The Defence Review
Capability Questions for the New Government
Michael Codner

Issue
A general consensus exists between the new coalition partners on the basis of a strategic defence review, though Afghan operations continue to restrain radical thinking. They can probably finesse those political differences that do exist on security issues, but there are tough immediate choices to be made that will test the ability of the coalition to think strategically, regardless of party differences.

Context
Despite some political consensus on national military strategy, questions about the scale and balance of key capabilities remain. There are differences within the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition on Trident and on the balance between Atlanticism and Europeanism. Disagreement on Trident is on hold for now, and differences over a ‘Europe or US’ choice may be more apparent than real. The major choice for the defence review is between continental and maritime military strategies – a choice that will affect the future of British defence.

Key Findings
- The February defence green paper outlined five key premises for the forthcoming defence review: world status and influence; maintenance of the transatlantic relationship; national interest; moral purpose; and the NATO-European context.
- Major political party manifestos indicated a broad agreement to these premises, ensuring the review can now proceed promptly.
- The defence review should first define the capabilities needed for autonomous obligatory operations and then explore those required for expeditionary operations of choice.
- Autonomous obligatory operations must be covered in the defence budget. The scale of remaining capabilities turns on the level of world status and influence the nation is prepared to pay for.
- The hard strategic choice remains between continental and maritime expeditionary capability.
- Some capabilities, including command and control, ISTAR and helicopters, are required in full for either strategic option. For most others it is a matter of scale.
- The case for aircraft carriers would be confirmed by the maritime strategic choice; frigate numbers relate closely to obligation but quantification is difficult.
- There is not a strong case for retaining heavy armour.
Michael Codner

The British nation is now having its ‘Iolanthe’ moment. The Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties have agreed to form a coalition government. Defence, however, is an issue over which the two parties are widely perceived to have divergent views. At this critical time, strong political leadership with broad public support is urgently needed to address the economic situation and the ongoing war in Afghanistan, and ensure a defence budget is agreed. The defence review promised by all parties cannot wait any longer.

An earlier paper in this FDR series, ‘A Force For Honour? Military Strategic Choices for the United Kingdom’, outlined ten premises on which the present British military strategy rests. In summary, the UK seeks to retain international influence in a changing world; and values-led diplomacy and military operations are a primary way to secure the world environment that the UK depends upon, economically and geostrategically. The UK attains its greatest influence in conjunction with, and through, the United States; yet our expeditionary military capability must be effective and agile, and of sufficient scale to be genuinely useful as a strategic instrument, and not merely as a supplement to US capabilities. A level of operational autonomy that allows for strategic clout is also important.

The issue of world status and influence should have been clearly addressed in the general election. Though party leaders presented a broad consensus on the need for continued international influence and the importance of the British military contribution, there were subtle differences — but differences nonetheless — in matters of national interest, moral purpose, the multinational context and routes to world influence. These faultlines now run through the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition.

Mother Hubbard and Her Dogs of War

A corollary of agreement on these strategic premises is that the new government must be prepared to pay for the kind of defence capability Britain needs to ensure its place in the world. So far, there has been no clear commitment to outlining exactly how the desired British defence posture will be funded and supported. In previous FDR working papers, Malcolm Chalmers has reviewed quantitative evidence of the last two decades, concluding that the value of defence spending in terms of military capability is likely to continue to reduce substantially in the current economic climate. Government departments also agree that large cuts are necessary. The cost of defence typically rises well above the general rate of inflation. But, even if the defence budget is sustained in real terms, it will still be necessary to reduce capabilities and personnel. To honour the commitment to a robust expeditionary strategy — a
condition of status and influence – the election debate needed to consider one of the election’s most basic questions: Will defence spending be increased in real terms?

It is a tough question, but Britain is at a tipping point. In absolute terms, the UK is currently the fourth biggest defence spender in the world but the ninth largest economy. In other words, the country pays more for defence than its world economic standing justifies. The dilemma turns on the retention of world status: if the taxpayer is unprepared to fund defence at current levels (2.3 per cent of GDP), Britain will be unable to prevent its international influence dwindling. The UK could make moderate defence cuts or even slash defence spending to the NATO European average of 1.65 per cent. Either way, large cuts could be made if Britain abandoned its predilection for perceived world influence.

