengthen, rather than undermine, the rules-based international system. However, China has proved remarkably clear-sighted in the pursuit of its national interests, abiding by some parts of the liberal international order but opposing others. This suggests that China will be neither a ‘revisionist’ nor a ‘status quo’ power; instead, it is becoming large enough to abide by international laws and norms as it sees fit.

The question for the UK, therefore, is how to stand up for its national interests in the face of a much more powerful China. The traditional sources of bilateral friction, such as human rights and democracy, will gradually decline in importance if the UK maintains an increasingly low profile with regard to such issues. There is resolve in London, for example, not to suffer a repeat of the ‘deep freeze’ in diplomatic relations that resulted from David Cameron’s meeting with the Dalai Lama in 2012. In the future, British leaders may find it more expedient to argue the case on such issues through the EU, which carries great collective weight when it can articulate a unified voice.

Even if London de-emphasises liberal values, however, the UK may still find it harder to control any second-order conflict in which it suffers from Chinese action indirectly or is compelled to come to the support of another state. If increasing tensions between the US and China erupt into a crisis, London may

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feel compelled to show solidarity with Washington in the form of a modest deployment. Likewise, it would be difficult for the UK to remain impassive if Beijing sought to increase sharply its interference in the passage of military or commercial traffic through the South China Sea or if UK partners such as Japan were to be attacked.

On the whole, the UK can take one of two broad approaches. First, there is a case for the UK to develop a clearer view of how the means at its disposal – namely a set of strengthened bilateral diplomatic relationships – can be better made to serve its goal of a stable, rules-based regional order. Second, given the limitations the UK faces in the region – in terms of physical distance, lack of military assets and limited diplomatic leverage – the UK might instead restrict its activity (at least for the time being) to consolidating its partnerships and avoiding entanglement in the region’s geopolitical disputes. This option might appear all the more appealing given that the UK is unlikely to be able to wield the influence it desires even if it were to adopt a bolder stance – if only rhetorically – on security issues that are of concern to its partners in the region.

**Conclusion**

The UK’s current security policy towards the Asia-Pacific is based on recognition that it must increase its scope of regional engagement if it is to maintain its ‘disproportionate’ global influence. The country has responded with a ‘network shift’ of diplomatic assets and attention eastwards, aimed at building the key relationships through which it can exert strategic influence. Cynical voices may argue that building relationships does not, by itself, amount to a coherent policy. However, the UK is starting from a low base – lacking a permanent military presence – and is further hampered by dwindling defence resources and the problems inherent to physical distance. A non-committal stance towards regional disputes has allowed the UK to remain an objective actor in the region, although this will be difficult to maintain as its relationships with opposing parties deepen and pressure for a greater UK commitment increases.

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III. Maritime Security in Asia and Europe

Peter Roberts

The sea is often considered an ungoverned space since – apart from very small coastal areas – it is not owned or ruled by any single state. The security and governance of the sea and activities under, in or on it are therefore not understood in the same terms or formats that relate to land. Yet the international laws for the sea are ubiquitous: the vast majority apply equally to the North Sea and Mediterranean as they do to the Sea of Japan and the South China Sea. Logically, then, the security of the maritime domain should not differ between Asia and Europe in any significant way – but it does.

This chapter will examine why there is such a difference between European and Pacific approaches to maritime security and it will show how the approaches differ between the two areas through the lens of international trade. The chapter will also examine the historical context and strategic cultures that point to potential alternative methods of governing the high seas. Finally, it will make an argument that might allow for a more meaningful understanding of the problems in maritime governance, whilst recognising that the conclusions are not clear. Even allowing for a mature, coherent debate about these factors, a European solution to maritime security in Asia might not be contextually apposite to the western Pacific: what is good for the goose might not be good for the gander. Instead, the conclusion points to the Gulf – an area in which the US now has relatively little interest – as the region where there is a confluence of European and Asian maritime-security interests.

Governance of the High Seas

The current arrangements for governance of the high seas are based on an internationally recognised and agreed set of standards and behaviour. Through the International Maritime Organization (IMO), states have concluded a number of agreements on the use of the high seas. These complement the main international instrument – the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) – which outlines rules which are ubiquitous: they cover all parts of the sea across the globe. UNCLOS permits individual states to introduce local rules and bylaws in areas where they can exercise sovereign control (usually within 12 nautical miles of their coastline with some jurisdiction beyond this into contiguous zones as well as their Exclusive Economic Zones of 200 nautical miles from the coast). However, these concessions to state sovereignty aside, the rules and prescribed behaviours are largely the same.
The rules are occasionally tested. Nevertheless, most disagreements between states are resolved through bilateral dialogue or one of the dispute-settlement mechanisms established by UNCLOS. In Europe, disputes have occurred between various states over governance and behaviours but, in the majority of cases, these have been resolved without militarising the situation. The dispute between the UK and Norway over ownership of undersea fossil-fuel reserves was settled amicably in this way with conventions in 1976, 1990 and 1992, for example. The broad acceptance of, and adherence to, international law has never been seriously disputed. And, while other methods of arbitration are allowed under UNCLOS, it has become normal for states to undertake complex resolution through international arbitration at the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

However, recent actions in the western Pacific do not appear to be following this Western model of resolution. Disputes over island sovereignty and ownership in the South China Sea – between China and Vietnam, China and the Philippines, and China and Indonesia – have caused significant tension, and the normal method of resolution through international arbitration has been rejected, usually by China.

Analysts in both Europe and Asia have sought to understand whether a European approach to law at sea could reduce tensions in the western Pacific, and whether a similar framework could be introduced as a stabilising mechanism. However, the contextual differences between actors on the two continents are so large as to make it very difficult to transpose the European model to the western Pacific.

The Sea and International Trade
Maritime security is underpinned by international norms regarding the behaviours of states and vessels on the sea. These principles, in turn, enable economic activity among states. The relationship between resources and outputs has changed, however, and many states now depend on trade across the seas for fundamental resources such as food and energy, as well as other discretionary goods and services. Any disruption to that flow of goods now has the potential for catastrophic consequences across the globe.

In Europe, a complex network of relationships and co-operation in the maritime domain continues to underpin governance on the high seas. Frameworks for maritime-security co-operation and enforcement draw on constabulary mechanisms that have evolved on the basis of consensual, collaborative and multilateral engagement. Even where threats are geographically outside Europe, states respond with naval power to enforce globalised norms. In the Horn of Africa, the threat of piracy – which remains relatively small in scale – was met with a vigorous response by NATO, a US-led coalition and the EU. The actions of these actors, which included states such as China, Russia, Iran
and India, were designed to overcome the piracy challenge, enable trade and enforce international norms.

In Asia, similar challenges to such norms are overlooked. Although China conducts activities in violation of international maritime law, the US – viewed by many as the policeman of the seas – appears to be withdrawing from any role that could cause Beijing to react. China’s behaviour is also contrary to US policy and the norms it seeks to uphold, yet the reaction from the Obama administration has been far from strident.

Indeed, the international community seems ambivalent (to put it kindly) to the activities of China at sea and fails to support states that try to make Beijing obey internationally recognised sovereign rights. In January 2013, the Philippines submitted a 4,000-page document to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague outlining its claim to sovereignty over areas of the South China Sea. The Court gave Beijing until December 2014 to respond. When China did formally reply – on 6 December 2014 – it was only to state categorically that it would not take part in international arbitration, despite having ratified UNCLOS, the convention that outlines how disputes should be resolved. Whilst the Philippine government received support from the US for its submission to The Hague, neither Washington nor Brussels took serious action in response to Beijing’s failure to comply with international norms. Similarly, Vietnam, in its dispute with China over territorial-water limits and oil exploration, was very much on its own as many Western states chose to avoid involvement in the issue.

**Policing the Seas**
The contrast is stark. In Europe, the role of navies in enforcing behaviour is accepted and conducted within an alliance construct which exploits the capability of naval units to conduct constabulary roles as well as high-end war-fighting. The US is the leading advocate for this approach in Europe, chiefly executed through NATO. However in Asia, the absence of a maritime-security alliance structure has left the issue to individual states, and US responses to Chinese actions, since 2010, have become ever-more muted. In Europe, therefore, the security of maritime trade is a given; in Asia, it is not.

China has no plans to conform to international norms regarding how the sea is controlled and governed in the Pacific. Indeed, Beijing’s expansionist behaviour in the China Seas underlies a deeper philosophy in relation to the sea, which recognises that the concept of the high seas might exist – just not in its neighbourhood. China appears quite content to exercise its own submarines off US islands, such as Hawaii, and potentially the coastline of the
continental US; but it does not accept similar activity by US Navy submarines in its own region.¹

China is, in effect, reviewing the arguments of freedom on the high seas as they are currently documented. Its initial focus is on its own region, but Beijing could gain support from some unlikely allies in this regard. Beijing is not alone in believing that the historical, Western-determined system enforced (or not) by the UN, through bodies such as the IMO, could benefit from a re-assessment. Arguably, the Indian approach to governance and responsibilities in the Indian Ocean can be viewed as having a similar basis.

Open versus Closed Seas

The contemporary debate between Western and Chinese views over the seas is not entirely new. In fact, disagreements on how the sea should be governed have a long history. In 1604, the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius articulated the defining standard in how the high seas should be controlled and governed. His thesis, *Mare Liberum (Freedom of the Seas)*, remains the basis for current international maritime law and the normative baseline for nearly all actors and operators on the seas. Yet Grotius’s doctrine did not go unchallenged at the time. In 1635, the British jurist John Selden put forward an alternative thesis, *Mare Clausum (The Closed Seas)*, in which the sea would be divided and neighbouring coastal states would assume stewardship for different areas. Whilst the maritime powers of the time adopted the view of Grotius, China appears to be, in effect, advocating a review of this established precedent that would reopen the *mare clausum versus mare liberum* debate.

The Chinese relationship with the sea has always been different to the West’s (certainly that of the UK, the US, France and the Netherlands), and will continue to be so. The strategic culture of China embodies a continentalist approach. Primarily a land power, Beijing approaches the Pacific as if it were another piece of land. Accordingly, it seeks control and dominance over the activities in the seas even if it acknowledges it as a space in which other states and actors can operate.

In contrast, the European view is based on a largely maritime-focused strategic culture. For these states, maritime behaviours, security challenges, trade dependence and environmental change do not appear to provide sufficient impetus for any alteration to the status quo.

Yet growing maritime powers other than China – such as India, Mexico, Argentina, Indonesia and Brazil – view current maritime-governance arrangements with a sense of injustice. They too seek a more dominant

voice in the future of governance of the sea and may possibly follow Selden’s thesis, rather than Grotius’s.

Selden’s approach had, and continues to have, merits. Allocating responsibility for neighbouring sea areas to specific countries is a clearer way to understand which state is responsible for maritime security in which area. It cuts down on complex, bureaucratic alliance or coalition constructs, and places governance and authority within existing, functioning and technically proven national apparatus. Arguments can be made that the time has come for change. The depletion of fish stocks and exploitation of undersea resources now make it essential for states to have a greater say in how their neighbouring environments are used, and who should make a profit from them. These are not just purely economic factors; they affect issues of national security that define and articulate vital sovereign interests.

