

THE ROAD TO RIGA & THE PATH AHEAD

NATO's transformation agenda before and after the Riga Summit

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i Introduction

On 20-21 July 2006 a NATO Transformation conference was held at the Royal United Services Institute in London ('the RUSI conference') in association with NATO HQ and Allied Command Transformation (ACT). As part of ACT's 'Road to Riga' process the event provided an opportunity to assess and invigorate the Alliance's transformation agenda ahead of the Riga Summit and took place against the background of NATO's increasingly operational and expeditionary role – most visible in Afghanistan. These 'out-of-area' engagements elevate the importance of Alliance transformation, for it is essential that NATO nations develop the capabilities necessary to meet allied ambition.

General Lance L. Smith US Air Force, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, delivered the keynote address, 'Insights on the Long View'. Other speakers included: Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola (Chief of Defence Staff, Italy); Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope KCB, OBE (Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation); Lieutenant General James Soligan (Deputy Chief of Staff Transformation, ACT); Lieutenant General David Richards, CBE, DSO (Commander ISAF IX); Major General Gary Harrell (Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, JFC Brunssum); Ambassador Jerzy Nowak (Polish Permanent Representative to NATO); Ambassador Janis Eichmanis (Latvian Permanent Representative to NATO); Ambassador John Anderson (former Canadian

Permanent Representative to NATO); John Colston (NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy & Planning); Jean Fournet (NATO Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy); José María Aznar (former Spanish Prime Minister); Desmond Bowen CMG (Policy Director, UK Ministry of Defence); Dr Harlan Ullman (Senior Advisor, CSIS); and Bill Emmott (former Editor-in-Chief of *The Economist*).

The six key themes discussed at the conference – transformation, the Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO), capabilities, the NATO Response Force (NRF), partnership and training & education – all featured prominently in the Riga Summit, hosted by Latvia on 28-29 November 2006. Indeed, in the run-up to Riga, the meeting had been billed as a transformation summit but, given the immediate challenges facing the Alliance in Afghanistan, discussions focused both on transformational questions and the present-day requirements of its International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission.

This report highlights some of the themes raised during the conference, assesses the Riga Summit's treatment of these matters and examines the priorities for transformation as the Alliance seeks to improve capabilities, to enable NATO to uphold its global security interests. It draws upon both the contributions of speakers at the conference and the conclusions of the Riga Summit, particularly the Riga Summit Declaration.

ii Transformation

At the RUSI conference transformation was characterised as a continuous process and one that is managed differently in different NATO nations. The ultimate aim of Alliance transformation is to build and operate a combined, joint force that is interoperable, sustainable, and can be deployed to distant theatres to meet Alliance objectives. In terms of both capability and conceptual development, transformation efforts are supported and guided by ACT which helps develop interoperability standards and align capabilities to ensure all national transformation efforts can contribute to the combined force.

The synergy that exists between ACT, Allied Command Operations and the nations in the development of joint, expeditionary capabilities is evidence of NATO's commitment to remain the pre-eminent military alliance in the world and to be not only relevant, but decisive. The deployment of NATO's ISAF mission in Afghanistan marks the first time the Alliance has undertaken land combat operations outside the continent of Europe. Moreover, ISAF is also the mission through which NATO is rapidly implementing, operationally validating and refining its concepts and capabilities. The methods and principles of transformation are being tested every day in the most demanding of situations in Afghanistan and NATO is recording regular advances in multinational capability and effectiveness. As transformation is both tested and moved forward in the Afghan theatre there is, however, a risk that whilst NATO's front-end transforms itself effectively, the back-end - the logistics and the financial underpinning of an operation - fails to keep up.

But it is 'instincts' rather than means that are the real key to the puzzle. Transformation of the mind is the most important aspect of the transformation agenda because while some NATO nations have significant experience of expeditionary operations, for others border defence has long been the principal concern. As the Alliance develops the tools of transformation it must, therefore, also nurture a culture of expeditionary instincts and ISAF is an important step in this process.

