

THE RUSI, IMPERIAL DEFENCE AND THE EXPANSION OF EMPIRE 1829-90.

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The origins of the Royal United Services Institute lie in the great upsurge of amateur literary, philosophical and scientific interests that occurred in late Georgian Britain. It began life in 1829, when an article in Colbourn's *United Service Journal* from 'an old Egyptian campaigner'¹ called for the foundation of a society which would apply the new lessons of science to the military art. This in turn led to the foundation of the United Services Museum whose prospectus declared that its aim was to be 'strictly a scientific and professional Society, not a Club'² and the editor of Colbourn's, the Peninsular veteran Major Shadwell Clerke, doubled up as vice-president of the USI 1829-41.³ Along with its belief that the scientific officer would be the well trained officer of the future, the USM sought from the beginning to be a political lobby speaking for the army and navy principally on procurement issues to Select Committees and the Admiralty Board,⁴ despite the fact that politics (and gambling) were 'absolutely excluded on principle'.⁵ In 1839, it became the United Services Institute but its membership of around 4000 mainly senior officers⁶ cannot be said to have wielded much influence mainly because the officers themselves were dispersed around the garrisons at home and abroad rather than concentrated in London. There was also the problem of the Whitehall building being 'swamped with the stuffed animals and geological specimens'⁷ which well meaning officers donated in response to the original prospectus' request for 'objects of Natural History.'⁸

Military reform is often deemed to begin with the Crimean War 1854-56 when public complacency over the state of the armed forces was shattered by the exaggerated reports of W.H.Russell of the *Times*, but in fact the USI – or the Naval and Military Library and Museum as it was sometimes confusingly known - had already begun the process. In 1853 all officer cadets from Woolwich, Addiscombe or Sandhurst were given provisional membership while curiosities, such as a battleship anchor dumped without warning on the pavement outside the Institute, were now routinely refused. The government too was beginning to take an interest and in 1857 agreed to subsidise the Institute to the tune of £400pa as well as taking a sympathetic attitude to its virtual squatter status in Whitehall – there was much doubt as to whether it was entitled to occupy the Mansion House at all. In 1859, the *Journal*, 'an instructive professional periodical'⁹ to 'guide through rational debate... the future course of the army'¹⁰ was established and demand quickly outran the initial print run of 3,500 copies.¹¹ The importance attached to this development was marked by the granting of a Royal Charter in 1860 which transformed the USI into the RUSI.¹² From this point on, a whole string of prescient articles, often written by relatively junior officers, concerning military equipment and tactics began to shape the thinking of the army. In 1860, Captain Tyler predicted trench warfare and the end of Napoleonic 'thin

red line' tactics in his lecture 'Rifle and Spade or the Future of Field Operations,'¹³ while the American Civil War prompted a great deal of debate on technological developments, the role of cavalry¹⁴ and the respective merits of volunteers and long- or short-service engagement regulars.¹⁵

However, it was the revolution in Britain's geopolitical situation during the 1860s that was to really expand the influence of the RUSI beyond narrowly professional and procurement issues. Indeed, it is hardly possible to understand the politics of later Victorian Britain and especially the remarkable growth in the British Empire that took place in the last quarter of the 19th century without understanding how powerful was the desire to achieve a sense of security in the face of these changes. Before 1860, Britons could afford to be somewhat complacent about their security; within living memory their soldiers and sailors had occupied Paris, burned Washington, looted Delhi and Peking, battered Sevastopol and would have done the same to St.Petersburg had the Tsar not sued for peace in time in 1856. However, the American Civil War, the three wars of German unification and the expansion of Russia into Central Asia and on towards the North West Frontier of India between 1860-70 all appeared to demand new responses to the questions of defence. Indeed, Britain cannot be said to have had a defence policy at all beyond a vague confidence in the Nelson touch backed up by Martello towers or their equivalents; planning in advance of a declaration of war was a new-fangled Prussian invention. From this point on, however, the question of formulating a defence policy became an increasingly important cross party issue. On one side Gladstone led a loose collection of Whigs, Liberals and Radicals who hoped to see the empire progressively abandoned, who deprecated spending on armaments and looked to an internationalist 'moral' foreign policy to guarantee British security. On the other side, Disraeli and Lord Carnarvon led an increasingly organized body of opinion, characterized as 'Jingo', which included the leading Whig Lord Hartington, that held that the empire could provide the platform upon which Britain could maintain her great power status in the face of continental rivals such as the USA, Germany and Russia.

