British success in Malaya appeared to show how an insurgency could be defeated by Western-led forces. The campaign was plundered for ‘lessons’ – for Vietnam in particular. The latter’s failure, however, led critics to argue that Malaya was a special case which did not offer transferable ‘lessons’. An analysis of the general principles underlying British success in Malaya can nevertheless still...
Placing the British army's experience on the Western Front into the context of wider military developments in strategic and tactical thinking amongst allies and opponents alike, Dr Philpott's assessment of the often traumatic but nonetheless dynamic transformation in the conduct of war between 1914 and 1918 provides an important corrective to the existing Anglo-centric interpretation.
But before too long this trivial inquiry was to generate anxious telegrams to Harold Macmillan from his Australian counterpart, Sir Robert Menzies, fearful of the collapse of American confidence in the Dominion’s ability to maintain military security.
The Cretan campaign shows how one side’s superior intelligence cannot compensate for inferior air power, infirmity of purpose and rigidity of mind; Arnhem illustrates the folly not so much of making inadequate use of available intelligence but of wilfully