At the Riga Summit the importance of transformation was reaffirmed both in the context of the threats emanating from today's strategic environment (terrorism, proliferation and instability due to failed and failing states) and NATO's operations in Afghanistan and the Balkans. The Summit's conclusions clearly reflect the discussion of transformation that has occurred throughout the Alliance, making clear that the concept encompasses the Alliance's operations and missions, capabilities and engagement with partners, other nations and organ-

isations. On the capabilities front, it was emphasised that NATO requires modern, highly capable forces able to deploy rapidly and Alliance leaders also endorsed the framework provided by the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) to guide its transformational efforts.¹ CPG, however, while certainly a major step forward, was never intended to supplant the Alliance's Strategic Concept (SC). Since the SC was agreed in Washington in 1999 the Alliance has conducted three summits, published a CPG, and significantly revamped its ministerial guidance. With that in mind some members of the Alliance are calling for a new SC.

The CPG, released to the public at Riga, makes clear that NATO must continue to develop the agility and flexibility to respond to complex and unpredictable challenges, which may emanate far from member states' borders and arise at short notice. In order to undertake the full range of missions, the Alliance must have the capability to launch and sustain concurrent major joint operations and smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response on NATO territory, on its periphery, and at strategic distance. The Comprehensive Political Guidance identifies the Alliance's top priorities as:

- joint expeditionary forces and the capability to deploy and sustain them;
- high-readiness forces;
- the ability to deal with asymmetric threats;
- information superiority;
- and the ability to draw together the various instruments of the Alliance brought to bear in a crisis and its resolution to the best effect, as well as the ability to coordinate with other actors.²

The focus of the Summit largely reflects those issues raised at the RUSI conference, though NATO must remain mindful of the need to ensure expeditionary instincts are nurtured among all allies and that transformation of the front-end of the combined force does not occur at the expense of logistics and resources. In the coming months and years the Alliance must, therefore, expedite the military application of this transformational agenda to develop a force with greater utility, flexibility and interoperability. This will require sustained and bold efforts on the part of all allies.

iii Effects-Based Approach to Operations

The RUSI conference heard that the EBAO binds the military, political, economic and civil instruments to achieve the desired outcome in a mission. The Alliance's ISAF operation provides a good example of the considerations behind such an approach and the tasks it must be capa-

ble of executing in today's security environment. In seeking to ensure success in Afghanistan, NATO has identified three guiding principles for the mission. Can NATO bring security? Can it improve the life and well being of the Afghan people through enhanced security, reconstruction and development? And can it work effectively alongside the Government of Afghanistan and other non-NATO organisations to find culturally acceptable solutions to the country's problems?

Today, victory on the battlefield is one element of a broader requirement and the establishment of stability and provision of reconstruction and development are also fundamental to achieving success. Recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan indicates that future conflict is likely to be complex, irregular and borderless, and, as a consequence, solutions that are exclusively military in character will not suffice. Increased emphasis must, therefore, be placed upon the political, economic and civil instruments (including international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)) to provide comprehensive solutions to the security challenges we face.³

When hostilities occur, the application of force must be targeted and decisive but armed forces should also expect to make a contribution to stabilisation and reconstruction that is likely to extend beyond the provision of security. Post-hostility stages are increasingly geared towards the establishment of successful, capable governments requiring comprehensive, multidisciplinary planning. Militaries must, therefore, be prepared for a wide-range of tasks in complex environments, and capable of operating among a population (as well as against a foe) and alongside both friendly forces and various non-military actors.

In Afghanistan, ISAF's "ability to enter into partnership with civil actors, whilst retaining the capacity for simultaneous rapid employment of focused military action, will be one of the defining marks of the success of NATO Transformation."⁴ Indeed, some believe significant progress in establishing a comprehensive approach has already been made in Afghanistan by creating the necessary architecture for an effective EBAO. A Policy Action Group has been established consisting of key Afghan ministries (including Interior, Defence, Finance and Rural Rehabilitation and Development) and members of the international community including Commanding General Combined Forces Command, Afghanistan and the ISAF Commander – coordinating an emerging EBAO for ISAF. Additionally, the ISAF Commander has been instrumental in the establishment of the Regional Command Capital (RCC) and Integrated Project Teams (IPTs).

