

COALITION STABILITY OPERATIONS PROJECT

A Working Paper

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The purpose of the Coalition Stability Operations (CSO) Project is to address conceptual and capability challenges related to multinational civil and military action, to raise awareness of differences in national or multilateral approaches and to explore ways of achieving more coherence of action in coalition settings. The Project will result in recommendations that are applicable to multinational experimentations and that can be of direct use in operational theaters.

This Working Paper is based on the CSO Phase I report, which presented the results of analysis conducted by U.S.-CREST for USJFCOM/J9 on challenges and potential solutions related to multinational stability operations.

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PREFACE

The central goal of the Coalition Stability Operations (CSO) Project is to identify possible solutions, in terms of approaches and capabilities, to the challenges posed by coalition stability operations. To do so, U.S.-CREST has proposed a two-phase, multi-nation study of consultation, coordination, command, and control (“4C”) issues related to conflict prevention, crisis management and stabilization, taking into account the civil and military dimensions of stability operations.

The work generated during the USJFCOM/J9-sponsored project’s first phase, from February to July 2006, and from which this position paper is derived, highlights a number of key issues for which more compatible approaches as well as adapted capabilities are required, and that would benefit from further discussion in a multinational setting. The first multinational meeting of the second phase of the project, also sponsored by USJFCOM/J9, is now scheduled to take place this coming December in Paris, France. Three additional multinational meetings are planned in the course of 2007.

When completed, the Coalition Stability Operations project will provide recommendations containing concrete insights on how to achieve a more comprehensive and coherent approach to coalition stability operations. The project will thus seek to lay foundations for a multinational, civil-military operating concept for stability operations.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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From Europe, former KFOR deputy commander LTG (Ret.) Jean-Claude Thomann also addressed the workshop, and extensively shared his experience and reflections regarding stability operations with the U.S.-CREST project team. The European Union Military Staff sent a member of its Civilian-Military Cell, Lieutenant Colonel Joachim Bruns, to the workshop, providing a detailed briefing on civil-military planning and coordination within the EU. Colonel (Ret.) Manfred Rosenberger, Professor Christopher Clapham, and the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) also made substantive and networking contributions to the project.

Lastly, based on a broad range of U.S. and European views, the U.S.-CREST "distributed" project team of Ms. Anne Kovacs and Col. (Ret.) Dominique Orsini in Arlington VA, Dr. Robert Grant and Dr. Niagalé Bagayoko-Penone in the UK, and LTG (Ret.) Christian Delanghe in France, provided the initial analysis of the challenges of stability operations, as it appears in the Phase I project report. The contents of the report remain the responsibility of U.S.-CREST alone.

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INTRODUCTION

Multinational stability operations have now come to represent a major part of the worldwide engagements of military forces and demand significant resources from governments and international institutions. They aim to manage crises, win the peace, and prevent future conflict. These operations present a complex set of challenges and requirements, given that they imply the use of potentially deadly military force, most of the time in a state of non-war, but always in conjunction with other essential means directed or not by governments or multilateral organizations, in an era of global media and instant communications. These operations demand the ability to conduct a number of interdependent military and civilian activities, either simultaneously or in close sequence, and involve a wide spectrum of actors. Effective undertaking of stability operations therefore requires coordinated assessments, well consolidated planning and as closely integrated an approach to operations as possible among a broad range of military and civilian actors within the intervening coalition, and the required consultation without. Defense and security partners have been grappling with the problem of how best to address these challenges for a number of years, more recently in the context of the complex contingency operations of the 1990s, and then in the post 9-11 environment; various military or civilian concepts and organizations have emerged from this process. New initiatives related to stability operations or crisis management based on experience, cultures, resources and political guidance, are at various stages of evolution among these countries and within the multilateral organizations to which they belong.

Effects-based approaches for multinational operations (EBAO), although not originally developed specifically for stability missions, present significant advantages for dealing with them because of their potential aptitude to take into account, coordinate, or integrate the use of non-military instruments. While the effects-based approach to multinational operations has garnered significant interest, perspectives differ among and within countries regarding how effects-based concepts can best be implemented. In parallel, militaries – for example in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France – have been developing or applying specific concepts in order to better deal with the unique requirements of stability operations, in South West Asia, the Balkans or Africa. Other conceptual developments, regarding counter-insurgency (COIN) operations and the role of the military in counter terrorism (CT) also have a potential impact on how multinational stability operations will be conducted in the future. Broader concepts, aimed at enabling a whole of government strategy, have also been emerging, such as the *Comprehensive Approach* in the UK, which is being expanded to the European Union, the *U.S. Government Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation*, the preliminary multinational civil-military strategic planning process described in the French-led Multinational Experiment 4 (MNE4) *Strategic Planning Guide* (SPG), or the Danish *Concerted Action and Planning* (CPA) initiative, now proposed to NATO. Although work will continue to be undertaken in multinational environments on crafting comprehensive approaches to rapid multinational civil and military interventions, greater clarification is still needed both within and between coalition partners and allies regarding exactly what these concepts mean and entail in practical terms. Further exploration of the linkages between a comprehensive approach, multinational interagency planning, EBAO and stability operations concepts encompassing both military and civilian

resources are also worthy of additional consideration to ensure coherence from the capitals to the tactical level of the intervening coalitions and other national and multilateral actors.

U.S.-CREST is therefore proposing a new examination of operational planning and execution to address the challenges presented by multinational stability operations and to help bring needed clarification and harmonization to emerging concepts and capabilities. This examination is centered on issues related to more effective consultation, coordination, command and control (4C) mechanisms between coalition partners, taking into account interagency and civil-military interactions within the multinational force and its environment:

- new consultation processes which can take into account bilateral, multilateral, and Allied civil and military evaluation and decision-making;
- efficient interagency and civil-military coordination methods, which take into consideration the many constraints the actors involved face in these operations, both within and without the intervening coalitions;
- new, command and control architectures and information flows, which allow for different levels of participation and capabilities and adopt a networked approach;
- and improved ways and means to ensure adequate national control, over both civilian and military resources, without undermining the effectiveness of coalitions' actions.

Phase I of the U.S.-CREST's Coalition Stability Operations (CSO) project focused on exploring the key challenges and stakes for coalition stability operations. This initial survey of the challenges of stability operations led to the recognition that in order for stability to take root in the long term, successful action must be undertaken in order to "master" a number of key interdependent domains, which include:

- The operational space and the ground environment
- The local population and crowd movements
- The availability of weapons for non regular adversary
- Organized adversary forces
- Humanitarian emergencies
- The "virtual dimension" of the operational space
- Community life, daily life, local civil functions
- Indigenous political, economic, and security sector capabilities.

Although initially identified in the context of the post Cold War engagements of the 1990's from a primarily military perspective, these domains remain relevant to current stability operations. Indeed, the areas in which action is necessary are the same, though the level of challenge in each might differ and the modes of action are in constant flux. Project participants agreed to use these domains to frame multinational thinking on *how* to undertake action in these areas and *with what* means. They will therefore serve as a frame of reference during the second phase of the CSO project, as participants address concepts and capabilities – including appropriate civilian-military approaches – as well as the consultation and coordination mechanisms necessary to enhance the effectiveness of future multinational stability operations.

Phase II activities aim to generate conceptual and capability related solutions, through the use of situational vignettes or structured discussion, to enhance the definition and coherence of the multinational concepts that can be developed and experimented in various settings. Phase II will be organized around four multinational working group meetings, each one comprised of plenary and sub-group sessions. The sub-groups will use situational vignettes based in West Africa to focus consideration on the most effective ways of responding to issues and challenges of stability operations in terms of:

- concepts and doctrine for stability operations,
- civil-military and interagency structures and processes,
- capability requirements for stability operations.

These aspects could be looked at more specifically in the context of transitions, both expected and unexpected.

Addressing the above-mentioned interdependent domains in a comprehensive and coherent manner is essential for improving coalition action in stability operations; the other issues – all important – pertaining to how to undertake consultation, coordination and planning from the highest levels, how to manage differing approaches, etc. can be considered key elements that feed into the overarching requirements of *comprehensiveness* and *coherence*. As a result, an examination of these issues will enrich multinational concept development and experimentation by providing conceptual insights and an intellectual framework regarding the operational approaches to stability operations of military, civil government agencies, and non-governmental organizations, as well as by identifying issues meriting further study or greater emphasis during experiments.

STABILIZATION ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

Armed forces know how to “make war”, in the classic meaning of the term, and are designed and equipped to do so, but do they also know how to “make security”? What is the role of armed forces in crisis management, where “victory” does not define success in the same way that it does in war? The reality of interventions shows that all units, at all levels, must prepare and train for area control and even counter-insurgency missions, and take into account their implications in terms of intelligence, contact with indigenous populations, decentralization of responsibilities, etc. All of these functions are carried out very differently, depending on whether they occur as part of war or part of crisis management.

When it comes to “creating security” the military cannot act alone, given that many tasks related to security are undertaken by civil actors specifically responsible for police, judicial services, prisons, etc. Unless the military is explicitly tasked with these types of functions (despite being ill- or un-prepared to fulfill them), which are essential to ensuring security, military actions must be “accompanied” by civil actions that are coherent, in terms of time and space, with those of the armed forces. In the absence of such coherence between civil and military activities, a dangerous void can emerge, especially if there is a significant time lag between the end of coercive military action and the establishment of the civil functions that are necessary to maintain security.

Given the environment in which we are now conducting crisis management and stability operations, which require a comprehensive, civil-military approach, the following key issues merit particular attention:

- developing a comprehensive approach to operations, which requires strong focus on multinational, interagency consultation and coordination, emphasizing assessment-sharing, consensus-building and planning,
- preparing for and managing transitions, both expected (to follow-on force) and unexpected (spike in violence),
- assuring coherence between the strategic and operational levels, between civilians and militaries, during and between planning and execution phases,
- comparing, understanding and if possible harmonizing national civil-military approaches to crisis management and stability operations.

These issues are all essential to improving multinational action in the interdependent domains listed in the introduction, and therefore in stability operations more generally. In order to address the challenges of coalition stability operations and to highlight a number of important questions for participants to think about, U.S.-CREST has chosen to structure its report according to three broad themes:

- preparation for multinational action (encompassing conflict prevention, as well as planning for crisis management and stability operations),
- the challenges of executing coalition interventions in various stability missions, and
- specific considerations for the challenges posed by transitions, both expected and unexpected.

The main issues that these topics bring to bear are detailed in the following sections.

PREPARING FOR MULTINATIONAL ACTION

Achieving Commonality of Purpose

Shared Situational Understanding

Crisis management and stability operations carry with them a number of significant military and civilian challenges for the intervening Nations and organizations; a point common to all these challenges is the need to promote greater *coherence of action* within the coalition. This again means improving consultation and coordination in order to better understand partner nations' evaluations of the situation, their interests in the crisis area, their view of the type of action to be undertaken and why.

Sound analysis of unfolding events and understanding of the strategic environment within the country and region, as well as the international context are crucial elements of any intervention for conflict prevention, crisis management, and stabilization. An operation may not necessarily be doomed to fail if the analysis of the situation is faulty, but it will be rendered more difficult and increase the coalition's vulnerabilities.

Understanding the strategic environment is the most basic element for a successful intervention, and yet incorrect analysis of the strategic environment, of the players, and of the stakes, is perhaps the most common error made. This, in turn, can lead to divergent perspectives on the coalition's objectives and the ways in which to attain them. As a result, coalitions will be less cohesive and more vulnerable to tensions that can be exploited by the enemy or adversary.

The Balkans conflicts of the 1990's provide ample illustration of this point. In the early part of the decade, the United States and European countries applied different but equally faulty assessments to the situation in Bosnia. The United States military perceived the mountains of Bosnia as analogous to the jungles of Vietnam, and argued that military intervention in Bosnia would lead to the same type of futile, bloody entanglement. Europeans, on the other hand, overestimated the impact of "soft power" on the decision-making of local actors. These assessments played an important role in preventing an effective coalescing of U.S. and European power to halt the conflict in Bosnia until 1995. In 1999, NATO countries erroneously hoped that a short campaign of air strikes would compel Belgrade to yield to Western demands regarding Kosovo. More recently, current ISAF commander LTG David Richards has stated that the international coalition in Afghanistan probably underestimated the potential for Taliban resurgence.

In short, coalitions cannot operate effectively, or potentially even be launched, if national situational assessments are too divergent or inaccurate. The complex interplay of the many different elements that can trigger crises and lead to state failure creates a substantial risk of divergent or inaccurate national assessments. A thorough situational assessment needs to include local culture, the personalities of faction leaders, and the issues at stake, which are often multifaceted, including:

- interests driven by local politics,
- ethnic, religious or ideological antagonisms,
- economic, demographic or ecological factors,

- separatist or secessionist movements,
- territorial disputes,
- instability from organized crime or international terrorism.

