

Ladies and gentlemen,

Before I get to the heart of the matter, I would like to pay tribute to Sir Jonathan Band's talent before he sets sails for new horizons...

More than a chief of Staff of an Allied navy, he has always been a friend of the French navy. He has managed to establish a unique and favourable climate to enhance our bilateral cooperation, and I have very much appreciated our personal friendship. I have no doubt that the future will provide us many opportunities to meet on golf courses...

His impressive career - 4 commands, responsibilities covering each branch (operational, financial, human resources...) – has always been admired by his fellow British compatriots and international partners.

Above all, we share a particular idea of the asset it is to own a navy serving our respective nations, of the importance of a naval power to defend our interests, and as well as to take part in the founding of a world that would be fairer and more stable.

I also pay tribute to his commitment to promoting maritime matters within European and allied authorities, and especially developing European capability.

We are both committed to the fight against piracy, and I was pleased to see the Royal Navy taking over the command of Atalanta, the first European naval operation.

Finally, we both are dedicated to maintain the basic capabilities of our navies so that they can face now and in the future the challenges of this century. This is no small task during this time of financial crisis when Defence is so obviously not the first political priority. We both know that navies are formed over time and requires ongoing investment. We are also fully aware of the dangers of defining a structure based on short-term expediency.

Let me now introduce a few points on multinational maritime security operations, as I have been invited to do so.

The rise of a maritime international dimension is one of the main characteristic of the past 15 years.

It is particularly stressed for maritime security issues, focused on multilateralism and cooperation.

It is neither random nor a consequence of national renouncement. On the contrary it is a question of efficiency, legitimacy, and recognition of the need for solidarity around the idea of security.

The end of the Cold War and the consequent lack of maritime military global confrontation have ushered an unprecedented era of naval cooperation as a growing number of nations became interested in collaboration amongst themselves and/or with the US Navy.

In particular, considering the maritime security environment changes, a need has arisen to

formulate a system of multilateral maritime cooperation. I would like to add also the idea that if the oceans are “res nullius”, that doesn’t mean that we don’t have to take care with them : maritime jurisdiction has been considerably extended in favour of coastal states, but at the same time, new duties aiming at the ocean’s preservation have been imposed to the future benefit of human mankind.

Indeed, non traditional threats have emerged, such as piracy, illegal immigration, maritime pollution and maritime environmental protection, organized crime and drug trafficking. These so called “new” maritime threats –although some are as old as navigation! -can not be effectively met with traditional forms of readiness or deterrence but with more sophisticated forms of influence and intervention, nevertheless requiring a self-implication of the Border States.

Economic globalisation required an increase of cooperation in various matters, and it can be said that the emergence of cooperative security is one of them which replaced the old Cold War concept of collective security.

In what some people would be tempted to call the “good old days” of traditional naval warfare,

things were simpler, far less intricately and usually geographically more constrained, whereas our rules of engagement were often easier to enforce. Remember our older CIC's screens coloured tracks and imagine now the nightmare of maritime security operations for which, except a few confirmed friendly tracks and even fewer hostile ones, almost all the tracks sailing at sea would be unknown/pending but potential suspects...

From a juridical or even a pragmatic point of view, the conclusion appears obvious: against widespread global maritime threats, no State can deal alone but will have to look for foreign cooperation.

Such a cooperation, first and foremost needed for quantitative reasons, will also provide additional

opportunities: as most of the basic operational requirements for maritime surveillance and security are roughly common among the participating nations, duplication of naval equipment development costs can be spared through cooperation or even coordination. This will make us more cost-effective and will allow us to cover a larger area, working for each others' benefit in the interest of all of us. I believe that the scale of the fleets we have available, the scope of our geographical interests and the diversity of situations we are confronted with make this cooperation more and more urgent.

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**If we share the idea formulated by Admiral Mullen of a 1000 ships navy which has become**

**the Global Maritime Partnership Initiative, the question now is “how can we achieve it? “**

Maritime security requires a comprehensive approach that must combine different levels: regional and international, military and civil, political and operational. involving various policies and sectors.

We understand that combining those levels is not that easy.

**Once we have said that we want to protect Sea Lanes Of Communication and stop organised crime at Sea, what are the implications?**

In all probability, we will have to develop the security notion in international maritime law. Initiatives such as Vienna or Rome conventions provide a legal framework for the fight against narcotraffic or terrorism in the high seas. But it is insufficient since they do not cover all illegal acts at sea.. We will also have to face the need for adapting national laws as, usually, criminal or civil law is centric land oriented.