As experience in Afghanistan suggests, the role of NATO and the armed forces in contributing to stabilisation is well established and many Alliance nations are considering or implementing some form of EBAO. This type of approach is neither new nor surprising but, at present, NATO is lacking an alliance level, grand strategic approach that binds the military, political, economic and civil instruments under a coherent strategic concept.

The development of a comprehensive approach will provide the methods and means for strategic cooperation with NGOs and international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU). Such an approach would not mean that NATO, as such, would be in charge of an overall, multidisciplinary response. It would, however, require the establishment of mechanisms that would allow NATO to understand the objectives of the overall effort, how and where it needs to deliver and act, in unison with other actors.⁵

At the Riga Summit NATO leaders endorsed the Comprehensive Political Guidance which provides the basis for a NATO EBAO. They went on to note that "Experience in Afghanistan and Kosovo demonstrates that today's challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments".⁶ Use of the term 'comprehensive approach' reflects modified terminology in the political arena for multidisciplinary response, though EBAO remains the appellation for the military elements.

Similar to the arguments presented at the RUSI conference, the Riga Declaration makes clear that more needs to be done to coordinate the wide spectrum of civil and military instruments necessary to respond to today's challenges. NATO leaders therefore tasked the North Atlantic Council (NAC) "to develop pragmatic proposals ... to improve coherent application of NATO's own crisis management instruments as well as practical cooperation at all levels with partners, the UN and other relevant international organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations and local actors ... with a view to enhancing civil-military interface."⁷ These recommendations will be published in early 2007 and will apply to the planning and conduct of ongoing and future operations, as well as taking into account emerging lessons from current missions.

This outcome clearly reflects the argument that there is a compelling operational case for NATO to adjust its political and military planning procedures to develop a flexible structure that paves the way for a comprehensive approach for the planning and conduct of operations. This should apply to all levels from the grand strategic to the tactical, the major requirement being at the higher level.

iv Capabilities

It was clearly enunciated that all NATO's efforts to improve capabilities must focus on the ultimate aim of developing a force that is interoperable, sustainable and can be deployed to distant theatres to address threats at their source. Some NATO nations have significant capabilities, others lesser capabilities, and across the Alliance there is a wide variety of assets. What NATO must achieve is effective alignment and interoperability of capabilities so that nations' niche capabilities can contribute to the combined force.⁸

There are, however, also capabilities that must be resident throughout the Alliance if NATO is to develop a combined force that matches its ambition. Expeditionary operations are central to NATO strategy and strategic lift is, therefore, a key Alliance requirement. While 72% of the Prague Capability Commitments (PCC) are likely to have been met by 2008, the remaining 28% include the more costly undertakings such as strategic lift aircraft. NATO must, however, be able to project military power to distant theatres, deploy a wide range of capabilities and establish forward bases either on land or at sea.⁹ Before the Riga Summit, ACT created a dedicated Integrated Capability Team (ICT) to find solutions to some of the more challenging and persistent capability shortfalls, including strategic lift.

To date, NATO has struggled somewhat to find the necessary resources to match its ambition and develop the capabilities that must be resident throughout the Alliance. The RUSI conference heard that the PCC should, therefore, be re-evaluated at the Riga Summit to ensure that interoperability, deployability, sustainability and information superiority are the focus of capability development efforts.¹⁰ In so doing it was argued targets should be raised on key capabilities such as strategic lift, C2, network enabled capability and friendly force tracker.