Each nation tends to assess the nature and impact of developing crises through its own set of indicators, warnings, and methodologies. Some form of continuous, multinational, multi-agency analysis could play a major role in helping to create the kind of common and early understanding of an emerging crisis that is a key enabler of effective conflict prevention and resolution.

While multinational sharing of intelligence information is an important aspect of this process, it is also a difficult one, and especially so if intended to feed into an interagency environment. However, there are many other valuable sources of information besides technical and human intelligence, such as a vast array of open source literature, reporting from embassies as well as field missions of international organizations, and networking with NGOs. Much can be done in terms of multinational, interagency assessment of potential crisis situations based on open source and unclassified information.

Greater attention should be focused on building processes and mechanisms for effective information and assessment sharing, including reaching agreement on ways to share intelligence and developing multinational, interagency consultation and communication on crisis indicators, warning, and assessment methodologies.

In order to improve coalition efforts in conflict prevention, crisis management, and stability operations, concerned nations must think about processes and mechanisms for consultation, for sharing of situational assessments as well as rapid early-warning signaling, and for pre-crisis contingency planning. A comprehensive understanding of the multitude of players and initiatives, and the ways in which they interact and reinforce or undermine one another's efforts is also required.

Strategic Objectives and End States

Achieving some degree of common situational understanding among coalition countries constitutes a critical requirement for defining the objectives of an intervention and the desired end state. Given that coalitions are by nature vulnerable to tensions caused by divergences regarding the objectives and the means and ways of attaining them, it is important to attempt to define them as clearly as possible in advance. While a total overlap of coalition members' objectives is not realistic, it is important to ensure that the underlying motives behind the intervention do not diverge too significantly. This was for example the case with the British-French-Israeli intervention in Suez, where France's goal was to isolate the Algerian rebellion by eliminating its main source of external support, Britain wanted to maintain control over the Suez Canal, and Israel sought to wage a preventive war. These divergent objectives played a significant role in the failure of the operation.

A successful intervention requires building a cohesive coalition, based, to the extent possible, on shared strategic objectives. Shared strategic objectives are a key prerequisite to subsequent agreement on: the mandate, strategy, command and control arrangements, rules of engagement, and resource contributions of each participant.

Agreement on objectives also requires agreement on measures of success, which cannot be limited to military metrics. However, because progress is difficult to measure in the political or social domains, for example, it would be useful for coalition members to think out these issues in advance.

Yet, at times potential coalition members can agree that “something” needs to be done, but disagree about what, why and how. This was for example the case with the intervention in Kosovo in which defining an end state would have hindered the constitution of a coalition: coalition members had no vision of what the end-state would look like and probably could not have agreed on an end state had they tried. Based on this example, ambiguity may sometimes be a necessary pre-requisite to agreed action despite the major complications it causes for the military. As a result, though ideally common consultations during the build-up to the crisis will have led to a common understanding, realistically there will be situations for which it will not be possible to agree on an end state and strategic objectives.

When international instances such as the UN or the political level more generally provide mandates that are vague in nature, it gives planners a great degree of flexibility but also opens the way for different interpretations, possible misunderstandings and therefore friction between coalition members. Moreover, the current recognized need for a more comprehensive, interagency approach from the strategic level down implies defining the coalition’s strategic aims as well as the ways and means to be employed in the attainment of these aims.

Thus, a clear definition is not easy, in particular for the military component, when the aim is not strictly military (to defeat the enemy) but rather, in the context of crisis management or post-conflict stabilization, to contribute to normalization of society. In general, mandates defined in international organizations are relatively vague, mostly because it is difficult to achieve consensus. In this context, forces are often asked to undertake broad and imprecisely defined missions, such as “ensure security” or “support civil activities”.

This imprecision, often desirable politically, has:

- disadvantages: such as the lack of clarity for the military. What defines success for the military under these conditions? When can one consider that the mission has been accomplished and therefore begin to disengage forces?
- advantages: the commander of the operation is by default granted significant leeway and freedom of action.

However, in a multinational setting (namely within a coalition), this leeway can generate serious differences in interpretation between national military actors, at various levels (strategic, operational, tactical). This, in turn, can make command and control very difficult, given the possible divergences in sensitivities, interests, and cultures among the contributing entities, as well as the possible differences in situational assessments, which can further vary by sector or region within the area of operations.

At the execution level, political ambiguity translates, for the military, into difficulties in developing rules of engagement (ROE) that are accepted by all and that establish a code of conduct applicable for all contingents. Here again, national approaches are rarely identical, and agreements on principle can hide divergences in application within units and headquarters, which are very harmful for the unity of effort and efficiency of the coalition's action. These divergences can namely create differences in attitudes, which local populations are very attuned to and which can be exploited by adversaries to threaten coalition members' theoretically unified front. This is a very important issue for the coherence of multinational action, which is discussed further in the second chapter on implementation of coalition stability operations. It is furthermore well known that operation commanders in coalitions generally deplore the existence of caveats that restrict the ways that forces can be used and are imposed by contributing nations for their contingent. Political ambiguity can also lead to increased use of national caveats as countries seek to guard against unexpected operational tasks.

The contradiction between the political advantage (and at times necessity) of remaining vague and the operational need for greater definition is particularly challenging in a coalition environment with diverging national views. How can coalitions work at crafting a comprehensive approach, necessary for greater effectiveness in stability operations, while taking into account the need for flexibility?

Legitimacy of the Intervention

The political mandate also serves the function of providing the foundation for legitimizing the intervention. The legitimacy of an intervention is an important issue, in particular in a coalition environment, because legitimacy is never fully ensured, whether vis-à-vis nations outside of the coalition or vis-à-vis public opinions whose versatility is well-known.

Though legal legitimacy can be established by obtaining an appropriate mandate from an appropriate international organization, "psychological legitimacy", which is a critical determinant for the success of an operation, is much harder to obtain: for this reason the CSO project will give particular attention to the means of maintaining the psychological legitimacy of stability operations across the range of coalition participants and local actors. It is important to take into account – throughout the entire operation – how to be perceived as legitimate by the populations involved (namely the local population), local authorities and forces, as well as by the international media.

The acquisition of legitimacy in the area of operations is an issue that must be examined before the operation is initialized, and brings to bear a variety of complex political, ethnic, religious or cultural factors. To meet this requirement, it is essential to understand the society and population concerned. It is important to take into account the region's history, its evolutions, local antagonisms, etc. Undertaking an effective and accurate analysis requires dependable sources and strong contacts with not only area experts but also with local populations whose experiences are often very telling and helpful when analyzing the situation, and choosing which attitudes or even courses of action to adopt for maximal effectiveness.

There is always a risk that the international actors on the ground will be “manipulated”, according to the interests or passions of various parties concerned, be they factions or local authorities. This general risk of manipulation, which can lead to grave errors in assessment and judgment, is exacerbated in the case of coalitions by the strong potential for divergence and disagreement it creates between actors in the way they perceive a situation, and consequently, the way they perceive the legitimacy of the actions being conducted. This can further complicate command of the operation in certain situations.

Civil-Military Planning

There currently seems to be a consensus around the necessity of developing a more comprehensive approach to operations. High-level multinational, civil-military consultations and coordination are needed, as are better coordinated assessment and information-sharing mechanisms, in order to work towards this comprehensive approach. To arrive at a comprehensive approach in a coalition environment requires agreement on a common vision of what the coalition can accomplish and how. Potential coalitions must agree as well on the ways in which they will share the burden of any type of operation and measure its progress once it is underway (in both the civilian and military fields). The general aim is to achieve greater clarity among partners in order to then increase the coherence of multinational, civil-military efforts.

However, as improvements and new “ways ahead” are sought, it is nonetheless important to remain aware of realities and limitations (such as imperfect overlap between strategic objectives of coalition members, or the dilemma between the operational need for clarity and the political advantages of vagueness, etc). This is particularly true when it comes to the challenges of integrating or interfacing civilian dimensions with what was originally a military planning process, and doing so within a multinational context.

Integrating or interfacing civilian and military efforts within a comprehensive planning process

Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq in particular have driven home the understanding that planning must be as inclusive as possible between military and civilian organizations for post-conflict operations. Because the success of an operation depends not on military victory but on the outcome of the stabilization and reconstruction phase, the military intervention is only one facet of a more global civilian and military approach. This realization pleads for strong civilian agencies input, and for some countries, lead, in two areas: first, in determining the overarching strategic goals – non-military and military – to be attained, and second, in planning post-conflict activities in close coordination with the military so as to avoid the “gaps” that create dangerous vulnerabilities.

Generally speaking, intervening in crisis management and stability operations has proved challenging for civilian agencies. The following points are only examples of regularly noted difficulties: rapid response capability has been very limited or non-existent; mobilization of civil resources can be very time consuming and is heavily reliant on “voluntary” capability; some critical civilian capability such as police may be under the control of local authorities who are very reluctant to release them for overseas deployment; and the need to provide security for civilian personnel in dangerous environments is now characteristic of many operations.

The experience of Kosovo, a stability operation which benefited from some two months of advance planning but still suffered from a significant time lag in the deployment of civilian capability, underscores the need, at a minimum, for parallel planning of civilian mission elements and the military intervention, with a civil-military strategic coordinating body able to ensure a coherent and complementary increase in strength of all components of the international operation.

Yet, multinational stability operations continue to struggle with the setting up of coherent strategic level civil-military planning frameworks. In 2002 the G8 adopted a system of “lead donors” for SSR in Afghanistan. The United States took on building the Afghan National Army (ANA), Japan assumed lead donor responsibility for DDR, Germany for police reform, Italy for the judicial sector, and the UK for counter-narcotics efforts. However, the lead donor countries carried out these highly interdependent SSR activities in a largely uncoordinated manner. The Afghanistan Compact in early 2006 terminated this lead-donor system and brought SSR activities under the auspices of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, co-chaired by the Afghan government and the UN.

More coherent strategic civil-military structures and processes at multinational level fundamentally require the creation of such structures and processes on the part of major coalition countries. These countries have begun grappling with the problem, and a number of new structures and concepts have emerged. The U.S. and the UK chose to respond to the challenges of civil-military coordination by creating interagency or cross-governmental structures: the Office of the Coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization within the U.S. State Department aims at integrating civil efforts in this field and serving as the interface with the U.S. military. The British Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) is a cross-governmental structure housed in DFID, incorporating military, development (DFID) and diplomatic (FCO) personnel to improve intra-governmental planning and execution. Broader concepts, aimed at enabling a whole of government(s) strategy, are also being developed by Nations and organizations. For example, the UK has been developing the *Comprehensive Approach* and has actively promoted its expansion to the European Union; the *U.S. Government Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation*, or the preliminary multinational civil-military strategic planning process described in the MNE4 *Strategic Planning Guide* developed under French lead are other examples of efforts to reflect on the strategic dimension of operations.

However, these new national structures and concepts generally must still gain stronger interagency and in some cases political acceptance, and be tested in experimentation as well as during actual crises. Interfacing civilian and military planning poses difficulties for both civilian agencies and the military.

With respect to the civilian side, first, as is often pointed out, most civilian ministries/departments, with the exception of development agencies, do not have a history or culture of detailed planning. A diplomat’s job, in particular, is mostly to shape and react to events on a day-to-day basis. While diplomats must be able to think strategically, they are not in the habit of undertaking contingency planning for interventions. One can in fact wonder whether participation in contingency planning would potentially undermine a diplomat’s credibility and thus his or her ability to serve the national interest.

Moreover, the remarkable asymmetry between military and civilian planning capacity resources, especially in the U.S., can be debilitating for the civilian side. This imbalance follows into imbalance in resources that can be called on to implement the plan – the military disposing of far greater resources than their civilian counterparts.

During MNE4 discussion sessions, participants pointed out that plans are often generated in a stove-piped manner, thus rendering it difficult to integrate them once they are almost completed. For this reason, integrating civilian and military plans early on may have merit. Others suggested that instead of trying to integrate planning in the classic concept, it would be useful to develop entry points for civilian partners to engage at appropriate level. It was suggested that the “international community” should develop an interface for a civilian process (more flexible than that of the military), which would likely look different than an effects based approach. This of course leads to the question of the role that the UN should have in crafting the overall plan and, generally speaking, the interactions between the coalition and UN agencies.

The significant differences between military and civilian processes have led others to wonder if it would not be more effective for the parties involved to try to simply identify synergies and resolves disconnects rather than participate in a fully integrated planning process.

It is important to try to explore options for more effective action, taking into account the multitude of actors—national, civilian, military, international and non governmental organizations—involved in stability operations. While these actors overwhelmingly want to have a positive impact on the situation, they tend coordinate their plans poorly, if at all, until after they meet on the ground, and with mixed results and effectiveness. The idea of bringing these efforts together at a higher level for a more integrated and effective approach therefore has a certain appeal.

