Cryptoassets in UK Politics: Seen and Unseen
This paper examines how cryptoassets can expose UK politics to opaque and foreign funding, and sets out reforms to strengthen political finance safeguards.
Overview
Cryptoassets expose UK political finance to opaque funding and foreign interference, requiring reforms that address both visible crypto donations and the less visible use of crypto to obscure the origins of political donations.
This paper examines how cryptoassets can amplify longstanding weaknesses in UK political finance rules. A ban on direct crypto donations may address the most visible risk, but it does not, by itself, protect the political finance system against funds that have been converted into cash before reaching a political party. The paper argues that protecting democratic integrity and national security requires scrutiny not only of who makes a donation, but also of where the money originated and how it moved.
Drawing on international cases, regulatory analysis and expert evidence, the paper sets out a three-stage framework – Pause, Protect, Prepare – to strengthen resilience against evolving financial threats. It finds that effective safeguards depend on agile regulation, stronger enforcement capability and increased coordination among electoral, law enforcement, intelligence and financial sector bodies.
Key Recommendations
- Introduce a conditional moratorium on all cryptoasset donations, including where crypto is converted into cash by an intermediary. The moratorium should be tied to political finance reforms and only lifted with Electoral Commission and Parliament approval.
- Require proportionate provenance checks so parties assess the origin and transaction history of significant or high-risk donations, not only donor eligibility. Donors of significant amounts should also declare the provenance of their funds, including whether they were converted from crypto.
- Strengthen the Electoral Commission to develop and update statutory guidance on political donation risks and any future crypto donation regime, with sufficient independence from ministerial control and appropriate parliamentary scrutiny.
- Build enforcement capacity by equipping the Electoral Commission with specialist staff, blockchain analytics tools and improved information-gathering powers, alongside a national centre of excellence for complex electoral finance investigations and increased expertise within prosecutorial authorities.
- Establish a political finance coordination body chaired by the Electoral Commission for cross-agency information sharing, threat assessment and response coordination, with mechanisms for engagement with private sector stakeholders.
The paper concludes that futureproofing UK political finance means building a system able to detect and respond to hidden financial influence as technology and interference methods evolve.
Project supporter
Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust
This paper is funded by the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust. The Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust has supported this work in recognition of the importance of the issue. The facts presented and the views expressed in this report are, however, those of the author and not necessarily those of the Trust.
Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust
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Introduction
Less than a year after proposing political finance reforms that would continue to permit cryptoasset donations, the UK government changed course and announced an immediate ban. In July 2025, the government published a strategy for 'restoring trust in our democracy' that included measures to 'futureproof' the UK's political finance framework. In the 37-page document, crypto was mentioned once – a passing note that any changes to political finance rules would also apply to donations made in cryptocurrency.
In October 2025, the issue moved from a footnote to the front page after Nigel Farage told Reuters that his political party, Reform UK, had begun receiving crypto donations. By March 2026, crypto-related headlines were coming thick and fast. Both the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS) and the independent Rycroft Review recommended that the UK introduce a moratorium – a temporary prohibition – on crypto donations. On 25 March 2026, the Prime Minister announced that the government would implement this recommendation through amendments to the Representation of the People Bill.
Yet, at the same time, a visibility gap was emerging. While Farage said in October 2025 that Reform UK had already received 'a couple' of donations in crypto, in February 2026 the Electoral Commission stated that no political party had reported a cryptoasset donation. Reform UK subsequently commented that its crypto donations were converted into cash by a third-party provider before reaching the party, and that it only accepts donations in accordance with political finance law. This episode illustrates the issue at the heart of this paper: cryptoassets can interact with a political finance system in both seen and unseen ways. The use of cryptoassets is visible where a donation is made to a political party in crypto. But where cryptoassets are converted into fiat currency before a donation is made, this may not be apparent to the political finance regulator.
It is striking how often, in discussions about crypto in UK politics, the author has encountered the assumption that cryptoassets are a passing phenomenon and, if policymakers simply wait, the problem may disappear. It is 17 years since the first Bitcoin block was mined and, despite extreme price volatility, high-profile crashes and frequent fraud scandals, crypto has become part of the plumbing of the global economy. Blockchain technology also continues to evolve, expanding the ways in which digital value can be created, transferred and integrated into the international financial system. Even if the legitimate use of crypto were to decline dramatically, it would remain a useful tool for malign actors seeking to covertly interfere with democratic processes.