Yet the counter-arguments are just as powerful and relevant. Activities at sea can have an impact across the globe, not just in the local area. Laws and governance therefore need to take account of this broader dimension. It is true that since the great proportion of international trade that runs across the seas makes free access critical, stewardship by coastal states might provide greater security than the current construct of policing by whoever owns the vessel (or rather, the country where it is registered). However, such a construct relies on coastal states investing in and possessing a strong naval force capable of providing policing. Actions by that state and its maritime forces must also allow and enable free trade, rather than exploit its position for gain. Indeed, what would happen under such a construct if a state were not capable or were unwilling to invest in constabulary services? And what would happen if the state were to turn a blind eye (due to corruption, negligence or ambivalence) to nefarious activities within its domain? The reality of each doctrine is more complex than the simple arguments presented in the academic debate, and only one version has ever been tested.

Proponents of the status quo – like the UK and Japan – could quite clearly state that the current system of governance has been tried over the last four centuries and has been found to have few serious flaws. Yet the doctrine of *mare liberum* is distinctly dated. Few states, acting alone, can provide the degree of constabulary presence now necessary; states simply do not have enough ships to ensure safety within their waters. The onus of responding to security threats is thus placed on coalitions of the willing to enforce established norms and behaviours. This could conceivably continue during times of peace, but it might not survive so well during periods of tension and conflict.

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2. Under such an arrangement, coastal states would take responsibility for legal and security arrangements within their sphere of influence, including policing and prosecution.
Whilst these two distinct doctrines of governance on the high seas might be debated, the role of middle powers in that governance regime remains vital. In this, the UK and Japan approach their roles in quite different ways: the UK adopts a global but passive role, whilst Japan has a more local but far more strident approach.

The UK continues to see itself as a centre of global maritime activity and has taken policy positions very much in this vein. It supports the freedom of navigation across the world as a prerequisite for trade and to maintain interdependence. Freedom of navigation and passage, as well as internationally arbitrated dispute resolution, together form a key element of the system of global trade on which the UK’s prosperity relies. On this basis, one might expect the UK to be vocal regarding such rights. However, policy now seems subservient to other considerations and the UK takes a far less vocal position when norms and economics come into conflict – as is the case with Chinese intransigence in the western Pacific – or when enforcing such a policy would be too expensive (even if those costs are marginal). The current British position may appear somewhat confusing to external observers, but is rational to those in government. Successive administrations have walked a fine line between preserving the normative status quo and disregarding violations of it when made by those with whom the UK has distinct economic or diplomatic interests. Despite playing a role in counter-piracy missions, occasionally training foreign navies and coastguards, and leading international legal debate in this regard, the UK cannot overcome the increasing perception (external and internal) that its actions are rendering it an irrelevant actor in upholding global maritime order and governance.

Seen from Europe, Japan is at the opposite end of the spectrum: its policy and actions are clearly defined, and its activities at sea to enforce the status quo are nuanced and based on the context of the region. No challenge from China goes unanswered, either by the government, the navy or the coastguard agencies. National fishing fleets play an important role in triggering responses and understand that the information they provide will be acted on with vigour. Governance at sea has become a national issue for Japan. This is an extremely healthy approach, yet unfortunately Japan continues to limit itself to a very localised area of operations. The current tenor of interstate relations in the western Pacific does not allow Tokyo to have an expanded or leading role beyond its immediate area. This leaves the US as the chief arbiter in the wider Indo-Pacific. The combination of a lack of self-confidence, sense of history and constitutional restrictions place Japan in a very challenging position between what could be perceived as an existential threat (in the form of China) and an ambivalent hegemon that appears to be willing to accept any outcome to preserve peace with Beijing for another year.
Such approaches on the part of leading maritime powers are disappointing for advocates of *mare liberum*, but give succour to those who aspire for change: if such actors are willing to bend their policies and positions, or are restricted in their ability to react by third parties, it might well be time for a more fundamental challenge to the status quo. As suggested by Vice Admiral Robert Thomas, commander of the US 7th Fleet, this means that Japan should consider projecting naval forces beyond the western Pacific to balance Chinese expansionist behaviours.3

Is the Debate Worth Having?
The mere act of initiating such a debate about the future of maritime governance is likely to have global consequences. However, even if China could be persuaded to engage in a discussion on how the sea should be governed in the future, there is no evidence that Beijing would end those activities that are serving to destabilise the Pacific. Indeed, such a broad discussion about fundamentals might prove a distraction from more potentially achievable initiatives that could change Chinese behaviour at sea. Of these, there are three possibilities: first, achieving a consensus definition of ‘innocent passage’ and the behaviours permissible thereunder; second, developing a better understanding of China’s approach to freedom of navigation within the China Seas; and, third, divining a meaningful interpretation of Beijing’s intentions towards UNCLOS. Each of these will provide a greater understanding of Chinese activities in the South China Sea – specifically, China’s construction activities in the disputed territory – and could potentially provide some understanding of the challenges in the East China Sea. By tackling these questions, it may be possible to gain further insight into the ‘nine-dash line’ debate itself. Both China and the US play central roles in each of these debates, but so too do smaller maritime powers such as the UK and Japan whose voices add weight to the establishment and maintenance of norms through mapping and reporting intransigent behaviour that does not conform to accepted practices under UNCLOS.

Neither Japan nor the UK, as important global voices in the maritime community, needs to play a physical part in such activities and it seems that there is little political appetite to do so. Nor are such actions by themselves likely to bring China to the table. In one sense, this is a good thing, since there is little evidence that players, such as the UK, Japan, the US, Australia, and the IMO, amongst others, have a coherent set of demands to present Beijing. And yet if such demands were outlined, this framework would enable the UK and Japan to be more proactive – and functional – in coercing China into less belligerent behaviours.

One area where pressure applied by states other than the US can potentially deliver change in Chinese attitudes is in the Gulf, where the maritime security interests of the UK and Japan, and indeed of Europe and Asia, coalesce around the free flow of oil and gas as the lifeblood of the economies of both regions. Seen from Beijing, China is separated from its supply of vital fuel resources by a long and highly vulnerable chain of tankers, all of which follow internationally recognised shipping lanes through international waters. This vulnerability is a potential point at which a UK–Japan–India–Australia maritime alliance could exert leverage on China’s behaviour elsewhere at sea. China must understand that there is sufficient resolve to sever its energy supply route should it not start to respect international norms and behaviours. Unless the Permanent Court of Arbitration rules that it has jurisdiction in the case of the Philippines against China – a very unlikely outcome given the potential for China to withdraw completely from UNCLOS if such a ruling were made – there appear to be few other levers through which to change Beijing’s challenge to international maritime law.

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IV. Japan’s Defence Diplomacy in Asia and Beyond

Michito Tsuruoka

Security and defence co-operation is now increasingly seen as an important pillar of Tokyo’s relations with other countries as the government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe seeks to strengthen Japan’s partnerships with states in Asia and beyond. In addition to traditional political dialogue and various types of consultation, Japan has introduced other activities into its efforts to strengthen its security and defence partnerships: political-military dialogues, notably ‘2+2’ ministerial meetings that bring together the countries’ respective foreign and defence ministers; military–military (or staff) talks; joint exercises between the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the armed forces of other countries; defence capacity-building activities; and defence-equipment co-operation. These are all examples of defence diplomacy, broadly defined. The involvement of defence authorities – both civilian and JSDF – in various aspects of Japan’s external relations has greatly increased in the past decade. Japan’s defence diplomacy, in short, has entered a new phase.

This chapter examines the development of Japan’s defence diplomacy and its role in the Japan–UK security and defence partnership. First, it reviews the nature and role of defence diplomacy in contemporary international relations. Second, it examines major developments in Japan’s defence diplomacy, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (the ADMM-Plus, which brings together the defence ministers of ten members of ASEAN, along with eight other states in the wider Indo-Pacific). Third, it examines potential avenues for further co-operation between Japan, the UK and Europe more generally in various areas of defence diplomacy.

Defence Diplomacy in Context

The term ‘defence diplomacy’ is not officially used by the Japanese government. The Japanese Ministry of Defense (JMoD), for instance, in the annual White Paper ‘Defense of Japan’, usually refers to ‘defence exchange’ and ‘defence co-operation’. Outside Japan, ‘defence engagement’, ‘military diplomacy’ and ‘military engagement’ are often used interchangeably with ‘defence diplomacy’. This indicates that there is no single internationally accepted definition for each term. Perhaps there is no practical need to define the concept strictly; indeed, it may be better not to restrict the scope of defence diplomacy so that it can stand as a highly inclusive concept. Thus, defence diplomacy can be broadly understood as a means by which countries use their ‘defence assets and activities short of combat operations to

achieve influence'. Policy dialogue amongst defence authorities of different countries, joint exercises, capacity-building assistance, port visits and a host of other activities can all be seen as part of defence diplomacy.

The end of the Cold War prompted European states to re-examine the role of their armed forces now that their primary task of deterring the Soviet Union and defending NATO territory was no longer relevant. In the years thereafter, defence diplomacy initially centred on military assistance to the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in an effort to help these states establish democratic control over their armed forces. In its 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the UK was the first country formally to introduce defence diplomacy, making it a mission of its armed forces.

More recently, London has come to use the term ‘defence engagement’ rather than ‘defence diplomacy’, indicating an approach focused more on operational, albeit non-combat, activity. The environment of fiscal austerity that prevailed in the UK following the global economic crisis in 2008, and particularly during the coalition government which came to power in 2010, also saw increased demand for effectiveness and value for money in all areas of government, including the armed forces. Thus, the International Defence Engagement Strategy of February 2013 states that ‘[The UK’s] defence capabilities and assets can be used more strategically to maximise their benefit to the UK as a whole’ beyond combat operations. In other words, there is a need to ‘derive greater utility from the armed forces’ in an age of fiscal constraint. After Afghanistan and Iraq, there is also a hope that other forms of lower-intensity or non-combat engagement – such as capacity-building missions for training and mentoring – could be substituted for more demanding forms of operational engagement. It is, after all, believed that defence engagement is much cheaper than conducting military operations. Yet it is an inherent challenge to accurately measure the advantages of defence-diplomacy efforts and quantify their value and effectiveness.

Although there may not be strong domestic pressure in Japan to make more effective use of the JSDF as a policy tool – given its historically limited role in the

7. For various views on the case of Australia, see Brendan Taylor et al., ‘Defence Diplomacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?’, Centre of Gravity Series, Australian National University, November 2014.
country’s broader international engagement – the use of defence capabilities and assets nonetheless seems to have become more accepted there.