Many countries are in the process of reorganizing internally in order to better respond to crises with a whole-of-government approach. This is already creating difficulties at the national level and is even more challenging within a coalition. Moreover, the “integration” of civilian and military efforts, while highly contentious, may be feasible at the national level but is much harder to imagine in a coalition environment since there is no strategic “supra-national” decision-maker. In a coalition setting, the key probably lies in developing better synergies for multinational, interagency planning through better consultation and coordination at all levels.

Proposed Structures

Recent experiences in crisis management have shown the great difficulty in undertaking civil-military planning, which would plan the international action by bringing together all the relevant civil and military actors and establishing, in concert, a clear and coherent campaign plan. In reality, nations each apply different “formulas”, based on their institutional structures, the nature of their executive branch, the relationships between military and political structures, and in fine, the system of devolution of responsibilities specific to each state.

To improve operational effectiveness, it would nonetheless be necessary to bring together early on, the relevant parties, civil and military, for a shared analysis of what can be done. In the

absence of pre-established structures, and in particular in a coalition setting, it is desirable to identify the following elements:

- At the political level, a contact group, comprised of representatives from all countries that will potentially contribute to the operation would be responsible for (i) preparing the mandate that would be given to the civil and military components of the coalition and would be officially validated by the international organization under which the operation will be conducted (UN, OSCE, AU, etc), or (ii) in the case of a coalition without a mandate from an international organization, for directly defining a mandate that all contributors can agree to. Moreover, this contact group would be in charge of orienting and validating civil-military planning as it is developed, before the campaign and operation plans are approved at the highest level of all contributing states.
- At the civil-military level, a strategic planning group, composed of civil and military experts would be in charge of developing the strategic level, civil-military campaign plan. Ideally, this group would be comprised of experts from all the contributing countries, drawn from the ministries and agencies concerned by the operation, including a cell specifically tasked with establishing permanent liaison with the IOs and NGOs who would also be involved in area.
- At the military level, an ad hoc operational level planning capability could be hosted by one of the coalition members.

Overall aims: issues requiring greater clarity

These structures, whose shape and content may vary according to the specificities of the various coalition members, aim to define the main contours of an operation:

- The desired end state, which based on the operation's aims, defines the situation to be created in order to determine that the coalition's engagement is no longer useful and can be terminated.
- The general civil-military phasing of the operation, including steps for the transfer of responsibilities between the military and international civil actors (where applicable) and with local authorities (political, administrative, economic, etc) in the area of operations. The aim is thus to develop a common "action plan" for all the relevant parties, which would serve as a reference document for all levels of responsibility to frame the actions to be undertaken. This "action plan" constitutes an indispensable matrix to analyze needs, define the means to be implemented and to deduce the modes of actions that will enable attainment of the desired aims.
- The general organization of responsibilities over time, dealing in particular with the relations to establish between international civil and military instances in the area of operation (subordination, coordination, reciprocal approbation, etc) and the validation of the coalition's civil and military leadership (which can be fulfilled by different states).
- The principal rules of engagement, which will determine the "tone" of the operation, in particular regarding the use of force for coercion within the legal context determined by the coalition.
- The attitude to adopt vis-à-vis local populations, factions, authorities (recognized or not), in the area of operation, and the major actions to be conducted regarding these parties, in order to move towards the desired end state.

- The collection, analysis and sharing of information and intelligence among the parties participating in the operation. Very specific agreements need to be put into place in this extremely sensitive domain, since it directly impact the control that contributing nations have on the operation.
- The general “media policy” that will ensure support from public opinions and will confirm the legitimacy of the coalition’s action vis-à-vis domestic and international public opinions as well as local actors.
- The operation’s general budget, in particular, everything that pertains to shared costs (this is always a sensitive topic and breaks in financing of civil actions are frequent, which can put the actors on the ground in difficult situations and even generate additional destabilizing or crisis factors).

Conclusions

These comments underline the importance of the work to be done, before undertaking an operation, to improve its effectiveness and coherence in setting goals and choosing the means to attain them. This is particularly true when dealing with ad hoc coalitions, whether or not the operation is placed under the auspices of an international organization such as the UN. This very important collective effort is in fact complicated to both organize and implement, given the multitude and diversity of potential participants, the political sensitivity of some of the problems to be addressed, the sometimes diverging interests of coalition members, as well as the structural and cultural differences that can cause many misunderstandings.

The political benefits of using a coalition or Alliance when undertaking a military operation are well understood, but they complicate operational planning and execution. As a result, it is tempting for the dominant player to deal with the problem almost unilaterally, requesting only nominal participation from the coalition members. This way, their participation confers a useful legitimacy on the operation without affecting the goals and means determined by the dominant power, thus enabling it to minimize the lengthy discussions and negotiations, and act more quickly. Attempting deeper consultation and negotiation between coalition members tends to slow planning and action, which is problematic when the situation requires a rapid response and the lengthy processes can potentially hamper military effectiveness.

This leads to the core issue of “coalition management” and the key question of whether coalitions can be efficient without strong leadership. Since it is difficult to imagine effective coalition action in the absence of strong leadership—in particular in a high-risk, high-stakes environment—the challenge is therefore how to make this strong leadership acceptable to most or all coalition members. The project will address how to create conditions allowing for effective action while fostering sufficiently close working relationships to minimize the friction and dissent that are inherent to coalitions and can be exploited by the adversary. These challenges can in part be dealt with through improved consultation and decision-making processes in the initial run-up to the crisis. They can be addressed in the initial process of political decision-making, then during the planning phase, by trying to involve as many of the relevant actors as possible and to seek consensus around a certain number of pre-defined driving ideas, which could then be reasonably amended and modified to incorporate participants’ proposals. Another important aspect of coalition management is to ensure that everyone involved in the planning and consultation

process, as well as in the various command structures, has connected with the appropriate counterparts, and is communicating at the right level. Particular attention should be given to information-sharing in this regard. Finally, in the field, the command structure must have a solid understanding of the capabilities, doctrine and operating procedures of the contingents that are at his disposal, so as to ensure that he only requires of his subordinates that they undertake actions they are capable of fulfilling.

Therefore, these various challenges regarding stability operations in particular and coalition operations in general require fresh multinational thinking on:

- improved consultation, coordination command and control mechanisms,
- more integrated multinational, civil-military planning efforts,
- increasing overall coherence from the strategic down to the tactical level (especially from strategic to operational), including between civilian and military actors,
- minimizing the problems/tensions/misunderstanding that can be exploited by the adversary.

Some of the issues highlighted in this part on the key issues for strategic level preparation for conflict prevention, crisis management and stability operations deserve further exploration by the multinational working group. Among these issues, sub-groups in the CSO project could for example address:

- How can coalition partners obtain more effective awareness and understanding of each others' civil-military structures and processes?
- How can coalitions set up effective multinational, interagency mechanisms for consultation, for sharing of assessments, and for rapid early warning signaling that can lead to development of a consolidated situation assessment?
- What are effective operational level mechanisms for ongoing consultation and coordination of the various actors (major coalition partners, international, regional and sub-regional organizations, national administrations, NGOs) in their respective circles?
- How can a rigorous and complicated military planning process be effectively interfaced with a diplomacy-based process that is essential and equally complex, but by nature very different?
- Are there similarities between military and development planning activities that could serve as a basis for more concerted planning efforts?
- What tradeoffs need to be considered between the requirements for political management of coalitions and the coalition's operational effectiveness? How can coalitions provide for an acceptable level of national control over assets in theatre without undermining the effectiveness of coalition action, especially given the fact stability operations have a substantial civilian dimension alongside the military one?

IMPLEMENTATION OF COALITION STABILITY OPERATIONS

Conflict prevention, crisis management and stability operations involve a wide variety of types of activities, which should not be seen as sequential phases of a crisis or conflict; post-Cold War and post 9/11 operational experience has shown that intervening coalitions will often need to carry out many of them concurrently. Preventive elements of crisis management are always present before escalation to conflict intervention as well as in post-conflict environments. A military operation set up to reinforce the security provided by a host government, regional or international organization when the level of violence is still low is the point at which *the lines between conflict prevention and crisis management or conflict intervention begin to blur*. This appears to be the type of mission that the EU is looking to become increasingly engaged in (Macedonia, Democratic Republic of Congo). This approach posits the use of armed forces in a relatively preventive manner; their presence is meant to dissuade parties on the ground from resorting to force to meet their objectives, and thus to seek to prevent escalation of violence, before, during and after a conflict has erupted. It may be interesting to look more closely at this approach and see if it could potentially be developed and extended to other regional security organizations.

Conflict Prevention

The benefits of treating potential crisis situations early and preventively are regularly highlighted by politicians, military staff and civil servants. Everyone agrees that conflict prevention is the smart way to deal with unstable situations since it saves human and financial resources for all parties involved. Nonetheless, the international community generally tends to ignore latent crises until they require a military operation.

There are signs of change, however, due to the current emphasis on the risks tied to failing, failed and collapsed states (by the U.S. and the EU in particular), which has led to an increased focus on prevention. Conflict prevention missions pose a certain number of challenges. **Most difficult is probably that of focusing attention and resources on a volatile situation before it has reached critical or emergency levels.**

What can be done by the international community in States that have already failed or are on the verge of collapse? While a number of “state-building” activities such as security sector reform, encouraging better governance, rule of law missions, and DDR can have considerable impact in bolstering weak states at modest cost, assisting failed ones presents more difficult choices. In these states, nation-building efforts – no matter how concentrated – tend to demand major resources and may have only limited prospect of success. Yet these states continue to pose a threat to global security, in that they become ideal bases for all types of illegal activities. The case of Somalia is particularly illustrative. The international community has had no desire to pour large amounts of money – much less send troops – into a country for which the reestablishment of a functioning national government would be an immensely difficult task. At the same time, there has been growing concern that Somalia could evolve into a major terrorist safe haven and recruiting site, but without any certainty that this worse case scenario will actually come to pass.

The core dilemma of conflict prevention is that the costs of acting are readily calculable while the costs of inaction are far more uncertain until the situation is on the verge on erupting into crisis.

Early intervention with weak states is critical in order to halt their decline into failure, at which point efforts to assist them generally become much more costly and are less likely to succeed.

Closer multinational consultation is critical in order to focus attention and resources and help enable timely action if necessary. With respect to conflict prevention, it would be helpful to examine and propose new mechanisms for closer multinational, interagency consultation, in particular to share evaluations, allow for shared early warning and contingency planning, and to begin planning for a multidimensional intervention to stabilize the environment before it degenerates further.

While conflict prevention is held up as the ideal goal to be attained, in many cases preventive efforts are either too half-hearted to succeed in more than delaying the eruption of crisis or are simply unable to steer the concerned parties off the path to crisis. As a result, for the foreseeable future coalitions will continue to involve their militaries in stability operations, be they crisis management, peacekeeping, or post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.

Acting in Interdependent Domains: the Key to Stability Operations

The interrelationships between different domains or lines of activity in stability operations are multifaceted and complex. The fundamental prerequisite to achieving progress in stability operations is the provision of security. Once security is established, however, it is unlikely to endure if visible progress does not take place in restoring the basic requirements of local life, community life, administrative, and political function. These functions must be progressively transferred to host country control through local capacity building initiatives, or again, a breakdown in security is eventually likely to take place. The perceived legitimacy of a stabilization mission is also critical to the ability of the coalition military force to provide security, which brings into sharp focus the psychological or “virtual dimension” of operations. Consequently, although the military has primary responsibility for providing a secure environment in a stability operation, success in this mission fundamentally depends on an array of other players acting in a variety of domains.

As discussed in the introduction to this report, action in eight interrelated domains appears to be critical to the conduct of stability operations and can serve as a frame of reference for thinking about how to plan and carry out stability operations, and the capabilities needed to do so:

- the operational space and the ground environment,
- the local population and crowd movements,
- the availability of weapons for adversaries,
- organized adversary forces,
- humanitarian emergencies,
- the “virtual dimension” of the operational space,
- community life, daily life, local civil functions, and
- indigenous political, economic, and security sector capabilities.

The Military Role in Stability Operations

For the military, the objective of stability operations is to act against the logic of violence in order to win the peace. Violence should be understood as “*abuse of force*”. It is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that stems from different rationales on the part of different actors. Therefore, it is important to understand its various forms and shapes, which can include politically-motivated violence, insurrectional violence, or criminal violence. As shown in Iraq and Afghanistan, insurgency and terrorism constitute two extremely difficult forms of violence for stability operations to handle. Non-violence may also sometimes support violent operating modes.

This categorization is not permanent and strictly fixed. In the theater of operations, all actors must be ready to face a *combination of several types of violence*. As a result, the notion of an easily identifiable “enemy” has eroded. In stabilization operations, forces face various *perpetrators of violence*, who often blend in with the local population, instead of an initially designated enemy.