Powering much of this concern was a growing fear that the Nelson touch was no longer enough to guarantee survival, a point made in a series of studies in the Journal which pointed out that Britannia's rule of the waves was nowhere near as secure as she imagined. The exploits of the Confederate Navy cruisers *Alabama*, *Florida* and *Shenandoah* had exposed the vulnerability of Britain's enormous trading interests to commerce raiding¹⁶ - in 1869 Captain Hamilton of the CSN was invited to address the RUSI¹⁷ - while the application of steam and iron to warship design produced some equally unsettling conclusions. In 1866, Commander P.H. Colomb RN argued in 'Lessons from Lissa' that this engagement between the Austro-Hungarian and Italian fleets in 1866 had revolutionised naval warfare; the ironclads had battered away at each other all day without effect and would therefore remain invulnerable unless the guns could be made five times more powerful; the only vessel to be sunk in the battle, the *Re d'Italia*, went down after being accidentally rammed by the *Ferdinand Maximillian*.¹⁸ There was a

corresponding debate over whether ships could now hope to compete on anything like equal terms with forts in a bombardment;¹⁹ in short, argued the RUSI, the navy was no longer any absolute guarantee of security because it could neither sink an enemy fleet nor protect Britain's commerce, nor bombard an enemy port. That technological change had simply undermined the wooden walls of England was a constant theme right up until the First World War.

If the navy could not guarantee security then what about the army? The response from Britain's traditionally miniscule army (100,000 all up, with another 200,000 approx in India; by comparison, Prussia put a million men into the field in 1870) was *The Battle of Dorking*, a fictional pamphlet initially written anonymously for *Blackwoods Magazine*, in which an unprepared Britain falls to a sudden German invasion.²⁰ The story caused a storm of excitement when it was published, selling 80,000 copies and earning its author, Colonel George Tomkyns Chesney RE, the princely sum of £287.²¹ The RUSI was not directly responsible for this publication but George was the brother of Charles Chesney, Professor of Military History at Sandhurst and Journal contributor. That this was a professionally inspired work was shown by the choice of Dorking as the site of the decisive battle; an invasion force landing on the south coast and heading for London would indeed head for the gap in the South Downs at Dorking.²² The story was published against the background of a Liberal government elected on a programme of 'peace, retrenchment and reform' which meant, in effect, defence cuts and an international situation which had just seen the Prussian army knock out France in a lightning campaign. The RUSI, or at least people intimately connected with it, seemed, even if at arms length, to be appealing for a much more proactive approach to home defence issues. Gladstone spotted the move and condemned the pamphlet as being driven by a desire only for 'the spending of more and more of your money'.²³

It was also in this period that the RUSI had a profound effect in drawing together all the strands of naval, military and imperial insecurities to call for some form of unified approach to the problems of imperial rather than narrowly Home defence issues that *The Battle of Dorking* had raised. This took place initially with the expansion of its membership; with the publication of the Journal came an influx of new members from the Indian army, the militia, the volunteers and the colonial forces as well as the regulars. In 1861, for example, the future Lord Chelmsford became a corresponding member of the council, while Captain Pole of the Cape Mounted Rifles and Commandant Macauley of the Scinde Horse joined; in 1864, all officers of the Grenadier Guards were required to join, while two colonial governors, Sir George Grey and Hercules Robinson, also added their names to the list. Colonel Glynn of the 24th Regiment was so impressed with the RUSI that he had many of his officers join before they went out to South Africa; Mostyn, Melville, Cavaye of Isandlwana fame were all members. In 1871, The Duke of Cambridge became President of the RUSI and by 1873, although membership was still stable at around 4000 members, 20,000 people had visited the Institute and the

Journal circulation stood at 21,000. There was also a sister institution, the United Services Institute catering for officers in India - Lt-Col Fred Roberts contributed to its first Journal²⁴ - and junior institutes based in the various ports and garrison towns around Britain.