The Green Paper
The former Labour government’s green paper on defence was published on 3 February 2010. Its aim was, amongst other things, to begin to build a broad national consensus on key issues for a defence review after the election. All the major parties agreed that this review should take place. Both the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats oversaw the green paper process and, though they may not now consider themselves to be bound to it, the paper provides more than background and key questions. It makes key assertions and draws some specific conclusions, including: legislation for cyclical defence reviews; wholesale reform of the Ministry of Defence (including increasing the powers of the Chief of Joint Operations and reforming the command of the armed services); and integration of the defence review conclusions into the National Security Strategy. Assuming the coalition parties concede these points, the paper is a sound start for the review.

The green paper yields nine strategic premises that confirm the proposition on world status and influence, and contribute to the central question: How much is the nation prepared to pay for defence?

1. ‘We are more secure today than at most times in our history’; ie, to have an expeditionary strategy, one has to pay way above the odds for it.

2. ‘The UK has a stake in the success of the international rules-based system and should maintain an active global military role which complements our diplomatic efforts and enhances our influence on wider international developments’; ie, an expeditionary strategy offering global influence is the fundamental premise of the United Kingdom’s military strategy.
3. ‘Our Armed Forces protect our interests. We also use our Armed Forces as a Force for Good’.

4. ‘We must preserve the reputation of our Armed Forces’; ie, we must continue to honour the nation’s commitment to Afghanistan and other interventions that it undertakes with an appropriate and effective military contribution.

5. ‘No relationship is more important than that with the United States and our relationship also increases our impact’. The Conservatives and Liberal Democrats differ in their interpretation of this relationship and on how it should be developed, and in the Leaders’ Debate on 23 April, Nick Clegg agreed that it was ‘immensely important’ but ‘not a one-way street’.

6. ‘We must be able to undertake evacuation operations (over 12 million British citizens live overseas\textsuperscript{10}) and defence of the Overseas Territories on our own’; ie, an autonomous expeditionary capability that is independent of access agreements is an essential element of our force structure.

7. ‘NATO is essential to conventional deterrence, reassurance, and collective defence and a robust EU role in crisis management will strengthen NATO ... Playing a leading role at the heart of Europe will strengthen our relationship with the US ... France offers the opportunity for even greater co-operation’; ie, Britain needs reliable partners to make sense of an affordable force structure.

8. ‘Our economy is exceptionally open to trade with many parts of the world and relies on the free passage of goods, services and information’; ie, Britain must \textit{inter alia} have a major influence on protection of sea lines of supply.

9. ‘We have to begin the process of renewal of a minimum strategic nuclear deterrent because not to do so would effectively commit us now to unilateral disarmament.’ The Liberal Democrats do not accept the need for the present replacement programme to provide Continuous-At-Sea Deterrence, but they have not advocated abolishing nuclear deterrent capability.

In addition, the green paper concludes that ‘“Go first, go fast and go home” has proved false from recent history’. This raises the question, ‘What can recent history prove?’, since it is questionable whether the interventions of the last decade – alongside the US and without wholehearted multinational support – are really the template for the future. Instead, they could be seen as a deviation from a sensible pattern of interventions in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, in which the UK played its part and took its turn, withdrawing...
from leading roles when its time was up. Ultimately, the political approach to military interventions must in the first place relate to the scale and capacity for enduring commitment; there should be agreement to this across the political spectrum.

The Choices
In fact, there seems to be significant agreement amongst the main political parties, including the new coalition partners. Despite the purported differences, the election manifestos, front-bench speeches and leaders’ debates all appeared to propose similar policies on defence and the armed forces. (The specific threshold issues of Vanguard submarine replacement and Typhoon Tranche 3B are unlikely to jeopardise a coalition solution, which could even endure through a subsequent short-notice election.) Review of the recent political debate succinctly captures the range of issues and choices at the heart of the defence review. Of these, there are four ‘false dichotomies’ and three ‘clear choices’.

False Dichotomies
• **US or Europe?** From both the Conservative and Liberal Democrat manifestos, the UK apparently has to make a hard choice between a close relationship with the US and greater integration into Europe. But in fact, greater coherence between NATO and EU institutions would bring benefits on both sides of the Atlantic. The UK could be a hub for rationalising European military capability for burden-sharing in partnership with France. Such a constructive approach would certainly appeal to the US, which will be looking to Europe to mind its own backyard while America pursues interests and challenges elsewhere.

• **Security or Defence?** Will the new government’s policy be sufficiently mature and detailed to obviate grand strategic review, or is there a need for a wider security review that includes both domestic security and defence?