As for the strategic objectives of defence diplomacy* – or ‘military engagement’ as it is called in the US – Dennis Blair, former commander of US Pacific Command, emphasises the mission of supporting democratic transitions or, more precisely, spreading democratic beliefs and democratic ways of behaviour throughout the armed forces of authoritarian states. This is because ‘The armed forces play an absolutely key role in fostering, allowing, or suppressing democratic movement in authoritarian states’. Simply put, ‘The armed forces matter in democratic transitions’. It is particularly important that they do not use force against their own citizens, thereby avoiding bloodshed in the process of democratic development. Similarly, after regime change or a transition to democracy, building a democratic military – in other words, one that supports democratic rule – is an indispensable process. It can also be argued that even where the democratic transition in question is not full-scale, discouraging militaries from using violence against their own citizens is always part of the objectives of any security- and defence-sector reform.

There does not seem to be a consensus in Japan, however, about the extent to which the country should or could incorporate the democratic-transition aspect in its conduct of defence diplomacy, particularly in Asia. While shared values are often emphasised at the political level, it has never been made clear that the aim of Japan’s defence diplomacy is to promote and consolidate democracy in the region. Nonetheless, it seems clear that Japan wants to build a group of countries in Asia – particularly in the southeast – with which it shares basic values and security interests, and which are more capable of addressing the maritime challenges emanating mainly from China.

**Japan’s New Defence Diplomacy**

Defence diplomacy – the international engagement of the JSDF and, more broadly, the JMoD – is still a new phenomenon in Japan. Until the upgrade of the former Japan Defense Agency (JDA) to ministry status in January 2007, the JDA was not supposed to play a major role in Japan’s external security policy. Indeed, it was long assumed that the main task of the JDA was

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8. As there are substantial restrictions on the operational use of the JSDF, this chapter uses the term defence diplomacy rather than defence engagement.
12. See, for example, Martin Fackler, ‘Japan is Flexing its Military Muscle to Counter a Rising China’, *New York Times*, 26 November 2012.
the administrative management of the JSDF. Mainly due to constitutional constraints, Japan’s international security profile remained low even for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. For a long time during the Cold War, co-ordination and co-operation with the US were believed to be the only thing that Tokyo needed to consider; relations with other countries were seen as unnecessary or, worse, incompatible with the US alliance. In his history of Japan’s security and defence interactions with other countries, Yukinari Hirose – a senior JMoD official – quotes a 1987 statement by then-JDA Director Yukou Kurihara (and de facto defence minister) in which he said that ‘in line with the constitution that allows Japan to have only the minimum necessary defence capability, the country needs to refrain from having close defence ties with countries other than the United States’. This situation began to change in the 1990s and more rapidly in the 2000s, exemplified by the increasing number of regional and global meetings involving JSDF officers and civilian officials, including the ministry’s political leaders.

There are a number of frameworks in the Asia-Pacific which bring together chiefs of defence staff, service chiefs or other military leaders, such as the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and the Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference. The related annual or biennial plenary meetings undoubtedly play a valuable role in building networks, mutual understanding and, hopefully, confidence among the militaries in the region. However, the extent to which those regular contacts are linked to the overall political and strategic relations among the states involved seems unclear at best. Greater co-ordination and the formulation of a coherent engagement strategy at the national level remains a challenging task, particularly in light of the increasing number of multilateral gatherings.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies’s Shangri-La Dialogue has also played an important role in facilitating contact between the defence leaders in the region and beyond by providing an annual forum at which they can convene. In Japan’s case, it is now established practice for both the defence minister and the chief of staff of the Joint Staff to attend the dialogue, where they hold a number of bilateral and trilateral talks with their counterparts, most notably from the US, Australia and South Korea.

Japan’s participation in the ADMM-Plus is one of the most notable examples of the country’s expanding defence-diplomacy activities. The first ministerial meeting took place in 2010 and the second in 2013. Despite its name, the ADMM-Plus is much more than just a defence ministerial meeting; rather, the core of its activities is practical co-operation among the militaries in the form of the Experts’ Working Groups (EWGs) framework.\footnote{Michito Tsuruoka, ‘An Era of the ADMM-Plus? Unique Achievements and Challenges’, PacNet No. 69, Pacific Forum CSIS, September 2013.} There are currently six EWGs, covering maritime security, counter-terrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), peacekeeping operations, military medicine and de-mining (Humanitarian Mine Action). Japan, together with Singapore, served as co-chair for the military-medicine EWG for the first cycle between 2011 and 2014, and is currently co-chairing, with Laos, the EWG focused on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Strengthened co-operation between co-chairs has proved to be one of the most tangible outcomes of the process. In Japan’s case, there was close co-operation with Singapore in the military-medicine EWG and the two co-chairs prepared and hosted a number of meetings together. It is also strategically significant that Japan is now co-chairing the HADR EWG with Laos given that it is often thought that Vientiane is heavily under the influence of China. Japan is not alone in reaping such benefits: the US co-chaired the counter-terrorism EWG in the first cycle with Indonesia, for example – an invaluable opportunity for the US to work closely on the issue with the world’s largest Muslim country.

One of the most significant achievements in the first cycle of EWG activities, between 2011 and 2014, was a joint military-medicine and HADR live exercise in Brunei in June 2013. This brought together troops from a number of countries, most notably China, the US, Japan and India. Indeed, Japan (as co-chair of the military-medicine EWG) and China (as co-chair of the HADR EWG) sat together on the steering committee – a rare occasion for Japanese and Chinese forces to work together, despite difficulties in the bilateral relationship.

Given the fact that defence authorities in many ASEAN countries still play a central role in domestic politics and remain close to state leaders, it is vital to talk to and work with these organisations. Rightly or wrongly, in some countries, they are more important than many other government bodies; and thus Tokyo must live with this reality and reach out to the militaries of other countries. Burma, Thailand and Vietnam are cases where such co-operation are particularly crucial.

Alongside these activities, since 2012 Tokyo has also provided defence capacity-building assistance, representing another new pillar in Japan’s
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growing defence diplomacy. While the scale and scope of this assistance so far remain limited – for example, Japan dedicated only ¥159 million to such activities in 2012, ¥225 million in 2013 and ¥236 million in 2014 – its long-term strategic rationale is clear. It is about helping regional states provide for their own defence as well as preventing a power vacuum from emerging, particularly in the Asia-Pacific maritime domain.16 Underlying these activities lies the view that the weak maritime capabilities of many Southeast Asian states have created conditions that allow China to behave in a more assertive manner in the region, particularly in the South China Sea. In other words, if the Philippines and Vietnam were more capable, China would behave more cautiously. Another element of Japan’s effort in this regard is bilateral and trilateral co-operation with Australia and the US in Southeast Asia.17

Two other elements of Japanese defence diplomacy, defence-equipment co-operation and arms exports, are potentially closely linked. Tokyo has recently committed to provide patrol vessels to the Philippines and Vietnam through official development assistance (ODA). While not technically military aid, this sort of assistance has been made possible under the notion of the ‘strategic use of ODA’ and the relaxation of Japan’s long-held ban on arms exports. Some Southeast Asian countries have shown an interest in buying Japanese equipment, and arms sales in the future are likely to involve mentoring and training by the Japanese. As a latecomer to arms exports, Japan has little expertise in managing such business. The alignment of its arms-export policy with political and strategic engagement is a challenge Tokyo will need to address.

Japan’s Defence Diplomacy and the UK and Europe

One of the major features of Abe’s so-called ‘diplomacy through a panoramic perspective of the globe [chikyuugi wo fukan suru gaikou]’ is reaching out beyond the Asia-Pacific region. Abe has given the Middle East and Europe more attention in foreign-policy and security terms, as well as in economic and trade terms. Europe shares fundamental values with Japan which can

form the basis on which to develop partnerships.\textsuperscript{18} As such, the region has become a key part of Abe’s ‘democracy-diplomacy’ agenda.\textsuperscript{19}

It is worth recalling that Japanese and European forces have already co-operated extensively on a number of occasions in recent years, including in a refuelling operation in the Indian Ocean following the 9/11 attacks; reconstruction assistance in Iraq; and counter-piracy efforts off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. However, while the reality of operational co-operation between Japan and Europe is not new, not many people outside the small circle of officials and experts working on this topic daily are aware of its extent.\textsuperscript{20}

In light of the past instances of operational co-operation (in the Indian Ocean and Iraq) and ongoing efforts (counter-piracy), interoperability is a key area which Japan and Europe (including the UK) need to prioritise. The JSDF – particularly its naval and air elements – is assumed to be highly interoperable with US forces. However, it is not clear to what extent this is the case with European forces, as interoperability with the US does not automatically translate in this way. Japan and Europe first need to identify exactly those areas in which they already have an adequate level of interoperability and those in which they do not. The issue of interoperability is not just about equipment: it also involves software, legal, human and organisational aspects, as well as operational procedures. In other words, the way of doing business as a whole plays an important part. It is probably in these aspects that Japan lacks essential interoperability with Europe.

In this regard, joint exercises will be invaluable. Japan has already conducted a series of joint exercises with EU and NATO forces in counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia.\textsuperscript{21} During their first ministerial 2+2 meeting, held in London in January 2015, Japan and the UK agreed to conduct bilateral joint training and exercises.\textsuperscript{22} The meeting also committed to conclude an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) between the two countries as quickly as possible, which will make

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practical co-operation, including in joint exercises, easier. For Japan, the ACSA with the UK is to be the third of its kind, following those established with the US and Australia. From a defence-diplomacy perspective, the diplomatic and political aspects of joint exercises between the UK and Japan also need to be highlighted: joint exercises can send strategic messages about the closeness of the two countries and deepen the level of mutual understanding.

The UK’s increasing interest in defence engagement in Asia is in line with Japan’s interest in reaching out to Europe. While the Royal Navy’s capability – particularly in terms of numbers of ships and personnel – continues to shrink, there is a growing awareness, if initially only among experts, that the country cannot afford to ignore the political and security situation east of Suez, not least in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. In this regard, London’s decision to appoint a naval liaison officer to the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) is a positive move (a Royal Navy commander already appointed as liaison officer to the US 7th Fleet in Yokosuka was then also assigned as liaison to the JMSDF). The arrangement is made possible because of close Japan–US and UK–US ties. While acknowledging the existence of ‘the tyranny of distance’ between Europe and Asia, the current liaison officer has argued that the UK ‘does have the capability’ to deploy assets to the Asia-Pacific and that ‘therefore it is vital that [it] build[s] and maintain[s] a strong understanding of both this complicated region and [its] allies within it’. For the UK, in short, the ‘strategic alliance with Japan’ gives it a ‘sure toe-in’.