The second step in drawing the strands of defence policy together came with the decision of Cardwell's War Office to insist on nominating one of the members of the RUSI Council from 1868 onwards²⁵ - perhaps a reason for the RUSI's arm's length treatment of *The Battle of Dorking*. Lt-Col. Cooke RE of the Intelligence Branch was the first to take up the post and thus began an intimate connection which saw the views of the RUSI conducted right into the heart of government policy making. Lt. John Ross of Bladensburg, Coldstream Guards and Intelligence Branch²⁶ also contributed to the Journal.²⁷ Major C. Brackenbury authored for the Journal, *The Intelligence Duties of the Staff Abroad and at Home* arguing that it was the duty of the Intelligence Branch to anticipate future threats and prepare plans for war in advance and only a secondary duty to provide useful information for the army.²⁸ This link was mirrored in India where the Durand Prize Essay for 1874 was won by the 'Essay on the formation of an Intelligence Department for India,'²⁹ a call which had already been acted upon with the dispatch of Lt. Collen, a very strong proponent of a more active approach to defence,³⁰ to London to see how the War Office had done it; he also wrote for the RUSI.³¹ That the particular thinking of the RUSI made itself felt through the Intelligence Branch and on into government policy is perhaps most remarkably demonstrated with the first systematic attempt to learn from the Prussian officer training technique, *Kriegsspiel*. This handbook posed three separate scenarios for officers to study; a colonial war in Basutoland, a defence of the Straits of Constantinople and an invasion of Egypt. The choice is significant in that it showed an expectation that the wars that Britain would be most likely to fight were *imperial* wars to protect colonial possessions or secure the route to India; the author of this book was Capt. Evelyn Baring, the future Proconsular ruler of Egypt.³² When the Balkan crisis of 1876-79 produced the possibility of a British seizure of the Suez Canal, it was Collen who had identified Tel-El-Kebir as the key position³³ four years before Wolseley won his victory there. There can be little doubt that the RUSI and the Intelligence Branch were coming to develop a high degree of symbiosis; the RUSI theorised and tested ideas, while the Intelligence Branch turned them into actual planning. It is also true that the RUSI was beginning to look very 'Jingo'; only once in this period was a Gladstonian figure invited to speak or chair a meeting.³⁴

The problems associated with the defence of India were also beginning to exercise the RUSI. The very first issue of the Journal had carried an article by Henry Rawlinson, Central Asian expert and so committed a Russophobe that Gladstone singled him out for attack personally in his Midlothian campaign of 1880;³⁵ it was Rawlinson, supported by Harry Green,³⁶ Fred Goldsmid³⁷ and Sir Bartle Frere who would unleash a tirade against the Liberal government's policy of 'Masterly Inactivity' - the acquiescence in

Russian advances in Central Asia in the belief that Afghanistan was too formidable a barrier for them to cross - which would result in the appointment of Lord Lytton in 1876 to carry out a 'forward' policy to create a 'scientific' or militarily coherent frontier.³⁸ Green and Goldsmid were both RUSI council members in 1874-5; Frere was discretely absent from the Institute as head of the Indian Council Political and Secret Committee, but made his influence felt through both men with whom he had worked in India. The Intelligence Branch summary dealing with the Russian advance quoted directly from Green's *The Defence of the North West Frontier of India* and its proposed solution was based extensively on Frere's proposals.³⁹ It was Frere who wrote the defence plan for India that Lytton and Sir George Colley would develop into the scientific frontier⁴⁰ and although the RUSI never dominated the Indian Council⁴¹ completely, its membership was well represented by Rawlinson, Sir Garnet Wolseley and Colonel Merewether (a Frere protégé). Other members, including strategic thinkers and leading officers like Valentine Baker and Maj-General Hamley, made their feelings on the Russian advance known more directly through the Journal⁴² and in well attended lectures. *The Strategical Conditions of our Indian North West Frontier*, a lecture given by Hamley at the RUSI in December 1878 had Rawlinson in the Chair and was turned into a pamphlet which prompted favourable responses by General Alason and Major East of the Intelligence Branch; it also found its way into the War Office planning files.⁴³

The third step in drawing together the strands of a defence policy came with the work of Capt. JCR Colomb of the Royal Marine Artillery. In fact for nearly two decades it was hard to pick up a copy of the RUSI Journal without finding Colomb or one of his followers in it. His first article, *The Distribution of our War Forces*, written in 1870 argued strongly that if Britain was to be secure then the first priority was to devise some integrated system of imperial defence⁴⁴ and his subsequent work continually highlighted the vulnerability of Britain's commerce and colonial ports in the event of war.⁴⁵ Colomb was absolutely right about this vulnerability⁴⁶ and his writings not only encouraged a deluge of similar articles⁴⁷ but also attracted the attention of Lord Carnarvon, the incoming Colonial Secretary in Disraeli's government of 1874-80. Attracting a key cabinet minister to the cause of defence was a major advance for the RUSI. Cabinet ministers had had automatic membership of the Institute since the 1860s but Carnarvon had always had an active interest in defence matters and now provided a mouthpiece in the cabinet for all those who argued that a more positive approach to the empire should be adopted than that previously shown by Gladstone and the Liberals. His particular confidant and troubleshooter, Lt-Col. Crossman, was a RUSI member;⁴⁸ his first action on entering office was to order a complete review of the defence arrangements of each colony;⁴⁹ he annexed Fiji in order to provide for a coaling station between Australia and Canada;⁵⁰ authorized a confederation scheme for Singapore and Malaya; he pushed forward plans to confederate South Africa to secure this route to India and employed Sir Bartle Frere to do it. During the Balkan crisis he organized the Colonial Defence

Committee and after his resignation in January 1879, grey with fear of the consequences for Britain's largely undefended empire if war with Russia did break out, went on to work on the Carnarvon Commission 'appointed to inquire into the defence of British possessions and commerce abroad.'⁵¹ All this work was based very largely on Colomb's original thesis and, indeed, Colomb lobbied hard to get on to the Carnarvon Commission⁵² but his profile was too high for him to serve on such a secret undertaking.