In short, it is no longer possible to dismiss the intersection of crypto and political finance as tomorrow's regulatory problem. Yet simply banning crypto donations only deals with the most visible manifestation of risk, while leaving significant vulnerabilities intact. This paper proposes that the UK build a political finance architecture that combines a robust regulatory framework with sufficient enforcement capacity and institutional connectivity capable of adapting as financial technologies evolve. The paper's recommendations would not only mitigate crypto-related risks but also make the UK's political finance system more resilient against modern financial threats – in other words, genuine futureproofing.
The first section of the paper outlines how political finance impacts democratic integrity and how the UK's political finance regime was vulnerable to opaque and foreign money entering politics prior to the advent of crypto. The second section explains key crypto terminology and the tension between crypto traceability and real-world attribution. The third section describes how cryptoassets can interact with political finance rules and the related foreign interference risks, while the fourth section summarises international responses to the use of crypto in political finance. The fifth section examines why a moratorium on crypto donations, combined with regulatory protections and institutional preparation, is the best way forward for the UK, and the final section makes five recommendations for policymakers.
This paper uses the term 'crypto' as a shorthand for 'cryptoassets'.
Scope
The regulation of political finance and cryptoassets, both separately and together, involves a complex web of technical, legal and policy questions. This paper examines how crypto technologies interact with political donation regulation. However, during interviews and discussions, three related issues outside the paper's scope arose so frequently that they are briefly outlined below to clarify the boundaries of this research.
Crypto Mega-Donors and Lobbying
Historically, the UK has not limited how much an individual or corporation can donate to a political party. After two crypto billionaires donated £72 million in fiat to Reform UK over two days in 2026, debate has intensified over the disproportionate political influence of 'mega-donors'. This reflects wider concerns about the amount of money in UK politics, including spending by political parties on campaigning, particularly outside regulated election periods, and by the crypto industry on political lobbying. These issues raise related but separate policy questions about whether the UK should introduce year-round campaign spending limits, increase lobbying scrutiny, and cap donations to prevent a US-style political fundraising arms race emerging in the UK.
Political Meme Coins
Political meme coins are cryptoassets associated with or inspired by politicians, elections and political events. US President Donald Trump notably launched the $TRUMP meme coin three days before his 2025 inauguration and, according to his mandatory financial disclosure, made more than $1.4 billion in crypto-related income in 2025, including $635 million from meme coin royalties. This raises significant but separate policy questions about conflicts of interest, personal enrichment and market manipulation by political office holders and candidates. However, the donation of meme coin proceeds to a political party, either in crypto or after conversion into fiat, as recently happened with the UK political party Restore Britain, falls within the scope of this paper.
Influencing Ecosystem
The Rycroft Review describes UK politics as sitting 'within a rich ecosystem of influencing, lobbying and policy thinking', in which social media influencers, think tanks and advocacy organisations can wield significant political influence. While most play a legitimate role in enriching democratic debate, there is international evidence that some undertake political interference and other illicit influence activities funded by crypto. Donations to political parties are therefore only one of many threat vectors for foreign and opaque financial influence. How actors in the influencing ecosystem are funded is another critical policy question, which is considered in a separate RUSI research project.
Political Finance Under Pressure
To understand the risks that crypto creates and exploits, it is first necessary to understand the political finance context it has entered. This section examines how money in politics can damage democracies and why the UK's regulatory focus on a donor's permissibility rather than the donation's provenance – exacerbated by underused and fragmented enforcement – has left the political finance system vulnerable.
Political Finance and Democratic Integrity
Money is an essential component of democratic politics. Political finance, which refers to the money raised and spent by political parties and candidates for political purposes, is used to fund election campaigns, policy development, party operations and engagement with voters. Yet precisely because money enables political participation, it can also be used to distort it. This can take several forms. Where money is used to exercise improper influence over a politician, this is referred to as 'undue influence'. Where a foreign state or state-linked actor uses coercive, corrupt or covert financial methods to interfere in domestic politics, this is called 'foreign interference'. Such conduct may also constitute other offences, including bribery. In the recent Nathan Gill case, for example, the former UK Member of the European Parliament pleaded guilty to accepting bribes to promote pro-Russian interests.