Assuming that the UK will be willing and able to send Royal Navy vessels more frequently to the Asia-Pacific in the coming years despite inherent limitations, Australia – and especially its port of Darwin – is likely to be a new hub not only for UK–Australia bilateral co-operation, but also for Japan–UK–Australia trilateral and Japan–UK–Australia–US quadrilateral co-operation. Partnering in defence capacity-building could also be promising. Defence-equipment co-operation can be situated in the framework of defence diplomacy owing to its close linkage with the overall political and security


26. Ibid.

partnership: in other words, equipment co-operation and the overall partnership are mutually reinforcing.28

**Conclusions**

Despite these new developments in Japan’s defence diplomacy, it is still far from a ‘(re)militarisation’ of Japan’s foreign policy. The JMoD and the JSDF are latecomers to Japan’s international engagement, and the space they occupy in the whole picture remains small – something unlikely to change dramatically in the foreseeable future. While defence diplomacy is an emerging and promising foreign-relations tool for Japan, its role is likely to remain limited. Nonetheless, it is perhaps because of this that the room for development is substantial, and working with reliable partners, including the UK, is important.

Looking ahead, there are arguably two fundamental issues which will have an impact on Japan’s defence diplomacy and the security and defence co-operation with the UK: first, whether Tokyo’s current foreign- and security-policy activism under Prime Minister Abe can be sustained in the long term; and second, whether the UK can remain as a great power engaged in the wider world, including in Asia, despite apparent ‘fatigue’ in its international engagement after Afghanistan and Iraq.29 Defence diplomacy, after all, wholly depends on the country’s political willingness to remain engaged in international security. As long as Japan and the UK maintain a certain level of international-security engagement, the two countries’ defence diplomacy will play an important and positive role in the world.

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28. For a more in-depth discussion of UK–Japan equipment co-operation, see Chapter VI of this Whitehall Report by Trevor Taylor.
29. See, for example, John Swenson-Wright, ‘UK Election Notes: Foreign Policy Opportunities – Security Cooperation with Japan’, Chatham House, 23 April 2015.
Peace and stability in Africa is important, not least because conflict and instability on the continent cannot be isolated. In January 2013, for example, ten Japanese and six British citizens died as a result of the attack by militants on the gas plant at In Amenas, in Algeria. Instability in Africa is also one of the root causes of the large-scale migration crisis centred on the Mediterranean Sea, leaving the EU facing a host of complex humanitarian and security challenges. The emergence of Ebola in West Africa in December 2013, meanwhile, was only belatedly recognised as a global threat capable of crossing borders and seas, and ultimately, several Western health workers who had volunteered or been deployed as part of the effort to counter the virus were infected and in some cases died. Clearly, as the world becomes more deeply interconnected, maintaining indifference to what is happening on the other side of the globe is increasingly difficult.

While Japan and the UK have long been important partners in many areas around the world, the potential for co-operation relating to building peace and stability in Africa has not been fully explored. Political and financial constraints faced by Japan and the UK, as well as the complex nature of instability in Africa, necessitate further co-operation between the two countries if they wish to make a more effective and efficient contribution to the continent’s security. Analysing the current challenges in Africa, and examining the approaches of Japan and the UK towards the continent, this chapter argues that security-sector reform (SSR) and capacity-building could be a promising area for Japan–UK co-operation in this regard.

The chapter consists of four parts. It first overviews two major security challenges in Africa: armed conflict and violence; and non-traditional security threats. Then it briefly reviews Japan’s approach to African peace and stability, followed by an examination of British engagement in Africa. Revealing the constraints and limitations of each country’s approach, the chapter argues for the necessity of Japan–UK co-operation. In the final part, it proposes that co-operation on SSR and capacity-building in particular would not only help

3. See, for example, BBC News, ‘Ebola; Mapping the Outbreak’, 19 June 2015.
African countries solve their challenges by themselves and in a sustainable manner, but would also overcome the specific constraints that Japan and the UK face. In conclusion, it discusses why co-operation should start in relation to Africa, and how it should move forward.

**Security Challenges in Africa**

The different political, economic, societal and environmental conditions of the more than fifty countries on the African continent defy any simple representation of an ‘African situation’. It is still possible, however, to identify some broad trends. Two major security challenges stand out in particular: protracted armed conflict and violence; and non-traditional security threats.

First, although relative to population the number of armed conflicts has decreased, in absolute terms the number of conflicts and fatalities remains high and is even increasing: 2013–14 saw a 12.9 per cent increase in the incidence of armed conflicts, while conflict-related fatalities also increased by nearly 10,000 or 31 per cent in the same period. Conflicts are characterised by the prevalence of ‘non-state conflict and its associated fatalities’ – the majority of attacks against civilians in Africa are carried out by militias. Although it is wrong to assume that Africa is more prone to conflict than any other region, armed conflict has greatly affected the broad pursuit on the continent of the Millennium Development Goals. Thus, armed conflict and violence remain among the most critical challenges facing the continent, and addressing the prevalence of non-state armed groups is particularly important.

The demand for international assistance remains strong. The majority of UN peacekeeping operations and personnel are currently deployed to Africa. At the same time, the African troop contributions to these operations – in both numbers of states and personnel – have steadily increased. Contributions have more than doubled in the last decade and Africa’s share of the global contribution was nearly 50 per cent in 2014. The African Union (AU) has also

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conducted African-led operations such as its mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The growing commitment of African states to African peace and security has also evolved institutionally through the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).\(^\text{11}\) This pursuit of ‘African solutions to African problems’ only increases the need for capacity-building within African security forces.

Second, non-traditional security threats – including infectious diseases, natural disasters and organised crime – also pose serious challenges. For example, 437,000 children under the age of five were killed by malaria in 2013 – almost fifteen times more than fatalities related to armed conflict of all ages in 2013.\(^\text{12}\) The recent outbreak of Ebola in West Africa resulted in more than 10,000 deaths despite the high levels of support eventually provided by the international community.\(^\text{13}\) Natural disasters such as droughts, floods and cyclones also contribute to insecurity and underdevelopment in Africa, having killed or affected 4.92 million people and caused damage worth approximately $230 million in 2013, for instance.\(^\text{14}\) While it is true that Africa is not as severely affected by natural disasters as Asia – the region most prone to such events\(^\text{15}\) – they remain a significant factor in instability in Africa due to their impact on development efforts in combination with the continent’s comparative lack of resilience to their effects. Organised crime, including piracy and the illegal trafficking of humans, drugs, natural resources and weapons, is another cause for growing concern. While the functioning of organised crime in African society is often very complex, it is fair to say that the trafficking and sale of illicit goods – especially small arms – fuel armed conflict and criminal activities, often undermining economic development. A couple of examples spring immediately to mind: armed groups fighting in northern Mali obtain weapons from Libyan stockpiles via the black market;\(^\text{16}\) while piracy off the coast of Somalia has affected the

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\(^{12}\) World Health Organization, *World Malaria Report 2014* (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2014), p. 36; ACLED, ‘Conflict Trends Report’, p. 2. Africa is the region most prone to such events – they remain a significant factor in instability in Africa due to their impact on development efforts in combination with the continent’s comparative lack of resilience to their effects.


\(^{15}\) *Ibid.*

economy of neighbouring countries by decreasing the number of tourists and disturbing local fishing activities.¹⁷

These security challenges are interconnected. While infectious diseases and natural disasters are not usually human-made tragedies, the inability or unwillingness of governments to deal with them damage their legitimacy in the eyes of the affected populations and may sow the seeds of future conflict. For more effective and efficient contributions to peace and stability in Africa, understanding the cross-cutting nature of problems will be necessary.

**Japan’s Approach to Africa**

Africa is a distant continent for Japan both geographically and psychologically.¹⁸ The focus of Japan’s engagement in the continent, therefore, is economic – including trade, investment and development assistance. Although Japan has increasingly supported African peace and stability – mainly through UN peacekeeping operations and official development assistance (ODA) since the end of the Cold War – the level of contribution will remain modest compared to that in other regions. This is due to several constraints.¹⁹

Japan’s approach to Africa – and its intended contribution to the continent’s peace and stability – has been outlined in the 2013 National Security Strategy (NSS) and other policy documents including the 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines and 2015 Development Cooperation Charter (DCC).²⁰ Recognising that ‘Africa is a prospective economic frontier with abundant strategic natural resources and sustained economic growth’ and that the continent is ‘increasing its influence in the international community’, the NSS states that ‘Japan will continue to contribute to the development and the consolidation of peace in Africa’.²¹ Based on the principle of a ‘proactive contribution to peace’, it also states that ‘Japan will further step up its cooperation with U.N. PKO [peacekeeping operations] and other international cooperation activities’.²²

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However, the relative unimportance of Africa compared to other regions such as the Asia-Pacific or the Middle East, where Japan’s immediate defence or energy security is at stake, and the political sensitivity over the deployment of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) overseas impose an important constraint on the country’s approach to Africa. Therefore, although the JSDF currently conducts overseas operations only in or around Africa, a large increase in its contribution to peace operations would be difficult.\textsuperscript{23}

International peace co-operation activities involving the deployment of the JSDF on the continent have been undertaken in limited areas with only small numbers of personnel. Although JSDF personnel have served in Africa from the mission in Mozambique in 1993 to the ongoing mission in South Sudan, the activity of deployed personnel has so far has been mostly restricted to humanitarian assistance or logistical support within the UN framework. In this context, their participation in the (non-UN) counter-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia is an important step in diversifying Japanese engagement. However, given the law-enforcement nature of the counter-piracy operation, along with little risk of Japan becoming involved in foreign conflict, it is unlikely that this experience will lead to substantial changes to Japan’s basic approach to peace and stability in Africa.

ODA is another, much bigger pillar of Japan’s support to African stability. At the Fifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD V) in 2013, for example, Japan committed assistance totalling $10 billion towards stability in the Sahel region. On his 2014 tour of African states, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe also announced $320 million of assistance to ‘respond to disasters and conflicts in Africa’, including $3 million of support to the AU-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA).\textsuperscript{24} Japan also assists peacekeeping training centres across Africa by constructing or repairing training facilities, providing equipment and sending Japanese experts.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{23} The lack of support from the general population makes the increase in numbers of Japanese peacekeepers in Africa all the more unlikely. The latest opinion poll shows that the majority of the Japanese population (55.5 per cent) thinks that Japan should maintain its current level of participation in UN peacekeeping operations, while only 25.5 per cent supports more active participation. Cabinet Office, ‘Gaikō ni Kansuru Yoronchosa [Opinion Poll on Foreign Affairs]’.


(JICA), an implementation agency of Japanese ODA, also supports peace-
building in the region. For example, it assists capacity-building and reform
of law-enforcement agencies in African countries – such as the police in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and coastguard in Djibouti. However,
the volume and experience of development assistance in the area of peace
and stability is, despite the increasing recognition of its importance, still
dwarfed by other activities such as infrastructure development and health,
and its co-ordination with JSDF activities also remains limited.\textsuperscript{26} Moreover,
given Japan’s ‘extremely severe fiscal situation’, the DCC cautiously avoids
committing to an increase in ODA;\textsuperscript{27} but without such an increase in funding,
it will be difficult to boost assistance in building and consolidating peace and
stability in Africa without adversely affecting activities currently undertaken
in other regions.\textsuperscript{28}

Thus, recent policy documents notwithstanding, a fundamental shift in
Japan’s modest approach to Africa is unlikely at least in the short term.\textsuperscript{29}
Given Japan’s current political and fiscal constraints, the possibility of further
co-operation with other countries – including the UK – needs to be explored
in order to maximise the effective and efficient use of the country’s resources.