• **Home or Away?** The 1998 Strategic Defence Review confirmed expeditionary operations as the force driver for the armed forces, but the military’s first priority is also to ensure homeland security if a threat requires the specific and irreplaceable contribution of the armed forces to domestic security.

• **Afghanistan or the Future?** The Ministry of Defence must continue to meet the needs of the Afghan expeditionary operation, whilst also preparing for future conflicts. The expeditionary ‘continental’ strategic option presented in the ‘Force for Honour’ working paper allows for the continuity of a range of capabilities specifically tailored for Afghanistan, but at the expense of strategic agility.
Clear Choices

- **CASD or a Cheap Alternative?** Replacement of the nuclear deterrent is one issue over which there is a clear choice. A government decision has been made to proceed with a new class of submarine, but the bulk of the expenditure will not be committed until the middle of the decade. No major political party has yet abandoned replacement of Trident; the Liberal Democrats instead opted for intercontinental ballistic missiles launched from the *Astute*-class submarine. If a government were to reject replacement of the nuclear deterrent in the 2020s, then the present nuclear deterrent strategy would be so undermined that there would be little point in retaining the present system now. There would of course be large disposal costs.

- **Efficiency Savings or Risk-Free Budgeting?** Cost savings through greater efficiency may be possible, but this does not necessarily make an expensive expeditionary force structure affordable. A robust military strategy needs budgetary headroom to ensure strategic agility, and therefore the new government must assume worst-case options for efficiency savings in light of the changing security environment.

- **People or Kit?** During the election, all the parties rightly made commitments to the wellbeing of the armed forces through reviewed pay, allowances, housing, family support and patterns of operation. However, increased personnel costs will have to be offset against other elements of capability – including equipment – unless the budget increases or efficiency savings deliver on an ambitious scale.

The Defence Review: A Logical Sequence

In light of these choices, it is possible to construct a logical sequence of requirements for the defence review to address, in order to meet the following categories of needs:

- Protect against direct threats (autonomous obligations)
- Meet government obligations (contributory obligations)
- Permit expeditionary operations (autonomous operations of choice)
- Extend status and influence (contributory operations of choice).

**Autonomous Obligations**

1. **Defence of the UK mainland:** Territorial defence is the first responsibility of any government. Although NATO membership provides for collective defence, as an island nation the UK can and must protect against direct threats through air and sea control, and reactive land defence. The basic requirements are intelligence and surveillance, air defence and sea denial, to which a submarine force is a major contributor.
2. **Domestic Security within the British Isles:** Although the armed forces will typically support the civil power, the military instrument is uniquely useful for command and control in cases of extreme emergency. The capacity for interventions abroad must be based on the need for this form of military response to be available at home if needed. This includes special and ground forces in cases of insurgency, terrorism, high-level criminal acts and natural disasters; maritime protection of inland waterways and territorial seas, and preventative action in the UK’s Exclusive Economic Zone and elsewhere on the high seas; and air power to prevent the exploitation of air space by terrorists and criminals.

3. **Security and Defence of the Overseas Territories:** This ‘global archipelago’ requires land, maritime and air components to be rapidly deployable and available if necessary for garrisons, presence and other preventative and inducement operations.

4. **Evacuation of Non-Combatants:** When British citizens are at risk, the UK must be able to respond autonomously. These operations are particularly challenging because of the short notice for planning, and high levels of uncertainty and risk. Maritime and airlift capacity is the principal enabler for this kind of obligation.

**Contributory Obligations**

5. **Defence of the NATO Article V Area:** As a signatory of the Washington Treaty, the UK must defend its mainland and also the land, waters and airspace of NATO Allies against encroachment, bullying and ballistic missile attack. The UK must define and provide an appropriate contribution, in particular for preventative, precautionary and pre-emptive operations; these threats are likely to differ from those envisaged during the Cold War. An important element of this category is existential (or inherent) conventional deterrent capability or risk management in an uncertain world.

6. **Maritime Security:** This is a global challenge requiring a multinational response. The United Kingdom is nevertheless economically highly dependent on sea routes, and for this and other geostrategic reasons the British government is obliged to provide a significant contribution and level of leadership alongside other major maritime powers.

7. **Proactive Counter-terrorism:** It is argued that contemporary terrorism is best tackled at its source, yet offensive operations abroad may be a catalyst for indigenous terrorist attacks at home. Committing to the expeditionary strategy nevertheless obligates a proactive approach to this kind of terrorism. The
principal instruments are special forces, specialist infantry, and air power, which may in certain circumstances benefit from maritime basing.