An unintended consequence of the more positive imperial policy of Disraeli's government was that many in the imperial, colonial and defence establishment increasingly came to believe that the state of the imperial defences were so fragile that they were justified in taking matters into their own hands; they read Disraeli's Crystal Palace speech as a green light for their particular plans. Admiral Jervois and Captain Speedy started the Perak war in 1874 in Malaya without the sanction of the Colonial Office; Jervois was a leading defence thinker; Speedy was another Frere protégé.⁵³ Furthermore, these fears were raised to boiling point when the dual Balkan and Afghan crises of 1878 brought Britain to the brink of war with Russia. Lord Lytton, hand in glove with Frere,⁵⁴ Sir Lewis Pelly⁵⁵ and Sir George Colley,⁵⁶ rejected Lord Salisbury's order that 'you will not stir a soldier beyond the frontier without obtaining my view on the matter first'⁵⁷ to start the Second Afghan war in order to prevent Russia gaining a foothold in Kabul. In South Africa, Frere started the Zulu war against his orders because he feared a Boer uprising in the Transvaal and a Zulu attack on Natal coinciding with a Russian naval attack on Cape Town and Durban.⁵⁸ In the event, Jervois got away with his disobedience but the twin disasters of Isandlwana and the Kabul massacre provided Gladstone with an opening which he exploited mercilessly; his Midlothian campaign of 1880 overthrew Disraeli and returned the Liberals to power. The Jingo policy was reversed, Afghanistan was evacuated, Zululand abandoned and the Transvaal retroceded after Colley, translated to South Africa, was defeated by the Boer rebels at Majuba.

None of this new foreign policy made sense, however, as long as Britain ruled India and unfortunately for him, Gladstone lacked both the political strength and the political courage to pull out of India and accept all the upheaval that would go with it. Hartington, and an increasing number of Whigs, Liberals and even Radicals therefore accepted the logic that if the empire was not to be abandoned, then it had to be defended. And if it had to be defended, then it needed to be expanded. Lord Northbrook, once a target of attack by the Jingoists, was persuaded into the Jingo camp by his nephew, Evelyn Baring, over the crisis in Egypt.⁵⁹ 'Radical Joe' Chamberlain, who had led the attack on Frere over the Zulu war⁶⁰ began to morph into 'Jingo Joe' and backer of forward policies in Africa.⁶¹ Between 1882 -86, therefore, foreign, imperial and defence policy was progressively removed from Gladstone's control by Lord Hartington⁶² and a series of forward moves initiated; Egypt 1882, Bechuanaland and Somaliland 1884, Malaya 1885, Pondoland and Zululand 1886 and a clear threat of war with Russia if she moved any closer to Afghanistan during the Penjdeh crisis 1886. The last

gasp of Gladstone's effective resistance was the abandonment of Gordon at Khartoum in 1884-5. Thus the paradox; the Liberals elected on a platform of anti-imperialism actually went further than the pro-imperial Tories in expanding the empire as a result of the defence imperatives as suggested by the RUSI.

Nor was this the whole of it. Colomb responded to his disappointment at not gaining a place on the Carnarvon Commission by publishing *The Defence of Great and Greater Britain* in 1880⁶³ and, when Gladstone attempted to bury the Carnarvon Commission reports,⁶⁴ co-operated with Carnarvon and Hartington (through his private secretary, Reggie Esher)⁶⁵, on an article entitled *Imperial Defence* which appeared in the *Times* in November 1884.⁶⁶ Carnarvon went further by correcting the proofs of W.T. Stead's *The Truth about the Navy* articles,⁶⁷ again based on Colomb's work. Colomb returned the compliment by leaking the existence of the Carnarvon Commission reports, whose existence was by now an open secret, to the *Times*. The effect was to drive Gladstone into another retreat and force him finally to accept that foreign, colonial, imperial and defence policy would be controlled by a new grouping within his party, the Liberal Imperialists, led by Lord Hartington who agreed substantially with Carnarvon, the RUSI and Colomb. In March 1885, a new interdepartmental Colonial Defence Committee,⁶⁸ was set up by Hartington which made the concept of a defence policy based on an active, planned system of imperial defence the political orthodoxy. The influence of Carnarvon and Colomb on Hartington's subsequent involvement in the *Royal Commission on the Civil and Professional Administration of the Naval and Military Departments* (1888-90) can also be seen in that Hartington concentrated largely on bridging the gap between the military and naval perspectives to rectify what many thought was an overemphasis on the navy in their work.⁶⁹ There is no irony that Hartington, 8th Duke of Devonshire, still stands on Whitehall between the RUSI and the old War Office buildings today (and you can find Frere round the corner on the embankment).

