Criminality is Taking Over Chile, and Politicians Can’t Seem to Fix It

Over the weekend of 17–18 August, Santiago, Chile’s capital, witnessed numerous murders. While such crimes predominantly occur in the southern and southwestern neighbourhoods of the city, they ultimately affect all residents of the metropolitan region. A significant portion of the police force has to be allocated to dealing with these incidents, compromising the quality of frontline officers and leaving other duties unattended. More importantly, these events have heightened the sense of fear and unease among all Santiago inhabitants, not just those living near the crime scenes.

In light of the situation, President Gabriel Boric’s left-wing government has admitted that it has not been able to successfully combat organised crime-related killings and overall criminal activity. Nevertheless, it has reiterated its commitment to fighting crime, which, to many, seems like mere rhetoric. The opposition is taking full advantage of the situation, especially with upcoming local and regional elections, criticising the government for its shortcomings. Even a significant segment of Boric’s own coalition is growing increasingly dissatisfied. Fearing electoral losses due to a lack of results in curbing high criminal activity, some are advocating for harsher strategies, far beyond what the presidency and the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security have proposed.

The impact of criminal activity on the population is severe, particularly in neighbourhoods where drug trafficking is strongest. One particularly troubling aspect of organised crime in Chile is its ability to establish a physical presence in areas where the state is less involved, effectively taking control of these territories. These areas are then used as operational bases, and more worryingly, transnational criminal groups begin to provide services that the state fails to offer, such as education, healthcare, security and, of course, employment.

Quality of life is severely affected as criminal elements infiltrate all aspects of daily life, even leading to the closure of schools and public spaces during violent, ostentatious drug-related funerals. Media coverage of these crimes extends their impact far beyond the immediate areas, as highlighted in the 2023 ENUSC survey. This poll clearly shows that people are altering their behaviour out of fear, with women, in particular, feeling vulnerable and at risk, regardless of the crime rates in their own neighbourhoods.

This reality did not exist in the Chile of the past. There is a consensus among Chileans that they did not see this coming; they felt protected in the southernmost part of the world, isolated by the Atacama Desert and the Andes Mountains. The absence of intelligence estimates to reduce risk and create awareness of what was happening further north has cost Chile dearly. Narco-criminal activity arrived quietly, taking advantage of Venezuelan migration flows, and expanded into Peru, Argentina and Chile – theoretically the most developed and sophisticated country in South America, yet unprepared to deal with organised crime and more intense criminal activity. This situation caught the country off guard, particularly after the social unrest of 2019, followed by almost 18 months of living under strict measures to counter the spread of COVID-19.

Unresolved Security Problems

Until recently, many analysts, including this author, considered the Mapuche unrest in southern Chile to be the most complex issue facing the country. Today, organised crime is the primary national security issue, with border security linked to transnational migration via illegal entry points coming in second, and the indigenous violence now third. However, this does not mean the Mapuche violence and terror attacks can be ignored, especially since the underlying issues have never been addressed. The military presence in the so-called Macro Zona Sur region remains, not to solve the problem but merely to prevent escalation, meaning troops will likely be stationed there indefinitely – another example of how military forces, once deployed, seldom leave.

While the northern border adjacent to Peru and Bolivia is not inherently a problem, the lack of protection is. This is not due to old fears of a military invasion by either of the two countries, but because of the challenging nature of securing this border. Effective protection of the border requires military and police forces, monitoring technology, surveillance satellites, drones and aircraft for day and night patrols. The same applies to maritime spaces, as inadequate protection could lead to increased criminal and migratory flows along the Pacific Coast in northern Chile. Unfortunately, the country’s neighbours are of little help, and are likely even pleased that Venezuelan migrants and criminals in their territories are heading to Chile or Argentina. No one wants to deal with the migration problem, especially those who already have more political crises than they can handle.

In light of the growing levels of organised crime, the government’s plan seems futile. Politicians are accustomed to reacting, and in this case, their response has been to propose legislation, most of which will not have an impact for a few years. In both 2023 and 2024, legislative packages were assembled to improve public security, including measures such as creating a Ministry of Public Security, which would take over responsibilities from the Ministry of the Interior; deploying the armed forces for more permanent internal security duties; improving the inefficient (or virtually non-existent) national intelligence system; reforming the prison system; adapting the judicial system to current realities; and several other minor initiatives.

Bills left pending from 2023 were put on the fast track for 2024, though this process has been anything but fast. Since May, only one bill – concerning repeat offenders – has been approved. Unfortunately, the opposition has not been very helpful, which is problematic, as several of these initiatives could be beneficial. The only relatively effective action the government has taken is to relieve the police of some administrative duties. Along with accelerating the graduation of new officers, this could put around 1,500 more officers on the streets. However, their effectiveness remains to be seen, as they will require retraining, and the new recruits will lack operational experience. This has been a cruel year for Chilean policing, with a number of officers killed in the line of duty.

Lack of a Strategy

All of this may sound bleak, but even worse is the absence of a comprehensive and actionable security strategy. Meetings are held, discussions take place, press announcements are made, but the result is just more legislative proposals and grandiloquent statements that quickly fade when another bloody weekend occurs.

Without a strategy that includes clear objectives, resources and methods, Chile will continue to stumble in the dark. A discussion on what such a strategy should look like has begun, but a wider debate is needed. Meanwhile, organised crime and criminals will continue to thrive, and Chileans will continue to live in fear. Chile is not El Salvador or Ecuador, but if nothing is done, even the calmest towns in Chile will succumb to the spread of criminal activity. If that happens, the only option left will be to use the armed forces to restore the rule of law, as has been seen elsewhere in the Americas. However, militarisation has proven not to be a silver bullet, leaving a big question mark over what to do next.

Security will be one of the key policy issues in both the 2024 local government elections and the 2025 national elections. Many candidates are declaring themselves experts on the subject, or at least trying to learn quickly. But in the end, it is a matter of having the will to use the full force of the state, without fear or hesitation, while respecting the rights of Chileans. This means that improving the national intelligence system is a priority challenge. The government needs a better assessment of the country’s threats and triggers of insecurity so that law enforcement institutions can then act effectively and efficiently in deploying resources, in conjunction with the public prosecutor’s office, the prison system, and the judiciary.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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