At Riga, NATO leaders broadly endorsed the thrust of such arguments, agreeing a set of initiatives to increase the capacity of Alliance forces to improve "our ability to conduct and support multinational joint expeditionary operations far from home territory with little or no host nation support and to sustain them for extended periods. This requires forces that are fully deployable, sustainable and interoperable and the means to deploy them".¹¹

Specifically, commitments were made to:

- increase strategic airlift (through a number of distinct initiatives by NATO members and partners to include the already operational Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS); the intent of a consortium to pool

C-17 airlift assets, and offers to coordinate support structure for A-400M strategic airlift, which complement Allies' efforts in nationally acquiring a large number of C-17 and A-400M aircraft);

- launch a special operations forces transformation initiative aimed at increasing their ability to train and operate together;
- ensure the ability to bring military support to stabilisation operations and reconstruction efforts in all phases of a crisis drawing on lessons learned;
- develop a NATO Network Enabled Capability to share information, data and intelligence and activate an Intelligence Fusion Centre;
- continue progress in the Alliance Ground Surveillance programme;
- take forward efforts to develop capabilities to counter chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats;
- transform the Alliance's approach to logistics, in part through greater reliance on multinational solutions;
- ensure that the command structure is lean, efficient and more effective;
- and move forward the development of a NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence system.

In addition to these broader targets, ACT has identified a number of specific priorities. These include: counter-improvised explosive device, friendly force tracking, future comprehensive civil-military interaction, maritime situational awareness, joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, NATO combined joint urban operations, situational awareness, coalition combat identification and operations support chain management.

Together the two sets of objectives reflect, but also go beyond, the new capability targets suggested at the RUSI conference although the Alliance still has a good distance to go to meet many of them. NATO must, therefore, continue to press for the capabilities it needs to address these challenges and match its resources to its level of ambition.

v NRF

At the RUSI conference the NRF was characterised as the Alliance's primary vehicle for transforming the force. With this in mind ACT recently created a capability development mechanism specifically for the NRF - the Evolutionary Capability Criteria (ECC). The ECC are designed to improve the capabilities of those units that make-up the NRF by capturing, transferring and imple-

menting new technological and conceptual developments originating both in NATO bodies and nations. In supporting the force transformation function of the NRF such an innovation is clearly fundamental.

The conference heard that when fully operational the NRF could be composed of as many as 25,000 personnel at five to thirty days readiness and capable of a wide spectrum of missions up to and including acting as an initial entry force, possibly in a non-permissive environment. In short, it is a formidable force and will provide the Alliance with a ready method of projecting military power. Use of the NRF, however, will constitute the very embodiment of consensus politics and gaining agreement to deploy the force will be a test for its political oversight and might prove difficult to achieve.¹² NATO nations have made a significant investment in the NRF and, in so doing, placed constraints upon their own freedom of action because capabilities committed to the force are theoretically not available for other contingencies. Some nations have expressed concern that this may limit availability of forces for future NRFs.

Some nations have made it clear that the use of the NRF must be proactive while others, concerned about costs, are less enthusiastic, and so the introduction of some form of common funding or shared costs clearly merits serious consideration in the context of the NRF. The lack of readily available strategic lift was a significant factor in both deployments of the NRF to the US (after Hurricane Katrina) and Pakistan (following the earthquake). In the latter case much use was made of tactical assets and C-130 Hercules airframes in particular. C-130s flew 1120 tons of cargo in 123 missions, costing approximately €10.5 million. Had strategic lift C-17's been used the required number of flights would have been about forty and the estimated cost approximately €4.4 million – less than half.

In addition, nations bearing all costs associated with their participation in an operation can dissuade governments from committing forces to a mission and sharing costs to some degree would greatly aid mission accomplishment.¹³ The limitations placed on the NRF by current strategic lift and C2 deficiencies serve to underscore the logic of collective investment in high cost enablers. Consequently, the challenge presented by the NRF could act as a catalyst for NATO's political and structural transformation – because national caveats, multi-sourced funding, and inadequacies in strategic lift and C2 would serve NATO poorly in an under-fire entry scenario.

At Riga, NATO leaders made clear that “The establishment of the NATO Response Force (NRF)

which today is at full operational capability has been a key development. It plays a vital part in the Alliance's response to a rapidly emerging crisis. It also serves as a catalyst for transformation and interoperability and will enhance the overall quality of our armed forces”.¹⁴ However, the stand-up of the NRF was not without difficulty and NATO acknowledged that there were some problems filling the final capability gaps for the NRF and shortfalls in airlift, helicopters, intelligence units and battlefield logistics for the force persist.