Colomb, elected to Parliament in 1886, and the RUSI had, however already gone one step further. For them, an imperial defence policy made no sense without active co-operation from the colonies themselves and if this was to be achieved then some form of equitable division of costs and responsibilities was necessary. To achieve this there would need to be some forum where British and colonial officials could meet to plan revenue raising, expenditure and strategy; an imperial parliament, no less, overseeing an 'imperial federation for defence'.⁷⁰ Nor was Colomb going out on a limb here; he began his article on the subject with a quote from W.E.Forster, one time Gladstonian radical cabinet minister and educational reformer and now first President of the Imperial Federation League (another Colomb inspired organization) set up in August 1886. Forster had been persuaded into the ranks of the Liberal Imperialists by his adopted son H.O.Arnold-Forster who had agitated against Gladstonian naval unpreparedness since 1883.⁷¹ Sir Henry Barkly, Frere's defence minded predecessor as governor of South

Africa and Carnarvon Commission member, took the chair at the RUSI in July 1886 when Thomas Brassey MP, another ex-member of the Carnarvon Commission and Journal contributor,⁷² called for a colonial naval conference.⁷³ Two weeks earlier, Carnarvon himself had chaired a discussion in which he had declared that 'Defence, in reality, is the prime factor in all federations.'⁷⁴ When, the following year, the first (1887) Colonial Conference took place, the Tory Prime Minister Lord Salisbury stated that it was to consider the empire not as 'a Zollverein, but a Kriegsverein'.⁷⁵ Within two years, a major reform of Colonial Militias⁷⁶ had been effected which by concentrating on harbour defence, effectively removed the threat posed by commerce raiders⁷⁷ and so effectively secured the empire – for a decade or so that is; the building of the German High Seas Fleet shifted the vital ground back to the North Sea and the decisive issue back to a general fleet engagement to enforce a blockade or prevent an invasion. Trafalgar was back in fashion and commerce raiding ruled impracticable (at least until the U boats made their appearance).

Was the RUSI responsible for the expansion of the empire in the last quarter of the 19th Century? It is a tantalizing prospect especially when one considers what might have happened if the gas explosion which ripped up thirty two yards of pavement and set off secondary explosions nearby had taken place when the Institute had been sitting.⁷⁸ Undoubtedly, it played a major part in creating the climate of opinion necessary for the politicians to react to the worries of the defence establishment and 'Jingo radicalism'⁷⁹ was rapidly picked up by the popular press.⁸⁰ A very strong case can be made out for the argument that defence and security was the principle motor for imperial expansion in this period; after all the expeditions to Mexico, Peking and Abyssinia during the 1860s were not accompanied by any large scale annexations, whereas after 1874 territory once occupied was expected to remain under the British flag. It is also the case that many of the areas annexed were economically worthless; Bechuanaland, Pondoland, Zululand, Somaliland and Afghanistan were unproductive; Egypt was bankrupt; Malaya without infrastructure; and gold wasn't discovered in the Transvaal until 1886.

There is also be no doubt that the RUSI was the principle platform for defence debates and no doubt at all that it was Jingo in spirit, connected into the heart of government and the press and that its views were taken very seriously indeed, but not all the credit (or blame) can be laid at the RUSI's door. It had no actual executive power. It was unable to influence the outcome of the 1880 election when Gladstone returned to scourge 'the Fiend of Jingoism,'⁸¹ lost the argument on the India Council to opponents of a forward policy in Afghanistan in 1877⁸² (hence Salisbury's strictures on Lytton) and even Hartington was unable to prevent the withdrawal from Afghanistan or the even more humiliating retrocession of the Transvaal. What it did do, however, was to frame the argument in stark terms; if the empire is to be retained, then it must be defended; if it is not to be defended it must be abandoned; if the politicians have not the courage to accept the political and human costs of abandonment, then the soldiers have a duty to the peoples of

the empire to ensure their security regardless. This stark logic was, in the event, persuasive enough to ensure that plenty of politicians could be found to agree with it and although there were plenty of others, such as Lord Derby,⁸³ who found in it a dangerous threat of praetorianism they could never come up with a workable alternative beyond some vague notions of a 'moral' foreign policy.⁸⁴ In effect, the RUSI, by promoting *informed* debate among *informed* actors was able to make its influence felt within government ministries and on into parliament and the cabinet and, by framing the debate, ensured that security was indeed debated. However, we should dismiss any latent suspicion that it acted as an *eminence gris*; all the final decisions on imperial expansion were made, in the end, by cabinet ministers, as was and is, correct.