Moreover, we will have to find a balance between security at sea and the principle of

freedom of the seas. That is why I am always reluctant to the general idea of Sea governance or any definition of a Sea public order

Two considerations come to my mind:

First, regional or sub regional cooperation is an adapted framework :

As a framework of negotiations and actions, the regional, or sub regional, scale seems to be very well adapted: each coastal area has its own problems and this framework is a privileged one to establish relationships on common matters and concerns. It is wide enough to encompass ambitious views and restricted enough to propose concrete and applicable solutions. If we take the example of piracy in the Malacca Strait, we should not forget that what has started as a local problem has finished with local solutions.

Secondly, international cooperation should not keep coastal nations out of their responsibilities.

It is clear that the open and safe navigation through the Straits involves many stakeholders not only the littoral States. The efforts by the worldwide maritime community to enhance security are indispensable. We witness it when we are all gathered to fight piracy. But this cooperation should also lead to help those coastal countries to face their obligations and their national or boarder problems.

When it comes to **the operations** themselves, to succeed and reinforce international MSO, I consider that **3 specific guidelines** should be improved : political, employability and technical dimensions.

- 1. The political dimension** is essential because there will not be multilateral operations without an endorsed common political will, based on a shared community of views and interests.

Those values can be expressed through an institutional framework as the United Nations, NATO or the European Union. They can also result from a political decision which creates an

ad-hoc coalition. That is why I don't believe that there should be "permanent MSO" whereas there should be a permanent maritime surveillance.

Therefore the strategic and above all political effectiveness of multilateral naval cooperation will always be dependent upon the cohesiveness and sincerity of the coalition that stands behind, and especially the will of the major contributing naval powers.

Considering the full spectrum of navies' missions - which is definitely not limited to those peacetime security and law enforcement activities - this cohesiveness and commitment should be enhanced from low level information sharing to high level waterspace management crisis.

2. **By employability** I would firstly refer to the "how to act together?", especially when we have to articulate our action with other Sea Security services.

I would refer to the military community, which should improve common concepts, doctrines and proceedings, in order to build a brain to brain interoperability.

Developing a common approach of operations; know-hows and shared practices... Western navies have already developed advanced common elements of doctrine through NATO.

This also means that if we want to share this with other partners, it must be done and worked a long time before any operations. Exercises and training are an absolute necessity.

Secondly, we have to identify the legal issues, which set limits within cooperation (when we totally act in common, when we are by ourselves, on a national framework) especially when it comes to law enforcement and implementation of criminal laws at sea. Indeed, no military navies intervene in the same scope of missions – especially when it comes to law enforcement.

3. Finally, **the technical aspect**: it looks simple but in fact, it can be a real brake if not correctly taken into account. It implies capabilities choices (at the beginning of equipment programs) for

compatible equipment and, may have some consequences on financial investments.

Let us take for example transmissions.

Managing information exchange is a very good example of these 3 criteria: it requires a political acknowledgment and authorisation (defining the perimeter and the nature of information to be exchanged) ; it requires the employability (know how and know who) and a compatible system to be connected;

Now, having looked at these guidelines, from my experience and from lessons learned through Atalanta, I would like to specify some principles for future multilateral maritime security operations :

1. There should always be several political frameworks for the missions, allowing any country to join the operations. This is not a tactical but a political requirement. If

tomorrow, operations are driven through a unique framework, participation and cooperation will be very limited

2. Those operations should be coordinated in very flexible ways that allow putting contributors on an equal level of intervention and also level of responsibility. On the other hand, there should be a meticulous pre-planning of the operation involving all the contributors.
3. At the same moment, we should discuss early the mandate; potential “CAVEATS” should be negotiated prior to the operations. It will keep us from bad surprises and from a discrepancy between the means deployed and their effective employability. In the same prospect, we have to agree on common rules of engagement. Some of our missions are already basically civil missions – the question is then, how far can we go in those missions when no navies, and no countries, have the same actual involvement in MSO.

4. In MSO, the military response is not exclusive. This is why the **global end state in all its dimensions must never be omitted but has to be considered from the first negotiation of the mandate.** This is maybe slightly less obvious for naval operations than in land warfare, but we should always keep it in mind, especially when we cooperate in brown waters along with coast guards and other sea services.
  
5. Finally, as an obvious reminder, no operations should be determined without having an idea of the final result and/or a timing of the end of the operation.

Ladies and gentlemen, as you have understood, I clearly support the requirement for future cooperation, within these guidelines and principles.

I thank you very much for your attention.