**The UK Approach to Africa**

Compared to Japan’s modest engagement, the UK maintains closer
relationships with many African states: for instance, it is an exporter of
conventional arms to several African countries; it also intervened militarily in
Sierra Leone in 2000 and in Libya, as part of a NATO operation, in 2011. These
types of engagements are almost unthinkable for Japan in the foreseeable
future. However, despite this deeper involvement, the British approach
to Africa faces similar constraints to those of Japan. As a result, further
co-operation with other countries, including Japan, could help maintain
London’s influence and interests on the continent.

\textsuperscript{26} Although there were some linkages between ODA and JSDF activity in South
Sudan, it remains unclear how this type of co-operation will be continued or
possibly expanded in the future. MOFA, ‘Minamisūdan ni okeru ODA Jigyō to
Jieitai no Katsudou tono Renkei [Co-operation between an ODA Project and JSDF
release/25/2/0201_03.html>, accessed 22 June 2015.


\textsuperscript{28} The share of bilateral ODA allocated to sub-Saharan African countries was less than
15 per cent in 2013 and there is little to suggest that the percentage will increase.
International Cooperation Bureau, MOFA, *Seifuku Kaisei Enjo Kunibetsu Deta Bukku
2014 [Japan’s Official Development Assistance Data Book by Country 2014]* (Tokyo:

\textsuperscript{29} See Chapter I of this Whitehall Report for further discussion of the overarching
continuity rather than the change in Japan’s security policy.
Stabilisation is a key aspect of the British approach to fragile states. According to the 2011 Building Stability Overseas Strategy, stability is a broad concept encompassing a range of factors conducive to security and development.30 Under this concept, government agencies – especially the Department for International Development (DfID), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Home Office – are expected to work in an integrated manner, along with the Stabilisation Unit, through a cross-governmental funding mechanism: the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF). In support of stabilisation efforts, 30 per cent of British ODA has been directed to conflict-affected and fragile states as of the end of the financial year 2014/15.31 Moreover, the replacement of the Conflict Pool by the CSSF in April 2015 increased the budget available for these activities to £1 billion.

Africa is the biggest recipient of these funds. In 2013, it received 54 per cent of British bilateral ODA and the largest share among programmes of the then Conflict Pool.32 Of Conflict Pool funding invested in Africa, SSR and peace-building were the two largest components.33 In particular, according to the recent review of DfID’s security and justice programme, the total funding provided in this area worldwide has grown to £53 million in 2013/14 from £10 million in 2000/01. Furthermore, six of the ten largest programmes currently being implemented are in Africa.34

Entwined with SSR is the capacity-building of African militaries. British military advisers have trained officers in countries such as South Africa, Ghana and Kenya. Although training missions during the Cold War were intended to maintain relations with the Western Bloc, recent efforts meet the broader aims of international defence engagement on the accepted basis that capacity-building helps to prevent conflict, improve peacekeeping, tackle terrorism and weapons proliferation (both conventional and unconventional), and combat illegal trafficking and piracy, all of which are considered necessary for stability overseas and the UK’s security and prosperity.35 Bolstering the

APSA through capacity-building of African troops is a case in point. In Sierra Leone, the British-led training programme played a key role in enabling the Sierra Leone armed forces to participate in the African Union/United Nations hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2009 and AMISOM in 2013.

These various engagements notwithstanding, the British approach to facilitating peace and stability in Africa also faces constraints. First, and most fundamentally, Africa – especially south of the Sahara – is of relatively small strategic importance for the UK. Thus much financial assistance to the continent is not necessarily rooted in direct British national interest, but rather in humanitarian and development interests. This tendency became particularly pronounced during the Blair governments, but seemed to continue under the 2010–15 coalition government.36 Faced with continued instability and uncertainty in Ukraine and the Middle East, where – for geopolitical and historical reasons – the UK has bigger interests at stake, it would be difficult for the UK to undertake a large, long-term military deployment to Africa, as its small contribution to UN peacekeeping operations attests.37 This may be partly because of the British preference for NATO or other arrangements rather than the UN; but, at the same time, it reflects the view of British decision-makers that sub-Saharan Africa is ‘a part of the world considered of relative strategic insignificance’.38 This does not preclude the possibility of short-term military intervention there in response to a crisis – as was the case in Sierra Leone – but a large, long-term military engagement, seen as a politically costly option after Afghanistan and Iraq, will be difficult.

Second, fiscal constraints overshadow the British engagement in Africa; as the 2010 NSS clearly states, the ‘most urgent task is to return our nation’s finances to a sustainable footing’.39 While ODA spending, most of which

is administered by DfID, has increased in the last few years to meet the internationally agreed target of 0.7 per cent of national income, two other arms of British engagement overseas – the MoD and the Foreign Office – have suffered from recent spending cuts. Austerity measures might not necessarily mean British disengagement from Africa; nevertheless, competition for scarce resources within and between government departments means that the current level of contribution to the continent may not be guaranteed. At the very least, the effectiveness and efficiency of the British approach to African peace and stability will come under increasing scrutiny.

**Japan, the UK, and African Peace and Stability**

Given the fundamental values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law shared by the UK and Japan, the potential areas of stability and development co-operation between the two countries should be broad.\(^{40}\) Such co-operation could not only help overcome the constraints each faces, but also improve the effectiveness of their approaches in Africa. The rest of this chapter focuses on SSR and capacity-building as two potential areas of Japan–UK co-operation.

The UK has played an important role in developing and operationalising SSR and has poured substantial amounts of money into SSR efforts in Africa. The assistance provided in this regard to Sierra Leone was particularly significant in terms of the resources devoted and the duration of the commitment, which lasted for more than a decade.\(^{41}\) Aside from the success of this effort, UK capacity-building in Sierra Leone also generated invaluable ‘lessons learned’, which have informed the UK’s assistance to other African countries – in Libya, for example, where the emphasis on a holistic, cross-governmental approach is evident in the Security, Justice and Defence Programme begun in September 2013, which spans reform and capacity-building of the police, justice and defence sectors to support for arms and ammunition control and border management. However, although the UK’s experience and expertise on SSR is substantial, it does not necessarily mean that success is guaranteed: the mixed record of SSR suggests that further improvement from the planning to the delivery of assistance is required.\(^{42}\) Moreover, the effectiveness of such assistance largely depends on the prevailing security situation: indeed, British assistance to Libya was suspended suddenly in 2014.

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Meanwhile, Japan’s SSR-related efforts have been led by JICA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), focusing on specific sectors such as police and justice. Through the UN, MOFA also provides support for military capacity-building, primarily in the context of peacekeeping operations. This includes assistance to peacekeeping training centres and a new assistance package announced in 2014, which aims to build an African rapid-response capability by providing engineering equipment and training. While the Japanese Ministry of Defense (JMoD) has undertaken capacity-building programmes since 2012, focused on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security and peacekeeping operations, these have so far been implemented only in a limited number of Asian countries. Despite these recent efforts, cross-governmental co-operation is still underdeveloped in comparison to the UK — and especially between the JMoD on the one hand and MOFA and JICA on the other. This is partly due to the lack of a coherent strategy for, or comprehensive experience of, SSR.

These differences notwithstanding, there are three reasons why Japan–UK co-operation on SSR in Africa should be explored. First, at a time when substantial personnel contributions are difficult for both Japan and the UK, SSR assistance requires a commitment of relatively small numbers of personnel compared to peacekeeping operations or other military interventions. Second, by sharing the political and financial burden, they can expand their assistance portfolio while maintaining the level of investment. This would help to diversify the risks – such as a deteriorating security situation or the unwillingness of local partners – and expand opportunities for lesson learning. Third, and most importantly, SSR and capacity-building are best suited to respond to current security challenges in Africa.

Indeed, as discussed above, Africa suffers from a number of internal, non-state conflicts that cause large numbers of civilian casualties. In most, if not all, cases, what African security institutions – both military and police – need the most is the capacity to assure local populations and establish their legitimacy through protecting civilians from political and criminal violence, rather than a high-intensity war-fighting capability. This type of capability is also required in peacekeeping operations, as the protection of civilians has become a central component of newly mandated missions.

for responding to natural disasters or infectious diseases lies with other public authorities, the skills and assets of security forces, especially of the military, have been increasingly in demand. During the Ebola crisis, the UK, the US and France, among others, deployed their militaries to help construct medical facilities and deliver necessary equipment to affected countries. Their support has been undoubtedly helpful, but some reports indicate that some of this external assistance might have come too late to achieve maximum effectiveness.\textsuperscript{44} This suggests the importance of strengthening local capacity so that African states can quickly and effectively respond to time-sensitive emergency situations themselves.\textsuperscript{45} Cases such as the need for counter-piracy off the coast of Somalia also demonstrate the importance of strengthening local maritime capacity: the international mission has undoubtedly been effective but at a surprisingly high financial cost.\textsuperscript{46}

Due to its legal and political constraints, Japan’s contribution to SSR and capacity-building may be limited to actions that help improve governance, build the police and justice sectors, or develop non-fighting capabilities of security forces, such as engineers.\textsuperscript{47} The importance of these contributions should not be underestimated, however. Improving governance is the key to successful SSR, and the necessity of police and justice reform has often been recognised. Thus, Japan can still make invaluable contributions in filling these gaps in SSR.


\textsuperscript{45} Stronger local capacity may prevent the outbreak of infectious diseases in the first place and does not require military involvement. However, given the fact that many developed countries including the UK and Japan often ask their armed forces to play a substantial role in responding to natural disasters and other humanitarian catastrophes, building the military capacity in recipient states is still important. Albrecht Schnabel and Marc Krupanski, \textit{Mapping Evolving Internal Roles of the Armed Forces}, SSR Paper 7 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2012).


\textsuperscript{47} The revision of the International Peace Cooperation Law currently discussed at the National Diet will allow the JSDF to embark on wider areas of defence reform in the context of peacekeeping operations or other UN-authorised missions. It is still politically improbable, however, that the JSDF will directly support improving the fighting capabilities of other countries.
Developing military-engineering capability could also help improve security in Africa. The combination of ‘ineffective or small security agencies’ and ‘poor infrastructure and difficult terrain’ in the continent has contributed to the prevalence of non-state armed conflict. Furthermore, assistance in building engineering capacity is less controversial than the provision of hi-tech equipment which, although a quick and easy solution, carries the risk of misuse against civilian populations. Moreover, engineering capability can be of great help internally in fighting insurgent or other non-state armed groups in remote areas, while, externally it is also critical in the successful implementation of peacekeeping operations in Africa, in which increasing numbers of African countries are participating.