Whenever military forces are engaged in stability operations, where a combination of types of violence is present, they are mandated to serve both military and non-military objectives. Although the implications of these objectives may vary, the principle on which they are based remains constant: stability operations seek to ensure or restore security in a crisis area troubled by violent actions. If the local population does not feel reasonably secure from perpetrators of violence such as ethnic or sectarian militia, insurgents, terrorists, and criminal gangs, it will not give allegiance to new or rebuilt political structures, and may quickly come to view the intervening coalition force as illegitimate occupiers. Overly aggressive action on the part of coalition forces in response to extreme perpetrators of violence can also lead to greater feelings of insecurity on the part of the local population and increase negative perceptions of the coalition. Consequently, it is critical for coalition forces to focus above all on providing security for the local population rather than on force protection or protection of the State, which has often been the case in stability operations. As important as these latter two objectives are, the local population arguably constitutes the center of gravity for stability operations, and its security will ultimately also enhance the security of coalition forces and of the State.

The confrontation of wills between coalition forces and perpetrators of violence must be won by resorting not only to classic combat actions, but also through the conduct of other operating modes, whose effects should be felt as much in the psychological field as in the physical one. British counter-insurgency expert John Mackinlay refers to this psychological field as the “virtual dimension” of operations (“the virtual war zone is in the human mind”).

Thus, emerging joint military doctrine on stabilization operations should no longer distinguish between combat and non combat operations. It should not differentiate between “high intensity crises” and “low intensity crises”. A potential conceptual framework in which to view new doctrine for stability operations is that such doctrine must combine two distinct operating modes – coercion and mastering violence - articulated along the same continuum of military actions. Mastering violence is a mainly French concept that emerged around the late 1990s based on the experience of operations in the Balkans. It is worth exploring the concept further to see how it could be adapted to the greater levels of violence that coalition forces and NATO are encountering in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Mastering violence can be distinguished from coercion with regard to the criterion of finality. The choice of either operating mode depends on the desired end state. There is no dichotomy between coercion and actions for mastering violence. Both operating modes constitute the two ends of the spectrum of land force operations. Mastering violence can thus be seen as an *effects-based approach* to stability operations that constitutes part of the wider framework embodied in the concept of a Comprehensive Approach, composed of all actions directed at resolving a conflict in order to win the peace along a political, diplomatic, military and economic continuum. Peace is won on different grounds, the military domain being only one of them. This evolution is pushing the armed forces to define an operating mode adapted to the action of opposing parties in order to counter the logic of violence.

It is also increasingly involving the military in debates over the appropriate policies to pursue in civilian domains. For example, the question of how to reduce Afghanistan's economic dependence on poppy production is a vital one for the military, both directly since the military could be asked to undertake or provide various forms of support to crop eradication activities, and indirectly, since efforts to reduce economic dependence on the poppy crop could greatly increase different forms of violence. Moreover, the issue of poppy cultivation has a significant impact on all other facets of the stabilization process: as a result, when applying an effects-based approach to military operations it is crucial to take into account non-military elements such as this one.

The interdependence of military action aimed at mastering violence with non-military processes does not mean, however, that the former has lost its intrinsically military dimension. Military forces should employ a military operating mode adapted to the environment and to their mandate, taking full advantage of the synergies provided by a tailored jointness. The joint military commander is responsible for its application. He must be able to resort to force at all times in a discerning way in order to limit collateral damage. This operating mode is conceived at the operational level to grant subordinate echelons enough initiative (within the limits of precise rules of behavior and rules of engagement) to enable them to adjust their role intelligently to the circumstances.

Action in the Interdependent Domains

The operational space and the ground environment

There are several different ways to master violence, but they all have one element in common: ***the necessity to manage the operational space, especially all aspects of the ground environment, in order to restrain the freedom of action and influence of violent actors.***

Management of the operational space requires in the first instance an effort to understand the reality of the country. As both support and stake of the stabilization mission, the operational space, in all its dimensions, is a complex reality. As a physical dimension, the ground environment is the habitat of human communities that spread networks of cooperation or confrontation.

As a result, each action is a specific case. Coalitions can implement several options within a theater of operations to support conflict resolution. Security can be achieved by the presence of **sufficient forces** conducting peace support activities, confinement operations, which consist of

regrouping a faction inside an area and preventing it from leaving that area, or denial operations, which consist of preventing the intrusion of a faction inside a restricted area.

This last option has gained prominence in the context of stabilization operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. A number of strategists have suggested pursuit of an “ink spot” approach in Iraq, involving the creation of secure enclaves in which to concentrate economic assistance. Successful development efforts within these secure zones would gain greater support and legitimacy for the intervening coalition among the local population, isolating insurgents and other spoilers. The coalition could then expand these secure enclaves outwards. In Afghanistan, British Lieutenant General David Richards, who assumed command of ISAF in May 2006, has openly stated his intent to pursue an ink spot strategy in ISAF’s new operating areas in the South and then East of the country.

However, beyond the three categories listed above, management of the operational space requires conducting a large number of tactical or micro-tactical actions in **contact with the population**, relying on presence, dialogue and determination.

The local population and crowd movements

The intervention of military forces in a crisis area where public authority is weak or non-existent (collapsed or weakened states) requires taking into account possible **crowd movements**, either to protect them against belligerents or conversely to protect coalition resources from mob violence. Even though military forces are not explicitly mandated to enforce the law, the control of crowds can contribute, if deemed necessary, to the effort of mastering violence. Crowd movements have caused significant problems in such diverse missions as NATO operations in the Balkans, French Operation Licorne in Côte d'Ivoire, Iraq, and most recently riots in Kabul following a traffic accident involving coalition forces.

Crowd control remains necessary according to a wider notion of security applied to force deployment and maneuver against any action that could hinder the successful execution of a mission. Thus, the control of crowds in operations must be an integral part of the security measures that any commander may take temporarily or locally. On the ground, the coalition task force confronting these tensions must find the appropriate response. In most cases, the prevention of crowd movements is preferable to their control.

Information gathering is the primary effort to conduct in order to identify crowds, the physical space in which they act, their motivations, their leaders and any other relevant elements. Only when enough information is gathered can the coalition force conduct *preventive* actions in the physical or in the psychological domain. In all cases, even when measures for control of the population are necessary, they should be accompanied by *safeguard* actions to ensure and secure the missions of the forces in spite of the hostility of the population. The psychological dimension of crowd control measures should not be ignored, since the mastery of violence as an operating mode is closely linked to the mastery of information.

If they are available, civilian or paramilitary police should have primary responsibility for crowd control, since military forces may not have fully adequate training for this mission. Nonetheless, civilian police may not be available, especially in the early stages of a stability operation, and even if available, a situation could deteriorate to such an extent that the military is asked to provide

support. Close coordination between military forces and civilian police is very important for successful control of populations.

The availability of weapons to adversaries

The successful control of weapons is a decisive turning point for the resolution of crises. Many difficulties have to be overcome before a positive result is tangible, and military forces have to conduct long term actions in order to achieve success.

The psychological dimension inherent to the disarmament process is at the root of these difficulties. The armed warrior still has a “mythic aura” linked to the emotional impact of carrying weapons, to the idealization of war aims, to the sublimation of destructive instincts for dedication to a cause, and probably also to the exalting call of adventure overshadowing the reality of pain, suffering and death. Others may simply not feel safe without their weapon.

The effort to control weapons can be conducted at several levels. *Arms limitation* can be linked to specific areas, types of armament, or conditions of use. *Arms reduction requires the setting up of quotas* for all or part of theater weaponry. Its efficiency depends on the capacity of the stabilization force to verify and destroy all excess armament. *Disarmament* refers to a more complete process. The aim is to deprive perpetrators of violence of their military capacity. This process may lead to demobilization, decommissioning, and reintegration processes, helping combatants to enter civilian life or, for some of them, their regular national security forces if such forces exist.

Depending to the chosen process, the control of weapons can be carried out in two different ways. When opposing parties agree, it can be conducted according to a *consensual* mode. After the conduct of negotiations, consolidated, if need be by measures of persuasion or coercion, this consensual mode might necessitate a combination of measures such as confidence-building (armament lists, limitation areas...) and security measures (exchange of plans, destruction of some weapons, limitations on freedom of circulation, monitoring actions...).

When a consensual operating mode is not possible, it may be necessary to resort – when applicable – to a more *coercive* mode of action to overcome obstructions hindering the establishment or implementation of agreements by perpetrators of violence. In this case, the risks of escalation must be carefully weighed against the benefits of disarmament.

It should be underlined that in all cases, the control of arms is a difficult task. Arms control is an essential part of stability operations. In the long term, security for the local population requires controlling access to weapons. Agreements decided at the political and strategic level are only a first stage. They must be confirmed at the operational level, and on a daily basis in tactical operations. The latter require accuracy, self-control, negotiating and intimidation capabilities. This explains why the action of a military force with regard to arms control always falls between consensus and coercion.

Dealing with humanitarian emergencies

The humanitarian dimension of military operations has significantly increased in the new strategic context. This phenomenon is a direct consequence of changes in the ethics and information environment. Confronted with human distress, the media amplifies the reaction of public opinion

and influences the political and diplomatic decision-making processes, which in turn influence the use of the armed forces.

In some cases, military forces are mandated to conduct *humanitarian operations* in order to put an end to a situation of imminent danger threatening the physical integrity of populations. Such a definition of military interventions for humanitarian purposes raises several problems.

First of all, the application of such a concept should rely on a clear political mandate showing an unambiguous will to resolve the crisis rather than simply manage a critical situation. Military-humanitarian operations cannot substitute for proper political management of a crisis. To these inherent difficulties can be added divergences resulting from the operational cultures and practices of the various humanitarian organizations (governmental aid organizations and NGOs).

While the primary objective of NGOs is to assist populations, the military focuses on the restoration of security in an environment where belligerents test the passiveness of the force and try to benefit from it. In this environment, co-ordination between military decision-makers, NGOs and the other humanitarian actors (international organizations, government agencies, and companies) is necessary at all levels. Once these conditions are met, military forces may structure the mastery of humanitarian relief around four roles that are distinct yet interrelated in practice:

- *Humanitarian contingency assistance*, which organizes and distributes aid to populations in distress;
- *Military contingency interventions*, which are conducted based on a different operational rationale. It ensures the survival of populations by putting an end to the exactions perpetrated by a faction;
- A third type of operation that can be conducted in a military-humanitarian framework is the *emergency evacuation* of nationals or populations. It is a real military operation requiring rigorous planning; and
- Lastly, the forces contributing to the mastery of humanitarian contingencies have a transversal role of *protecting* humanitarian actors, people and property.

In all cases and whatever the difficulties with which the mandated force has to cope, they come under a framework of mastering violence in which military operations with humanitarian purposes contribute to the restoration of order and to a crisis resolution process beyond the immediate need for aid.

Dominating organized adversary forces

The mastery of violence strives to dominate direct or indirect violence exerted against populations and the use of force by opposing parties on the ground. The objective is to subject perpetrators of violence to a reasonable use of force, limiting to the maximum extent possible the escalation of force.

Thus, the mastery of violence is first and foremost a battle of perceptions and wills, which consists of demonstrating enough determination to put a targeted belligerent in a situation where it feels compelled to submit or be suppressed. The operations of the military stabilization force should rely on a precise psychological analysis of the targeted actor or party, understanding its psychological perceptions and ideological vision in order to identify its motivations and anticipate its actions.

The aim of stability operations is therefore to provide a *flexible response that compels the opponent to understand the determination of the intervention force through the application of increasingly constraining measures*. As a result, this action should be exerted on the foundations of the opponent's moral and material strength.

In this context, stabilization operations require the respect of a certain number of conditions to be successful. In an environment such as the one in the Balkans, where the use of violence by organized forces has been limited in scope, these operations should be:

- a response to a reprehensible or threatening action,
- limited in time and space (they can take the form of a brief and appropriate reaction that creates a psychological shock),
- clearly readable to avoid erroneous interpretations (they should appear as an irreversible engagement),
- targeting symbolic objectives (the nature of the latter can justify the use of force in the public eye but still have a sufficient impact on opponents),
- focused and without collateral damage,
- accompanied by increased safety measures,
- announced yet relying on surprise (the announcement should signify the force's determination, and once the action is launched it should be unexpected, brisk and even brutal if it is brief); and
- leaving a door open to negotiation (the operation should preserve a negotiating prospect).

Once these conditions are fulfilled, several generic maneuvers can be conducted in a varying sequential order depending on the situation. The aim might be to put a belligerent in a position of openly assuming the choice of a deliberate, hostile posture toward the stabilization force. As a last resort before the use of force, coalition military could carry out an intimidation maneuver that combines a manifest change of attitude with an increased intensity by exploiting information superiority and coordinated communications. At a higher level, a warning maneuver would be the first step toward a direct attack against the opponent through the conduct of an operation aimed at the minor centers of gravity affecting its operational credibility.

An inhibition maneuver is more far reaching. Its objective is to obtain a decisive edge by making the opponent realize the coalition's force superiority. Through the combination of an effect of surprise, a favorable ratio of forces, and follow-up initiatives (media, diplomatic and economic), this type of maneuver puts an end to the opponent's use of violence by making it impossible for him to keep on fighting, or by deterring him with the coalition's determination.