¹ Capt. E. Altham CB RN, 'The Royal United Services Institute, 1831- 1931,' RUSI Journal LXXVI 1931.

² Prospectus of the United Service Museum, Commander Henry Downes RN, Secretary.

³ H. Strachan, The Reform of the British Army 1830-54, (Manchester University Press, 1984), p.20.

⁴ M.D. Welch, Science and the British Officer: The Early days of the RUSI for Defence Studies (1829-1869), (RUSI Whitehall Paper, 1998), p.28.

⁵ Opinion of the Committee of the United Service Museum quoted in Capt. E. Altham CB RN, 'The Royal United Services Institute, 1831- 1931,' RUSI Journal LXXVI 1931.

⁶ M.D. Welch, Science and the British Officer: The Early days of the RUSI for Defence Studies (1829-1869), (RUSI Whitehall Paper, 1998), pp.37-38.

⁷ H. Strachan, The Reform of the British Army 1830-54, (Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 131.

⁸ Prospectus of the United Service Museum, Commander Henry Downes RN, Secretary.

⁹ 29th Annual Report 1860 p.5.

¹⁰ M.D. Welch, Science and the British Officer: The Early days of the RUSI for Defence Studies (1829-1869), (RUSI Whitehall Paper, 1998), p. 53.

¹¹ 29th Annual Report of the Council, 1860 p.5.

¹² 29th Annual Report of the Council, 1860 p.5.

¹³ M.D. Welch, Science and the British Officer: The Early days of the RUSI for Defence Studies (1829-1869), (RUSI Whitehall Paper, 1998), pp.47-48. See also Capt. C. Chesney RE, 'The Recent Campaigns in Virginia and Maryland,' RUSI Journal Vol. vii, 1864. Chesney was Professor of Military History, RMC, Sandhurst.

¹⁴ See for example Sir Garnet Wolseley's comments in the debate following Major T. Hutton, 'Mounted Infantry,' RUSI Journal Vol. XXX 1886-7.

¹⁵ M.D. Welch, Science and the British Officer: The Early days of the RUSI for Defence Studies (1829-1869), (RUSI Whitehall Paper, 1998), p.60

¹⁶ See my article 'Privateers, Cruisers and Colliers; the Limits of International Maritime Law in the 19th Century,' RUSI Journal.

¹⁷ JR Hamilton, late CSN, 'The American Navy; its organisation, ships, armament, and recent experiences,' RUSI Journal Vol.12, 1869.

¹⁸ Capt P.H. Colomb RN, 'Lessons From Lissa,' RUSI Journal Vol. xi, 1867. Also, W. Laird Clowes, 'Naval Warfare 1860-1889, and some of its Lessons,' RUSI Journal Vol. xxxiv, 1890-1.

¹⁹ See for example BL Add. Mss 60812 Carnarvon Papers. Also J. Mackintosh, 'National Defence, or New Strategies in Warfare,' RUSI Journal Vol.iii, 1859.

²⁰ G. Chesney, 'The Battle of Dorking. Reminiscences of a Volunteer,' Blackwood's Magazine May 1871.

²¹ I.F. Clarke, Voices Prophesying War, 1763-1984, (Oxford, 1966).