Military engineering capabilities can also contribute to economic development through improved infrastructure. While Japan and other donors have supported many large infrastructure projects across Africa, they tend to focus on urban cities, resource-rich areas, and major ports and airports. As a result, infrastructure in rural and conflict-affected areas remains underdeveloped. The World Bank has estimated that fragile countries need to spend more than one-third of GDP on infrastructure development in order to meet increasing needs and boost economic development. Specifically, funding is needed for electricity, irrigation, transportation, water and sanitation, and information technologies in those countries. While, in principle, civilian authorities and private companies should play a leading role in this area, military engineers can help fill the investment gap, particularly in unstable environments. Nurturing engineering skills in the military could therefore contribute to the development of the home state by making the military a source of skilled engineers. By providing the skills and then facilitating

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48. For the importance of building engineering capacity of armed forces (albeit not specifically in Africa), see Christopher K Tucker, ‘Afghanistan Needs an Army Corps of Engineers’, *National Interest*, 16 April 2014.
53. The report sets economic and social targets of infrastructure development in each sector. The target for the water and sanitation sector, for example, is to meet the Millennium Development Goals (that is, to halve the proportion of the population currently without access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation), and the economic target for the energy sector is to attain demand–supply balance in production. For the detail of targets, see *ibid.*, p. 52.
smooth reintegration of retired or demobilised soldiers into civilian life, such activity could contribute to stability at the community level.54

Conclusion: The Case for Japan–UK Joint Engagement in Africa
Given current security challenges in Africa and the limitations of Japan and the UK in expanding their regional engagement, the two countries should explore co-operation in SSR and capacity-building in Africa. But why should this be the case and how should this co-operation move forward?

As shown, sub-Saharan Africa has not necessarily been a high priority for either Japan or the UK. In the short term, co-operation in other strategically important regions such as the Asia-Pacific or the Middle East may be of more direct benefit to both countries. However, further co-operation in Africa is worth exploring for three reasons. First, British and Japanese ties with African countries seem to be increasingly under pressure as the presence of emerging powers, particularly China, on the continent is growing. Japan–UK co-operation will help to strengthen these existing ties by improving the effectiveness of their engagement. Second, by widening the area of co-operation geographically, Japan–UK co-operation can be portrayed as a partnership in pursuit of the global public good rather than a traditional alliance formed against specific enemies. Assistance towards the development of peace and stability in Africa is one of the few issues on which almost unanimous support already exists from within the international community.55 Third, although many challenges in Africa are unique to the region, the experience and best practice of co-operation between Japan and the UK could then be utilised in other contexts, including in Asia. As Japan and the UK discuss the early conclusion of the bilateral Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement which will enable them to share supply materials and transportation during their military operations, issues of interoperability and co-ordination will likely come to the fore. Co-operation in Africa will provide an invaluable learning opportunity through which the two countries will be able to recognise and overcome challenges to their close co-operation in other regions.

Since SSR is cross-sectoral, Japan–UK co-operation in SSR should be explored through a multi-agency channel. In particular, both the UK and Japanese National Security Councils will need to play a leading role in facilitating co-operation. Foreign and defence ministerial meetings, the first of which was held in January 2015, are also a good place to discuss further co-operation

55. This is perhaps another reason why the majority of UN peacekeeping operations are undertaken in Africa, despite the prevalence and intensity of conflict elsewhere – for example, in Syria.
on cross-cutting agendas, including SSR. The first step will be to share their respective experiences with regard to Africa and SSR – a process which will not only result in the sharing of expertise but also assist in identifying specific needs and opportunities for co-operation. The cross-deployment of military officers in countries where Japan and the UK are already engaged in capacity-building would also be beneficial for mutual learning.

Despite the many hurdles that stand in the way, given the continuing challenges in Africa, the constraints facing both countries and the opportunities their co-operation will offer, concrete steps such as these should be taken towards Japan–UK co-operation in support of peace and stability in Africa at the earliest opportunity.

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56. At the first foreign and defence ministerial meeting, Japan and the UK agreed, for example, to promote co-operation on peacekeeping operations and humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief missions, both of which are also cross-sectoral in nature. ‘UK-Japan Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting: Joint Statement Annex: Areas for Cooperation’, 21 January 2015, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000066167.pdf>, accessed 23 June 2015.

57. In this phase, a ‘Track 2’ or ‘Track 1.5’ process involving academic researchers would be particularly helpful as it would facilitate evidence-based, candid discussion between the two countries.
VI. The Prospects for Japan–UK Collaboration in Defence Equipment

Trevor Taylor

Japan has considered national defence industrial capabilities to be important to both its economy and security since the early 1950s, when its post-1945 demilitarisation period came to an end. Thus it sought to rebuild its defence industry through the licensed production of foreign systems (primarily bought from the US), such as the F-15, and the development of national defence platforms including armoured vehicles and warships. However, the Japanese government did not seek to promote defence exports and in 1967 adopted a formal Three Principles policy which prohibited the sale of arms to states that were communist, under UN sanctions or engaged in armed conflict. In practice, however, Japan did not allow any defence exports except under specific circumstances to the US, on which it relied greatly for its security.¹

This approach became less and less viable after the end of the Cold War because of the rising cost and complexity of defence equipment and the weakness in the Japanese economy. The Japanese government was having trouble maintaining the commitment of its defence suppliers, especially subcontractors, to the market.² Moreover, after seventy years of democracy, important parts of the political spectrum in Japan felt that the country should benefit from similar security and defence options as other leading Western countries,³ particularly in being able to use its armed forces outside

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3. The most recent relaxations of restrictions on defence exports were undertaken by two successive administrations (President Noda of the Democratic Party of Japan and then-President Abe of the Liberal Democratic Party) and should be seen in the context of the debates about Japan becoming a ‘normal country’ able to integrate a defence element into its external policies. See, for instance, Lionel Pierre Fatton, ‘Is Japan Finally a Normal Country?’, Diplomat, 27 December 2013. Some see the easing of export restrictions as part of a long-term trend in which Japan takes on similar defence options to others: ‘The entire course of Japan’s post-war defence policy has been a slow march towards normalcy’; see Aurelia George Mulgan, ‘Japan’s Security Dilemma’, Security Challenges (Vol. 1, No.1, 2005), p. 60, <http://
the country but also including the related topics of defence exports and
defence acquisition.

In 2011–12, the then ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) changed
policy to allow the country to participate in international development and
production projects, exports for peace-building purposes (for instance, for
use by UN peace forces) and defence exports for humanitarian reasons.4
This policy development enabled Japan to sign bilateral defence-technology
co-operation agreements, initially with the UK and Australia.5

Then, in the spring of 2014, the Abe administration secured National Security
Council, cabinet and government approval for significantly modifying the
old policy enshrined in the Three Principles, pursuing instead an approach
similar to that of NATO countries.6

The new weapons-export policy again affirmed three points, asserting that
Japan would not export arms to countries which: violated international
treaties to which Japan was a party; had violated UN Security Council
resolutions; or were involved in international conflict, as determined by
the UN Security Council. The revised direction also stated that Japan would
require recipient countries to have sufficient weapon-technology control
systems so as to protect against the potential misuse of weapons, and to be
aligned with Tokyo’s stated vision of international peace and security.7

Thus, technically, Japan still has a policy of the ‘Three Principles on Transfer
of Defense Equipment and Technology’8; however, the detail and the
interpretation of the principles have changed substantially. The new policy
has begun to be reflected in practice, with Japan supplying patrol boats

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1 January 2014, p. 23.
5. Foreign Office et al., ‘Foreign Secretary Signs Groundbreaking Defence and Security
Agreements with Japan’, press release, 4 July 2013; Daniel Hurst, ‘Tony Abbott
Describes Japan as “Exemplary International Citizen”’, Guardian, 8 July 2014.
Defence Weekly, 5 March 2014, p. 10; Japan Times, ‘New Arms Export Principles,
Guidelines Are Adopted by the Abe Cabinet’, 1 April 2014.
7. Shannon Dick and Hana Rudolph, ‘Japan Updates Arms Export Policy’, Spotlight,
Stimson Centre, 24 April 2014.
8. See speech by Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera to the 13th IISS Asia Security
for coast-guard roles to the Philippines and Indonesia, and potentially also
to Vietnam.9 Perhaps more significantly, in July 2014, Japan is reported
to have approved the export of PAC-2 missile parts to the US for onward
delivery to Qatar.10

The changes to the export-control regime raise two possibilities. The first is
the export of defence goods which are developed and produced by Japan,
and serious discussions are already underway about a possible sale of
Japanese submarines, or at least submarine-engine technology, to Australia.

The second is that Japan could become a partner in collaborative development
and production projects, which have been common particularly among
European states. With Japan’s new freedoms on exports, it could ‘export’ its
elements of any such projects for final assembly in partner states. It could
also agree a regime with partner countries that would govern the export of
any collaborative project to non-partner states, although this would unlikely
be a straightforward exercise.

London is particularly interested in the collaborative route as Japan has
signalled that it sees the UK as its most likely initial collaborative partner.
Japan also recognises the pressures to work with the US on a bilateral basis,
although that would generate a rather different and perhaps even more
demanding agenda.

National Defence Products and Their Export
Japan’s potential to develop national defence products should not be
underestimated. It obviously has a very strong science, technology and
manufacturing base. It excels in the electronics sector in an era when
electronics and computing is at the heart of many defence capabilities. In
aerospace, its recent endeavours include a new (albeit somewhat delayed)
transport aircraft, the Kawasaki C-2, and the same company’s P-1 Maritime
Patrol Aircraft (MPA). This is an airframe specifically designed for the role,
with the capability for sustained low-level operations and extended time

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9. Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 13th IISS Asian Security Summit,
dialogue/archive/2014-c20c/opening-remarks-and-keynote-address-b0b2/keynote-
10. Bradley Perrett, ‘A New Source: Japan’s Policy Change on Arms Exports Opens
Opportunities for Foreign Partners’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 28 July 2014,
p. 26. Other sources confirm Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’s (MHI) involvement in the
Patriot missile system: see Anna Fifield, ‘Defence and Military Manufacture Makes
a Comeback as Japan Struggles with its Wartime Legacy’, Independent, 11 January
2014; Bradley Perrett, ‘Japan Allows MHI to Supply PAC-2 Parts to Raytheon’, Aviation
ShinMaywa has developed a unique second-generation, large amphibious aircraft, the US-2. Japan also has a strong radar industry and is working on systems that can detect the ‘stealthy’ aircraft that China and Russia are developing. Despite the problems with the FSX/F-2 programme, the Japanese defence ministry has clear hopes of developing a new fighter aircraft to be procured after Japan’s purchase of the F-35: to date it is understood to have invested about $1 billion into early work on the engine and airframe for the twin-engine F-3 concept which stresses range, weapons and networking (in contrast to the sensor and stealth emphasis of the F-35). Japan’s programmes in this area reflect the desire to strengthen its aerospace industry. A high-altitude, long-endurance surveillance unmanned aerial vehicle proposed by the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency is meant for civil-disaster management purposes, but it would obviously have potential military utility.