Although an interim agreement was reached at Riga to share the costs of airlift for short notice NRF deployments, a broader application of common funding had been proposed at the RUSI conference. This principle, it was suggested, should apply to both the NRF and to longer-term ventures, such as ISAF, due to the fact that the concept of a lead nation bearing the financial burden in enduring operations will likely become increasingly less attractive. It will, therefore, be important to extend some sort of shared costs or common funding mechanism to those aspects of operations that are of collective benefit or utility, be they NRF missions or not.

NATO must continue to work to resolve such difficulties but, perhaps more importantly, if the NRF is to continue to be a viable force and the vehicle for ongoing Alliance transformation, it must not be derailed by current operations. The force needs to be exercised and utilised, nations must fill the Combined Joint Statement of Requirement and be mindful of the severe operational limitations imposed by caveats. And, of course, an equitable solution to funding must be found.

vi Partnership

It was made clear at the RUSI conference that, in a similar vein to the requirement inherent in EBAO for NATO to cooperate with other actors, so should the Alliance's transformation efforts retain some external focus. As NATO develops its capabilities to create a combined force that is interoperable, sustainable, and can be deployed to distant theatres it must also consider the implications of future political engagements and Alliance enlargement – NATO must retain and develop its ability to operate effectively alongside militaries outside the Alliance. In this regard, over the last decade, NATO has developed a certain institutional flexibility to allow both participation and non-participation of allies and partners in operations and the recent agreement on employment of partner nations' forces in combat operations in Afghanistan is an important step.

Although NATO's membership, outreach, competences, operational engagements and expeditionary character have all grown in recent years the Alliance remains a political and military alliance of liberal democracies united by an undertaking to defend shared values and freedoms, as well as common strategic interests. It is in this context that the Alliance has continued to develop its defence cooperation with partners and NATO's increasing outreach programmes are important in ensuring that the fruits of transformation are not felt exclusively within the Alliance – be it through the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Mediterranean Dialogue or the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

Discussion of NATO's relationship with the European Union¹⁵ at the RUSI conference focused on the dialogue between the two organisations in the area of capabilities. The EU has a set of capability targets that is separate from, but similar to, NATO's Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) and EU efforts in this area have increased since the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2004. NATO has been working informally with EDA since its establishment and the NATO-EU Capability Group provides a mechanism for dialogue between the two organisations in the area of capabilities. Political constraints have, however, limited the nature and extent of the NATO-EDA relationship and this was identified as an area in which renewed efforts to agree formal liaison arrangements was a matter of critical importance.

At Riga, NATO's partnership considerations constituted a major element of the debate, covering the PfP, Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and Contact Countries. In the context of these partnerships the Alliance identified three key objectives:

- to develop fully the political and practical potential of NATO's existing programmes;
- to increase the Alliance's ability to provide practical advice on, and assistance in, the defence of reform in countries where NATO is engaged;
- and to increase the operational relevance of relations with non-NATO countries and to strengthen the Alliance's ability to work with current and potential contributors to NATO missions.¹⁶

This latter element is of particular importance given that analysis of missions past and present clearly indicates that NATO is increasingly challenged to sustain all the operations it might be called upon to conduct. At present eighteen nations outside the Alliance contribute forces and support NATO operations and others have expressed interest in working more closely with the Alliance.

Consequently, Alliance leaders identified some ini-

tial steps including by resolving to call ad hoc meetings with partners in response to willingness to support NATO operations and tasked the NAC to examine the matter further.¹⁷ In this context ACT is evaluating a 'Building a Partnership of Nations for Operations' initiative that would coordinate operational requirements and also decide how partners' contributions might be delivered within the existing NATO Command Structure. In a similar context, the Riga Declaration recognised the "increasing contributions to international peacekeeping and security operations" of some of those countries working towards membership and reaffirmed that "NATO remains open to new European members".¹⁸ Clearly, there is scope for future consideration of partners' and aspirant members' contributions to Alliance missions.

