Ministerial Decision-Making in the Run-Up to the Helmand Deployment

Matt Cavanagh

16 April 2012Long Read

The Helmand deployment in 2006 was characterised by a general strategic failure at ministerial level

The decision-making process leading to the Helmand deployment in 2006 was seriously flawed. Matt Cavanagh, special adviser to the government at the time, revisits the dynamics behind the ministers’ failure to devise and maintain a successful strategy.

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Conflict and Security
UK Foreign and Security Policy

Ministerial Decision-Making in the Run-Up to the Helmand Deployment

Read the full text on Taylor & Francis

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