However, Japanese-developed combat air platforms and complex weapons are likely to prove unattractively expensive even to a Japanese government (regardless of political hue), unless notable export markets can be discovered. These would help spread fixed costs (especially research-and-development and production-investment expenses) over a longer production run while helping firms to keep the skills and talents necessary for development and production in the periods after the Japanese demand for a system had been satisfied and before a new requirement had emerged. The need for export markets has become apparent, not just in defence companies in Europe, but also in the US. In the case of the C-2, for which Japan’s need is only around fifty aircraft, Kawasaki is hoping for sales in the civilian world.

However, on a unilateral basis, Japan would not find it easy or comfortable to break into the already very competitive international markets for defence products. In 2015 it has been exploring possible British interest in the P-1 MPA, but will find it hard to overcome the predisposition of many in the UK services and political establishment towards the US P-8 system.

In addition to the recognised high cost of many Japanese defence products, there is a need for the assured provision of other capability elements besides equipment. Intelligent defence customers realise that for equipment to be a foundation for usable capability, purchasing armed forces need individual...
and collective training, including for combat. In addition, equipment must also be maintained and repaired so as to achieve appropriate availability levels, which means extensive support documentation has to be provided. English is the most obvious language for training and support material and activities. Given that Japanese commercial products are supported by much non-Japanese-language material, it can be assumed that the Japanese defence industrial sector could overcome this hurdle. However, although Tokyo has been ready to provide training and other support for coast-guard operations to countries receiving its patrol boats, there must be a question about whether the Japanese government and armed forces will regularly be ready to take on the sort of training and other roles that rivals in the defence market already provide.

Thus, although Japan has formally changed its policy, there are few governments in the world that have the money to afford Japanese equipment and the kind of political respectability and good-governance arrangements that Japan might look for in customers receiving Japan-badged defence systems, as opposed to systems such as the Patriot with some Japanese content. EU states have set eight criteria relating to standards in importing countries that exporting states should consider before concluding an arms-export agreement. However, all that is required is that these standards are taken into account: if they were to transform considerations into requirements that had to be satisfied before an arms export were approved, very few deals with states outside of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) would pass. Moreover, even in cases where Japan were willing to sell, the potential customer might not be confident that Japan would be able to increase or even maintain support for the equipment concerned if the equipment recipient became involved in a shooting conflict. Tokyo’s formal stance is not to supply arms to states involved in international conflicts, although arguably it is such states which have the most urgent and clear needs. France, the UK and the US, by contrast, are sometimes selected as defence suppliers because the purchaser feels they will get physical backing from the equipment-supplier state in the event of a crisis.

In light of the above, a *prima facie* proposition would be that Japanese national defence products would have to offer clear advantages in terms of price and performance in order to succeed within the world market. Japan appears to recognise the weight of these arguments and its strategic approach to the development of its national defence industrial capabilities pays little attention to the export of indigenously developed final products. Overall, in terms of international competitiveness, the Japanese Ministry of Defense appears to see its companies as stronger in the technological
domain than in costs and prices, mainly because of the impact of low-volume production.\textsuperscript{17}

On the other hand, Japanese concerns about China are leading it to seek stronger relations with other regional states, and this could lead Japan to add a substantial aid element to its defence-export offerings in order to reinforce bilateral relations with countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, India, the Philippines and even Vietnam. The supply of patrol boats to the Philippines is a sign of such considerations.\textsuperscript{18}

**The Potential for Japan–UK Collaborative Projects**

Given that Japanese national defence projects reinforced by exports face a difficult future, what are the possibilities for Japan working with other states, in particular the UK, in the development and production of new defence systems?

This can be examined using force-field analysis, which essentially involves the identification of factors that support change in one direction and those that resist it.

First, and rather specifically, the new and controversial secrecy law in Japan, which came into effect only at the end of 2014 and which is broadly equivalent to the Official Secrets Act in the UK, should give the UK and other Western states increased confidence about the security of any classified information passed to Japan as part of collaborative work.\textsuperscript{19}

A second consideration is the basic similarities between Japan and the UK. Both are large island states, with populations that have an insular perspective with regard to the rest of the world as a result of their geography. There is an old expression in the UK that sums up how many British people think: ‘fog in the Channel, the Continent is cut off’. Also, as Simon Chelton has observed, Japan and the UK tend to vote the same way at the UN.\textsuperscript{20} They are both dynamic democracies with a strong manufacturing tradition and a history of successfully working together.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p. 22.


on defence projects at the beginning of the twentieth century. Japanese success in the 1904–05 war with Russia owed much to the naval technology it had acquired from the UK.\(^\text{21}\) Although distant in time, it is not forgotten in Japan. The defence budgets of the two countries are similar in size and both are under pressure: their governments should therefore be open to new, mutually advantageous ways of working in defence acquisition.

Third, the UK has long recognised that it cannot afford the fixed costs of developing and producing major defence platforms, especially in the aerospace dimension of defence. The ‘Plowden report’ in 1965 found that the UK did not have the resources to develop its own future combat aircraft indigenously.\(^\text{22}\) Consequently, the UK has been ready to explore collaborative opportunities and in many cases has opted for such a route. Both Japan and the UK can be seen in the same uncomfortable position in terms of overall defence acquisition. As industrially and technologically advanced states, they face similar decisions: each can choose to develop an expensive national project; purchase a developed product from overseas with all that implies for employment, foreign exchange and of course external dependence for the support phase; or collaborate with another state or states on development, production and possibly support. Offsets or licensed production may mitigate some of the disadvantages of buying from elsewhere, but these options are usually associated with significant costs and sometimes risk. The UK has had many good experiences in buying from the US, but there is nonetheless widespread awareness among defence-acquisition professionals of the problems of dealing with US export-control regulations.

Winston Churchill is said to have observed that, in politics, democracy was a terrible system but still better than any of the alternatives. The UK has viewed defence-equipment collaboration in the same way, as indicated by its historical practice. Indeed, the UK is basically open to collaborative projects with appropriate partners and spends almost a quarter of its procurement money on such programmes, mostly with European states.\(^\text{23}\)

A fourth consideration, however, puts reservations on the UK stance. While Japan sees collaboration as the norm in the West for very advanced systems,\(^\text{24}\) many in the UK defence-acquisition domain are concerned


\(^{24}\) JMoD, ‘Strategy on Defence Production and Technological Bases’.
that collaborative projects too often are not well managed, and that the more partners there are, the more likely it is that decision-making will be unnecessarily slow. There is therefore a contemporary preference for confidence that the UK's future partners will be clear, decisive and committed, and adopt the same degree of urgency as the UK in any project: hence the current desire for working with France, which is recognised as having a similar outlook regarding the utility of national armed forces. In short, the UK is unlikely to commit to major collaborative projects with Japan unless it has confidence in Japan's own commitment and its military need for the materiel involved in the agreed timescale.

Fifth, at present there seem to be no stand-out national needs in the UK and Japan that could be met through a commonly developed system. In part this is because the coalition government elected in the UK in 2010 was focused on reducing the number and scale of approved projects into an affordable package. As a result, less attention was given to new projects; indeed, there is a dearth of major development activity in the current UK portfolio. Moreover, while there is an established network of UK contacts with major allies – both on a bilateral and collective basis through NATO and the European Defence Agency – to support the identification of shared requirements, the Anglo-Japanese machinery in this area is far less developed.

Sixth, Japan has expressed a clear interest in working with the UK and others on defence projects but its companies have little experience in this regard and know US businesses much better than UK defence firms. Also, at least from the Western perspective, while Japan has recognised that 'enormous effort is often required to co-ordinate and manage the project among participating nations',\(^\text{25}\) it is not yet clear if the wider governmental machine in Japan fully understands the myriad formal and informal matters needed to make a collaborative project work. Defence collaborative projects would involve the defence, foreign, finance, and trade and industry ministries as well as the export-control authorities. It is therefore useful to point out just a few of the issues associated with defence collaboration:

- What is to be the legal or formal basis for a project? Is it to be a memorandum of understanding (MoU), which would be politically but not legally binding, or a treaty, which would need parliamentary ratification and submission to the UN?
- Into what phases will a project be divided and which phases of the life cycle of equipment will be covered by collaborative activities? Will there be an initial agreement only for development, or will development and production be addressed in one package? Recent

\(^{25}\) Ibid., p. 9.
European projects have seen increasing pressures to extend collaboration into the in-service phase, but this has not proved straightforward. However, in April 2015 Japan provided itself with more freedom of action by extending the limit on the time period covered by public-sector contracts to ten years from five years.

- What system for requirements engineering and contracting will be used to define the overall needs that must be satisfied by the project and what are the obligations of the private sector in this process?
- On what basis will work be shared among the partners in the project? Will the widely used but often costly system of *juste retour* be applied, which involves allocating financial contributions and workshare on the basis of expected production off-take from the project, or will contracts be awarded to the companies judged best able to execute them? Japan has traditionally sought to partner with preferred national suppliers when buying defence equipment and has felt that it can make little use of competitive tendering. Moreover, its motive for considering collaboration is to strengthen domestic suppliers. It thus might be reluctant for competitive tendering to play much of a role in any collaborative arrangement.
- What provision will be made for technology intellectual-property rights and transfers? Will it be envisaged that both/all partners will be given the information that will enable them to sustain and modify equipment on a sovereign and national basis or will some information be withheld? As a related issue, if it appears uneconomic to establish two separate sources of spares for any collaborative project, what arrangements will be agreed to deal with assurance and agility of supply in the event of conflict and more intensive use of the system?
- How will delivery to participating states be arranged – which systems will be delivered to each state and when will they receive these? One problem in the establishment and operation of collaborative projects is that two countries can share a need but have different degrees of urgency. This is normally because they have existing equipment serving a function which the collaborative project is ultimately intended to fill.
- What arrangements are to be made regarding possible withdrawal from a project? When two countries commit to a joint course of action and accept a position of mutual dependence, if one subsequently decides to withdraw, there is an argument that it should make available the intellectual property in its possession that would enable the remaining members of the team to complete the project without too much additional expense. Will Japan be able to agree to the sort of withdrawal terms that the UK and other European states might require?

• What arrangements are to be made for the management of any collaborative project, both at the governmental and corporate levels? Europeans have generated several models, including passing many responsibilities to a formal international body, OCCAR (Organisation conjointe de coopération en matière d’armements). On the other hand, the medium-range air-to-air Meteor missile, in which Japan has a real interest, is largely managed by the UK on behalf of its partners.

• What arrangements are to be made for the export to third parties of any equipment produced as a collaborative activity? This can be expected to be especially important to the UK and Japan for different reasons. The MoUs governing these agreements are not in the public domain, but the common European arrangement appears to be a formal position which allows any partner to veto the export of a collaborative project. This has been accompanied by the informal, but recognised, practice that partners would not exercise this right, and that they would trust each other’s judgement as to the reasonableness of an export. A related issue is which country and company should lead on the marketing of a collaborative project, and in which areas of the world? On defence-export control policy, Japanese and European considerations have somewhat different emphases but in general they are compatible. Thus an export regime for collaborative projects would be difficult but not unthinkable.