**Contributory Operations of Choice**
8. These include expeditionary operations that are motivated by world influence and Force for Good arguments, and in support of the US-UK relationship; the prime example is the Iraq war. Afghanistan is more difficult to categorise: if the motivation is, as claimed, to prevent Al-Qa’ida re-establishing its presence in Afghanistan and constituting a domestic threat to the UK, then it could be classified as a category 7 operation of contributory obligation.

However, the operational purpose is clearly more complex. In any event, though it may be argued otherwise (that the distinction between obligation and choice is false) operations of choice usually become obligations once forces have been committed. The distinction is very real, both in terms of force planning and political decision-making — hence the decision to commit to an operation of choice must embrace the probability of an enduring obligation.

The fundamental issue here is whether the UK has the capabilities for this category of operations, in addition to those for operations of obligation (both contributory and autonomous). Afghanistan must be seen through, and thus there are intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, ground and air capabilities which must at least be sustained in the short to medium term. But should the longer-term additional capabilities be defined for operations of choice (more Afghans) or for operations of obligation (assuming Iraq and Afghanistan are not models for the future)? The second FDR working paper presented this choice for the future as a continental and maritime choice between ‘global guardianship’ and ‘strategic raiding’. A more tentative maritime approach to future elective operation is more likely to have political and public support.

**Autonomous Operations of Choice**
9. This final category enjoys mention for completeness. Though the Sierra Leone intervention began as an evacuation of non-combatants (category 1 autonomous obligation), it is widely perceived as an example of an autonomous operation of choice. These are not important in the definition of the future expeditionary force structure except insofar as autonomous capability must be kept available for operations of obligation even during major operations of choice.
A Future Force Structure

It would be fairly easy to define a core force structure based on the needs of autonomous obligation (categories 1 to 4) and maritime security (category 6) where the matter of appropriate contribution is purely one of scale (this paper will not try to assign numbers to the required capabilities in advance of the defence review). These categories nevertheless clearly require situational awareness, expeditionary command and control, fighter aircraft, submarines, surface combatants, special forces, and agile and deployable specialist infantry and combat support with the necessary air and maritime lift.

For the other categories of contributory obligation (categories 5 and 7), the key consideration is what constitutes an appropriate contribution. Unlike during the Cold War, NATO’s force planning system is not an imperative; and the 1998 SDR outlined the UK’s decision to define its contribution to a Joint Rapid Reaction Force by its own requirements. In light of an ongoing political commitment to an expeditionary strategy, NATO will probably continue to receive what Britain is prepared to offer, so long as that matches the minimum element of the strategic bargain; in return, the UK gains collective defence. The appropriate contribution is therefore a combination of the capabilities discussed above, and those additional capabilities needed for contributory operations of choice.

In defining appropriate contribution, the UK must further consider legacy capabilities. If the United Kingdom already possesses a useful contribution for inherent deterrence, is it not sensible to offer this? Heavy armour and the full fleet of Typhoons to Tranche 3B come to mind. The first could have some role in expeditionary operations, but not to operations of obligation. The second involves contractual commitment without the option for large savings. In addition, the UK must retain and develop command and control capability for the high operational level, so that it can lead (alongside France) the rationalisation of the European contribution to NATO. The UK can be an effective framework nation for operations of an appropriate scale and can embed these capabilities in the NATO command structure.

The final stage in this logical sequence is defining and scaling the additional capabilities for expeditionary operations of choice. First, the capabilities for operations of autonomous obligation and maritime security should be costed; added to this should be the further capabilities required for contributory operations of choice (category 8). The combination would then form the appropriate contribution for categories 5 and 7. Hence the nation’s expeditionary clout (ie, the capability above and beyond what it needs autonomously for its direct security) is what the British public is prepared to pay for in order to assure world status and influence.
The financial premium for status and influence also finally includes the nuclear deterrent and its replacement system.15

**Continental or Maritime Prevalence**

If this logic is pursued, there are two hard choices. The first is on the scale of capability for expeditionary operations of choice, which is a matter of acceptable affordability. The second is that between continental or maritime prevalence in such capability. Continental prevalence allows for a continuation of capabilities post-Afghanistan; that is, once fresh commitments are made to sustained ground operations, a greater ability to influence through scale and permanence is possible. Troops on the ground express the greatest military commitment. Maritime prevalence, on the other hand, allows for a rational expansion of the requirements of operations of obligation (categories 1-4, 6 and 7), and a greater ability to influence through inducement operations (or ‘suasion’) early in the emergence of crises. A smaller army would offer fewer opportunities for participation in enduring coalition ground operations, and a de facto lower risk of embroilment. But the costs require consideration: the emphasis on agile specialist infantry would require higher salary levels to attract and retain suitable individuals. To date, however, the decision between continental and maritime prevalence has not been made.