Deception maneuvers are quite different. Their objective is to use subterfuge to mislead the opponent. Its target is specifically the thinking capability of the enemy. This maneuver can be conducted on its own or in addition to any of the maneuvers described above in order to create and maintain a false impression. It can also blur the opponent's perception of the situation, thus maintaining uncertainty.

The set of carefully targeted conditions and generic maneuvers are most applicable in the forms described above in situations where opposition to the coalition military presence is limited, such

as in the Balkans. For environments characterized by more extreme and pervasive forms of violence, some of the conditions and maneuvers will not be applicable while others require adjustment. For example, where a robust insurgency develops against the coalition presence, as has been the case in Afghanistan and Iraq, implementation of these conditions for dominating organized forces may involve difficult trade-offs. Execution of tightly focused operations that do not cause collateral damage can become highly problematic. An emphasis on avoiding collateral damage in order to maintain a strong level of local legitimacy and support may severely curtail the possibility of offensive military operations, except where highly reliable intelligence has been received or as an immediate counterattack against an insurgent strike. If the stability operations force adopts a defensive strategy focused above all on protecting the local population and civilian infrastructure, it may diminish short term coercive pressure on the insurgents but potentially offer the best long-term prospect of undermining support for the insurgency. Countries participating in an intervening coalition may well strike different balances between offensive and defensive counter-insurgency operations, potentially undermining the coalition's operational coherence.

Acting in the psychological domain

The psychological dimension of military operations did not disappear with the demise of the Soviet system: the conquest of “hearts and minds”, assisted by public affairs specialists, remains a critical instrument used today in many crisis areas. In stabilization operations, military forces must participate in the “war of ideas” in accordance with democratic principles and values through the use of diversified operating modes.

The carrying out of coherent action to achieve psychological effects must be understood as a fundamental part of stabilization operations. Action in the intangible or “virtual” area constitutes an indispensable complement of physical action. Carried out within a precise legal framework based on the mandate given to the military task force as well as on democratic values, psychological operations are a powerful instrument for winning the peace at the heart of a conflict of ideas and passions.

Understand in order to act

Contemporary conflicts can be understood as conflicts of legitimacy. Sources of confrontation stem first of all from political, ethic, religious or economic issues. Each belligerent claims legitimacy for their actions through the “instrumentalization” of the media.

In stabilization operations, the objective of coalition forces is to put an end to violence. The sense of the action is a decisive parameter. It is thus necessary to explain the actions conducted by stabilization forces. This necessity is both practical (the efficiency of coalition actions requires that the coalition is convincing) and democratic (the legitimacy of coalition actions must be strengthened by an effort of explanation).

Therefore, “actions in psychological fields” encompass all actions planned and conducted:

- to contribute, from a military point of view, to the best vision of the situation (perception, knowledge, understanding, anticipation),

- to act on the emotions, feelings, reasoning, attitudes and behaviors of all concerned active or passive parties (either within the theater or throughout the world).

It is critical to explain the meaning of the military engagement (the reasons why military forces are in the theater), make the actors and parties aware of the challenges, and assert or confirm the finality of the action.

These actions should be conducted on three types of actors:

- national public opinion, which should be convinced of the validity of the intervention from both military and political viewpoints,
- international public opinion, which is of increasing significance in this global context; and
- actors within the theater of operations, who should be helped out of the crisis.

Stabilization operations in the psychological domain must be conducted coherently at all levels decisive for the success of the action. At the politico-strategic level, a global “influence campaign” must be conceived and conducted at government level and by any other actor having an influence on the media. It is a necessity to act in this controversial field to inform on the reality of facts, counter propaganda and maintain the legitimacy of the operation. At operational and tactical level, a “battle for the support of local actors” must be conducted. Its aim is both to maintain the cohesion of actors for the resolution of the conflict and to force perpetrators of violence to adopt a peaceful vision. Therefore, the military force’s daily behavior and conduct is a key factor in winning the confidence of the local population and convince all parties.

Methods of action

Military forces may not resort to measures such as terror, indoctrination, or propaganda in order to compel acceptance of their views or arguments. As a result, and depending on the specific circumstances, stabilization forces can:

- *give meaning through adhesion* - adhesion can be obtained through debate (which use demonstrations in order to convince), suggesting (which allows identification with the proposed message), persuasion (which relies on marketing techniques) or obedience (which provokes submission through participation incentives or law enforcement),
- *distort opponents’ perceptions* - when the aim of the operation is to counter perpetrators of violence, it may be necessary to mislead the enemy decision-making chain by means of “deception” operations (diversionary maneuvers, dissimulation operations...); and
- *fight opponents’ propaganda* through counter information (disproving an opponent’s discourse, diverting the public eye onto another topic...).

All this process is based on intelligence, situational awareness and control. It is linked with the following domains:

- *media communication*, which aims at the public at large,
- *internal communication* aimed at supporting the morale of the force by maintaining their motivation and making their mission perfectly clear,
- *local communication* aimed at local populations and authorities, should be conducted by coalition military forces in liaison with civil military authorities, and

– *rules of behavior*, which provide attitude guidance to coalition forces and constitute an indirect message to local actors.

Moreover, stratagems used to mislead the opponent and facilitate friendly maneuver could become the main instrument for achieving surprise.

Restoring community life, local life, and civic functions

The reorganization of political and economic life in a crisis area is not the direct responsibility of military forces. Yet, it is clear that the restoration of normal conditions of both public and private life helps to defuse the potential for conflict by restoring trust and eradicating sources of violence. Therefore, military units can be assigned to this type of mission in close coordination with other institutional actors, either public (political and administrative bodies) or private (companies and NGOs).

Thus defined, actions contributing to the restoration of community life can be conducted according to two different operating modes. An autonomous operating mode is conducted after a critical period, and entails a drastic change of attitude (usually the end of a coercive operation) towards perpetrators of violence. The second operating mode may be described as “collaborative”. In this case, the military force complements the activities conducted by more directly relevant civil agencies and organizations.

In all cases, four different fields of action are possible:

- *the restoration of freedom of movement* (which implies the restoration of secured routes),
- *the reorganization of daily life* (which implies ensuring the safety of and working with NGOs, restoration of the electric grid and water distribution, and mine clearing operations) in coordination with humanitarian activities,
- *the restoration of minimal administrative and political function* (organization, monitoring of polls, protection of local authorities, restoration of the administrative and judiciary system, and training and supporting police forces),
- *the reestablishment of a minimal level of economic activity* by ensuring the safety of trade in essential products, restoring facilities, supporting businesses, and detecting and dismantling local mafia groups).

As soon as conceivably feasible, it can be highly beneficial to get local communities involved in deciding on early reconstruction priorities. In Afghanistan, a National Solidarity Program (NSP) targeted some 30,000 villages for this purpose. NGO representatives and Afghan government officials went to the villages, helped them elect councils, asked them to determine what initiatives would most improve their lives, and then provided funding and technical support for implementation. The program has many achievements to its name.

Indigenous political, economic, and security sector capability

As discussed in further detail in the following chapter on transitions, coalition militaries will be unable to successfully disengage from a stability operation unless steps are taken to build local political, economic, and security sector capability. These areas are all tightly linked; significant progress in one of these them cannot be sustained without parallel forward movement in the

others, although it is clearly difficult to advance at the same pace in all of these fields. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the political process has considerably outstripped achievements in both security sector reform and reconstruction and development, with the result that the new governments established in both countries are confronting in 2006 the threat of loss of local legitimacy. Within the security sector alone, major problems have also arisen in Iraq and Afghanistan from the relative neglect shown towards the rebuilding of police and criminal justice capability compared with that of the national army. If the criminal justice system is corrupt, when the police arrest people they can quickly bribe their way out of prison, making the police much less inclined to do their job. A broad range of well trained, specialized police capability is needed as well, such as mobile assets for patrolling highways and paramilitary ones for borders. Gaps in any key security sector capability area can be highly damaging to stabilization and reconstruction efforts.

Stabilization and reconstruction appear to be increasingly viewed as simultaneous actions rather than sequential ones, very likely due to experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, the question of coordinating civil and military activities becomes particularly relevant.

Civil-Military Relationships and Coordination

The preceding discussion underscores the very substantial interdependence between military and civilian missions in the conduct of stability operations. The establishment of a secure environment, pursuing DDR, rebuilding indigenous military and police forces, and creating a functioning legal sector all require progress in parallel; stagnation in any of these areas will undermine the impact of forward movement in the others. Without sufficient progress in improving the daily living conditions of the local population, coalition stabilization forces risk becoming perceived as an occupying force, which in turn makes their primary mission of providing a secure environment far more difficult.

Coalition stability operations therefore require a robust set of structures and processes in the theater of operations to enable civil-military sharing of information and coordination of activities. At the national or multinational levels, two generic models exist for achieving this objective: a unified civil-military authority in theater, and parallel “chains of command” between civilian and military contributors that require the cooperative establishment of structures and processes for information sharing and coordination.

Unified Civil-Military Authority in Theater

Various strands of thinking in the UK have moved further towards endorsement of a unified civil-military chain of command than in other major coalition states or multinational organizations. The UK has conducted a number of successful national operations with a unified civil-military chain of command. Most famously, during the insurgency in Malaya that lasted from 1948-1957, the British government appointed General Sir Gerald Templer as high commissioner and military director of operations, providing civil-military unity of the chain of command at the highest level in the theater. In his counterinsurgency study *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, John Nagl observed that the culture of the British army enabled it to come to understand the political primacy of the counterinsurgency task, thereby equipping it to exercise effectively both political and military authority in Malaya.

More recently, the joint task force commander for Operations Palliser and Silkman, the UK military interventions in Sierra Leone during May-June 2000 and again in the fall of that year, was able to formulate and impose a multi-dimensional plan with interdependent civil and military lines of activity on all of the actors in the theater, including the Sierra Leonean government, UN, and the small number of NGOs that remained present in what had become a brutally violent environment. All of these actors were too dependent on the British military presence to refuse cooperation with the integrated campaign plan that the joint task force commander had put together. Civil-military coordination took place through daily meetings at the British High Commission of all key elements of the British presence in country. Subsequent academic discussion of the civil-military approach taken in Sierra Leone has characterized it as analogous to that used earlier in Malaya, albeit on a much smaller scale.

The UK MoD's Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) on *The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations* argues for a unified civil-military chain of command. However, rather than having this unified chain of command under military control, the JWP states that the civilian head of mission (HoM) should have, whenever possible, "delegated and meaningful authority over assigned civil and military resources". The range of peace support operations discussed in the JWP includes the coercive use of force for maintaining a cease fire or peace agreement, but it does not take into account the conduct of nation building activities in a counter-insurgency environment.

Writing in a RUSI Whitehall Paper, UK counter-insurgency expert John Mackinlay argues for the appointment of a single campaign director who would act as the senior executive of the occupying or intervening powers, and as such have full responsibility for overseeing the "entire restoration and counter-insurgency campaign as a single entity". This approach would have the merit of greatly reducing the number of independent actors in the operational theater. Even most NGOs would have to accept integration into the coalition structure or be denied access to the theater.

In order to help failing states that request international assistance, or to impose that assistance in the case of a deeply failed state, General Richards has in the past proposed the structure of an "embedded-support team". The team would consist of diplomats, military officers, civil servants, bankers, industrialists, doctors, etc., drawn from both inside and outside the country. It would formulate a multi-dimensional plan, and then work with the host government's departments to implement it. All outside donors would channel their assistance through the embedded support team, which would act as the decisive actor in the country and exercise authority over all other bodies, including NGOs. The team's director would ensure strong overall leadership, and report directly to the host country head of state or government.

Thus, based in part on a number of significant operational experiences, the inclination of much UK thinking regarding stability operations is to rationalize the operational space by bringing virtually all outside actors, including most NGOs, under the orbit of a single, cohesive line of authority. Beyond the UK, for some very small scale ESDP operations, such as a mission to assist security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC – D.R. Congo), the EU has been able to establish a single chain of command with civil-military capability. The EUSEC mission has a mixed civil-military staff with a military commander, who reports to the EU Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR) through the EU Special Representative (EUSR).

In general, however, coalition countries have been reticent to envisage a unified civil-military chain of command. Germany, for example, has maintained two completely separate civil and military lines of authority for its PRT operations in Afghanistan, although there is in principle no barrier to giving a German civilian head of mission authority over both civilian and military assets in the theater. U.S. operational practice has tended to avoid making the senior civilian representative or the military commander subordinate to the other. An early draft of the U.S. Joint Operating Concept for stability operations talked about the need for “unified direction from legitimate civil authority” and supported/supporting relationships between civil and military agencies. It did not discuss, though, options for implementing these supported and supporting relationships, or otherwise suggest the possibility for hierarchical civil-military relationships. More recently, however, the U.S. defense community has begun to struggle with the concept of an “operational leader”, under which someone who is not a uniformed officer could control the military capability provided to the combatant commander.