At the Summit the NATO-EU relationship was discussed in the context of capabilities and the other areas of overlap, including the fight against terrorism, civil emergency planning and cooperation in the Western Balkans. In the context of transformation and the comprehensive approach, there are clear military advantages in having a full NATO-EU strategic partnership in which the two organisations mutually support one another. Alliance leaders made clear that the relationship between the two organisations required improvement to achieve closer cooperation and greater efficiency, and avoid unnecessary duplication – a clear reflection of the essence of the more limited discussion of NATO-EU coordination in the area of capabilities at the July conference.

In the coming years NATO must continue to strengthen its ties within established partnership arrangements, encourage greater, more practical cooperation with the EU and institute broader engagement in other nations and regions. The Alliance should also create a partnership for operations with those non-NATO, Partner and Contact Countries with whom the Alliance shares common values and interests.

vii Training & Education

At the RUSI conference it was explained that in the last three years NATO has greatly improved its capacity for training Alliance armed forces. This takes place through the:

- Joint Warfare Centre (JWC, Stavanger, Norway) which promotes and conducts NATO's joint and combined experimentation, analysis and doctrine development to maximise transformational synergy and improve NATO capabilities and force interoperability;

- Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC, Bydgoszcz, Poland) which trains in combined operations at the tactical level for NATO and partner forces and deploys expert training teams to provide advice and conduct training for NATO and partner forces;
- Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC, Monsanto, Portugal) which is the Alliance's primary mechanism for analysis of operations, exercises, training and experimentations and for the collection of lessons learned.

The aim of the training construct is to identify and swiftly implement improvements in policy, doctrine and capabilities to increase the operational efficacy of the force. The lessons learned process is critical to Alliance operations, e.g. ISAF, and the further development of the NRF. For example, the deployments of NRF C2 and logistic capabilities during the recent Hurricane Katrina and the Pakistan earthquake contingencies provided invaluable feedback. The RUSI conference heard that the immediate aim for the Alliance is to bring these three centres to full capacity to ensure that lessons learned are translated to operational units without delay.

At Riga, rather than concentrate on the work of the three training centres, attention focused on in-theatre training in Afghanistan, Iraq and Darfur, with NATO agreeing to increase its training of local forces in each country. In addition, the Alliance also launched the "NATO Training Cooperation Initiative in the modernisation of defence structures and the training of security forces"¹⁹ to apply to partners from the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. Initially the programme will include expansion of partners' involvement in existing NATO training as well as the establishment of a Middle East faculty at the NATO Defense College. As a second phase, the Alliance has agreed to consider supporting the establishment of a Security Cooperation Centre in the region, owned by the partners and supported by NATO.

Although more general than the specific training focus suggested at the RUSI conference, the in-theatre training initiatives of the Riga Summit are likely to provide valuable support for both NATO operations and partnership activities. NATO is uniquely placed to deliver training and military expertise to a wide diversity of nations and organisations. It can assist in a broad range of training, from niche military expertise to assisting in the modernisation of defence structures and security forces. One of the concepts the Alliance might consider is that the delivery of such training takes place within a Joint Force Trainer concept. In addition, NATO should not lose sight of the need to bring the three training cen-

tres to full capacity to support the NRF, as discussed at the RUSI conference.

viii Conclusions & Recommendations

NATO transformation constitutes the Alliance's response to the current strategic environment. Today's challenges – be they in Afghanistan or elsewhere – make clear the need for comprehensive responses involving the deployment of the full-range of capabilities to distant theatres. The Alliance has declared its ambition to be able to respond to a wide variety of scenarios and significant practical progress has already been made, not least through the creation of the NRF and on the ground in Afghanistan. The RUSI conference called for the Riga Summit to take NATO efforts to the next level and place renewed emphasis on the development of a combined, joint force that is interoperable, sustainable, and able to address threats at their source. This was deemed essential for the Alliance to ensure its ability to act decisively in future decades.