**Implications for Specific Capabilities**

A number of specific capability areas require comment in advance of the defence review:

- *Command and Control and Communications* at the high end operational level with a robust home-based strategic capacity are a *sine qua non* for any of these strategic options. However, it could take different forms depending on the choice made (carrier, shore based, and so on).

- *Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Target Acquisition* also spans the range of strategic choices, but the balance of specific systems depends on the strategic choice made.

- *Helicopters* are similarly a capability area that would be needed for either a continental- or maritime-focused expeditionary capability. The requirement to rationalise the fleets, reduce the number of types and improve operational availability are all well understood.

- *Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships* have obvious utility for category 3 and 4 operations, but the case is much the stronger for the carrier if the maritime expeditionary option is taken. Fixed-wing strike is a defining capability, but sea-based command
and control and the versatility they provide for deployment of a number of other platforms and capabilities are as important. Their roles in inducement operations cannot be overstated.

- **Fixed-Wing Attack Aircraft** have a core justification in category 1 to 3 operations. The issue of total numbers is affected on the one hand by the affordable scale of expeditionary capability, and on the other the protection afforded by the legacy issue discussed above. The size of the Joint Strike Fighter force in relation to Typhoon numbers depends on the continental/maritime strategic choice.

- The overall size of the **Infantry** is somewhat ring-fenced by operations in Afghanistan. In the longer term, the total numbers beyond the requirements for autonomous operations of obligation depend, on the one hand, on affordable scale of expeditionary capability, and on the other the continental/maritime strategic choice. An increase in the proportion of specialist infantry – useful in either future – will reduce affordability. Personal equipment and infantry training must be highly adaptable to a changing strategic environment and the challenges of irregular and urban operations in new forms and environments.

- The scale of artillery, engineering and other **Combat Support** capabilities will relate to the overall size of the infantry. Deployability and adaptability will be features that transcend strategic choices. Civil engineering has an important role in stabilisation and related operations. A continental strategic choice could place more emphasis on these capabilities.

- **Strategic and Operational Airlift** must be adequate to the scale of the ground elements of the expeditionary force.

- Numbers of **Armoured Vehicles** will depend on the overall size of ground forces. A major issue is adaptability to operational environments. There is much to be learned from the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan in melding the Urgent Operational Requirements (UOR) system into that of planned acquisition processes. It is not clear that the modularity options that air and maritime platforms offer are the only way ahead for armoured vehicles. A combination of that and institutionalised off-the-shelf purchases may allow for the right adaptability.

- **Surface Combatants** have roles in category 1 to 4 operations and of course maritime security. There is a particular problem with numbers. It is difficult to quantify capability requirements for inducement (in particular presence, preventive, proactive
and precautionary operations) which are relevant to most of the operations of obligation. For maritime security beyond the national EEZ and those of overseas territories, the issue is one of appropriate contribution. Finally, a maritime expeditionary strategic choice would also have implications for the sea control roles of these vessels which are also relevant to category 5 (NATO Article V) operations. There is also the issue of the balance between high- and low-capability vessels, and the pressing need for modularity to allow for relatively cheap future platforms to be adapted quickly to a changing security environment: for instance, the emergence of a very real ballistic missile threat.

- **Heavy Armour** does not fit neatly into the force development sequence discussed earlier. The only strong argument for the retention of any heavy armour capability is that of a legacy capability that can continue to contribute to category 5 operations. Of course, in that context it is a capability which is provided for abundantly by continental European nations.

An expeditionary strategy based on either strategic choice (continental or maritime focus) places a heavy emphasis on precision weapons because intervention operations impose particular moral demands on military forces. ‘Network enabled capability’ may have fallen out of fashion as a concept, but integration of capabilities in relation to an accurate common operating picture will be increasingly important, as will technical and behavioural interoperability between arms and services and with coalition partners.

