1920s-1930s: Mechanisation and the 'British way in warfare'
Basil Liddell Hart and J F C Fuller
Basil Liddell Hart and J F C Fuller, while possessing starkly different political outlooks, coalesced in their ideas on the military art in the aftermath of the First World War. Their inter-war lectures and writing did much to interpret the British lessons of the recent conflict. Their ideas, while not wholly accepted in British military circles, nevertheless stimulated lively debate on operational doctrine and strategy, and were internationally read and served to shape thinking on future war. Liddell Hart’s only military experience came during the First World War as a junior infantry officer, but from this he developed a keen interest in infantry tactics. J F C Fuller in contrast was a career officer with experience of both India and the South African War and had during the latter stages of the First World War served as a senior staff officer in the newly formed Tank Corps. Together, however, with Fuller acting as Liddell Hart’s patron, their lectures and articles, several published by RUSI Journal during 1919-20, were the first to accurately synthesise and disseminate British operational lessons of the First World War. Brian Holden Reid has observed in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography that ‘These important lectures and papers consolidated Liddell Hart's growing reputation as an intelligent interpreter of the operational experience of 1918: distilling its essential principles for training purposes, and then relating them perceptively to mobility and command in a novel way.’
B H Liddell Hart, ‘The Ten Commandments of the Combat Unit’, RUSI Journal (Vol. 64, 1919)
B H Liddell Hart, ‘Suggestions for the future development of the Combat Unit: the Tank as a weapon of Infantry’ RUSI Journal (Vol. 64, 1919)
B H Liddell Hart, ‘“Man in the Dark” theory of Infantry Tactics (lecture)’ RUSI Journal (Vol. 66, 1921)
J F C Fuller, ‘The War on Land: The application of recent developments in the Mechanics and other scientific knowledge to Preparation and Training for Future War on Land (Gold Medal Prize Essay 1919)’ RUSI Journal (Vol. 65, 1920)
Liddell Hart and Fuller during the 1920s continued to advance their theories of future war and the importance of armoured and mechanised warfare to restore mobility and prevent a repetition of 1914-18. Liddell Hart later criticised the teaching of Clausewitz, which he considered responsible for the unimaginative strategy and tactics of the First World War. Liddell Hart’s military career was curtailed by ill-health and he instead became military correspondent of The Daily Telegraph and eventually for The Times. In 1931 he first advanced his concept of a ‘British way in warfare’ at a lecture he delivered at RUSI. He argued that a continental commitment was contrary to British military history. A future war should be conducted on the periphery through economic pressure brought about by naval superiority. This in part stemmed from his reading of the Allies’ success during First World War as a consequence of bringing about Germany’s demise through an economic naval blockade rather than operational success on the Western Front.
J F C Fuller, ‘Progress in the mechanicalisation of Modern Armies (lecture)' RUSI Journal (Vol. 70, 1925)
B H Liddell Hart ‘Armoured Forces in 1928’ RUSI Journal (Vol. 73, 1928)
B H Liddell Hart ‘Economic Pressure or Continental Victories (lecture)' RUSI Journal (Vol. 76, 1931)
J F C Fuller’s military career did not fulfil the promise of 1918-19, largely a consequence of his attacks on senior British command and generalship, most notably in Generalship: Its diseases and cure (1933) and because of a close association with Oswald Moseley and the British Union of Fascists. He nevertheless revived his reputation during the 1950s and 60s by writing several notable historical military studies, including his Decisive Battles of the Western World. Brian Holden Reid declared that Fuller, ‘sought to develop a system by which to evaluate ideas about war... Such efforts to divine the conditions of war, he believed, could help determine future policy.’ Both Liddell Hart and Fuller were honoured together at a joint ceremony in 1963 with the award of the RUSI Chesney Gold medal for their contribution to the theory and understanding of warfare.
Henry Robert Brooke-Popham
‘The Air Force’ RUSI Journal (Vol. 65, 1920)
At a lecture held in December 1919 Air Commodore Brooke-Popham provided an overview of the RAF’s contribution in the recent conflict and offered his views as to the future of air warfare. He warned: ‘we might one day have a very rude awakening if we take the very limited results obtained either by ourselves or the Germans as a criterion of what will happen in the next war.’ He underlined the impact future bombing would have on morale and economic stoppages, and highlighted the potential of incendiary attacks on urban centres. While the debate on air power effectiveness was to be extended considerably during the interwar years, Brooke-Popham provided original thinking in this element of war only months after the armistice. Appointed the first commandment of the RAF's Staff College’s in 1921, he did much to foster debate on the effects of airpower.
Lord William R Robertson
‘Policy and Strategy: a lecture' RUSI Journal (Vol. 68, 1923)
Field Marshal Lord William Robertson served as Chief of the Imperial General Staff during 1915-18. As a key member of the War Cabinet Robertson and his office were responsible for translating British policy into wider strategy and for mediating between theatre commanders and politicians, most notably Haig and Lloyd George. In this lecture, later published by RUSI Journal, Robertson draws upon his own experiences to explore the theoretical relationship of policy and strategy through the lens of Britain’s First World War campaigns. Robertson is unique in the history of the British army, having been promoted from private to field marshal.