It is important to conduct further assessment of the potential benefits of and obstacles to a unified operational civil-military authority for coalition stability operations. Issues for such an assessment include:

- **What are the legal, cultural, or other practical limitations confronting the establishment of such an authority?**
- **In what types of situations could the benefits of a unified operational civil-military authority be most significant, or even imperative?**
- **What conditions could enable a unified civil-military authority to be established under civilian direction? Under military direction?**
- **What kind of education, training, and experience should a military commander or civilian representative possess in order to provide effective leadership of a unified civil-military operational authority?**

Parallel Civil and Military Chains of Authority

In the absence of a unified authority, the strategic level political guidance for the operation can help clarify respective roles. For example, for the EU’s *Operation Althea* in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), EU comprehensive policy regarding its security strategy for the mission directs the EU Force (EUFOR) commander, “without prejudice to the chain of command”, to take the political advice of the EU Special Representative (EUSR) into account, in particular with respect to issues on which the EUSR has an explicit role, and to attempt to take into account any request from the EUSR. The policy adds that this arrangement is particularly important with respect to the Integrated Police Unit (IPU), which is under the control of EUFOR but on which the EUSR is able to draw in agreement with EUFOR, in order to reinforce the EU Police Mission, over which the EUSR does have political control. In the event of disagreement, the EUSR and EUFOR commander are directed to refer to their respective chains of command. The EUSR chairs regular informal meetings of all EU civil and military actors in BiH in order to co-ordinate EU implementation activities. The EUSR is therefore recognized as the central figure in attempting to achieve coherence and synergy between EU civil and military implementation activities in BiH.

When there is no formal subordination between civil agencies and the military task force in the theater, a good personal relationship between the civilian HoM and the task force commander is absolutely critical for effective civil-military coordination. Given the importance of this personal

relationship, leaving it entirely to chance seems ill-advised, and thought should arguably be given to selection criteria for the civilian and military leaders of multinational stability operations.

Extensive civil-military interaction at the highest level of the mission can play a valuable role in helping the effective functioning of lower level structures and processes. In the case of Kosovo, the KFOR commander (COMKFOR), his deputies, and chief of staff met daily with the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), his deputy, chief of staff, and as needed the heads of the pillars of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), as well as the head of the international police mission. These meetings were extremely valuable in terms of exchange of information, establishing priorities, and civil-military planning. Moreover, the same officials held day long bimonthly meetings to conduct an overall situational assessment and to plan the conduct of major actions. In addition to their very positive impact within the theater, these processes also allowed the senior officials to provide their respective governments and the UN an exhaustive and coordinated portrayal of the difficulties encountered, needs to satisfy, and support required for various contemplated measures. The daily and bimonthly meetings therefore constituted both a powerful means of leverage for the civil and military leaders within the theater, and an indispensable foundation for coordination between governments at the strategic level.

Below this interaction between mission leaders, structures and procedures for civil-military coordination can take a variety of forms. The early deployment of military advisers to the heads of civilian missions and of political advisers to military headquarters is a critical coordinating mechanism, but only represents a first step. Civil-Military coordinating bodies and bodies are required at different levels (theater, zones or sectors, and even sub-sectors or cantons). At their most basic, coordinating bodies and procedures can be ad hoc in nature, but this approach can often result in a lack of follow-up action. Coordinating meetings that are more structured and better resourced, with at least some allocated staff and budget, have greater promise of affecting implementation activities.

Some form of civil-military joint operational planning capability can provide still stronger synergy of effect between the activities of the joint task force and those of civilian actors. Civilian agencies can detach personnel to work with and advise military planning staffs regarding the elaboration of the military plan for a stability operation, as in the Multinational Interagency Group (MNIG) model. Conversely, the joint task force commander could also detach military planners to work on the staff of the civilian HoM. Shortly after setting up Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A), then MG David Barno detached a small group of officers to the U.S. Embassy Kabul to form the core of the Embassy Interagency Planning Group. Most ambitiously, the military commander and civilian HoM could establish a fully integrated interagency planning structure that would plan composite civil-military objectives for the mission.

The establishment of a combined mission field headquarters would greatly facilitate implementation of any of these various options for interagency planning and coordination, constitute a major step forward towards providing more effective oversight of peace and reconstruction processes, more efficient joint military and police operations, and more consistent reporting on activities in the theater. It would also most effectively enable the kind of extensive, senior level civil-military interaction that took place in Kosovo. In the absence of a combined mission field headquarters, co-location of headquarters would be extremely valuable for civil-military coordination efforts.

Yet, there could also be sensitivities towards a combined or co-located headquarters, depending on whether the predominant characteristic of the mission is civilian, police, or military. In some environments, civil agencies may have the concern that co-location with the military might send a wrong message to the local population. There may sometimes be reluctance for a civil police mission to co-locate with the military because the distinction between the police role and that of the military could be compromised by co-location. Furthermore, when military forces are employed in stabilising a situation, they may be perceived by protagonists as a target for violence, while civilian elements of the mission could be perceived as more benign. Moreover, if civil actors perceive standing coordination groups or integrated planning structures as leading to a military-centric approach to civil-military cooperation, it could potentially lead to a more limited engagement on their part.

There is a need for more detailed examination of what civil-military planning and coordination structures and processes are best suited to different types of conflict prevention, crisis management, and stabilization environments, as well as of how better to ensure effective, collaborative relationships between civilian and military leaders of a non-hierarchical civil-military mission.

Issues Related to Military Command and Control

Multinational interventions require successfully dealing not only with operational challenges but also ones related to political management of the coalition. Military command structures have constituted one key area in which coalitions have sometimes made tradeoffs between operational and political effectiveness. Command arrangements that are as inclusive as possible are not optimal from an operational standpoint but can help meet political needs.

In the case of KFOR, for political reasons the major contributing nations to the initial entry force were very closely associated to the exercise of command by the KFOR commanding general. This association was achieved by surrounding the commanding general with several deputies, which might seem to contradict military best practice but which presented the immense political advantage of directly associating all the major contributing nations to the conduct of operations by the commander. Thus, the British commander of KFOR had Italian, German, and French deputies, while the director for operations on the headquarters staff was from the United States. This organizational structure required the commanding general to make a particular effort in terms of having to form something of a collective viewpoint in the exercise of command, but it gave him a guarantee of having his actions approved by the contributors since those actions were decided and undertaken in full transparency.

This unconventional type of command structure has engendered divided views among the military, where some view the establishment of three deputy commanders as too complex and overly constraining on the commander. Supporters of the approach argue, however, that its advantages outweigh its drawbacks. The structure can help organize a stronger contribution to the coalition on the part of major nations. The deputy commanders have a completely clear, transparent view of all operational difficulties, and can then explain these problems to their respective capitals.

The drawbacks of a complex command arrangement can be partly mitigated by having a robust headquarters staff with a solid core from the same country. In general, the more threatening the

environment the greater the requirement for the headquarters staff to be as homogenous as possible. Thus, for the initial entry into Kosovo, when operational risks were highest, the use of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) provided a headquarters staff with a strong, 60% British spine, reinforced essentially by French officers since France did not participate in the permanent ARRC structure. A strong national spine in the headquarters staff, combined with a significant multi-national presence in the organization of the command group, may provide the best compromise between the needs of operational efficiency and those of coalition political management.

Once established, the coalition command structure must have a complete understanding of the capabilities, operational methods, and ROE of the forces placed under its control, in particular when contributing nations have been assigned responsibility for a specific sector. Without possessing this understanding, the operational commander will either be unable to control the conduct of the operation or will make errors of judgment that can be heavy with consequences. NATO operations in Kosovo as well as in Bosnia demonstrated divergent approaches between national contingents that, for identical missions, produced very different reactions on the part of the affected populations. There were huge differences, for example, in the way that U.S., German, French, and other forces implemented as basic an order as establishing a checkpoint operation to control an intersection. Ideally, the “international community” should have employed a common approach to operations in order to demonstrate its unity and coherence of action. Local authorities, factions, and other actors have been adept at exploiting differences in operational approaches between coalition members, putting pressure on the coalition and its command structure by exposing the varying postures of national contingents towards them.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, which were established under the national control of individual coalition countries, have also suffered from different levels of resources, goals, and national caveats. Some PRTs would not send soldiers out on patrol at night, and some would not operate beyond a limited radius, PRTs have done a good job in many areas, but would have been more effective if they had worked together in a coherent way towards implementation of a national program. Instead, they have acted differently, have sometimes lacked resources, have sometimes come under the influence of a local warlord, and have sometimes been greatly hampered by the problem of national caveats. With the transition during 2006 to NATO’s assumption of responsibility for security operations throughout the entire country, PRTs have been brought into the NATO command chain, placing them for the first time within a unified framework providing a common set of objectives towards which all PRTs can work. A substantial effort was required in Brussels in order to get contributing nations to agree to this development.

Senior European military commanders have held a series of discussions on whether it is possible to achieve greater harmonization of operational approaches so that national contingents perform in a more homogenous way once in theater. The issue is an extremely difficult one, coming up first of all against the obstacle of national political autonomy. Secondly, the capabilities and operational approaches of national contingents will always be very diversified due to the structural and cultural differences between countries. It would be a mistake to think that at international level, even within NATO, countries will ever be able to achieve the same consistency that exists at national level. In NATO exercises, national forces operate together, but they do so on the basis of larger units. Accepted practice is that multinational units cannot go

lower than battalion level in low risk environments, and brigade level if a higher level of threat exists.

Common schools for military officers down to the level of battalion commander could have a substantial impact in terms of sharing doctrine and providing military commanders with greater awareness and understanding of different national practice, but it is not feasible to have common schools below the battalion commander level. Having national units train together to the extent necessary to achieve common practice would entail huge costs. National differences are therefore too profound to be eliminated, and coalition commanders must take utmost account of them in defining and assigning missions, and in the elaboration of suitably adapted orders.

The CSO project may consider whether greater use of multinational training and education programs could have a meaningful impact on reducing differences in national operational approaches, at acceptable cost. What other measures might be available for doing so? As already noted in the previous chapter, the use of national caveats adds to the operational problems stemming from different national practices, permanently constraining the freedom of action of the operational commander and making the very conception of the conduct of operations extremely arduous, even substantially reducing its effectiveness. In the initial phases of KFOR, for example, U.S. or German units were not allowed to leave their national sector in order to reinforce another sector in case of operational needs, even critical ones. Similarly, U.S. attack helicopters, the most numerous and capable in the theater, could not operate outside of the U.S. sector. A constant concern of successive KFOR commanders was to diminish the number and impact of national caveats. This effort has been largely successful due to the near total disappearance of threats as the Kosovo stabilization phase progressively unfolded. The situation in Afghanistan regarding caveats has improved in recent months, with a majority of contributing nations in Afghanistan apparently recognizing the need for removal of caveats and ready for combat operations if necessary, but in the far more difficult environment there political interventions in military operations are likely to continue.

Coalition operations tend to begin with very high levels of national caveats, which are then progressively reduced at the cost of considerable time, effort, and loss of operational effectiveness. CSO project participants will examine whether measures exist that could limit to a greater extent the use of national caveats from the outset of operations while still satisfying political needs in capitals for oversight of national assets. For example, could the establishment of a strong national presence at the top level of the coalition command structure be more effectively leveraged to limit the initial imposition of caveats?

TRANSITIONS

Transitions are a key aspect of operations, and are of particular importance in stability operations and crisis management. Transitions encompass a wide variety of situations, from normality to crisis, from high intensity or coercion phases to a stabilizing one, from civilian to military lead and vice versa, from international to local authorities, or when spikes of violence unfold during the course of a stabilization phase. Transitions occur throughout any intervention – sometimes planned for and anticipated, sometimes entirely unexpected – and never fail to create vulnerabilities, which can potentially be exploited by enemies, adversaries or spoilers.

A number of the issues that are important to successful transitions have been discussed in the previous sections and will therefore be touched upon only briefly in the following pages. For example, previous sections have covered the necessity of effective civil and military linkages within the intervening coalition and among a wider array of stakeholders, or the importance of multinational interagency planning capabilities, which have to focus on transition contingency planning.

Because transitions tend to differ from one another quite substantially, it is difficult to identify common solutions. Nonetheless, a number of issues and challenges emerge with some consistency and they deserve further attention and focused thinking on possible solutions or at least options to decrease their negative impact on the overall operation.

From Coercion to Stabilization

The transition from high-intensity combat or coercive actions, aimed at forcing an adversary or warring parties to submit to the intervening forces' will, to a stabilization phase, aimed at progressively normalizing society, poses a number of difficulties. Some of these have already been addressed in the previous sections, namely with regards to the necessity of improving multinational civil-military strategic planning, but merit further development here.

