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Both Sides of the Hill Intelligence in the Crete and Arnhem Campaigns
RUSI Journal, 15 June 2004History, Intelligence
The Cretan campaign shows how one side’s superior intelligence cannot compensate for inferior air power, infirmity of purpose and rigidity of mind; Arnhem illustrates the folly not so much of making inadequate use of available intelligence but of wilfully
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