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- ²² Major H. Elsdale RE, 'The Defence of London and of England', RUSI Journal 7th May 1886. See also WO 106/6188 Handbook for the London Defence Positions 1903.
- ²³ Quoted in I.F. Clarke, Voices Prophesying War, 1763-1984, (Oxford, 1966), p. 39.
- ²⁴ Lt-Col F.S. Roberts 'Rough Notes on formation, equipment, and despatch of a force from India for service in China, Egypt, or elsewhere beyond the Sea.' USI Journal Vol. I, 1871.
- ²⁵ RUSI Journal Vol. xi, 1868.
- ²⁶ WO 33/32 'Newspaper Correspondents with an Army in the Field, and Military Attaches of Foreign Powers at Head-Quarters'. Lt. John Ross of Bladensburg, Coldstream Guards, Intelligence Branch 28th Feb 1878.
- ²⁷ John Ross-of-Bladensburg, 'Maritime Rights', RUSI Journal, Vol. xx, 1877).
- ²⁸ Major C. Brackenbury, 'The Intelligence Duties of the Staff Abroad and at Home,' RUSI Journal Vol.19, 1879.
- ²⁹ Capt J.A.S Colquhoun RA 'Essay on the formation of an Intelligence Department for India,' USI Journal Vol. iv. 1874.
- ³⁰ See the discussion following the paper presented by Col. Medley, 'The Defence of the North West Frontier' Vol.II USI 4th August 1880.
- ³¹ Lt. E. Collen RA, Officiating Assistant Secretary to the Govt of India, Military Dept, 'Military Transport and Supply in India,' RUSI Journal, Vol. xvi, 1873. Also WO 33/32 Reports and Memoranda 1878; Report on the Intelligence Branch, QMG's Dept by Capt E.H. Collen, Assistant Military Secretary to the Government of India, October 1878.
- ³² WO 147/17 Rules for the Conduct of the War Game. Capt. E. Baring 1872. See also WO106/1 'Turkey' by Lt. E. Baring 1870.
- ³³ IOR L/MIL/17/17/44 Memorandum on the Employment of an Indian Force in Egypt. Capt Edwin Collen, First Assistant Mil Sec, India. Intelligence Branch, QMG's Dept 18th January 1878, Horse Guards.
- ³⁴ Lord Lawrence chaired a meeting in 1876 in which he took the opportunity to warn against forward policies in India. See Maj-General Fred Goldsmid, 'Journeys from Herat to Khiva,' RUSI Journal Vol. 19, 1876.
- ³⁵ Lt-Col. Henry Rawlinson, 'Persia and the Persians,' RUSI Journal Vol. 1 1858.
- ³⁶ Colonel Sir Harry Green, The Defence of the North West Frontier of India, with reference to the advance of Russia in Central Asia, (London, 1873).
- ³⁷ Sir F. Goldsmid, Central Asia and its Question, (London, 1873) and Eastern Persia, (London, 1876).
- ³⁸ WO 33/32 Reports and Memoranda 1878. 'The Strategical Conditions of our Indian North West Frontier,' A lecture by Maj-Gen E.B. Hamley CB RA at the RUSI 13th December 1878. Rawlinson was in the Chair.
- ³⁹ WO 106/174 Russian Advances in Asia 1873.
- ⁴⁰ Sir B. Frere, Afghanistan and South Africa. Letters to the Right Hon. W.E. Gladstone, M.P. regarding portions of his Midlothian Speeches, and a letter to the late Sir John Kaye and other papers, (London, 1881).
- ⁴¹ Its function was to advise the Secretary of State for India and was composed mainly of old India hands resident in London.
- ⁴² Col. Valentine Baker, 'The Military Geography of Central Asia,' RUSI Journal Vol. 18, 1875 and Gen. E. Hamley, 'Russia's approaches to India,' RUSI Journal Vol.27. 1884. Fred Goldsmid was in the chair for this meeting.
- ⁴³ WO 33/32 Reports and Memoranda 1878. 'The Strategical Conditions of our Indian North West Frontier,' A lecture by Maj-Gen E.B. Hamley CB RA at the RUSI 13th December 1878. See also WO 33/32 Reports and Memoranda 1878. Memorandum on the NW Frontier of India. Major CJ East 57th Regt, Acting AQMG, 25th November 1878.
- ⁴⁴ 'The Distribution of our War Forces,' Capt JCR Colomb RMA. RUSI Journal, Vol. xii, 1870.
- ⁴⁵ See, for example, Capt JCR Colomb RMA, 'General Principles of Naval Organisation,' RUSI Journal Vol.15, 1872 and 'The Naval and Military resources of the Colonies,' RUSI

Journal Vol. 23, 1880. Also 'Naval Intelligence and the protection of Commerce in War,' RUSI Journal Vol.25, 1882.

⁴⁶ See for example PRO 30/6/122 Carnarvon Papers. Defence of Commercial Harbours and Coaling Stations.

⁴⁷ See, for example, 'The Maritime Defence of England, including Offensive and Defensive Warfare,' Capt. R. Scott RN and 'Naval Prize Essay 1876,' Commander G.Noel RN, RUSI Journal Vol.xx 1877.

⁴⁸ Crossman put down the Black Flag revolt on the Kimberley diamond fields in 1877 as well as reporting on the harbour defences of the colonies. One of those arrested was a certain C.J. Rhodes. See CO 879/9 Confidential Print Africa. Report of Lt-Colonel Crossman RE on the Affairs of Griqua-land West June 1878.

⁴⁹ CO 854/15 Colonial Office Circulars 1874.

⁵⁰ Holland to Carnarvon 20 Aug 1874 Bl. Add. Mss 607968 Carnarvon Papers.

⁵¹ CAB 7/2. First Report of the Royal Commissioners appointed to inquire into the defence of British possessions and commerce abroad 1879.

⁵² 13th Sept 1879. Colomb to Colonial Office, CO 885/4/20 Correspondence respecting the Defences of the Colonies Colonial Office Sept 1880. He was refused on 25th Sept 1879.

⁵³ See the series CO 882/3/4-7 Further Correspondence relating to the affairs of Certain Native States in the Malay Peninsular in the neighbourhood of The Straits Settlements.