It is clear that the process of NATO transformation is moving forward within the Alliance and many of the initiatives endorsed at Riga reflected recommendations made by experts at the RUSI Conference. In its ongoing transformational efforts NATO should, however, be mindful of the following key considerations:

- Transformation of the mind remains the most important part of the puzzle and a culture of expeditionary operations must continue to be nurtured. In the coming months and years the Alliance must expedite the military application of the transformational agenda to develop a force with greater utility, flexibility and interoperability.
- The operational case for EBAO is compelling and the Alliance should ensure proposals are brought forward for a NATO comprehensive approach in 2007.
- NATO armed forces must continue to improve their capabilities to execute a wide-range of tasks in complex and distant environments to address contemporary challenges and match its resources to the level of ambition.
- While the NRF has reached full operational capability and should continue to be a viable force and the vehicle for ongoing NATO transformation, it must be properly resourced within the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) and supported within the formal system of NATO exercises.
- The Alliance must continue to strengthen its ties within established partnership arrangements and broaden the geographical scope of its engagement.
- NATO is uniquely placed to deliver training and military expertise to a wide diversity of nations and

organisations and such training should take place within a Joint Force Trainer concept.

- NATO and the EU need to forge a formal relationship based on shared common values and strategic interests and there are clear advantages in having a full NATO-EU strategic partnership in which the two organisations mutually support one another.
- A 'Partnership of Nations for Operations' should be launched to coordinate operational requirements and also decide how partners' contributions to missions might be delivered within the existing NATO Command Structure.
- Interoperability remains the key to NATO transformation. The Alliance must become the 'Gold Standard' for interoperability.

As the Alliance moves forward it must ensure that all lessons learned from all its operations of recent years, and in particular ISAF, are fully exploited and applied to a changing strategic environment, characterised by asymmetric threats, failing and failed states, terrorism, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and technology breakthroughs. To meet these challenges NATO must be capable of projecting modern military force across the spectrum of operations from warfighting to disaster relief. The capabilities required, the political and security cooperation and interoperability between NATO and its global partners, and the conditions of engagement must all be identified and pursued.

Since 1999 progress in this direction has been taken forward at various Summit meetings, via the Comprehensive Political Guidance, through the fruits of transformation and capability development and, most recently, with the endorsement of a comprehensive approach. Given the fundamental nature of many of these advancements, as well as the fact that when the Alliance reaches its 60th anniversary its Strategic Concept will be ten years old, there is a strong case for the launch

of a new Strategic Concept in 2009. In short, NATO needs a new strategy to address the changing environment in which it finds itself and to codify the Alliance's role as a key element of comprehensive response to present-day and emerging challenges.

ix Notes

¹ Riga Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga on 29 November 2006, paragraph 2.

² Comprehensive Political Guidance, endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government on 29 November 2006, paragraphs 10, 11 & 18.

³ General Lance L. Smith address, 20 July 2006, RUSI.

⁴ Lieutenant General David Richards, CBE, DSO, "NATO in Afghanistan: Transformation on the Front Line" *RUSI Journal* (Vol 151, No 4, August 2006) p.11.

⁵ Desmond Bowen CMG address, 21 July 2006, RUSI.

⁶ Riga Summit Declaration, Op Cit, paragraph 10.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ General Lance L. Smith address, Op Cit.

⁹ Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope KCB, OBE address, 21 July 2006, RUSI.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Riga Summit Declaration, Op Cit, paragraph 24.

¹² Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope KCB, OBE address, Op Cit.

¹³ Major General Gary Harrell address, 21 July 2006, RUSI.

¹⁴ Riga Summit Declaration, Op Cit, paragraph 23.

¹⁵ NATO and the European Union share common strategic interests and their cooperation on security issues goes back to January 2001 when the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency exchanged letters defining the scope of cooperation and the modalities of consultation between the two organisations.

¹⁶ Riga Summit Declaration, Op Cit, paragraph 12.

¹⁷ Riga Summit Declaration, Op Cit, paragraph 13.

¹⁸ Riga Summit Declaration, Op Cit, paragraphs 29-30.

¹⁹ Riga Summit Declaration, Op Cit, paragraph 17.

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