One of the main problems with this type of transition is the lack of civil resources and the subsequent “gaps” that can arise as a result of the time lag between the force's initial entry and the establishment of a temporary civil authority. The deployment into Kosovo of KFOR and UNMIK provides an example of the problems that have stemmed from these limitations on the mobilization and deployment of civilian capability.

The UN does not have the same capacity to anticipate and react as NATO, which is a much more structured organization, with effective strategic and operational planning assets, as well as a firmly established force generation procedure. For this reason, the “extraction force” based in Macedonia during the phase in which observers were sent to Kosovo was quickly transformed, under the ARRC's command, into an initial entry force, able to intervene coercively if the Serb military failed to apply the agreement signed regarding its redeployment following the Operation Allied Forces, and also at any rate, able to dissuade the Serbs from an counter-offensive against the multinational ground forces. The operational force was put together on the assumption of the possibility of high intensity combat and was thus made up of five quasi homogenous (in terms of nationality: U.S, UK, France, Germany and Italy-Spain) brigades under ARCC headquarters,

reinforced by contributing countries. KFOR was rapidly deployed and took control of Kosovo in only a few days.

Yet the international civil administration was unable to follow this pace: only a small core of civilian actors was in place in the first weeks following the entry into Kosovo and in fact the UN required approximately 6 months to find the necessary personnel for its mission. This gap generated many difficulties, in that Kosovo, following the Serb withdrawal and retreat, no longer had any of the institutions or civil administration (administration, finances, justice, police, penitentiaries, codes of law, etc). In the economic domain, the crisis was particularly deep (energy, fuel, train and road transportation, banking system, etc). Given the UN's initial powerlessness, KFOR was obliged to get involved in a number of areas, in order to fulfill its mandate to restore security and support civil activities. This posed a number of problems, including:

- choosing priorities and difficult trade-offs; i.e.: should the military engineers de-mine certain zones that were very dangerous for the local populations but were not initially priorities for the force's mission or focus its efforts on protecting the forces' installations?
- difficulties in harmonizing attitudes and behaviors of the different contingents (despite the ROEs), in particular when forces on the ground were forced to undertake policing tasks that do not generally devolve to militaries in democratic states: who to arrest, how to detain, length of "legal" detention, given that they were dealing not with combatants but rather with criminals and delinquents?
- taking charge of essential tasks (re-establishing electricity and dealing obsolete and sabotaged infrastructure), normally requiring skills held by non-military actors,
- putting reserves with specific expertise at the disposal of UNMIK in order to fulfill vital functions while the UN was waiting for the necessary international civil contributions.

This example pleads for more concerted civil-military planning, and perhaps for working more closely with the UN as it prepares its role in theater. It also shows the need to focus attention on ways to speed up civilian deployable capability, under the auspices of national governments, the UN, the EU, etc. Otherwise it is necessary to enable the military to assess the probable shortfalls on the civilian side and, consequently, provide temporary, ad hoc means to cope with this gap (expert reservists, specialized units, etc) above and beyond the level of resource required for the military part of the intervention.

Another key aspect of transition for coercion to stabilization is that of assuring security. Often, if not always, some form of robust law enforcement/security force must be planned for along with the combat force in order to take charge of – under military command when the security situation demands it – problems related to crime rather than combat operations. Thus, law enforcement capable forces should be seen as intervening almost side-by-side with the combat elements, rather than serving as follow-on forces.

The aim is to avoid security vacuums as well as to avoid requiring armed forces to undertake missions they are not trained or legally prepared for. Yet, deploying police or para-military security forces in a highly unstable and violent environment poses its own set of specific problems, such as ones linked to rapid deployment. Given that such units' main purpose is domestic law enforcement, they are not always readily available for operations abroad and their absence may strain law enforcement capabilities at home and create vulnerabilities. The European

Gendarmerie Force or the EU civilian police ready reserve are only a partial solution to this problem, given their relatively limited size.

Moreover, using civilian police forces alongside the military requires placing them under military command, which in fact is only acceptable by law in a limited number of countries. This constitutes a severe limitation in the use of police forces and will perhaps require countries to create specialized constabulary units or to change their command structures when deploying police in stabilization missions. Are there other possible solutions to enable the establishment of security and law and order in the early stages of an operation?

Conflict Termination

Any multinational stability or crisis management operation is characterized by the great number of actors involved, all of whom have different perceptions of the situation as it unfolds. Nonetheless, these many actors are all present on the ground because they have arrived at the common judgment that a given situation is sufficiently important to merit the expenditure of significant resources, both human and financial. Because these resources are necessarily finite and could certainly be used to cope with other problems, be they domestic or international, there is a strong pressure to avoid lengthy commitments and the “unnecessary” prolongation of deployments.

Though much has been said about designing exit strategies, it is in reality very difficult to establish when and how to disengage. While all intervening countries tend to want to identify an “end point” to their commitment, in reality it is difficult to guess how long it will take to stabilize a situation or how long peace keepers will be needed. Missions that deal with stabilizing and rebuilding countries or regions do not in general stop abruptly, they simply fade away progressively. The process of stabilization is not a linear one, and there can be spikes in violence, which must be handled with particular care, but do not automatically indicate that the international community has failed in its stabilization and reconstruction efforts.

Commitment to a region or country’s post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization often depends less on objective factors such as the progress it is making, than it does on the international community’s priorities. “Donor fatigue” is a particular important cause of disengagement: the further away the country is, the faster donor fatigue is likely to occur, excepting cases that are viewed as vital or very important for the national interest. A telling example of the differences in donor commitments is the disparity between commitments to East Timor and those to Kosovo.

Though it seems quite obvious to state that transitions and disengagement points should not be established based on criteria completely unrelated to the situation on the ground, political realities cannot be ignored and clearly drive important decisions. Thus, part of the issue becomes not only when to transition, but also how. In the United States, the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), for example, has already factored in the risk of donor fatigue and the resulting disparity between goals and resources, which leads to mission failure. As a result, the strategic planning template proposed by S/CRS establishes a short-term timeframe of 2-3 years to achieve “conflict

transformation” or setting up conditions to allow for “locally-led nascent peace”, which roughly translates into local ownership of the pacification and normalization processes.

In France, within the military in particular, the concept of “*sortie de crise*” has emerged in order to better take into account and bridge the gap between the military intervention (for crisis management or challenging stabilization missions) and longer-term reconstruction and development efforts. It addresses the period during which security is fragile; efforts are therefore aimed at progressively pulling the region or country away from the brink of crisis and towards more durable peace and stability.

The United Nations, as another example, has a set of bureaus for “peace consolidation”, which are entirely civilian, such as in Sierra Leone, to handle its transition out of the country and to minimize the vulnerabilities that can be created by abruptly ending a mission.

Transitions in personnel, authorities and command structures

Though most of the thinking on transitions tends to focus on those that occur between military and civil authorities, there are also challenges to purely military transitions, as well between command structures. These transition points typically create vulnerabilities and thus require particular vigilance.

Changes in personnel are inevitable and also inevitably create vulnerabilities. Rotation of troops creates a “lag” period, during which the newly deployed troops adjust to a new environment and gradually acquire local knowledge; belligerents, adversaries and even friendly parties with their own agendas often use this transition point to “test” the new arrivals. This therefore requires particular vigilance, as local parties try to take advantage of changes in personnel to shift the situation on the ground to their benefit. These difficulties are compounded when the units deployed have very different approaches than their predecessors.

Problems related to change in personnel also affect international civilian administrators, humanitarian actors, NGOs, etc. Indeed, because in many cases, operations are still undertaken in an ad hoc manner and coordination mechanisms have not been codified, effectiveness of coordination often depends on personal relationships. Thus, when the people on the ground change, so can the ability to “do business”. This point has often been highlighted as an argument for further thinking about more formal procedures and mechanisms for civil-military consultation and coordination.

Changes in command structures are quite frequent and can occur at the time of a transition between the “initial entry” forces and follow-on forces, between a coalition and an alliance (NATO), between NATO and the EU, between civil and military authorities. Each transition poses a specific set of challenges.

The current transition from Operation Enduring Freedom to ISAF in the South of Afghanistan illustrates some of these challenges involved in purely military transitions. For example, the deployment of NATO forces in Kandahar province took some time to build up in strength, allowing the Taliban to claim that Western forces were reluctant to move into Southern Afghanistan. Somewhat similarly, following announced reductions in U.S. troops and their

replacement by NATO forces, public perceptions took hold in Afghanistan that the United States was abandoning the South of the country at a critical time. These developments led to increased support for the Taliban in the Southern provinces, and they underscore the need to think more about the information and perceptual aspects of these types of transitions.

The current ISAF command also wants to make a quick transition from Stage 3 (OEF-NATO handover in the South) to Stage 4, when ISAF will take command of all operations in the country, to include eastern Afghanistan. A quick transition would ensure that any artificial line between ISAF and the U.S.-led coalition currently in control of operations in eastern Afghanistan would only be of short duration.

Local capacity-building and transitions to local authorities

Logically, for an international force of peacekeepers and administrators to disengage, the following conditions should be fulfilled:

- law and order should be re-established,
- public services and public administration should function decently,
- indigenous institutions must exist, be run by locals who are representatives of the population (thanks to an election, constitution, etc) and take into account domestic needs.

Law and order is the prerequisite for all other reconstruction and stabilization activities. Nothing can be done if security and sufficient law and order are not in place, yet their establishment alone cannot be the sole criteria for international disengagement.

If a certain level of local professional and administrative competence is not in place by the time the international community leaves, the transition cannot succeed and it will be necessary to intervene again in the future. Haiti and the Congo are particularly striking examples of countries that have required international intervention on several occasions, yet with no durable impact.

Post-conflict situations are often characterized by tensions between locals, who are anxious to take control of their own destinies, and the intervening authorities (regardless of their “format” – coalition, UN administration, etc) in charge of establishing the conditions listed above, without which the transition cannot succeed.

There is therefore a constant and almost inevitable gap between the political impatience of local populations and the operational reality. As an international presence is maintained despite indigenous impatience to take power, local perceptions may start to shift and yesterday’s “liberators” may become today’s “occupiers” or “neo-colonialists”.

These tensions and shifts in perception require careful management – by supporting local capacity-building, by visibly taking the back seat in certain cases, by showing restraint in the use of force and limiting civilian casualties and by demonstrating impartiality in the areas where ethnic or religious cleavages are palpable. By doing so, the aim is to minimize local impatience and ill-will *vis-à-vis* the intervening forces.

Building local capacity is a very difficult and often expensive and lengthy process, which can at times be likened to a gamble. Indeed, since training judges, magistrates, police, administrators,

etc. requires not only technical education but also changing mentalities and durable investment, it is a fairly slow process, bearing mixed results, also dependant on outside factors. For example, police can be trained in law enforcement techniques yet remain highly vulnerable to corruption when salaries are low; judges or magistrates can receive training in the application of the country's new laws yet be unable to show impartiality vis-à-vis another ethnic group, etc. Effective training therefore requires long-term investment by intervening actors. Moreover, in cases where security is not established, training a civil administration is an expensive leap of faith because there is no guarantee that they will be able to exert their functions; the example of Iraq is in this case glaring.

Moreover, local capacity-building efforts are dogged by two considerable problems. The first is the competition among countries regarding the administrative models to put in place. The second is related to the limited deployable civilian capabilities, already pointed out in the previous section.

Competition among intervening nations is strong when it comes to the administrative models to be established in a post-conflict state. This can in part be explained by a natural tendency to believe in the advantages and virtues of their national models and also perhaps by a desire to ensure their long-term influence in that country through the similarity of structures, processes, etc.

In many cases, little thought is actually given to how well national models could be transposed into a very different context with its own historical, cultural and societal particularities. As an example, there was significant debate regarding how to structure the police forces in Kosovo. Americans, for example, favored a decentralized model, probably because in the U.S. police are under local and state authorities, and not the federal one. Yet, given the size of Kosovo, a decentralized model made little sense, especially given that local power structures were often controlled by powerful families with criminal ties: a decentralized model would have increased the risk of corruption. Similarly, some of the French involved in Kosovo proposed setting up the equivalent of a “gendarmerie” as well as a police force, although this would not have made sense for Kosovo either. Thus, it is important to work closely with international and local authorities to develop models that can function effectively and durably. Imposing foreign models and failing to take into account local specifics can severely compromise the chances of long-term peace and stability.

The second problem is that of deploying civilians to a conflict or post-conflict environment. Most countries have not exactly figured out how to put together civilian missions; in the case of most European countries, the EU is in fact a step ahead of national governments and has begun setting up missions for what is called “civilian crisis management”, involving police, border guards, magistrates in particular. They can be focused on direct action in the crisis or post-conflict environment, or on training future local capabilities. Unfortunately, these missions are still of modest dimensions.