⁵⁴ Lytton to Frere, 26th March 1876. Reproduced in J. Martineau, The Life and Correspondence of the Rt. Hon. Sir Bartle Frere (London, 1895), Vol.II., pp. 154-5.

⁵⁵ Pelly led the negotiations with Afghanistan on Lytton's behalf.

⁵⁶ See for example, Confidential Minute. OIOC IOR Mss Eur E 218/125 Lytton Collection.

Viceroy's minutes and notes relating to Afghanistan and the frontiers of India 1876-80.

⁵⁷ Salisbury to Lytton, 10th August 1877. OIOC IOR Mss Eur E 218/4a Lytton Papers. Letters from the Secretary of State to the Viceroy 1877 Vol.2.

⁵⁸ MY Historian article here.

⁵⁹ See for example, Northbrook to Baring 27th September 1882. Quoted in B. Mallet, Thomas George, Earl of Northbrook. A Memoir, (London, 1908), p.168.

⁶⁰ Hansard, Commons 14 March 1879, pp. 1910-1911.

⁶¹ M.E. Chamberlain, Pax Britannica? British Foreign Policy 1789-1914 Vol.II, (London, no date 2000?), p.144

⁶² On one occasion, Hartington and Gladstone appeared to have come close to fist cuffs. Entry 20th June 1882. GD.

⁶³ J.C.R. Colomb (Ed), The Defence of Great and Greater Britain, (London, 1880).

⁶⁴ D.M. Schurman, Imperial Defence 1868-1887, (London, 2000), pp. 90-93.

⁶⁵ See Entry 24th May 1884. J. Vincent. (Ed.), The Diaries of Edward Henry Stanley, 15th Earl of Derby (1826-93), Between 1878 and 1893, (Oxford, 2003).

⁶⁶ D.M. Schurman, Imperial Defence 1868-1887, (London, 2000), p. 131.

⁶⁷ Carnarvon to Stead, 12th October 1884. BL.Add.60777 Carnarvon Papers, Correspondence with W.T.Stead.

⁶⁸ Schurman, p. 134.

⁶⁹ P. Jackson, The Last of the Whigs, (London, 1994), pp.282-3. See also F.A. Johnson, Defence by Committee, (London, 1960), p. 27.

⁷⁰ JCR Colomb, 'Imperial Federation' RUSI Journal Vol.XXX 1886.

⁷¹ See, for example, H.O. Arnold-Forster, 'Our position as a Naval power,' in The Nineteenth Century, Vol. 13. Jan - July 1883.

⁷² T. Brassey MP, 'A Colonial Naval Volunteer Force,' RUSI Journal Vol.22, 1879.

⁷³ Discussions after presentation of JCR Colomb's, 'Imperial Federation' RUSI Journal Vol.XXX 1886.

⁷⁴ Col. Sir Charles Nugent, 'Imperial Federation,' RUSI Journal Vol.XXX 1886.

⁷⁵ R.K. Ensor, England 1870-1914, (Oxford, 1936), p.178.

⁷⁶ WO 106/6341 Local Land Forces of the British Colonies. Capt G.Wemyss 1889. Intelligence Division War Office.

⁷⁷ See for example, PRO CAB 11/32 South Africa: Cape Peninsular Defence Schemes. Reply to Defence Circular, August 1888.

⁷⁸ USM Minutes 29th October 1855. The explosion was set off by an employee of the Gas Company who responded to reports of a gas leak made by the RUSI by going into the cellars and lighting a match to see what the problem was. The meeting to discuss the result took place on 5th November. Honestly, you just can't make this stuff up.

⁷⁹ Entry 16th February 1885. J. Vincent. (Ed.), The Diaries of Edward Henry Stanley, 15th Earl of Derby (1826-93). Between 1878 and 1893, (Oxford, 2003).

⁸⁰ Entry 11th January 1884. J. Vincent. (Ed.), The Diaries of Edward Henry Stanley, 15th Earl of Derby (1826-93). Between 1878 and 1893, (Oxford, 2003).

⁸¹ Gladstone to Lord Acton, 11th Feb 1885. GD.

⁸² See for example, Salisbury to Lytton, 14th August 1877. OIOC IOR Mss Eur E 218/4a Lytton Papers. Letters from the Secretary of State to the Viceroy 1877 Vol.2.

⁸³ See entries for 7th & 22nd April 1878, 17th May 1878, 6th December 1884. J. Vincent. (Ed.), The Diaries of Edward Henry Stanley, 15th Earl of Derby (1826-93). Between 1878 and 1893 (Oxford, 2003). Foreign Secretary Derby deserted the Tories in 1878 over Disraeli's bellicosity and served as Gladstone Colonial Secretary 1882-6.

⁸⁴ See for example, my article Cetshwayo.