Cyber-attack will be an increasing threat as networks become more crucial. Military capacity to counter cyber-attack will provide capabilities which will be useful in domestic security. The ability to conduct urban operations proactively will place particular demands on technology, as will the technological competition in the development and countering of improvised explosive devices. The use of remotely piloted vehicles will continue to expand and replace manned capabilities, and will migrate into autonomous systems in the longer term, bringing a range of moral and practical challenges.

Finally, the dependency on space systems will continue to increase, although the United Kingdom faces the problem of sustaining autonomous capability with limited national space assets.

**Conclusion**

There is a broad consensus among the major political parties on the policy basis of the defence review. This consensus should allow the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government to proceed with the review urgently. Indeed, the general agreement
that defence reviews should be conducted cyclically every four years, or during each parliament, could provide the basis for sustained consensus; the Danish model is such an example.

There is a logical sequence for defining the future force structure that proceeds from the requirements for autonomous operations of obligation through to contributory operations of choice. This can generate a core set of capabilities, which could be expanded and added to depending on whether the recommendations of the review point to the continental or maritime strategic choice. Ultimately, the scale of a future expeditionary force will be limited by affordability. As this scale represents the scale of elective operations, it is not unreasonable for the force structure to be limited by budget. The question is therefore: What financial premium, above the 1.6 per cent of GDP of a normal European nation, is the government and electorate prepared to pay for world status and influence, insofar as it perceives that it can develop and sustain these through military power alongside the other instruments?

There is a very reasonable alternative military strategy that none of the political parties have adopted. Reinterpret world status and influence in terms of moral standing. Abandon Trident. Reduce the defence budget to 1.6 per cent of GDP. Develop a force structure specifically to address autonomous operations of obligation, with an additional expeditionary capability primarily for United Nations-mandated humanitarian operations, similar to the models of Canada and the Scandinavian countries. The relationship with the US would remain important, but would be based on American respect for British moral standing and leadership in this community of ‘Northern Lights’ countries. But such a grand strategy is not going to happen – yet.17

Michael Codner is Director of Military Sciences at RUSI. His work and that of his department covers all aspects of the nature, creation and purpose of military forces. Before joining RUSI, he was a Defence Fellow at King’s College London and a Lecturer in strategy and operational art at the United States Naval War College as a Royal Navy Officer.
Notes

1 In Gilbert and Sullivan’s comic opera Iolanthe, Strephon – a lad of mixed birth (half fairy, half man) – enters parliament as a Liberal-Conservative and, with the magic of the Fairy Queen, wins every vote including the reform of parliament.


3 Anonymous 2010 (after Oliver Goldsmith):

Will you both roam the world for me and mind my door?
Asks Mother Hubbard of her dogs of war.
She spreads her ‘Daily Mail’ beneath the table
To snatch each lonely crumb as she is able,
When – lo – an inside photograph exposes
A skeleton, a dog, the Mary Rose’s!
Ask! Did it drown because the ship was faulty?
Or starve perhaps as victuals were too paltry?
This insight born of history beside -
Alas, poor Hatch, ‘the dog it was that died’.


7 The title of the defence review varied between party manifestos, implying differences in emphasis on the relationship to a process of security review. The Conservatives have suggested ‘Strategic Defence and Security Review’; and the Liberal Democrats use ‘Strategic Security and Defence Review’. The Labour Party stuck with ‘Strategic Defence Review’ presumably because the existing National Security Strategy such as it is is subject to annual review anyhow.

8 This analysis by the author was published previously on the RUSI website.

9 Quotations in these bullets are drawn directly from the green paper.

10 This is the very substantial figure given in the green paper, although other estimates differ.
11 In British naval doctrine, ‘presence’ is defined as the exercise of the use of naval force in support of diplomacy in a general way, involving deployments, port visit, exercising and routine operating in areas of interest. The purpose is to declare interest, reassure friends and allies, and to deter (convince a potential aggressor that the consequence of coercion or armed conflict would outweigh the potential gains).

12 This is the capability to deter any existing or emergent significant military power from developing and using military capability of its own for bullying, blackmail and, perhaps in due course, direct threats to territory.

13 Codner, op. cit.

14 Having made a judgement as to the scale of appropriate contribution in this category.

15 Regardless of whether its funding is presented by government outside or within the defence budget.

16 An uncomfortable class of nations with a distinct moral motivation for military intervention, including Canada, Norway, Denmark and Finland.

17 The author is grateful to Professor Michael Clarke for drawing attention to Michael McGwire’s concept for an alternative British grand strategy which is similar to this.