Two political issues must also be taken into account. The first of these relates to the attitude of the US. How will the US react to the possibility of the UK and Japan working together to bolster their defence industrial structures and make their armed forces less reliant on US suppliers? The wording of the question suggests the answer. There is extensive awareness within the UK defence-acquisition community that the US government (which includes Congress) is normally oriented towards the protection of US defence industrial interests. Thus there is a need to note the issue of whether the UK and Japan will be ready to live with any US opposition to their co-operation that may arise.

A further political matter concerns China. If Sino–Japanese relations continue to deteriorate, would London be happy to undertake defence collaboration with Japan if it judged that the UK consequently would lose economic opportunities in the Chinese market? This would be an even bigger issue for Germany, for which China is economically very important. Certainly any UK consideration of defence co-operation with Japan would have to weigh its potential impact on relations with China.
Conclusion

The core democratic, economic and technological situations of Japan and the UK present real opportunities for closer collaboration between the two countries on defence equipment. It is far from unthinkable that, in twenty years’ time, the two countries could be working together on a range of projects and, indeed, Japan could have begun collaborative defence work with a number of OECD states in Europe and elsewhere.

However, any clear-eyed look at the possibilities would have to recognise that a significant number of challenges will have to be addressed for this to occur. In high-level terms, many areas of government and business in Japan will have to learn the dimensions of the collaborative agenda and Tokyo will have to consider, and then probably negotiate, the terms on which it wishes to collaborate. The likely responses of China and the US will have to be taken into account and managed. Both the UK and Japan will have to reach conclusions on the risks as well as the benefits of working together. The current leadership in the UK Ministry of Defence wants to ensure that its collaborative defence projects are more effectively managed than in the past.

There are two prudent and sensible areas of collaboration: initially on protection measures for biological weapons and then possibly the insertion of Japanese technology into a European system – the Meteor missile. The former has been quietly underway for over a year and the latter possibility is being explored by the companies concerned. Since both the UK and Japan are buying the F-35, it opens the possibility that the two countries could negotiate together with the US and Lockheed Martin regarding the integration of Meteor onto the aircraft. These modest and not-so-small steps will enable greater familiarity at the governmental level with each other’s acquisition systems and strengthen practical links at the industrial level. Those considering the broad topic of management in complexity advocate small, experimental steps. This approach means that partners can withstand any failures while still learning valuable lessons.

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equipment collaboration, involving a mass of political, technical, military and financial considerations among many stakeholders over a protracted period of time, would appear to justify the ‘complexity’ label. However, at some stage in the near future, the partners may seek a real test by undertaking a significant flagship joint project.

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VII. Conclusion: Challenges and the Way Ahead

Michito Tsuruoka

As natural partners, Japan and the UK are seeking to strengthen their security and defence co-operation. Each chapter of this Whitehall Report has demonstrated that there are a number of areas where London and Tokyo share interests, which provide the foundation for further development of the relationship. In particular, the two countries could work together on engagement with other Asian states, maritime security and defence diplomacy, as well as enhance co-operation in relation to Africa and defence equipment. This list is not exhaustive: cyberspace; outer space; and intelligence are other promising and necessary areas for Japan–UK co-operation.1 Owing to the increasing connectivity between Europe and Asia, the security of Japan and the UK are also becoming more interdependent. As this trend will only continue, Japan–UK security co-operation must be seen as a strategic imperative.

While this report has focused on contemporary issues, it is worth noting that the Japan–UK partnership has a long history of addressing international challenges. The Anglo–Japanese alliance in the early twentieth century was an early example of the strategic interaction between the two countries. In the post-Second World War period, London has been Tokyo’s preferred and premier interlocutor in Europe both in economic and political terms.2 In the mid-2000s, London and Tokyo co-operated operationally in Iraq; Japan sent troops to southern Iraq – where UK troops were in charge of security – to provide humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. This was the start of a new phase of more concrete defence co-operation, which was undoubtedly facilitated by the long history of dialogue and engagement.

This concluding chapter will address some of the major challenges in pursuing this partnership further in the years to come.

Managing Expectations and Perceptions

The first challenge is to manage expectations and perceptions. As the authors of this Whitehall Report point out, it is unlikely that the UK will


substantially increase its military presence in Asia in the foreseeable future, mainly due to a lack of capability. Therefore, Tokyo cannot expect London to play an active and direct military role in the region. At the same time, even once the current debate in Japan on the interpretation of the constitution and security legislation is resolved, the country will not be able to engage in international combat missions alongside British forces, whether in the Middle East or Africa. Moreover, Japan’s attitude towards defence-equipment co-operation is likely to remain more cautious than some in the UK would like. While acknowledging that there is a wide range of areas where the two countries can co-operate and reap substantial benefits, therefore, expectations must always be managed.

Another key consideration, however, is those perceptions – of each other and of the international environment – which underlie these expectations. As such, it is essential to explore perceptions as well as expectations as factors in determining the progress of Japan–UK co-operation.

One of the principal areas where a perception gap between the two countries exists is China. Tokyo and London agree that the rise of China poses a fundamental problem for the maintenance of the rules-based international order for which both countries stand. However, as Jonathan Eyal argues in the introduction to this Whitehall Report, there is no agreement on how to deal with Beijing. The gap can largely be explained by the geographical locations of the two countries: Japan sits next to China, whereas the UK is on the other side of the globe. This means that London rarely encounters the same challenges as Tokyo in this regard: the ships of the People’s Liberation Army Navy do not frequent the UK’s territorial waters, for example.

In Japan, there is widespread suspicion and criticism that the UK emphasises the economic benefits of dealing with China at the expense of geopolitical and security factors. In other words, the UK is seen by Japan as being too soft on China. London’s decision to join the Beijing-proposed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank – the first G7 country to do so – annoyed many Japanese and was seen as yet another demonstration of the UK’s predominant focus on commercialism. Similarly, on the British side, some are worried that Japan’s position vis-à-vis China is too tough and inflexible, including with regard to historical matters. Moreover, Tokyo is often seen by London to be pushing it to choose between Japan and China in relation to regional tensions. While it is undeniable that these perceptions contain an element of truth, the reality is, unsurprisingly, more complex. London is increasingly concerned about Beijing’s assertive and unilateral behaviour in the South and East China Seas, as this could affect the UK’s interests more directly in the future. Likewise, the Sino–Japanese relationship contains a number of co-operative elements that contrast with the obvious tensions.
How Japan and the UK perceive each other therefore needs to be fully understood. This would be an important step in managing expectations and perceptions. On one hand, it is not in Japan’s interest for its policy towards China to be seen as being too rigid by focusing only on the hard military aspects. On the other hand, it is equally against the UK’s interest to be seen as being concerned only with economic benefits. Both countries need to convey the different and lesser-known aspects of their respective ties with China. It is also important to be aware of the expectations that each state has of the other. In this regard, it is worth highlighting that Japan does not expect the UK to play a direct military role in a possible conflict involving China.\(^3\)

Related to this discussion is what Robert Kennedy called ‘the importance of placing ourselves in the other country’s shoes’.\(^4\) Although this statement was made about the adversarial relationship between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, it is an apt reminder that countries inevitably view the world differently. These world views need to be understood before levelling criticism at other parties. It is fully understandable and hardly surprising that the UK does not want to be drawn into a Sino–Japanese conflict which might serve to jeopardise its relations with China by unnecessarily and prematurely siding with Tokyo. Similarly, Japan’s response to the Ukraine crisis in 2014, and in the months since, has been inherently different from that of countries geographically closer to Crimea or Moscow – including the UK. Tokyo, unsurprisingly, does not want to undermine its relations with Moscow too much as a result of the events in Ukraine.

Developments in Crimea, eastern Ukraine, and the East and South China Seas are widely viewed as attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion; however, neither ‘tough on Russia, but soft on China’ (or ‘punish Russia, but appease China’) nor ‘tough on China, but soft on Russia’ (or ‘punish China, but appease Russia’) are responsible policy options. If London were to argue for the former or Tokyo for the latter, it would likely be seen as irresponsible.\(^5\) It is necessary to have complete awareness of these wider interdependencies of policy, the matter of policy consistency, and, above all, of how such issues shape perceptions and impact interstate relationships. Japan–UK dialogue at various levels on those issues facing the two countries should offer a good opportunity to place ‘ourselves in the other country’s shoes’.

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Remaining the Best Regional Partner

On the occasion of Prime Minister David Cameron’s visit to Tokyo in April 2012, the two countries claimed that they are ‘each other’s most important partners in Asia and Europe, respectively’. This was indeed a bold statement given that both clearly have important ties to other countries in the respective neighbourhoods. There is no doubt that the UK has long been seen by Japan as its primary partner in Europe in political as well as economic terms: Tokyo has often used London as a reliable channel for communicating with Europe as a whole. For London, by contrast, China is an indispensable export market and destination for foreign direct investment. Indeed, at least in quantitative terms, China is arguably more important to the UK than Japan. The UK, however, does not share fundamental values with China. With Beijing’s increasing importance in international affairs, the political, economic and military challenges it poses will become more consequential, and Japan’s role as a reliable partner with similar values will become clearer.

One of the more obvious questions about the bilateral relationship is whether Japan and the UK can continue to be each other’s most important partners in the Asia-Pacific and Europe, respectively. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s active foreign and security policies are well received by the UK and other partners. Abe’s activist approach is exemplified by intense summit diplomacy and his determination to overhaul the country’s security-related legislation, which will facilitate Japan in addressing regional security challenges with a greater emphasis on hard power and increasing its international engagement under the banner of ‘proactive contribution to peace’. These efforts provide a good basis for strengthening the strategic partnership between Japan and the UK; and whether these can continue in the medium-to-long term will determine the extent to which this partnership can develop.

In the UK, particularly in the run-up to the general election in May 2015, there have been heated debates on the ambition of British foreign policy. The UK government’s apparent lack of enthusiasm for international engagement has caused concerns and generated criticism both domestically and abroad. Tokyo would certainly like the UK to remain engaged in the world, especially in Asia but also in Europe. Indeed, Japan sees the UK’s continued

membership of the EU as essential both economically and politically. This is not a political statement – it reflects the fact that foreign partners like Japan would prefer a UK with good relations with continental Europe, thereby playing a major role in keeping the European economy vibrant and the EU as a whole outward-looking. This would be better than the alternative: a UK isolated in Europe and with limited influence in the region. The same can be said about Japan, of course. For London, a Japan with stable and strong relations with its neighbours that also plays a leading regional role would be better than a Japan marred by history and other provincial issues. Such a Japan would not be able to exert influence commensurate with its power.

If Japan and the UK are to remain each other’s principal partners in Asia and Europe, both countries need a renewed domestic consensus on their respective levels of ambition regarding international engagement. Japan’s ongoing debates on security legislation provide a good opportunity to deepen public thought on these matters, while the UK’s forthcoming National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review are likely to stimulate similar discussion in this regard.

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