Sudden changes in situation

Stabilization is not a linear process and is often characterized by sudden, unexpected spikes of instability or violence. These appear as massive setbacks and tend to lead to doubts and questions regarding the overall impact of the stabilization and reconstruction efforts: two such examples are

the unexpected ethnic violence that took place in Kosovo in March, 2004 and the recent outbreak of violence in East Timor. These events immediately provoked questions regarding the effectiveness of multinational efforts. This type of occurrence can provide an occasion to evaluate the path that the international community has taken in the post-conflict environment and potentially to identify and cope with glaring problems or shortcomings. This is a case of confronting an unfolding plan to the reality of sudden changes, and possibly modifying the plan and multinational course of action to adapt to a new situation.

Yet, while never good, these spikes in violence can also simply be taken as part of the normal evolution in the process of pacification. In this case, a significant portion of challenge lies in managing these violent events within a multinational context, in particular given the likely strategic impact of tactical-level occurrences.

Sudden changes on the ground pose particular challenges in any multinational operation in terms of consultation. Contributing countries may have different perceptions of unfolding events and different visions of how to deal with them. There is therefore an almost inevitable tension between the need to reach agreement regarding how to react and the urgent response that the situation requires. This type of situation pleads for strong ties between capitals and actors on the ground, perhaps using a “Contact Group” format. Moreover, spikes in violence can lead to difficulties and tensions among coalition countries regarding the use of force in response to a given event. Given that the forces’ reactions can have a strong impact on the future evolution of the situation on the ground, ideally contributors should have reached strong agreement regarding rules of engagement and rules of behavior, before even deploying. Yet approaches to stabilization and to the use of force differ significantly between militaries, thereby causing vulnerabilities that can only be reduced through greater consultation and coordination.

Moreover, the quasi omni-presence of the media also contributes to increasing the importance and impact of sometimes relatively small-scale changes in situation. The media’s presence can cause isolated incidents occurring far away to appear on the TV screens in contributing countries and provoke a strong reaction, which in turn obliges national governments to react in one way or another. This challenge has been further complicated by the multitude of sources, such as blogs, digital videos, or spontaneous photos via mobile phones, which can have significant impact on public opinions locally, regionally and in coalition countries. Therefore, when facing unexpected turns for the worse, the multinational actors on the ground must be aware of the importance of the message they give out, in particular regarding the speed with which they react and the coherence of their replies. This issue requires concerted thinking about multinational strategic communication, or “information operations” as they have been called in MNE4.

SYNTHESIS AND QUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION

In summary, as highlighted in the previous sections, almost by its very nature, multinational action is vulnerable to a wide array of problems: divergences in perceptions, evaluations, objectives and approaches; incoherence, gaps in planning and execution, wasted resources, failures in consistency and follow-through. In fact, multinational operations – in both their civil and military dimensions – are more likely to be characterized by their disjointedness, their incoherence and their inefficiency than they are by unity of vision and effort, holistic approaches or coherence among actors. Nonetheless, because ineffectiveness in multinational action carries a high cost in terms of the length of deployments, financial investments, political capital, and can also be heavy in geo-strategic consequences, all actors involved now appear to be conscious of the stakes and the importance of developing more concerted and comprehensive approaches, as demonstrated by interest in comprehensive planning and effects-based processes.

These types of concepts and approaches are specifically relevant to stability operations because they enable a more global and multi-faceted way of coping with the complexity that characterizes these environments. Yet comprehensive and effects-based approaches require focused thinking on a number of underlying issues; if some of the problems that can potentially hinder the effective application of these approaches are not addressed and practical, applicable solutions are not sought, the new concepts, processes and approaches will have only limited impact.

In U.S.-CREST's analysis, *comprehensiveness* must be joined by *coherence* as the two overarching goals for successful coalition stability operations; to work towards these aims, the project report has in particular sought to describe some of the challenges for stability and crisis management operations, as they relate to (i) preparation for multinational action, (ii) implementation, and particularly (iii) transitions. The report has also identified issues that merit further exploration to enable more effective multinational civil-military action, and in particular when seeking to apply comprehensive or effects-based approaches. Based on these points, U.S.-CREST has highlighted a number of questions to be discussed by the multinational working group.

Preparation for multinational action

Achieving commonality of purpose

A point common to all the challenges that intervening states and organizations face is the need to promote greater *coherence of action* within the coalition. This means improving consultation and coordination in order to better understand partner nations' evaluations of the situation, their interests in the crisis area, their view of the type of action to be undertaken and why.

Each nation tends to assess the nature and impact of developing crises through its own set of indicators, warnings, and methodologies. Some form of continuous, multinational, multi-agency analysis could play a major role in helping to create the kind of common and early understanding of an emerging crisis that is a key enabler of effective conflict prevention and resolution.

- Given the reality of political imperatives and the fact that nations and agencies will rarely be entirely transparent, a total convergence of perspectives is utopian. How can we improve understanding and common assessments, despite the reality of some secrecy and ambiguity?
- What mechanisms would enable achieving a certain level of comfort with other actors' viewpoints and desired courses of action? How can they be set up?
- How can actors also have a better understanding of the multitude of players and initiatives, and the ways in which they interact and reinforce or undermine one another's efforts?

While multinational sharing of intelligence information is an important aspect of this process, it is also a difficult one, and especially so if intended to feed into an interagency environment. Much can be done in terms of multinational, interagency assessment of potential crisis situations based on open source and unclassified information.

The CSO project proposes to focus attention on building processes and mechanisms for effective information and assessment sharing and developing multinational, interagency consultation and communication on crisis indicators, warning, and assessment methodologies.

- How can multinational actors achieve better situational awareness and develop more converging perspectives that are necessary for cohesive action? How can the classification and clearance issues be dealt with in a multinational civil-military context? How great an impact can informal open-source consultations have?
- How can actors undertake consultation and pre-crisis planning given the clearance and classification problems?

The contradiction between the political advantage (and at times necessity) of remaining vague and the operational need for greater definition is particularly challenging in a coalition environment with diverging national views. Through case studies and lessons learned in recent multinational interventions, project participants will propose how coalitions can work at crafting a comprehensive approach while taking into account the need for flexibility.

- What degree of coordinated multinational strategic planning is realistic? How specific will Nations be willing to get? How can the political need for ambiguity be reconciled with the comprehensive and effects-based approaches, which require more closely concerted action?

Civil-Military Planning

Because the success of an operation depends not on military victory but on the outcome of the stabilization and reconstruction phase, the military intervention is only one facet of a whole-of-government approach. This realization pleads for strong civilian input, and for many countries, lead, in two areas: first, in the determination of the overarching strategic goals – non-military and military – to be attained, and second, in planning post-conflict activities in close coordination with the military so as to avoid the “gaps” that create dangerous vulnerabilities. Generally speaking, intervening in crisis management and stability operations has proved challenging for civilian agencies.

- How can a rigorous and complicated military planning process be effectively interfaced with a diplomacy-based process that is essential and equally complex, but by nature very different?
- What are the main challenges?
- How deep are the “cultural” difficulties? Can they be overcome? Are there some “natural” partners who could serve a bridging function?

→ Are there similarities between military and development planning activities that serve as a basis for more concerted planning efforts? Are the U.S. Agency for International Development's Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART) a possible example of greater convergence between civil and military ways of doing business?

Many countries are in the process of reorganizing internally in order to better respond to crises with a whole-of-government approach. This is already creating difficulties at the national level and is even more challenging within a coalition. Moreover, the "integration" of civilian and military efforts, while highly contentious, may be feasible at the national level but is much harder to imagine in a coalition environment since there is no strategic "supra-national" decision-maker. The CSO project will focus above all on how to achieve better synergies between multinational, interagency planning

→ What are possible mechanisms for ongoing consultation and coordination of the various actors (major coalition partners, international, regional and sub-regional organizations, national administrations, NGOs) in their respective circles?

→ How appealing and viable is the three-tiered structure proposed in the body of the report?

→ What are the limits to be aware of?

Implementation of stability and crisis management operations

Conflict prevention

The benefits of treating potential crisis situations early and preventively widely recognized in terms of the potential savings in human and financial resources. Nonetheless, capitals generally tend to ignore latent crises until they require a military operation. The most difficult challenge relative to conflict prevention is thus probably that of focusing attention and resources on a volatile situation before it has reached critical or emergency levels.

In order to improve our common efforts in conflict prevention, concerned nations must think about *processes and mechanisms for consultation*, for *sharing of assessments* of the situation as well as *rapid early-warning signaling*.

→ How can these processes and mechanisms be set up? Would they be useful (namely in the absence of political will)?

→ What are the barriers to improved consultation and early-warning mechanisms? How can they be circumvented?

→ What is the role of international, multilateral and regional organizations with regards to consultations and early warning mechanisms?

Part of this section of the report discusses how stability operations require action in order to manage a number of interdependent domains and sets out a concept of how the military should conduct operations to meet stabilization and reconstruction objectives.

The objective of stability operations is to act against the logic of violence in order to win the peace. A new stability operations doctrine must combine two distinct operating modes – coercion and mastering violence – articulated along the same continuum of military actions. Mastering violence can be viewed as an effects-based approach to stability operations that constitutes part of the wider framework embodied in the comprehensive approach concept,

composed of all actions directed at crisis resolution in order to win the peace along a political, diplomatic, military and economic continuum.

Mastering violence in stability operations concerns actions in six different domains: control of space, control of populations, control of weapons, control of humanitarian emergencies, control of organized forces, and the restoration of community life.

→ Based on the descriptions contained in the body of the document, do these six domains seem like a useful way to think about stabilization? Are there other domains that could be added to the ones listed? How can civilian and military efforts best be melded in each of these areas?

→ What are the most salient difficulties to the successful mastering of violence in coalition operations?

Contemporary conflicts inevitably involve conflicts and competition over legitimacy, between belligerent parties, local authorities, armed factions, etc. They also create some competition of legitimacy among intervening actors, who are all seeking to promote their activities in the eyes of local, domestic and international public opinions.

→ How can coalitions minimize vulnerabilities that can lead to loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the local population?

→ What are the key elements to gaining and maintaining local legitimacy?

→ How can coalitions best manage the virtual dimension of operations through strategic communication and control of the psychological terrain?

Coalition stability operations therefore require a robust set of structures and processes in the theater of operations to enable civil-military sharing of information and coordination of activities. At the national or multinational levels, two generic models exist for achieving this objective: there is one with a unified civil-military authority in theater, and one of parallel “chains of command” between civilian and military contributors that require the cooperative establishment of structures and processes for information sharing and coordination.

→ How does the choice between either a unified civil-military authority or parallel chains of command impact the execution of stability operations?

→ How does the choice impact the implementation of a comprehensive approach?

→ What are the advantages and limitations of these models? Which seems most desirable in the context of coalition stability operations?

There is a need for more detailed examination of what civil-military planning and coordination structures and processes are best suited to different types of conflict prevention, crisis management, and stabilization environments, as well as of how better to ensure effective, collaborative relationships between civilian and military leaders of a non-hierarchical civil-military mission.

→ How can interactions between NGOs and national actors be optimized? How significant are the convergences and divergences in countries’ perspectives on this issue?

→ What are the advantages and drawbacks of other models, such as the PRTs in Afghanistan, the JIACGs that are in place within American regional combatant commands or the MNIG as discussed in MNE4?

→ How can the national and multinational civil-military coordination at the strategic, operational and tactical levels (comparison/evaluation of different models) be improved?

Transitions

Transitions encompass a wide variety of situations, from normality to crisis, from high intensity or coercion phases to a stabilizing one, from civilian to military lead and vice versa, from international to local authorities, or when spikes of violence unfold during the course of a stabilization phase. Transitions occur throughout any intervention – sometimes planned for and anticipated, sometimes entirely unexpected – and never fail to create vulnerabilities.

The transition from high-intensity combat or coercive actions to a stabilization phase, aimed progressively normalizing society, poses a number of difficulties. One of the main problems with this type of transition is the lack of civil resources and the subsequent “gaps” that can arise as a result of the time lag between the force’s initial entry and the establishment of a temporary civil authority.

- How can 4C mechanisms contribute to reducing these gaps?
- What are the requirements in terms of consultation and planning between intervening forces and international organizations to reduce vulnerabilities and lag times? What are the limitations?
- How can an intervening coalition disengage and hand over authority or responsibility to international or regional/sub-regional organizations or national governments?

Sudden changes on the ground pose particular challenges in any multinational operation in terms of consultation. Contributing countries may have different perceptions of unfolding events and different visions of how to deal with them. There is therefore an almost inevitable tension between the need to reach agreement regarding how to react and the urgent response that the situation requires.

- What are the requirements in terms of consultation, coordination, command and control in order to manage unexpected changes in situation?
- Is the “Contact Group” format satisfactory for handling these situations quickly and effectively?
- Sudden changes can expose vulnerabilities in coalition operations, since forces with different doctrines and approaches to stabilization may react differently; how can effective command and control be exercised best to face this type of difficulty?
- What are other challenges related to dealing with sudden changes in situation?