Political finance rules designed to prevent undue influence and foreign interference do more than regulate the flow of money into politics. By determining how political activity may be funded, they set the legal boundaries for financial participation in democratic processes. In doing so, a political finance system seeks to uphold the fundamental principle of popular sovereignty: that a government should be created by and subject to the will of the people. Implicit in this principle is the expectation that electoral outcomes should not be distorted by covert or impermissible financial influence. Where political finance safeguards are circumvented, money can be used to skew political debate, influence electoral competition and ultimately undermine the independence of democratic decision-making. Weaknesses in political finance regimes can therefore threaten the integrity, sovereignty and security of democracies.
Permissibility versus Provenance
Political finance systems differ between countries but are usually structured around the concept of permissibility – rules that specify who is allowed to donate and what checks a political party must carry out to confirm the donor is permissible. In the UK, 'permissible sources' are primarily individuals on the UK electoral register and UK-registered companies. Section 56 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 requires UK political parties to take all reasonable steps to establish a donor's permissibility before accepting a donation. For example, the Electoral Commission advises political parties to cross-reference names and addresses against the electoral register for individuals, and Companies House records for corporations. Permissibility checks must be recorded and donations above the relevant threshold must be reported to the Electoral Commission. For UK political parties, donations from the same source become reportable once they exceed £11,180 in a calendar year. Amounts of £500 or less are not considered donations and do not need to be recorded or reported.
Electoral Commission guidance states that political parties 'must be alert' to donors attempting to evade political finance rules, such as making multiple donations under £500 or donating on behalf of someone else. Criminal and civil penalties apply for breaches of the rules. However, political parties are not subject to the anti-money laundering (AML) regulations that apply to banks, crypto businesses and other regulated firms. As a result, political parties have not historically been required to undertake AML risk assessments or, where risk indicators arise, enhanced due diligence, such as verifying source of funds (where the money for the donation originated) or source of wealth (how the donor obtained their assets). Instead, the system has relied on political parties to determine whether a donation can be accepted, subject to Electoral Commission oversight.
WRITTEN BY
Eliza Lockhart
Senior Research Fellow
Centre for Finance and Security
- Jim McLeanMedia Relations Manager+44 (0)7917 373 069JimMc@rusi.org
Footnotes
The first trial concerning Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 political finance offences has since taken place, with five defendants pleading guilty and two acquitted in 2023.
Author interview with former FBI special agent, online, 13 July 2026.
Ibid.
Discussions at RUSI expert workshop, London, 25 November 2025; author interviews with blockchain analysts, online, 14 July 2026, 27 July 2026 and 21 August 2026.
Crypto could also interact with political finance through crypto-denominated loans, in-kind donations paid for with crypto, token or non-fungible token sales by political parties and candidates, and political expenditure involving crypto. Figure 1 focuses on financial donations, which are the subject of this paper. Regulator visibility in Figure 1 assumes the donation exceeds the reporting threshold.
Electoral Commission guidance states that crypto donations converted into fiat by a crypto payment processor on behalf of a political party are ‘likely’ to be treated as non-monetary donations for reporting purposes, which suggests they could fall within the proposed ban. However, the legal position remains uncertain. At its February 2026 Parliamentary Parties Panel meeting, the Electoral Commission said it was discussing with crypto payment providers the point at which donations are legally received by the political party, but the Commission did not provide an answer at that date.
Discussions at RUSI expert workshop, London, 25 November 2025; author interviews with electoral regulators, law enforcement officials, foreign interference intelligence analysts, forensic financial investigators and academics, online, 20 May 2026, 16 July 2026, 28 July 2026, 31 July 2026, 5 August 2026, 8 September 2026 and 10 September 2026.
The UK’s Defending Democracy Taskforce (DDTF) and the Joint Election Security and Preparedness Unit (JESP) similarly bring together multiple agencies but differ in their leadership and focus: the DDTF is chaired by the Security Minister and coordinates responses to a broad range of democratic threats, while the JESP is a joint Cabinet Office and Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government unit that focuses on election security, including political intimidation, disinformation and cyber threats. The Electoral Commission participates in both, but neither is designed to support the Commission’s political finance functions or connect it with the financial intelligence and private sector expertise needed to assess complex financial risks.



