Russia’s Crimea Gamble: another Reckless Putin Move

This article was updated on 2 March 2014 - Russian President Vladimir Putin is not famous for his respect of constitutions and laws. So, the fact that the Russian leader went to his country’s upper parliamentary chamber to get the 'authority' to use force in Ukraine is neither here, nor there: Putin sent his troops into Ukraine before the resolution was adopted, and he started the war against Georgia also without having any specific parliamentary mandate. Still, the demonstrative way by which the decision was taken is an indication that the Russian president remains determined to escalate the conflict, a strategy which is as reckless as it is misconceived, and which is sowing the seeds to a  long-term confrontation.

A New Brezhnev Doctrine

Russia already has a law which 'allows' Moscow to intervene in other countries, supposedly in order to ensure the safety of 'Russians'. The concept was always elastic: depending on how this suited the Kremlin, the definition of a Russian could either mean someone who holds a Russian passport (as well as the passport of another country), someone who speaks the Russian language, a person who has family in Russia or, more simply, almost anyone willing to fly the Russian flag at some street demonstration.

The concept itself is, therefore, legally meaningless. But now, Mr Putin has added further details on what he sees as his 'responsibility' for the protection accorded to his 'kith-and-kin': 'in case of any further spread of violence to Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, Russia retains the right to protect its interests and the Russian-speaking population of those areas', the Russian government announced in a statement on Sunday. This is nothing less than a return to the old Soviet Brezhnev Doctrine, which allowed Russia to invade any country it wished, on the basis of pretexts the Kremlin decided.

No Invasion

Superficially, Russia’s sabre-rattling is almost identical to moves undertaken by Moscow against Georgia back in 2008: the same massing of troops, the same threats that Russia cannot 'stand idly by' as ethnic Russians are allegedly being butchered, the same violent language and the same provocations by a variety of Martians who come out of nowhere only to stoke up the fires of war.

Yet the real comparison is not so much with Georgia in 2008, but with Poland in 1981, a time when Moscow also considered an invasion against a neighbouring country it did not like, only to decide that, on balance, the risks of a war were simply too great. Georgia is a small country of 4.5 million people on Europe’s southern periphery, while Ukraine is a nation ten times larger, in the heart of Europe, just as Poland. Subduing such a country will result in serious bloodshed and take months.

A Russian military intervention will also have huge international repercussions. It will almost certainly result in the imposition of EU economic and diplomatic sanctions, violate all the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) accords, and require an immediate Western military response. Russia would then find itself both isolated and encircled by US-led forces, exactly what President Putin has sought to avoid. Nor would such a war be popular in Russia itself: the killing of Ukrainians, seen by most Russians as their brethren, will not be received with equanimity. And the idea of saving ethnic Russians in Ukraine from 'pogroms' by killing them is not like to be received with applause. For all these reasons, therefore, one can exclude the danger of a Ukrainian invasion. But there’s no reasons to rejoice, for the alternative which is currently being pursued by Putin could be just as dangerous.

The Crimea Card

Crimea has been a ticking time-bomb since Ukraine got its independence in 1991. Russians fought to defend this strategic Black Sea peninsula for generations, and the territory was only transferred to Ukraine sixty years ago, at a time when such things were meaningless, since the border between Ukraine and Russia – both then parts of the Soviet Union – was only a bureaucratic divide. Over half of Crimea’s residents are ethnic Russians, the biggest such concentration in Ukraine. And Russia continues to maintain its biggest Black Sea naval base in Crimea, under a lease from the Ukrainian government.

President Putin could have chosen to make a stand in many other parts of Ukraine if he just wanted to portray himself as the protector of local Russian residents. But the fact that he chose to do so in Crimea, Ukraine’s most dangerous powder keg, is an indication that Moscow is determined to play tough, long, and for very high stakes.

It appears increasingly likely that Mr Putin wants to encourage Crimea’s Russians to go well beyond the autonomy they already enjoy and acquire a quasi-independent status. That would remind Ukrainians that their ultimate fate does not lie in friendship with the West, but in the hands of Russia: a future Ukrainian government could either choose an alliance with the West and see the country carved up by Russian separatists, or remain friendly to Russia and keep Crimea.

It is also possible that the Russian military may now deliberately set about to violate the terms of its lease agreement with Ukraine by increasing the number of its sailors and crack marines stationed in Crimea beyond the 15,000 men it is currently allowed to deploy, and by seizing control of some key local strategic installations. The purpose of this would be to humiliate the Ukrainian military without provoking a Western response, to redeem President Putin’s macho reputation without embroiling Russia in a war.

Reckless

The policy is utterly reckless, for the following reasons:

• The introduction of armed men with no identifying markings is illegal under international law, and shows Russia’s disregard for the most basic standards of interstate behaviour;
• The arming of local thugs in the name of 'patriotism' may end up rebounding on Russia itself. Once such weapons come into the possession of paramilitaries, they will fuel bloodshed for decades to come;
• The confrontation in Crimea is not merely between Russians and Ukrainians, but it also involves the Tatars, a Muslim Turkic nation which was was treated abominably during the days of the Soviet Union and thus now sides with Ukraine. A tri-cornered ethnic confrontation is much more difficult to control, and is far more likely to spill into bigger violence;
• While Russian troops in Crimea don’t wish to fight, they may end up doing so anyway: it is not difficult to envisage isolated attacks on Russian soldiers which spread into a wider conflagration.

 

For the moment, none of these inherent dangers seem to deter President Putin: the Russian leader continues to believe that he can escalate and de-escalate the conflict at will. But that is just a fallacy, the same fallacy of omnipotence which has led Mr Putin to gamble so often on Ukraine, and lose the bet every time.

But the outcome is that, although a fully-blown war in Ukraine is unlikely, a confrontation between East and West and the restart of a new Cold War is very much on the cards.